The debate in the Japanese Diet remained contentious this quarter as opposition parties challenged the Fukuda government on several legislative issues including the gasoline tax, a new health insurance program for the elderly, and host nation support for U.S. forces.  Fukuda’s approval rating fell suddenly due to public dissatisfaction with his domestic policy agenda but later rebounded enough to quell rumors of a Cabinet reshuffle prior to the Hokkaido G8 Summit in July.  The arrest in early April of a U.S. serviceman charged with murdering a taxi driver in Yokosuka brought negative publicity for U.S. forces.

Japanese anxieties also continued to mount as the U.S. prepared to lift terrorism-related sanctions on North Korea as part of the Six-Party Talks, despite earlier pledges that this would not be done without progress on the abductee issue.  President Bush did announce his intention to lift those sanctions on June 26, but his strong reaffirmation of support for Japan on the abductee issue helped to assuage some of the concerns in Tokyo.  It also helped that Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice stressed during the G8 foreign ministers meeting in Kyoto that the U.S. actions would be reversed if North Korea’s claims could not be verified; a message of reassurance Bush would likely echo and broaden during his visit to Japan in July.  All of this took place as the Japanese public paid close attention to the U.S. presidential race and as the candidates took their debate into the pages of Japanese newspapers.  Speculation also persisted about possible dissolution of the Diet and new elections in Japan sometime in the next year.

Rancor in Japanese domestic politics

The opposition parties continued to exploit their majority in the Upper House to slow down the Fukuda government’s legislative agenda.  The ruling coalition had to utilize its super majority in the Lower House to reinstate a controversial gasoline tax in May after the opposition refused to extend related legislation citing wasteful spending (proceeds were typically earmarked for pork barrel spending in the form of road construction) and the need to provide relief for consumers.  The opposition also refused to pass a special measures agreement renewing host nation support for U.S. forces in Japan, the first time an international agreement or treaty had been rejected by the Upper House under the current constitution.  The government was able to pass the legislation by taking advantage of its two-thirds majority and a constitutional provision allowing the Lower House to override results in the weaker chamber.

Prime Minister Fukuda was then blamed for a confusing new health insurance program for the elderly instituted April 1 – even though the plan was proposed and passed under the Koizumi administration back in 2006 – and also came under fire repeatedly for his failure to address pension reform in the wake of a scandal that surfaced in 2007 during the Abe administration when the government acknowledged having lost 50 million pension records.  The only hint at bipartisanship came in the form of the Basic Law for Space Activities, a bill authorizing the military use of space for defensive purposes which passed easily in both houses.  The legislation dictates the creation of a new Cabinet post dedicated to space policy – placing policy planning directly under the control of the prime minister – and emphasizes a shift away from research and development toward utilization and defense, with a possible focus on communications satellites or support for missile defense systems.  The government has already staffed the new space policy headquarters in the Prime Minister’s Office and expects to complete a draft master plan for development of new space systems by the end of the year.

Fukuda soldiers on

The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) pressured Prime Minister Fukuda relentlessly and generated momentum with victories in an April by-election in Yamaguchi Prefecture and in Okinawa Prefectural Assembly elections in June.  (The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) lost its majority in that chamber.)  The DPJ then upped the ante by passing a largely symbolic censure motion against Fukuda in the Upper House, though the government ignored the nonbinding measure and got a boost from a subsequent vote of confidence in the Lower House.  DPJ President Ozawa Ichiro continued his confident rhetoric in a June 1 interview with the Financial Times, stating that the “opposition party will take over power, which means the LDP will collapse and dissolve.” (Ozawa’s poll ratings are below Fukuda’s, but his party’s are higher.)

Fukuda stood firm despite an approval rating that dipped below 20 percent at one point but hovered around 25 percent at the end of the quarter based in large part on an ambitious diplomatic agenda that featured summit meetings with the leaders of South Korea, China, and Australia; trips to Europe for consultations with G8 member countries; the Tokyo International Conference on African Development, which included delegations from 51 African countries; and the upcoming G8 Summit where he hopes to gain consensus on climate change, rising commodity prices, development aid, and political issues including North Korea.  In June, Fukuda publicly dismissed the notion of a snap election and vowed to press on.  Speculation on the future persists but some pundits suggest that Fukuda could stay in power until constitutionally mandated elections in fall 2009, though a Cabinet reshuffle before the next Diet session in September is possible.

Concerns about the U.S.-Japan alliance but reassurance too

The arrest of a U.S. serviceman in April for allegedly murdering a taxi driver in Yokosuka renewed public concerns about the presence of the U.S. military in Japan and prompted the U.S. Navy to introduce a curfew at Yokosuka naval base and conduct background checks on all 20,000 personnel stationed in Japan.  The U.S. Navy also published a comic book to ease concerns about the impending arrival of the USS George Washington, a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, in Yokosuka later this summer.  Increased scrutiny of alliance matters also pertained to a 2006 agreement concerning the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan, designed to reduce the burden on the Japanese public but held up by disputes over cost and the desire of local governments to revise it.  Former Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Asia-Pacific Affairs Richard Lawless, in a May 22 interview with Asahi Shimbun, focused on the realignment issue to express concern about drift in the alliance.  U.S. Ambassador to Japan Thomas Schieffer called on Japan to increase defense spending that same week in a speech to the Foreign Press Club in Tokyo, perhaps signaling consternation in Washington after the prolonged debate over host nation support.  Defense Secretary Robert Gates and Defense Minister Ishiba Shigeru accentuated the positive in respective speeches at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore at the end of May and confirmed in a meeting there that the two governments would work toward the steady implementation of the realignment plan. Gates also thanked Japan for its renewed participation in Operation Enduring Freedom, though the mission is scheduled to expire in January 2009 and could be a subject of heated debate in the Diet this fall.

The question of what Japan should do next on security quietly consumed officials in Tokyo this quarter.  U.S. and coalition governments hope for a new Japanese contribution in Afghanistan that has operational and not just symbolic significance.  That probably means helicopters or boots on the ground – both of which the coalition desperately needs even in noncombat roles that Japanese forces could constitutionally fill.  However, the political impasse in Tokyo would make the necessary legislation for such a high risk deployment difficult at best.  Some leading Japanese politicians hoped that it would be enough to transfer the C-130s now operating in Iraq to Afghanistan, but that would be seen as a net loss in capabilities by the coalition, since the transport need in Afghanistan is not for fixed wing aircraft.  Nor is the expectations game likely to get any easier for Japan after the U.S. election, since both John McCain and Barack Obama have been clear about the need to increase overall efforts in Afghanistan.  The Fukuda government appears ready to use its two-thirds majority again next year to reauthorize the deployment of refueling operations in the Indian Ocean in support of Operation Enduring Freedom, since the government succeeded in doing so this year.  However, some political observers worry that the LDP’s coalition partner Komeito (Clean Government Party) might lose its nerve since its members will be going into local elections in Tokyo next summer where the support of pacifist grass roots organizations is critical.

In the face of new doubts about Japanese political will, the Fukuda government did take some steps that show continued readiness to step up in international crises despite the political challenges at home.  Japan dispatched disaster relief teams to Burma and China in response to natural disasters; announced it would consider sending Self Defense Force (SDF) troops to Afghanistan; and agreed to send SDF forces to Sudan later this year in support of UN peacekeeping efforts.  Japan was also ready to send the SDF to China in response to the earthquake, but the Chinese side pulled back.  (See the Japan-China section of this quarter’s report for details.)

The wild card: North Korea policy

Much of the diplomacy between the two governments this quarter was dedicated to the Six-Party Talks on North Korea’s nuclear programs.  Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs William Burns, Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte, and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice all visited Japan over the course of the quarter to engage in strategic dialogue on North Korea and reiterate concern about the fate of Japanese abductees.  When North Korea finally delivered a declaration concerning its nuclear program on June 26, media coverage in Japan pointed largely to questions of U.S. credibility rather than a breakthrough in multilateral diplomacy.  President Bush’s decision to take steps toward removing North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism and remove some sanctions under the spirit of “action for action” in the Six-Party Talks was viewed widely in Japan as a policy shift away from a commitment to Japan on the abductees in favor of a bad deal.  The narrow focus on plutonium production and the exclusion of key factors including the number of nuclear weapons in North Korea’s possession, details on the highly enriched uranium program, and information on proliferation activities were deemed worrisome in Japanese commentary on the decision.

The Japanese government’s response was reserved, emphasizing the verification of North Korean claims and close coordination with the U.S. on the abduction issue.  Japanese media editorials expressed a general sense of frustration with the deal ranging from factual to emotional; a Nikkei Shimbun editorial on June 27 declared a crisis that could possibly break the foundation of the U.S.-Japan alliance and also noted that without shared threat perception the bilateral security treaty is close to a scrap of paper.  Secretary Rice tried to allay concerns by arguing repeatedly during her visit to Kyoto for the G8 foreign ministers meeting that the U.S. would reverse its decision if North Korean claims could not be verified, but it appeared President Bush would travel to Japan in July with his work cut out for him. Bush’s press conference on the sanctions-lifting helped at least reassure the Japanese public of his strong personal commitment to standing with Japan on the abductee issue, particularly after his 2006 meeting in the Oval Office with the family of Megumi Yokota, the most famous of the innocent people taken by North Korea.

Looking toward elections

While various developments this quarter tested the two governments and raised public awareness of critical issues facing the alliance, persistent rumors of a snap election in Japan and an intensifying U.S. presidential election also focused attention on what might lie ahead.  As noted above, Fukuda survived a barrage of attacks by the DPJ and vowed to stay in power beyond the G8 Summit in July.  Talk of a snap election later this year has died down; a Cabinet reshuffle, perhaps with a new prime minister, might occur over the summer.  It is equally likely that Fukuda will remain in office through next year to greet the new U.S. president.  DPJ President Ozawa spoke frequently of the need for a more “equal” alliance, though the concept remained largely undefined.

A Pew Global Attitudes survey released in June found that 83 percent of the Japanese public was following the U.S. presidential campaign somewhat or very closely (compared to 82 percent of Americans!!).  Sen. McCain and Sen. Joseph Lieberman articulated a vision for the U.S.-Japan alliance in a Wall Street Journal op-ed piece reprinted in the Yomiuri Shimbun on May 28 entitled, “Putting our Allies First.”  The article listed several priorities such as coordination on North Korea policy including the abduction issue, the North Korean ballistic missile program, and its human rights record; continued engagement with China; support for free trade; and an alliance based on common values.  The Obama campaign followed suit with an article by Richard Danzig and Joseph Nye entitled, “Barack Obama and U.S.-Japan Relations”, published in the Asahi Shimbun on June 28.  This article also noted common values and interests and listed priorities including support for the reconstruction of Afghanistan; continued diplomacy with North Korea through the Six-Party Talks; cooperation in humanitarian relief efforts, climate change policy, and health issues such as avian flu; and bilateral and regional trade.  Both candidates responded to the North Korean nuclear declaration with caution, citing the importance of verification and the need to re-impose sanctions should that process prove unsatisfactory.

The next three months

Prime Minister Fukuda will hope for a productive G8 Summit to bolster his leadership credentials, particularly in the area of climate change.  The Bush-Fukuda meeting on the margins of the G8 Summit will prove important in light of Japanese concerns about North Korea policy and the potential for drift as the U.S. presidential campaign heats up in the coming months.  Both governments will pay close attention to how China handles the Olympics in August.  Acrimony in Japanese domestic politics should resurface in September as a special Diet session grapples with domestic policy and the fate of legislation authorizing Japan’s support for Operation Enduring Freedom.  The Six-Party Talks will likely continue to top the diplomatic agenda for both governments.