China-ASEAN Relations:
China Consolidates Its Long-term Bilateral Relations with Southeast Asia

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During the second quarter, China further consolidated its bilateral relations with Southeast Asia by signing four new long-term cooperation agreements with Myanmar, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Singapore. China also reinforced bilateral relations by exchanging high-level delegations with Singapore, the Philippines, and Myanmar, and several regional states joined with China to celebrate milestone anniversaries marking the establishment of diplomatic relations. Discussions on territorial disputes in the South China Sea continued without resolution, while Chinese and Vietnamese leaders expressed concern over the slow pace of negotiations over delineation of the Gulf of Tonkin. A new dimension was added to China’s relations with ASEAN states--the inauguration for the first time of direct party-to-party ties between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and governing parties in non-socialist states. China also reinforced its ideological relations with Vietnam and Laos, its military ties with Thailand, and reportedly increased its military support for Myanmar.

Long-term Cooperation Agreements

In 1999, China negotiated long-term agreements on cooperation with Vietnam, Thailand, Brunei, and Malaysia. During the second quarter of 2000, China expanded this list to eight with the inclusion of Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Myanmar. Only Cambodia and Laos have yet to reach similar agreements with Beijing.

The four long-term agreements are joint statements signed by respective foreign ministers. These statements affirm that bilateral relations will be based on the basic norms found in the UN Charter, Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, and international law. The PRC-Singapore statement omits any reference to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and the basic norms of international law, while the PRC-Indonesia statement includes a reference to the ten principles of the Bandung Conference.

All four documents, while reflecting the specific nature of bilateral relations, also contain several areas of similarity. For example, all four call for frequent high-level exchanges and regular consultations between foreign ministries. The PRC-Singapore and PRC-Philippines statements make provision for annual consultations between foreign ministries. The PRC-Myanmar joint statement is less specific, while the PRC-Indonesia joint statement calls for regular consultations between foreign ministers. All four joint statements call for “high-level exchanges” (Indonesia...
and the Philippines) or exchanges by “top leaders” (Singapore and Myanmar). All four joint statements also contain a paragraph acknowledging support for a “one-China” policy, although the wording in each varies slightly. If note, the PRC-Myanmar statement reads “The Chinese side reaffirms its respect for the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Myanmar.” The PRC-Indonesia joint statement contains the further elaboration: “The Chinese side holds that Indonesia’s stability, integrity, and prosperity are conducive to peace and development in the region, and supports the Indonesian Government in its efforts to maintain national unity and territorial integrity and to facilitate ethnic reconciliation and promote harmony in the country on the basis of equality.”

All four joint statements include the pledge to consult and cooperate in various multilateral forums including ASEAN, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN+3, and the United Nations. With the exception of the PRC-Myanmar joint statement, the other three include Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), and the World Trade Organization (WTO). Only the PRC-Indonesia joint statement includes the Non-Aligned Movement, while the PRC-Myanmar statement includes quadrangular cooperation (China, Laos, Myanmar, and Thailand) and cooperation among the Mekong states (Cambodia, China, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam).

The four joint statements differ in some significant aspects. For example, both the PRC-Singapore and PRC-Philippines joint statements include a major paragraph on defense cooperation. The former states: “Both sides will promote security cooperation by facilitating exchange of high-level visits, dialogue between defense institutions, cooperation between their strategic security research institutes, [and] exchanges between professional groups of their armed forces and exchange of port calls.” The latter declares: “The two sides agree to make further exchanges and cooperation in the defense and military fields, strengthen consultations between their military and defense personnel and diplomatic officials on security issues, to include exchanges between their military establishments on matters relating to humanitarian rescue and assistance, disaster relief and mitigation, and enhance cooperation between their respective strategic and security research institutes.” Prior to General Maung Aye’s visit to Beijing, Myanmar TV reported that military cooperation would be discussed yet no reference was made to such cooperation in the official commentary of his visit or in the PRC-Myanmar joint statement.

The subject of human rights was raised in joint statements between the PRC and Indonesia and the PRC and the Philippines. The PRC-Indonesia declaration read: “The two sides reaffirm their position that both the principle of universality of human rights and the national particularities of each country, including its cultural background, should be respected… They maintain that human rights issues must not be solved at the expense of the principles of state sovereignty and sovereign equality among nations or in contravention or violation of the principles on which the United Nations itself was founded.” The PRC-Philippines joint statement also included recognition of “the universality of human rights taking into account their distinct culture, tradition, and practices.”
The PRC-Indonesia joint statement was the only one to mention weapons of mass destruction. Point 13 declared: “The two sides agree that the Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM) treaty and the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone play an important role in maintaining international peace, security, and strategic stability. The two sides support the endeavors of forging a universal and effective compliance with the implementation of the provisions of bilateral as well as multilateral agreements on disarmament, disarmament of weapons of mass destruction in particular. Failure to comply with these treaties will only threaten regional and global peace and stability.” The PRC-Philippines joint statement was the only one to include mention of territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Each joint statement spelled out specific areas of cooperation based on the state of bilateral relations.

**High-Level Visits**

**Singapore.** Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong paid an official visit to China at the invitation of Premier Zhu Rongji from April 9-20. In Beijing, Goh held talks with Premier Zhu, President Jiang Zemin, Vice President Hu Jintao, and Li Ruihuan, Chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). On April 11, Foreign Ministers Jayakumar and Tang Jiaxuan signed the Joint Statement of Bilateral Cooperation between their two governments.

Discussions between Prime Minister Goh and Premier Zhu focused on potential new areas of cooperation including trade, finance, information technology, and telecommunications. They also discussed the reform of state owned enterprises and housing. Singapore’s involvement in the development of China’s western provinces was a prominent theme in Goh’s discussions with Premier Zhu and other Chinese leaders. President Jiang stated that Singapore was a major component of China’s relations with Southeast Asia and that bilateral relations were characterized by “sound momentum, close contacts, mutually beneficial cooperation.”

Goh’s visit was nearly a month after the election of Chen Shui-bian as President of Taiwan. Chinese officials used the occasion of every high-level visit during this period to spell out China’s policy toward Taiwan and to elicit a reaffirmation of support for the “one-China” policy from visiting guests. Goh stated that Singapore viewed the Taiwan issue as a Chinese domestic matter.

**Philippines.** President Joseph Estrada made a state visit to China from May 16-20, despite an increase in Moro Islamic Liberation Front violence in Mindanao and a hostage crisis triggered by Abu Sayyaf rebels on the eve of his departure. Estrada was accompanied by 120 businessmen. In Beijing, Estrada held talks with President Jiang, Premier Zhu, Vice President Hu, and Li Peng, Chairman of the National People’s Congress. In meetings with Jiang and Zhu, Estrada reaffirmed the Philippines’ commitment to the one-China policy.

According to President Estrada, Manila received reassurances never given before by China to Filipino leaders, adding that “President Jiang Zemin assured me that China does not pose a threat to the Philippines.” According to Estrada, the Spratly Islands were recognized as “the only
existing difficult question between our two countries.” He also stated, “Importantly, I received Chinese reassurance that the matter should be resolved peacefully and in accordance with international law. We agreed not to take actions that might complicate or escalate the situation.”

Myanmar. The second quarter was marked by two Chinese ministerial visits to Myanmar and the official visit of General Maung Aye, Vice Chairman of the SPDC, to China at the invitation of PRC Vice President Hu Jintao to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations on June 8, 1950. Vice President Hu told his guest that the further promotion of good-neighborly and cooperative relations between China and Myanmar is an important part of China’s diplomacy concerning its surrounding areas. “We are satisfied with the smooth development of Sino-Myanmarese relations,” Hu said. Maung Aye replied that Myanmar is willing to work with China to develop their relations in the 21st century. Myanmar hoped to maintain high-level visits, expand economic and trade cooperation, implement a border management agreement, and intensify anti-drug cooperation. Maung Aye also reiterated Myanmar’s support for the “one-China” policy. Premier Zhu raised the issue of combating drug smuggling along their common border. Maung Aye stated that Myanmar wanted to follow China’s lead over reforms and opening up to the outside world.

Territorial Disputes

South China Sea. During the second quarter, the Philippines continued to press China on a Code of Conduct for the South China Sea. In mid-April, for example, Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary Domingo Siazon raised the South China Sea dispute at the meeting of Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) Foreign Ministers in Cartegena, Colombia. The NAM endorsed the establishment of a Code of Conduct and the resolution of sovereignty and territorial disputes in the South China Sea by peaceful means without resorting to force and/or threat of force. It also endorsed on-going bilateral and multilateral consultations among the parties concerned at the inter-governmental level, the ASEAN-China dialogue, regular exchanges in the ARF, and the informal Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea.

The South China Sea Code of Conduct was discussed at the sixth China-ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting in Kuching, Malaysia from April 25-26. This meeting agreed to speed up the drafting of the code. On May 26, a drafting committee for a Code of Conduct for the South China Sea, comprised of Chinese and Thai officials, met in Kuala Lumpur with no discernable progress.

Territorial disputes in the South China Sea also featured in discussions during President Estrada’s state visit to China in May. On May 16, China’s Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan and Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs Domingo Siazon agreed in a joint statement on bilateral relations to promote the peaceful settlement of disputes through bilateral friendly consultations and negotiations under international law, including the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). They also reaffirmed their adherence to the 1995 joint statement on the South China Sea and agreed not to take actions that might complicate or escalate the situation. Finally, they reiterated their commitment to the formulation and adoption of a regional South China Sea Code of Conduct.
The upbeat tenor of Chinese-Philippines discussions on the South China Sea was marred on May 26, immediately after President Estrada’s visit to China, when a Philippines’ naval vessel fired upon and killed the captain of a Chinese fishing boat. The boat was spotted poaching turtles eight kilometers from Palawan island in Philippine territorial waters. Philippines officials claimed that they had been fired upon by the Chinese crew first. The Chinese Ambassador Fu Ying reported to the contrary and delivered a *note verbale* to the Philippines’ Foreign Ministry demanding the release of the crew and their vessel, the body of the slain captain, and compensation. The Philippines complied with all requests except the claim for compensation. On May 30, Chinese Foreign Ministry warned that bilateral ties could suffer if the Philippines did not agree to compensation.

China then downplayed the incident as an isolated one. The Chinese Embassy acknowledged that its fishermen were clearly encroaching on Philippine waters. Ambassador Fu was quoted as stating that “(turtle poaching) needs to be verified. If indeed they fish turtle, they will face punishment in China, too.” The Chinese fishermen were released and arrived back in China on June 4. In the meantime, the Chinese Foreign Ministry announced that it would make further representations on their claim for compensation.

Meanwhile, Sino-Vietnamese negotiations on maritime issues in the South China Sea bogged down. On May 11, at the conclusion of the thirteenth round of talks, Vietnam announced that no progress had been achieved. Both sides expressed concern at the slow pace of talks and agreed to continue discussions on the possibility of cooperation in hydrology and meteorology.

*Tonkin Gulf*. Nong Duc Manh, Chairman of Vietnam’s National Assembly, paid an official visit to China from April 4-10. Discussions centered on the 1999 Land Border Treaty and current negotiations on the delineation of territory in the Gulf of Tonkin. Manh also met with President Jiang. On April 29, China’s National People’s Congress Standing Committee ratified the border treaty. Vietnam’s National Assembly followed suit in June. As for the territorial dispute in the Tonkin Gulf, Manh told President Jiang: “We believe that with the continued efforts of both sides, the issue of delimiting a boundary line in [the Gulf of Tonkin] can surely be settled properly [in 2000].” Jiang agreed.

The following month Deputy Prime Minister Nguyen Manh Cam attended a conference in Shanghai and used the occasion to hold discussions with Premier Zhu Rongji on territorial disputes. On May 10, Zhu expressed the hope that both sides would exchange documents as quickly as possible to permit the start of demarcation work along the land border. Zhu called for the two countries to speed up negotiations to sign an agreement on delineation of the Gulf of Tonkin before the end of the year. Cam promised that Vietnam would do its best to accelerate negotiations. A similar note was sounded at the conclusion of the fourteenth meeting of the joint working group on the delineation of the Gulf of Tonkin that met in Beijing from June 26-29.

**Party-to-Party Relations**
During the second quarter, in a new development, delegations representing the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) visited Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore to establish formal party-to-party ties with political parties in these countries. According to the CCP, such party-to-party ties will be based on four principles: independence, complete equality, mutual respect, and non-interference in each other’s internal affairs.

A CCP delegation led by Dai Bingguo, a member of the CCP Central Committee and head of the Central Committee’s International Department, paid a five-day visit to Thailand from April 3-7 at the invitation of Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan. Press reports indicated that this was the first official visit by a CCP delegation to Thailand. The Chinese party delegation met with Prime Minister Chuan Likphai and leaders of the Chart Thai, Democratic, Chart Pattana, New Aspiration, and Thai Rak Thai parties. In May, Ma Wenpu, the deputy head of the CCP Central Committee’s International Department, attended the 54th General Assembly of the United Malays National Organization in Kuala Lumpur.

Contact between the CCP and political parties in Indonesia was inaugurated in May with the visit to China by a delegation of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle, led by former General Secretary Alexander Litaay. Litaay discussed cooperation and an exchange program with Wei Jianxing, a member of the Standing Committee of the CCP Politburo. Wei received a delegation of Indonesia’s Party of Functional Groups (GOLKAR) in late May and a delegation of leaders of Indonesian Islamic parties in June. Discussion also focused on cooperation and exchange visits. Finally, contact between the CCP and Singapore’s People’s Action Party (PAP) was inaugurated with the visit to Beijing of a PAP delegation from May 19-26. The PAP delegation met with Wei to discuss contacts and exchanges.

**Chinese Support for Laos and Vietnam**

During this quarter, Laos continued to experience civil unrest by armed Hmong ethnic minorities. In addition, unknown perpetrators set off five or more explosions in Vientiane and Pakse. According to press reports, Lao hardliners sought and received Chinese military and economic assistance. According to the *Far Eastern Economic Review*, China supports the political status quo in Laos because it faces the same pressures for political change. It is in this context that the following visits by party and military delegations takes on significance. A CCP “goodwill delegation,” led by Politburo member Huang Ju, visited Laos from May 26-29 for an exchange of views with the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party on party affairs, government management, and socio-economic development. On June 30, Duang Chai, the Chief of the Lao People’s Army General Staff, visited Beijing to hold discussions with Fu Quanyou, Chief of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) General Staff. Duang Chai also met with Defense Minister Chi Haotian.

During the second quarter China and Vietnam firmed up their already close bilateral political and ideological relations. For example, one of the purposes of Nong Duc Manh’s April visit to Beijing was “to promote exchanges and to learn from each other’s experiences.” The ideological affinity between the two socialist states became more apparent in June when the Chinese
Academy of Social Sciences hosted a theoretical seminar in Beijing on economic reform. The meeting was reportedly held at the request of Le Kha Phieu, General Secretary of the Vietnam Communist Party (VCP). The seminar was attended by a sixteen person delegation from Vietnam led by VCP Politburo member Nguyen Duc Binh, who also held separate discussions with Vice President Hu.

**Chinese Military Relations with the Region**

**Thailand.** During this quarter Thailand dispatched two high-level delegations to China. The first was led by General Surayut Chulanont, Thai Army Commander-in-Chief, who visited China in May at the invitation of the PLA General Staff Headquarters. Talks were held between General Surayut and Qian Shugen, Deputy Chief of the PLA General Staff, on “international and regional issues as well as on bilateral ties.” Surayut also met with Fu Quanyou, Chief of the PLA General Staff and member of the Central Military Commission, and with Zhang Wannian, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission. At both meetings the subject of Taiwan and Chinese threats to use force were raised. In late May, General Mongkon Ampornpisit, Supreme Commander of the Thai Armed Forces, visited Beijing. He held separate talks with Fu Quanyou and Defense Minister Chi Haotian. Both discussions featured bilateral military exchanges and the Taiwan issue.

**Myanmar.** During May there were several unconfirmed reports that China had stepped up its military assistance to Myanmar. Lt. General Tin Oo, Myanmar’s Army Chief of Staff, reportedly made an unpublicized visit to China to arrange new arms purchases. The Democratic Voice of Myanmar (Oslo) reported that two PLA delegations visited the Coastal Regional Command from May 2-5. According to this source, China agreed to provide technical assistance and military equipment to move the Mawyawadi Naval Base from Moulmein to Heinle, and to construct field maritime surveillance stations along the Tenasserim coast. A subsequent Democratic Voice of Myanmar broadcast reported that Chinese experts will install a maritime surveillance radar station and advanced radar systems (Global Positioning System and Global Information System) in the Tenasserim Division.

**Chronology of China-ASEAN Relations**

**April-June 2000**

**Apr. 1, 2000:** Secretary General of the Thailand’s House of Representatives visits China.

**Apr. 3-7, 2000:** A delegation of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) pays a five-day visit to Thailand at the invitation of Foreign Minister Surin.

**Apr. 4-6, 2000:** Chinese Minister of Agriculture pays a goodwill visit to Myanmar, signs two Memorandums of Understanding (MOU) dealing with cooperation in the agricultural sector and the exchange of technology.
Apr. 4-10, 2000: Nong Duc Manh, Chairman of Vietnam’s National Assembly, pays an official visit to China.

Apr. 6, 2000: Prime Minister Go Chok Tong reiterates Singapore’s commitment to a “one-China” policy.

Apr. 9-20, 2000: Prime Minister Go Chok Tong visits China, signs Joint Statement of Bilateral Cooperation.

Apr. 11, 2000: Malaysia and China sign an agreement concluding negotiations on bilateral market access in the context of China’s accession to the World Trade Organization.

Apr. 11-13, 2000: General Fu Quanyou, PLA Chief of the General Staff, make a two-day stopover in Bangkok.

Apr. 12, 2000: Second ASEAN Business Summit is held in Kuala Lumpur. China’s Foreign Trade Minister attends.

Apr. 13, 2000: Indonesia’s President Abdurrahman Wahid and China’s President Jiang Zemin exchange congratulatory messages on the fiftieth anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations.

Apr. 13, 2000: China’s Vice Premier Li Lanqing, attending the South Summit in Havana, meets separately with Vietnamese President Tran Duc Luong and Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir.

Apr. 15, 2000: Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary Domingo Siazon raises the South China Sea dispute at the meeting of Non-Aligned Movement Foreign Ministers in Cartegena, Colombia.

Apr. 17-26, 2000: Vietnam’s Minister of Education and Training visits China and signs a cooperation agreement for 2002-2004 with China’s Minister of Education.

Apr. 19, 2000: Tran Van Tuan, Chairman of the Hanoi People’s Council, visits China.

Apr. 19-20, 2000: Governments of China, Laos, Myanmar, and Thailand sign an agreement on commercial navigation on the Lancang-Mekong River that will come into force in 2001. Fourteen ports (four in China, six in Laos, 2 each in Myanmar and Thailand) will be opened.

Apr. 20-21, 2000: The Seventh China-ASEAN Dialogue is held in Beijing.

Apr. 21-27, 2000: Cambodian Minister for Information Lu Laysreng visits China.

Apr. 22-29, 2000: Singapore’s Trade and Industry Minister George Yeo visits China.

Apr. 25, 2000: Cambodia’s Prince Norodom Sirivudh, Senior Advisor to the King, visits China.
Apr. 25-26, 2000: The Sixth China-ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting is held in Kuching, Malaysia.


May 1, 2000: Meeting of the ASEAN Economic Ministers and the Trade Ministers of China, Japan, and South Korea held in Yangon.

May 2, 2000: President Jiang Zemin and Prime Minister Zhu Rongji offer condolences to Vietnam on the death of former Prime Minister Pham Van Dong.

May 3-5, 2000: China’s Minister for Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation makes three-day official visit to Myanmar.

May 8-11, 2000: Indonesia’s Foreign Minister Alwi Shihab pays an official visit to China, signs a Joint Statement on the Future Direction of Bilateral Cooperation.

May 8-12, 2000: Lin Hsiang-neng, Chairman of Taiwan’s Council of Agriculture, visits Vietnam to promote agricultural exchanges.


May 9-10, 2000: The Vietnam-China joint working group on maritime issues holds the 5th round of talks in Hanoi.

May 9-11, 2000: Philippine Foreign Minister Domingo Siazon pays working visit to China to prepare for the visit of President Estrada.


May 11, 2000: Senior Officials representing the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) meet in Seoul to plan for the Third ASEM Summit scheduled for October 20-21.

May 11, 2000: Chinese and Vietnamese experts meeting in Hanoi hold the 13th round of talks on maritime issues.

May 17, 2000: General Surayut Chulanont, Thai Army Commander-in-Chief, visits China.

May 19, 2000: Vietnam’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs declares Vietnam has repeatedly affirmed its unquestionable sovereignty over the Spratly and Paracel archipelagoes, and calls for efforts to adopt a Code of Conduct for the South China Sea.


May 23, 2000: Lt. Gen. Tin Oo, Myanmar’s Army Chief of Staff, reportedly makes an unpublicized visit to China to arrange new arms purchases.

May 25, 2000: Moneakseka Khmer, a newspaper which reflects the views of the Sam Rainsy Party, criticizes China for its policy on the international tribunal to try Khmer Rouge leaders and calls China’s policy interference in Cambodia’s internal affairs.

May 26, 2000: The captain of a Chinese fishing boat in Philippine territorial waters is killed in a gunfight with pursuing Philippines’ Coast Guard and maritime police eight kilometers from Rizal town, Palawan island.

May 26, 2000: Drafting Committee on Code of Conduct for South China Sea, comprised of Thai and Chinese officials, meets in Kuala Lumpur.


Jun. 2, 2000: Chinese Embassy Counselor visits the Thai Foreign Ministry to discuss the invitation to former Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui to visit Thailand.


Jun. 5-12, 2000: Myanmar General Maung Aye pays official visit to China to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations on June 8, 1950. Foreign Ministers sign a joint statement on the Framework of Future Bilateral Relations and Cooperation.

Jun. 9, 2000: 25th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the Philippines.

Jun. 9, 2000: In response to the declaration of independence issued by the Papua National Congress, the Chinese government reiterates its support of efforts made by the Indonesian government to safeguard sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national unification.

Jun. 11-14, 2000: Singapore’s Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew makes a working visit to China.

Jun. 12, 2000: An agreement on economic and technological cooperation between Vietnam and China is signed in Beijing.

Jun. 12, 2000: An Indonesian delegation of leaders of Islamic parties visits China.

Jun. 19, 2000: Singapore’s Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Tony Tan Keng Yam visits Taiwan.

Jun. 26-29, 2000: Former Thai Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun visits China to commemorate the 25th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations.


Jun. 27-30, 2000: Vice Chairman of the Standing Committee of China’s National People’s Congress, pays an official friendly visit to Cambodia.


Jun. 30, 2000: Philippines’ Armed Forces Western Command reports that seven Chinese fishing boats have been spotted near Second Thomas Shoal and three others near Pagasa, Lawak, and Patag Islands.

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