Slowly but surely, the Bush administration’s Asia policy is taking shape and, as expected, it shows a great deal of continuity despite some changes in emphasis and approach. Sino-U.S. relations are gradually recovering from the tailspin generated by the EP-3 collision and President Bush’s comments about doing “whatever it took” to help Taiwan defend itself. The completion of the administration’s Korea policy review resulted in a renewed U.S. commitment to support the ROK’s Sunshine Policy, and the U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework, plus a willingness to engage in serious discussions with Pyongyang on a broad agenda, including a resumption of missile talks. While Bush had been criticized for not being supportive enough toward an Asian ally during his Washington meeting with ROK President Kim Dae-jung last quarter, his shirt-sleeve summit this quarter with Japan’s Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro was criticized for brushing too much under the rug as the two agreed on just about everything. The two leaders did, however, set the stage for deeper cooperation between Tokyo and Washington on strategic as well as on economic issues. Meanwhile, administration policy regarding regional multilateral initiatives, while not fully clear, is also beginning slowly to emerge.

Emerging Asia Policy

Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs James Kelly provided the administration’s most detailed description of its Asia policy to date in testimony before the House Committee on International Relations’ East Asia and Pacific Subcommittee on June 12. Kelly (who we should note, in the spirit of full disclosure, was formerly president of the Pacific Forum) identified China’s emergence as a regional and global power, Indonesia’s ongoing efforts at democratic transformation, Japan’s struggle with economic reform, and the situation on the Korean Peninsula as areas where the U.S. was “working hard to encourage the most positive outcomes,” even while cautioning that “our ability to influence events in these four areas varies widely.”

Kelly described the Asia Pacific region as one of “enormous economic opportunity” but also cautioned that many unresolved economic problems remained in the wake of the devastating 1997-98 Asia financial crisis. The administration would be working to promote further economic reform and reduce or eliminate unfair obstacles to U.S. exports, while pursuing free trade agreements with willing partners such as Singapore. He also noted that “regional consciousness – a collective sense of identification and common cause – remains relatively undeveloped” but noted positive movement brought
about by the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN), the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).

Not surprisingly, Kelly also underscored the administration’s intention “to nurture our key bilateral relationships in the region and make them even better,” citing the U.S. military and diplomatic presence as “a crucial element of stability.” While maintaining alliance relationships is central to U.S. East Asia strategy, the U.S. also seeks “a constructive relationship with China that contributes to the promotion of our shared interests in peace, stability, and prosperity in the region.”

Another Asia policy development of note during the past quarter centers on press reports of an impending “strategic shift” in the Pentagon from its traditional Euro-centric approach to one focused more on Asia. Such reports appear, at best, to be premature. While a few independent studies (among over a dozen reportedly commissioned by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld) have recommended that more attention be paid to Asia, no decisions have yet been made and Rumsfeld has assured America’s NATO allies that there will be no lessening of U.S. interest in or commitment to Europe.

U.S.-China Relations: Recovering from the Tailspin

Everyone expected the first few months of the Bush administration would be tough for Sino-U.S. relations: a decision was due on U.S. arms sales to Taiwan; Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian was seeking overnight stays in the U.S. on his way to and from Central America while his predecessor, Lee Tung-hui, had another trip planned to his alma mater, Cornell University; the delay in China’s accession to the WTO meant another potential congressional challenge to Beijing’s “normal trade relations” status; and President Bush’s anticipated decision to push forward with national missile defense (NMD) was sure to increase Beijing’s paranoia regarding Washington’s true intentions toward China. Add to this the desire by some on the American right and left for Washington to actively seek to block Beijing’s 2008 Olympics bid and a rise in tensions appeared inevitable.

Added to this predictable list of sore points was the unanticipated April 1 collision between a U.S. Navy surveillance aircraft and a Chinese fighter jet over the South China Sea, which resulted in the loss of the Chinese pilot and aircraft and the emergency landing and subsequent 11-day detention of the U.S. aircrew on China’s Hainan Island. Both sides initially took “hard line” positions, which made the resolution of the incident more difficult. On balance, however, the Bush administration deserved high marks for defusing the situation and meeting Beijing more than half way. China also accepted less than initially demanded and now appears intent to proclaim the incident “over and behind us,” especially after reaching a compromise that allowed the EP-3 to be partially disassembled and flown out of China in two Russian transport aircraft. However, a considerable amount of ill-will was generated by the incident, especially within the respective defense establishments, and this is sure to have a lingering impact on U.S.-China relations.
Another event with potential long-lasting impact was President Bush’s April 25 remarks
that his administration was prepared to do “whatever it took” to help Taiwan defend
itself. Senior administration officials, including the president himself, were quick to take
to the airwaves to proclaim that there had been no change in the U.S. “one China” policy.
Nonetheless, to many in Beijing, it confirmed deep suspicions about Bush’s true
intentions. Taiwan officials, already delighted by Bush’s victory, were further heartened
by Bush’s initial comment. The concern in Beijing and elsewhere (including
Washington) was that Taipei would also be emboldened by these remarks, hence the
perceived need for Bush’s caveats.

This event stimulated the debate over Washington’s historic policy of “strategic
ambiguity” when it comes to cross-Strait intervention. A Pacific Forum survey of its
PacNet readers revealed that 57 percent of respondents believed that the current policy of
strategic ambiguity should be retained, while 40 percent favored greater clarity regarding
U.S. intentions in the event of cross-Strait hostility. (Among Taiwan respondents, the
numbers were essentially reversed.) Of note, 85 percent of respondents argued that the
U.S. should not oppose Beijing’s Olympics bid, thereby underscoring the wisdom of the
Bush administration’s recent decision to remain neutral on this issue. (For survey
results, see PacNet 27.)

Missile Defense: Dialogue Welcome . . . and Needed

President Bush’s announcement on May 1 that the U.S. was committed to pursuing a
missile defense system added additional strains not only to Sino-U.S. relations but to
Washington’s ties with many of its longtime allies. Bush announced that “deterrence can
no longer be based solely on the threat of nuclear retaliation,” further arguing that
“defenses can strengthen deterrence by reducing the incentive for proliferation.” As a
result, Bush said the Defense Department was examining “near-term options that could
allow us to deploy an initial capability against limited threats,” stating unequivocally that
“when ready, and working with Congress, we will deploy missile defenses to strengthen
global security and stability.” President Bush also promised “real consultations” in
determining what America’s future missile defense system would look like. “We are not
presenting our friends and allies with unilateral decisions already made,” Bush asserted,
underscoring his willingness to take the concerns of others into account.

There appeared to be a dual message in Bush’s announcement. First, to those who were
intent on convincing Washington that missile defense was a bad idea or impossible dream
that should be abandoned, the message was, simply stated, “save your breath.” The U.S.
was going to have some form of missile defense; the “will we or won’t we” debate was
over. But Bush was also saying that the form of missile defense to be pursued had not
been determined and that he was willing to listen to, and to factor in to the final system
design, the concerns of those most affected by this decision. To underscore this point, he
sent high-ranking teams to Asia and Europe to discuss the issue and collect feedback.

The decision to pursue NMD has been highlighted by many international critics as
another example of “U.S. unilateralism” and there is some truth in this argument. But,
few countries, in making what is essentially a sovereign national security decision, have
taken as many pains as has the U.S. (under Clinton as well as under Bush) to consult with
allies and others every step of the way. When Russia announced a few years back that it
was abandoning its nuclear weapons “no first use” policy, no consultations were held.
Likewise, when China decided to unilaterally expand its military presence in the South
China Sea (Mischief Reef) or to dramatically increase the number of offensive missiles it
has deployed within range not just of Taiwan but of all its neighbors in Southeast and
Northeast Asia, it just did it. Yet both continue to lead the crusade against U.S.
“unilateralism.”

The unenviable task of soliciting Chinese feedback on Bush’s missile defense
announcement fell upon Assistant Secretary Kelly. Kelly had accompanied Deputy
Secretary of State Richard Armitage to Japan and South Korea for similar discussions.
But, in a powerful message that “it was not business as usual” in the wake of the EP-3
crew’s detention and the (at the time) still unresolved dispute over the aircraft’s return,
Armitage proceeded instead to India (arriving on the anniversary of New Delhi’s May
1998 nuclear test – another pointed message?).

By most accounts, Kelly had frank and substantive talks with Chinese officials. But
Beijing’s rhetoric still seems fixated on the “trying to convince Washington not to
proceed” mode. What’s needed is a serious U.S.-China dialogue on what China’s
genuine security concerns are, given Washington’s current inclination to listen. Secretary
of State Colin Powell has said that the currently-envisioned U.S. missile defense plan
is not aimed at negating China’s nuclear deterrent capability, but proponents of a more
expansive system are numerous, especially in the U.S. defense establishment. If Beijing
continues to insist on its current “all or nothing” approach, it could end up being faced
with a more vigorous, threatening (to China) U.S. missile defense system. Proponents of
such a system are numerous, especially in the U.S. defense establishment. The time has
come for Beijing to exhibit some “understanding” of U.S. concerns, even as it pursues its
own national security interests.

Korea Policy Review Stresses “Comprehensive” Approach

It was with some trepidation that Koreans on both sides of the DMZ watched the Bush
administration come to power, given the more “hard line” position many Republicans in
Congress had taken over the years regarding North Korea. However, the outcome of the
administration’s finally – completed Korea policy review was, on the whole, quite
balanced and not significantly different in terms of overall objectives from those pursued
by the Clinton administration.

The U.S. policy review confirmed what President Bush had told President Kim three
months earlier; namely, that Washington will continue to support the Sunshine Policy, the
Agreed Framework, and the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG)
process. It also signaled Washington’s willingness to engage Pyongyang in dialogue on a
broad range of issues, including missiles. Bush stressed reciprocity and verification in
any future negotiations, but so did the Clinton administration.
The main difference in approach was the U.S. desire for a more “comprehensive” dialogue. This is quite understandable, given that one of the primary complaints logged against the Clinton administration in its dealings with Pyongyang (by many South Koreans and Americans regardless of political affiliation) was that it seemed to approach the Peninsula as a non-proliferation problem rather than as a regional security problem with an important proliferation dimension.

As Secretary Kelly spelled out during his House testimony, “the president has directed us to undertake serious discussions with North Korea on a broad agenda, including improved implementation of the Agreed Framework, a verifiable end to the DPRK’s missile production and export programs, and a less threatening conventional military posture.” Unlike the past administration, which favored a “step by step approach,” Washington now plans to take a “comprehensive approach,” to address the many elements that comprise Peninsula and regional security and will try to make progress simultaneously on as many issues as possible . . . provided, of course, that Pyongyang is willing to cooperate.

One final point about the Agreed Framework. The press has been full of speculation about U.S. desires to change the terms of the agreement. But the Bush administration is firmly on record supporting the current arrangement as long as Pyongyang also honors its commitments (which it has thus far done). However, the real moment of truth for Pyongyang and for the Agreed Framework in general is the requirement for the North to come in full compliance with the IAEA prior to the delivery of any sensitive components of the promised light water reactors (LWRs). This requires detailed inspection to determine past accountability, a process that some speculate could take two to four years. Thus far, Pyongyang has not allowed the IAEA to begin this task – the IAEA’s most recent attempt, in May, was once again rejected by the DPRK. Thus, North Korea has only itself to blame if additional delays occur in the completion of this project.

In the meantime, the U.S. and the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) are honoring their part of the bargain. Construction activity continues on the LWR site (even though striking North Korean workers had to be replaced with Uzbek laborers) and KEDO continues to provide North Korea with 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil annually as compensation for shutting down its Yongbyon reactor. These deliveries are scheduled to continue until the first LWR becomes operational, making North Korean demands for compensation if the project is delayed doubly inappropriate: first because they are already being compensated through the heavy fuel oil deliveries and second because they have been at least as much at fault for delays experienced thus far.

Of note, earlier in the quarter, Kim Jong-il reportedly stated that he was waiting for the Bush administration to complete its Korean Peninsula policy review before setting a date for his promised visit to Seoul. However, at this writing, the U.S. willingness to resume dialogue has not been met with DPRK willingness to set a date for Kim Jong-il’s visit to the South. Neither has Pyongyang resumed its high-level dialogue with Seoul (suspended by Pyongyang since March), raising questions as to whether Chairman Kim’s
earlier comments were the reason or merely a convenient excuse behind the lull in North-South dialogue. In the final analysis, it will be North Korea’s actions, and in particular Pyongyang’s willingness (or lack thereof) to continue its dialogue with Seoul, that will be the principal determinant of U.S. policy on the Peninsula.

**Stage Set for U.S.-Japan Strategic Dialogue**

In Japan, the selection of Koizumi Junichiro as prime minister has raised hopes for genuine (and long overdue) economic reform. It has also increased the prospects for deeper cooperation between Washington and Tokyo on regional security issues. Koizumi has stated that it is desirable for Japan to be allowed to participate in collective defense activities and to help defend its allies (read: the United States) in the event of regional crisis. He also noted that Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution – which stipulates that Japan shall never maintain land, sea, or air forces – “fails to reflect reality.”

Koizumi’s view seems to dovetail nicely with calls for a more equal relationship coming from Washington. Deputy Secretary Armitage seemed to be echoing Mr. Koizumi’s remarks during his early May visit to Tokyo when he noted that “the lack of an ability to participate in collective self-defense, although they are signatories to a defense treaty, is an obstacle. I think it is a healthy thing for the Japanese to look at some of these things and see what is reasonable and what is not.” But, while the Bush administration is clearly supportive of an increased Japanese security role, even if this requires constitutional reinterpretation or revision, Armitage and other administration spokesmen have been careful not to directly call for revision, recognizing that this is a domestic Japanese decision.

It is still not clear, however, precisely what Washington expects from Tokyo, or how much Japan is willing or able to contribute. Washington has a responsibility to make it clear to Japan what it expects and desires from Tokyo in terms of greater security cooperation. It is then the Japanese government’s responsibility to determine what it is willing to do. The two sides then need to reach some common understanding about revised roles and missions to ensure that their actions continue to be complementary. Tokyo must further determine if reinterpretations or amendments to current laws or even the constitution itself are required in order to travel down this chosen path. The U.S. should not been seen as pressuring Japan to change its constitution . . . neither should Washington be seen as opposing such changes if this is the will of the Japanese people.

Prior to Prime Minister Koizumi’s coming to power, few Japanese leaders appeared willing to broach this subject. Yet it will become increasingly difficult to sustain the alliance relationship, much less answer Washington’s call for a deeper U.S.-Japan security partnership, without identifying the future roles and missions breakdown that would best sustain “the world’s most important bilateral relationship” well into the 21st century.

This is not to imply that the U.S.-Japan alliance is seriously troubled today. The current state of the relationship is good. But the opportunity and need for improvement are also
greater than at any time in recent history. Maintaining the status quo does not mean doing nothing. Considerable effort is required on both sides to reinvigorate the alliance as new, forward-thinking leaders take command on both sides of the Pacific. (For more on this subject, see the Pacific Forum’s report on *U.S.-Japan Strategic Dialogue: Beyond the Defense Guidelines*.)

**ARF/APEC Preparations Underway**

In his House testimony, Kelly described the ARF as “a limited forum,” but one the U.S. should encourage and support. He noted that “progress both in deepening the debate on security issues and in sharpening its focus has been slow, but there has been progress.” Kelly attended the ARF Senior Officials Meeting in Hanoi in May and confirmed that Secretary of State Powell would be attending the annual ministerial there in late July. It would appear that the key to future U.S. enthusiasm will be the ARF’s ability to deepen and sharpen its debate on security issues of concern to Washington. Of note, Mongolia has reportedly suggested an informal side meeting of Northeast Asia ministers (including the U.S.) during this year’s ARF meeting – a similar suggestion previously appeared in this journal.

Kelly also noted that President Bush was looking forward to the APEC Leaders’ Meeting in Shanghai this October. Beyond his reference to APEC as “a principle engine of regional coherence,” he had little to say about American hopes for this multilateral gathering, stressing instead that Bush’s presence “will speak volumes about our commitment to market-oriented reform in China.”

In preparation for the October meeting, APEC trade ministers, including U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick, met in Shanghai in early June. They agreed to a number of measures to strengthen processes to achieve the Bogor goals of free trade in the region by 2010/2020, which they intend to present at the Leaders’ Meeting. In addition, they agreed to “make best efforts” to launch a new round of WTO negotiations (scheduled for November 9-12 in Qatar). WTO Secretary General Michael Moore delivered a speech urging expediency in closing gaps in priorities among members, yet the APEC ministers’ statement simply lent support to a “balanced and comprehensive agenda” without clarifying details. The most concrete outcome was a final bilateral agreement between the U.S. and China on terms of China’s WTO entry, raising new hopes that China can join WTO in time for the Qatar meeting.

Pacific Forum economic analyst Jane Skanderup notes that the June APEC meeting also provided “a sobering reality check” on the progress of bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs), which were all the rage at the November 2000 Brunei APEC Leaders’ Meeting. A whole host of APEC members have been negotiating bilateral FTAs, convinced that these would be faster and easier than the APEC consensus approach. Yet many of these are withering on the vine – South Korea/Chile, Japan/Mexico, Japan/Singapore – and the FTAs that are still being negotiated – Australia/Singapore, for example – promise to include a whole host of exceptions to protect sensitive industries. As a result, the fall back to bilateral FTAs may be less promising than once appeared.
The region’s economic struggles are certainly one factor in the failure to adopt bold approaches to trade liberalization – whether at the bilateral, regional, or global level. The clear and overwhelming trend throughout the region is the need to focus on domestic restructuring, dampening enthusiasm for regional cooperation. This was also evident at the third ASEAN Plus Three economic ministers’ meeting on May 4 in Siem Reap, Cambodia, which tended to rehash old ground in vague projects meant to draw ASEAN together with South Korea, Japan, and China.

Looking Down the Road

While Secretary Kelly’s House testimony in June was useful in further defining Asia policy, what’s still missing is a more comprehensive Asia “Vision Statement” spelling out the Bush administration’s overall goals and policies toward East Asia. During his first Asia visit in July 1993, President Clinton – himself a relatively inexperienced southern governor whose election similarly raised Asian anxiety levels – outlined his vision of a “New Pacific Community” that helped put his evolving Asia policies in perspective. A similar effort by President Bush would enhance regional understanding of his Asia policy.

Unfortunately, Bush is unlikely to visit Asia before the October APEC meeting. In fact, rumors of impending “strategic shift” toward Asia notwithstanding, thus far only one senior administration official, Deputy Secretary of State Armitage, has found his way to Asia, and he was there primary to discuss missile defense, a global rather than strictly regional issue. This should change in July, with Secretary Powell’s visit to the region for the ARF ministerial in Hanoi. Presumably, Powell will visit Japan and the ROK and perhaps others during his first appearance in Asia. Hopefully, Powell will use this occasion to provide an overall vision and framework that President Bush will then be able to reinforce and embellish in October.

Regional Chronology
April - June 2001

**Apr. 1, 2001:** A PRC jet collides with a U.S. Navy maritime patrol aircraft. The PRC jet goes down in the South China Sea, the Navy EP-3 plane makes an emergency landing in the PRC.

**Apr. 1-9, 2001:** Dalai Lama visits Taiwan.

**Apr. 3, 2001:** U.S. nuclear-powered submarine USS Chicago makes unannounced port call to Sasebo, Japan, violating a 1994 bilateral accord and drawing the ire of Tokyo.

**Apr. 3, 2001:** Japan approves controversial history textbooks.

**Apr. 3, 2001:** Former U.S. President Bill Clinton visits India for seven days.
Apr. 4, 2001: China and South Korea file formal complaints against the Japanese textbooks; FMs from each country summon Japanese ambassadors to express their indignation.


Apr. 6, 2001: Japanese PM Mori Yoshiro announces intention to resign.


Apr. 10, 2001: ROK recalls temporarily ambassador to Japan in protest over textbooks.

Apr. 10, 2001: ROK President Kim Dae-jung meets with Cambodian PM Hun Sen in Seoul.

Apr. 12, 2001: China releases EP-3 crew after 11 days detention.

Apr. 12, 2001: ROK Defense Minister Kim Dong-shin and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld speak via telephone.


Apr. 19, 2001: South Korean ambassador returns to Japan.


Apr. 20, 2001: Taiwan holds military exercise off its southern coast.


Apr. 22, 2001: Former Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui arrives in Osaka.

Apr. 23, 2001: Koizumi Junichiro wins LDP party elections.

Apr. 24, 2001: U.S. approves $5 billion defense package to Taiwan, including four Kidd-class destroyers.

Apr. 24, 2001: ROK and Indonesian navies hold talks near Taejon, South Korea.

Apr. 25, 2001: In a television interview, President Bush says he would do “whatever it took” to help Taiwan defend itself against China.

Apr. 26, 2001: Koizumi Junichiro is elected PM of Japan and selects his Cabinet.

Apr. 26, 2001: DPRK Vice Chairman Kim Il-chol meets with President Putin and FM Ivanov in Moscow; an accord is signed on defense industry cooperation.

Apr. 30, 2001: DoD announces suspension of all U.S. military relations with the PRC.

May 1, 2001: Bush announces his commitment to proceed with a missile defense system.

May 1, 2001: Putin agrees to arms sales to DPRK, including fighter jets and intelligence-gathering systems totaling $50 million.

May 1, 2001: A man claiming to be Kim Jong-nam, son of Kim Jong-il, is detained in Narita, Japan on a fake passport; he is deported on May 5 to China.

May 2, 2001: Presidents Kim and Bush speak via telephone, Kim urges Bush to consult on NMD.


May 2, 2001: President Putin meets with FM Tang Jiaxuan in Moscow.

May 2, 2001: EU delegation led by Swedish PM Goran Persson visits the DPRK; Kim Jong-il pledges to maintain missile moratorium until 2003.

May 2, 2001: DoD retracts April 30 statement in favor of “case-by-case” review.

May 4, 2001: ASEAN Plus Three economic ministers meet in Cambodia.

May 7-8, 2001: U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage and Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs James Kelly arrive in Tokyo, meet with PM Koizumi.


May 8, 2001: The ROK postpones indefinitely plans for military exercises with Japan until the textbook issue is resolved.


May 11, 2001: Armitage in India.

May 11, 2001: FM Ivanov in India.

May 11, 2001: Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz in Moscow.

May 13, 2001: New Zealand PM Helen Clark arrives in Seoul; meets with President Kim.

May 14, 2001: EU announces it will establish diplomatic ties with the DPRK.


May 15-19, 2001: Cobra Gold multilateral military exercise is held in Thailand.


May 17, 2001: Kelly attends ARF Senior Officials Meeting in Hanoi.


May 18, 2001: USCINCPAC in Singapore.

May 18, 2001: Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian expresses desire to attend Oct. APEC Leaders’ meeting in Shanghai; PRC rejects idea.

May 19, 2001: Chinese Premier Zhu visits Thailand.

May 21, 2001: Chen Shui-bian makes unofficial transit stopover in New York while en route to Central America.

May 22-26, 2001: IAEA team visits the DPRK to discuss compliance with international safeguards regime, without success.


May 23, 2001: Li Peng, National People’s Congress chairman, visits Seoul.

May 23, 2001: Thomas Hubbard is tapped to be ambassador to South Korea.

May 23, 2001: Asia-Europe Meeting of foreign ministers in Beijing.

May 25, 2001: Philippine VP Teofisto Guingnone, Jr. and PRC VP Hu Jintao agree to peacefully resolve South China Sea dispute.

May 26, 2001: TCOG meets in Honolulu.

May 27, 2001: Twenty people, including three Americans, are kidnapped by Abu Sayyaf guerrillas from a resort near Palawan Island. On May 29, they threaten a mass killing of some of the hostages.


June 1, 2001: Bush extends “normal trade relations” with China for another year.

June 4, 2001: Malaysian FM Seri Hamid Albar arrives in the DPRK for four-day visit.

June 4, 2001: President Chen makes unofficial transit stop in Houston en route home from Central America.

June 5, 2001: The ROK gives permission for the DPRK to use Southern shipping lanes with prior notification.

June 5, 2001: APEC trade ministers’ forum is held in Shanghai.

June 6, 2001: President Bush announces completion of Korea policy review and U.S. willingness to resume talks with the DPRK.

June 5-12, 2001: FM Han Seung-soo in Washington.

June 9, 2001: U.S. and the DPRK resume joint MIA search, suspended after fatal Apr. 7 helicopter crash.

June 9, 2001: U.S. and China reach consensus on issue stalling Beijing’s entry into the WTO.

June 11, 2001: Singapore Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong meets with President Bush and Secretary Powell to discuss free trade negotiations, U.S. Navy aircraft carrier use of pier facilities in Singapore, and regional issues including support for Indonesia’s territorial integrity.

June 12, 2001: Asst. Secretary Kelly lays out Asia policy during House testimony.


June 14, 2001: President Putin in Shanghai for sixth “Shanghai Five” summit meeting.

June 15, 2001: On North-South summit anniversary, President Kim calls for Kim Jong-il to make a return visit to South Korea.

June 16, 2001: Lee Teng-hui publicly announces his support for Chen Shui-bian.
**June 18, 2001:** FM Tanaka meets with President Bush and Secretary Powell in D.C.

**June 19, 2001:** Taiwan successfully test fires Patriot missile.

**June 21, 2001:** ROK PM Lee meets with President Jiang in Beijing.

**June 21, 2001:** ROK Defense Minister Kim Dong-shin meets with Secretary Rumsfeld in Washington.

**June 22, 2001:** PRC Asst. FM Zhao Wenzhoung visits U.S. State Dept.

**June 24, 2001:** ROK Navy gunboats fire warning shots at a DPRK fishing vessel that violated South Korea’s western sea border.

**June 26, 2001:** U.S. special envoy Jack Pritchard and DPRK counterpart Li Hyong-chol begin talks in New York.

**June 26-28, 2001:** Lee Teng-hui visits Cornell University.

**June 27, 2001:** Turkey and the DPRK establish diplomatic ties.

**June 27, 2001:** DPRK FM Paek Nam-sun meets with FM Alexander Downer in Australia.

**June 29, 2001:** A U.S. serviceman is accused of rape by an Okinawa resident.

**June 29, 2001:** President Arroyo says she has asked the U.S. to help with surveillance and equipment in the effort to quell the Abu Sayyaf terrorist group in Mindanao.

**June 30, 2001:** President Bush and PM Koizumi meet at Camp David.