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WASHINGTON WELCOMES PRIME MINISTER KISHIDA

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2024 began with a full agenda for the US and Japan. All eyes were on the January presidential election in Taiwan, and China's reaction to it. The choice of William Lai Ching-te, who is currently vice president, cemented the hold of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) on power, with a third term for the party. Lai has close ties with Japan and has made no bones about his expectation that Japan, as well as the US, will figure prominently in his hopes for Taiwan's future. The invitation to former Kuomintang (KMT) President Ma Ying-jeou to visit Beijing on April 10 [made it clear](#) that Beijing had a different preference than the people of Taiwan. The uptick in Chinese military pressure across the Strait as well as in the South China Sea also concerned the US and Japan. The People's Liberation Army's growing demonstration of pressure on Taiwan's eastern islands continued in the months after Lai's victory, as Taiwan prepared to inaugurate him as president on May 20. The US and Japan found common cause also in speaking out against China's growing aggression against Philippine maritime forces at Second Thomas Shoal.

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But the headlines for this first quarter of 2024 clearly belong to Prime Minister Kishida Fumio and President Joe Biden. Kishida [visited](#) the US from April 8 to 14 for a formal State Visit, the first in nine years. Japan's prime minister was [feted](#) at a State Dinner at the White House, [spoke](#) at a Joint Session of Congress, and then was [hosted](#) for a lunch by Vice President Kamala Harris and Secretary of State Antony Blinken before heading to North Carolina to highlight the role of Japanese foreign direct investment there.

Some important personnel changes for the US-Japan alliance occurred this quarter. Japan sent its new ambassador, [Yamada Shigeo](#), to Washington, DC in time to begin the new year. Yamada is well-known to Washington insiders, having served at the embassy several times over his career. He has also been at the forefront of broadening the scope of US-Japan strategic coordination both in the Indo-Pacific, including the Quad Leaders' Summits and the US-Japan-South Korea Summit at Camp David, and globally after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, including the G7 Summit in Hiroshima and the NATO Summits.



Figure 1 Japan eyes senior diplomat Shigeo Yamada as ambassador to U.S. Japanese Senior Deputy Foreign Minister Shigeo Yamada (far right) speaks at a high-level security dialogue with China at the foreign ministry in Tokyo on Feb. 22, 2023. Photo: Kyodo

Out in Hawaii, the US Indo-Pacific Command also has a new commander. On May 3, John Aquilino stepped down and [Adm. Samuel Paparo](#), Pacific Fleet Commander, became the region's combatant commander. Admiral Paparo is a naval aviator, a TOPGUN graduate, and has served in Japan as well as Central Command. As head of the US Navy's Pacific Fleet from 2012 to 2024, Paparo witnessed firsthand the expansion of Chinese maritime activity across the Indo-

Pacific and has [led the US response](#) in building a coalition of allied navies.

Taiwan's Expectations of the US-Japan Alliance

Both Washington and Tokyo are concerned about rising tensions between China and Taiwan. On Jan. 13, Taiwan held elections for its presidency and national legislature, the Legislative Yuan. DPP candidate and current vice president Lai emerged victorious, although the DPP lost its legislative majority. Lai's presidency will mark the third consecutive term for the DPP, following the two terms of President Tsai Ing-wen (2016-2024). With the election concluded, attention has turned to how Lai will govern when he takes office on May 20.

During his campaign and since becoming president-elect, Lai has [repeatedly stressed](#) his intention to [deepen cooperation](#) with the US and Japan. Lai brings significant experience with both countries to his new role. He has made multiple visits to Tokyo and Washington throughout his political career, first as a member of the Legislative Yuan (1999-2010), then as mayor of Tainan (2010-2017), premier (2017-2019), and vice president (2019-2024). Notable visits include his 2019 [speech](#) to Japan's House of Representatives; his 2020 visit to the US, where he [attended](#) the National Prayer Breakfast as the highest-ranking Taiwanese official in over 40 years; and his 2022 visit to Japan to [pay respects](#) to the family of assassinated former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, which marked the highest-ranking visit by a Taiwanese official in over 50 years.



Figure 2 China protests Taiwan's VP paying respects at Abe's memorial. Taiwan's Vice-President Lai Ching-te, centre, leaves Zojoji temple after the funeral of former Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe in Tokyo, July 12, 2022. Photo: Hiro Komae

Officials in both Tokyo and Washington quickly [congratulated](#) Lai on his victory. Secretary of

State Blinken noted that the US looks forward to working with Lai to “[advance our shared interests and values](#),” though both Blinken and President Biden were careful to state that the US [does not support](#) Taiwan’s formal independence in keeping with the US one-China policy. In comparison, Foreign Minister Kamikawa issued a stronger statement, referring to Taiwan as “[an extremely crucial partner and an important friend](#).” This choice of words [elicited a strong protest](#) from China, with the Chinese Embassy in Tokyo criticizing Japan for “seriously interfering with China’s internal affairs.” However, two days later, Chief Cabinet Secretary Hayashi Yoshimasa seemed to double down on Kamikawa’s remarks, referring to Taiwan as “[an extremely important partner for Japan](#).”

Lai was also quick to meet with delegations from both Japan and the US in Taipei. On Jan. 14, the day after the election, Lai [met](#) with Ohashi Mitsuo, Japan’s de facto ambassador as chair of the Japan-Taiwan Association, and Furuya Keiji, who heads a group of lawmakers promoting Japan-Taiwan relations. Lai focused particularly on strengthening economic cooperation, especially in the semiconductor industry, as Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) is [investing](#) heavily in new chip plants in Kumamoto.

On Jan. 15, Lai [met](#) with an unofficial delegation from Washington, including former National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley, former Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg, and Chair of the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) Laura Rosenberger. During the meeting, Hadley [praised](#) Taiwan’s democracy as a “shining example for the world,” while Lai referred to freedom and democracy as the “core values” shared by the two countries “and the foundation for the long-term stability in the Taiwan-US partnership.” Later in the month on Jan. 25, Lai [met](#) with a group of US lawmakers from the House of Representatives Taiwan Caucus.

Looking ahead, Taiwan clearly will remain a high priority for the US and Japan. Moreover, how to cope with a crisis across the Taiwan Strait will be high on the alliance agenda. In their remarks following their summit meeting in Washington on April 10, both Biden and Kishida emphasized the importance of [maintaining peace and stability](#) across the Taiwan Strait. Putting personnel in place to advance dialogue on how Taiwan might be managed in the US-Japan alliance is also important. Media reports [indicate](#)

that Raymond Greene is set to become the de facto US ambassador to Taiwan as the next AIT director. Greene is currently the deputy chief of mission at the US embassy in Tokyo, but prior to that, he served as consul general in Okinawa and as deputy head of AIT.

Kishida’s State Visit

The US-Japan alliance could not have had a better fete than it had during Kishida’s State Visit to Washington, DC. The mood was celebratory but relaxed. The list of alliance initiatives exhaustive—over 70 deliverables was the standard phrase around Washington, DC. A firehose of deliverables, in fact. But what was remarkable was the ambitions of the two governments.

Here are [some of the highlights](#) from the [Biden-Kishida Joint Statement](#) and the [Fact Sheet](#):

- The US Indo-Pacific Command will assign a commander to work with the Japan Self-Defense Forces’ Permanent Joint Operations Command to ensure smooth operational command and control.
- A new, \$12 million educational exchange endowment was created for the Mineta Ambassadors Program, which honors Norman Mineta, a former member of the House of Representatives and the first Asian-American to serve as a cabinet secretary.
- US and Japanese universities are teaming up to form AI research partnerships, with funding from public and private sector sources. Additionally, Microsoft has committed \$2.9 billion in AI investment in Japan.
- A Lunar Surface Exploration Implementing Arrangement was signed, including an agreement that two Japanese astronauts will join a future US Artemis mission to land on the moon.

The Kishida-Biden summit also emphasized *who* must play a role in the strategic development of the US-Japan alliance in the years ahead. First, and perhaps most obvious, are the two national militaries. Japan’s strategic review in 2022 [transformed](#) the organization of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to a joint operational command. In 2025, a Permanent Joint Operational Command will be launched that will appoint a combatant commander for the entire

SDF. Integrating Japan's three services—Maritime, Ground and Air—will be the first step toward ensuring an integrated response to a crisis as well as enhancing Japan's readiness. This command will look to the US for coordination of combined operations. Announced at the Biden-Kishida meeting was the [creation of a new post](#), under the Indo-Pacific Commander, tasked with coordinating operations with Japanese forces. Moreover, a Bilateral Information Analysis Cell will allow US and Japanese forces to [share military intelligence](#) in real-time.



Figure 3 U.S. President Joe Biden and Prime Minister Fumio Kishida at the White House on Friday. Photo: AFP-JJJI

Second, economic security strategies can be designed within government, but it is the private sector must be brought in to implement them. During this State Visit, several announcements were made that create new roles and missions for the US and Japanese businesses. Japanese companies have long been central to the US economy, and foreign direct investment by Japan's private sector in the United States will continue to be an indispensable foundation for the partnership. Nonetheless, there are some signs that US attitudes toward foreign firms might be changing. The politics surrounding the Nippon Steel offer to buy US Steel is a case in point and [drew](#) not only the challenger in the presidential race into the conversation but also the president himself. Union support is crucial for US presidential candidates, and this will continue to be part of the dynamics of local investment across the country.

But the prime minister was well aware of the need to [showcase the benefits](#) of Japan's investment in US communities. His trip to North Carolina after leaving Washington, DC [highlighted](#) a [\\$13.8 billion investment](#) by Toyota

Motor Company in an EV battery factory there due to go online next year. It is the first battery factory to be built overseas by Toyota. Honda Motor Company too has [investment](#) of [more than \\$380 million](#) in the state. Local media coverage on the visit put the total number of North Carolinians whose jobs are related to Japanese investment at [around 30,000](#).

Finally, the US and Japan are looking ahead to supporting the next generation that can lead the alliance. Here, too, private sector has a major role to play in investment in human capital. This takes both ideas and resources. Microsoft [announced](#) it would create a new AI collaboration and invest \$2.9 billion in the US-Japan initiative. Other companies [joined](#) to invest \$12 million in the Mineta Ambassador Program to honor Norman Mineta, the first Asian-American to serve in the US Cabinet. Ensuring people-to-people exchange continues to be robust remains an alliance priority. Charles D. Lake II, president of Aflac International and chairman of Aflac Japan, has [assumed](#) the leadership of the US-Japan Friendship Commission and the US Panel of CULCON. The two nations' scientists and innovators will also [enhance their cooperation](#). Whether it is the mission to Mars or the development of new, critical technologies, the intellectual capital of Japanese and Americans is also being harnessed to the task of building a resilient strategic partnership.

Japan's prime minister was well received on Capitol Hill. Kishida [spoke](#) of his childhood experience living in Queens, New York, referencing the Flintstones and other fond memories. But in his address to the US Congress, Kishida was surprisingly blunt about the need for US leadership. Telling the chamber that he detects "an undercurrent of self-doubt" among some about what role America should play in the world, he went on to emphasize that the US is not alone in upholding the international order, saying "Japan is proud to be your shipmate."

The theme he wanted Washington to hear was that the US and Japan now have a global mission. At a time when war continues to rage in Europe and the Middle East, Japan wants to help the United States ensure the continued viability of the liberal order Washington helped define early in the postwar era.

The US, Japan, and the Philippines

For some time now, the US and Japan have expanded their regional cooperation, especially in the maritime domain, to include other nations. Australia, India, and South Korea have become close strategic partners, dedicated toward enhancing their own defense capabilities but also consulting on the various challenges of the Indo-Pacific. This year, another partner joined the US and Japan: the Republic of the Philippines.

China's challenge to Philippine sovereignty at Second Thomas Shoal has intensified this year. The two countries have had a number of maritime encounters in this area of the South China Sea, with [tensions rising](#) precipitously in March when Chinese coast guard ships used water cannons against Philippine vessels, causing damage to ships and injuries to personnel.

On April 7, the US, Australia, Japan, and the Philippines agreed upon a Maritime Cooperative Activity, based on international law, to operate within the Philippines' exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The first exercise was [held](#) in the South China Sea and included anti-submarine warfare drills. The effort is led by the three allies' defense ministers and the US secretary of defense, who met in Manila. Their joint statement [stated their aim](#) to “demonstrate[e] our collective commitment to strengthen regional and international cooperation in support of a free and open Indo-Pacific.” Maritime and air forces would operate together to model “professional interactions among naval/maritime and air forces.” They also reaffirmed the 2016 South China Sea Arbitral Tribunal Award as the “final and legally binding decision on the parties to the dispute.” Without a doubt, China's behavior toward the Philippine forces had stimulated this collective response.

On the heels of this came an even more conspicuous statement of cooperation between the US, Japan, and the Philippines. Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. visited Washington, DC to join Prime Minister Kishida and President Biden for a Trilateral Leaders' Summit, the first of its kind. In their joint statement, the three leaders [emphasized](#) their common concern for regional stability and a free and open Indo-Pacific. They further [committed](#) to cooperate in maritime drills, largely designed to help the Philippines police their own waters and EEZ.



Figure 4 U.S. President Joe Biden escorts Philippines President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. and Japan Prime Minister Fumio Kishida to their trilateral summit at the White House in Washington, April 11, 2024. Photo: Kevin Lamarque

Much of the trilateral discussions focused on economic cooperation. Three areas were identified for future collaboration: strategies for economic resilience and inclusive growth, addressing climate change and building clean energy supply chains, and developing critical and emerging technologies. The three leaders [announced](#) that the first Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment corridor in the Indo-Pacific would be in Luzon, to connect Subic Bay, Clark, Manila and Batangas. This is designed to accelerate investment in infrastructure to enhance economic connectivity between these four areas.

One other aspect of the Joint Vision Statement stood out—the mention of Taiwan:

“We affirm the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait as an indispensable element of global security and prosperity, recognize that there is no change in our basic positions on Taiwan, and call for a peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues.”

While the language was consistent with longstanding policy by the three nations, President Marcos had become embroiled in a verbal back and forth with Chinese officials after he [congratulated](#) newly elected Taiwanese president William Lai in Jan. in a social media post on X. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson claimed this violated the “one-China policy” and that the Philippines should “[refrain from playing with fire](#) on the Taiwan question.”

Nonetheless, Marcos has been forward leaning on allowing the US greater access to ports and facilities in his country. In their discussions after the trilateral summit, Marcos and Biden agreed to update their alliance. Marcos later [described](#) expanded access for the US forces in the Philippines as a defensive step, and a “useful” one should China attack Taiwan. The Philippine president has a very particular worry should a crisis, or worse yet a conflict, erupt across the Taiwan Strait. There are reportedly over 140,000 Philippine nationals living in Taiwan.

The US, Japan, and the Philippines could continue to formalize their regional cooperation, although it remains doubtful that this would entail a formal role for Philippine forces in a Taiwan contingency. Nonetheless, Chinese pressure on Manila continues and the US and Japan have offered to help enhance Philippine economic resilience and maritime law enforcement capabilities.

Conclusion

The rest of 2024 will be just as busy for the US and Japan. In July, the US will host the NATO Summit and leaders from its Indo-Pacific allies, Japan first and foremost, are expected to attend. By the end of summer too there should be some clarity on how the Indo-Pacific Command will organize its operational coordination with Japanese forces.

As the US presidential election campaign heats up, economic security issues will continue to affect US politics. The Nippon Steel buyout of US Steel has been postponed, but there are other currents of change afoot that will affect foreign direct investment in the US. United Auto Workers (UAW) are intent on targeting foreign automakers in six states across the American south in an attempt to unionize factory floors. Governors openly criticized the effort in a joint letter, saying it [would jeopardize jobs and foreign direct investment](#). The first attempt in Tennessee at a Volkswagen plant was [successfully unionized](#). Later in May, a second German auto plant will vote on joining the national union. Japanese auto manufacturers will also be part of the UAW effort.

Of course, the larger question of how the US will approach trade remains a concern. In his campaign for office, former president Donald Trump has advocated for across-the-board tariffs on foreign goods. More recently, the Biden

administration has placed new tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles and parts. In Tokyo, the concern now is how to manage the lack of US participation in the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) as both Taiwan and China seek accession. The rising rhetoric of protectionism in US politics continues to be worrisome.

The US approach to China is also of interest as the election approaches. Several articles in *Foreign Affairs* magazine reveal the variety of perspectives in the US policymaking community on how to approach strategic competition with Beijing. In their article, entitled, *Taiwan and the True Sources of Deterrence: Why the US Must Reassure, Not Just Threaten, China*, Bonnie Glaser, Jessica Chen Weiss, and Thomas Christensen addressed the growing tensions across the Taiwan Straits and argued that the US must reassure Beijing that the US [does not seek conflict over Taiwan](#). A follow-on article, entitled *No Substitute for Victory: America's Competition with China Must Be Won, not Managed*, authored by Matt Pottinger and Mike Gallagher, both Republican China hands, argued instead that the US [should prepare to win](#) the competition with China rather than accommodate its interests. Both articles were widely read in Tokyo as possible points of view for the presidential candidates.

While the Japanese government is very familiar with those who might serve in a second Biden Administration, there is considerable effort being made to understand the composition of a possible second Trump Administration. It may be too early to tell who the next senior foreign policy makers might be should Trump win. However, LDP faction leader, former Prime Minister, and former Deputy Prime Minister under Abe Shinzo, Aso Taro, [successfully made contact](#) with the presumptive Republican nominee. They met in New York City on April 23 for dinner. At the media gathering before dinner, Trump referenced his friend, Abe Shinzo, and reassuringly praised the Japanese people.

Kishida too faces a fall election. His visit to the United States [produced a small bump](#) in his approval ratings back home but he and his party are suffering considerable headwinds. The Unification Church scandal, unearthed after the assassination of former prime minister Abe, reduced public trust in some members of the party. More recently, a more serious erosion of public trust resulted from the revelation of the

misuse of ostensible campaign funds by the Abe faction. According to a *Nikkei* poll, only 25% of respondents support the conservative party, the lowest support rate since it was voted out of power in 2009. To make matters worse for the prime minister, the LDP [lost three out of three by-elections](#) in April. To some extent, this was a self-inflicted wound as the party did not even field candidates in two of the three races. But the real setback was the loss in the third in Shimane, a bastion of conservative support. Kishida faces what is expected to be a tumultuous party leadership election in September. Then, and only then, will the Japanese prime minister be able to turn their attention to the US election outcome.

CHRONOLOGY OF US-JAPAN RELATIONS

JANUARY-APRIL 2024

Jan. 5, 2024: US-Japan-Republic of Korea Trilateral Indo-Pacific Dialogue is [held](#) in Washington, DC.

Jan. 12, 2024: Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Minister for Foreign Affairs Yoko Kamikawa [meet](#) in Washington, DC.

Jan. 12, 2024: National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan and Minister for Foreign Affairs Kamikawa [meet](#) in Washington, DC.

Jan. 12, 2024: Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo and Minister for Foreign Affairs Kamikawa [meet](#) in Washington, DC.

Jan. 12, 2024: Congressional Caucus on Women, Peace, and Security and Minister for Foreign Affairs Kamikawa [meet](#) in Washington, DC.

Jan. 14, 2024: Senior Official for the DPRK Jung Pak, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Director General for Asian and Oceanian Affairs Hiroyuki Namazu, and South Korean Special Representative for Korean Peninsula Peace and Security Affairs Kim Gunn [speak](#) by conference call.

Jan. 17-18, 2024: Senior Official for the DPRK Pak, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Director General for Asian and Oceanian Affairs Namazu, and South Korean Special Representative for Korean Peninsula Peace and Security Affairs Gunn [hold](#) Trilateral Special Representative Consultations in Seoul.

Jan. 24, 2024: Prime Minister Kishida and a delegation from the US Congressional Study Group on Japan [meet](#) in Tokyo.

Feb. 6-7, 2024: 14th meeting of the US-Japan Dialogue on the Digital Economy is [held](#) in hybrid format.

Feb. 13, 2024: State Minister for Foreign Affairs Tsuge Yoshifumi and Special Envoy on North Korean Human Rights Issues Julie Turner [meet](#) in Tokyo.

Feb. 16, 2024: Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs Okano Masataka and Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell [speak](#) by conference call.

Feb. 22, 2024: Minister for Foreign Affairs Kamikawa, Secretary of State Blinken, and South Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs Cho Tae-yul [meet](#) in Rio de Janeiro on the sidelines of the G20 Foreign Ministers' Meeting.

Feb. 27-28, 2024: Acting Special Coordinator for the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment Helaina Mataz [travels](#) to Tokyo.

March 6, 2024: United Auto Workers [says](#) that more than 30% of workers at a Toyota factory in Troy, Missouri, are seeking to join the union.

March 7-8, 2024: Second US-Japan Strategic Dialogue on Democratic Resilience is [held](#) at the US Department of State.

March 11, 2024: Deputy Secretary of State Campbell and Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs Okano [meet](#) in Washington, DC.

March 14, 2024: Minister for Foreign Affairs Kamikawa and Senior Advisor to the President John Podesta [meet](#) in Tokyo.

March 14, 2024: President Biden [announces](#) his opposition to the planned sale of US Steel to Nippon Steel.

March 19, 2024: Representative to the United Nations Linda Thomas-Greenfield and Minister for Foreign Affairs Kamikawa [meet](#) in New York.

March 21, 2024: Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs Okano and Deputy Secretary of State Campbell [meet](#) in Tokyo.

March 21, 2024: Minister for Foreign Affairs Kamikawa, Deputy Secretary of State Campbell, and Philippines Undersecretary of Bilateral Relations and ASEAN Affairs Maria Theresa P. Lazaro [meet](#) in Tokyo.

March 21, 2024: Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs Okano, Deputy Secretary of State Campbell, and Philippines Undersecretary of Bilateral Relations and ASEAN Affairs Lazaro [hold](#) a Japan-US-Philippines Vice Ministers' Meeting in Tokyo.

March 29, 2024: Prime Minister Kishida and Ambassador to Australia Caroline Kennedy [meet](#) in Tokyo.

March 29, 2024: Second US-Japan-Republic of Korea Trilateral Diplomacy Working Group for Foreign Minister Cooperation on North Korea's Cyber Threats is [held](#) in Washington, DC.

March 31, 2024: Prime Minister Kishida [meets](#) with a delegation led by Senator Kirsten Gillibrand in Tokyo.

April 1, 2024: Prime Minister Kishida and President of the Iwo Jima Association Major General (retired) David Bice [meet](#) in Tokyo.

April 3, 2024: Minister for Foreign Affairs Yoko Kamikawa, Representative Sydney Kamlager-Dove, and Ambassador-at-large for Global Women's Issues Geeta Rao Gupta [meet](#) in Tokyo.

April 9, 2024: Prime Minister Kishida [meets](#) with Vice Chair and President of Microsoft Brad Smith in Washington, DC.

April 9, 2024: Prime Minister Kishida [attends](#) a luncheon meeting with US business leaders in Washington, DC.

April 9, 2024: Prime Minister Kishida [holds](#) a dialogue with the next generation for Japan-US friendship and cooperation in Washington, DC.

April 9, 2024: President Biden and First Lady Jill Biden [host](#) Prime Minister Kishida and Spouse of the Prime Minister Kishida Yuko for an informal dinner in Washington, DC.

April 10, 2024: US Justice Department [opens](#) an extended antitrust investigation of Nippon Steel's planned takeover of US Steel.

April 10, 2024: President Biden [hosts](#) a White House Arrival Ceremony for Prime Minister Kishida.

April 10, 2024: President Biden and Prime Minister Kishida [hold](#) a US-Japan Summit Meeting at the White House.

April 10, 2024: Secretary of Commerce Raimondo and Minister for Foreign Affairs Kamikawa [meet](#) in Washington, DC.

April 10, 2024: President Biden [hosts](#) a State Dinner for Prime Minister Kishida.

April 10, 2024: Acting Assistant Secretary or the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs Jennifer Littlejohn and Deputy Director General for the Secretariat of Science, Technology, and Innovation Policy [sign](#) a Global Innovation through Science and Technology Memorandum of Understanding.

April 11, 2024: Speaker of the House Mike Johnson and Prime Minister Kishida [meet](#) at the US Capitol.

April 11, 2024: Speaker of the House Johnson, House Minority Leader Hakeem Jeffries, Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer, and Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell [meet](#) with Prime Minister Kishida at the US Capitol.

April 11, 2024: Prime Minister Kishida [delivers](#) an address at a Joint Meeting of the US Congress.

April 11, 2024: Vice President Kamala Harris and Secretary of State Antony Blink [host](#) a State

Luncheon for Prime Minister Kishida at the State Department.

April 11, 2024: Department of State and AirBnB [announce](#) a partnership to support binational tourism in the US and Japan with a focus on rural areas.

April 11, 2024: President Biden, Prime Minister Kishida, and Philippines President Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. [hold](#) a US-Japan-Philippines Summit in Washington, DC.

April 11, 2024: President Biden, Prime Minister Kishida, and Philippines President Marcos [launch](#) partnership to develop the Luzon Economic Corridor.

April 12, 2024: Prime Minister Kishida [visits](#) a Toyota Motor Corporation automotive battery manufacturing plant and other facilities in North Carolina together with Governor of North Carolina Roy Cooper.

April 12, 2024: Prime Minister Kishida [visits](#) a Honda Aircraft Company plant in North Carolina together with Governor Cooper.

April 12, 2024: Governor of North Carolina Roy Cooper [hosts](#) a luncheon for Prime Minister Kishida.

April 12, 2024: Prime Minister Kishida [meets](#) with Japanese students studying abroad at Nagoya University Global Campus at North Carolina State University.

April 12, 2024: Prime Minister Kishida [meets](#) with Japanese language learners at the North Carolina Japan Center at North Carolina State University.

April 12, 2024: Prime Minister Kishida [meets](#) with Japanese business representatives operating in North Carolina.

April 12, 2024: Prime Minister Kishida [attends](#) a dinner with those who have ties to Japan and reside in North Carolina.

April 12, 2024: US Steel shareholders [approve](#) deal to be purchased by Nippon Steel.

April 18, 2024: Chief Cabinet Secretary Hayashi Yoshimasa and Representative to the United Nations Thomas-Greenfield [meet](#) in Tokyo.

April 18, 2024: Japan-US Joint Event on Artificial Intelligence is [held](#) in Tokyo.

April 19, 2024: Prime Minister Kishida and Representative to the United Nations Thomas-Greenfield [meet](#) in Tokyo.

April 19, 2024: G7 foreign ministers [issue](#) statement on steadfast support for Ukraine, and [issue](#) statement on the situation in the Middle East.

April 22, 2024: Prime Minister Kishida and Commander of US Indo-Pacific Command Admiral John Aquilino [meet](#) in Tokyo.

April 23, 2024: Former President Trump and Former Prime Minister Aso Taro [meet](#) in New York.

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