

COMPARATIVE

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JAPAN-CHINA RELATIONS

Movement but Minimal Progress

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Signs of a possible improvement in Sino-Japanese relations followed a [meeting](#) between newly elected Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru and Xi Jinping on the sidelines of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) gathering in Peru on November, with the two exchanging vague promises of cooperation. Separately, China softened its position on various issues, [saying](#) that an unexpected obstruction had accidentally pushed its spy plane into Japanese airspace, allowing the [resumption](#) of imports of Nishikigoi tropical fish that had been suspended since November 2023 and [reinstating](#) visa-free entry that had been suspended in the wake of COVID. The government also indicated that it will gradually [resume](#) imports of Japanese seafood and [remove](#) a buoy in what Japan considers its exclusive economic zone, though neither has happened yet. Japanese [skeptics](#) pointed out that with no resolution on these and a number of other issues such as the detention of Japanese nationals on vaguely worded charges and sporadic violent attacks against Japanese children, it is premature to speak of Xi's long-postponed state visit to Tokyo.

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Political

While the hopeful signs mentioned above led optimistic sources in both countries to conclude that the time for improved Sino-Japanese relations had [arrived](#), contraindications abounded. Chinese ships and planes continued to fly and sail in contested areas, and in May it was announced that a US State Department officer would be [deployed](#) to the embassy in Tokyo to work under the State's Office of China Coordination, informally known as China House, to monitor Chinese "problematic" behavior and consider countermeasures. The position's duties include cooperation with the Japanese government to collect more information about China's coercive activities.



Figure 1 Japanese Foreign Minister Yoko Kamikawa, on the left, shakes hands with Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi. Photo: Japanese Foreign Ministry

On China's part, and also in May it was announced that the Hong Kong Museum of Coastal Defense was to be [converted](#) into the Hong Kong Museum of the War of Resistance & Coastal Defense with the inauguration taking place on Sept. 3, the date marking victory in the Chinese People's War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression (1931-45). The four existing exhibition galleries about the War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression in the HKMCD cover different parts of war history such as the Japanese invasion of China, the fall of Hong Kong, the Hong Kong and Kowloon Independent Brigade of the East River Column behind enemy lines and the fighters' contributions, and the surrender of Japan. Such efforts, plus the attention given to Japanese behavior during World War II in school curricula are believed to be instrumental in attacks on Japanese in China. The killing of a 10-year-old Japanese boy on his way to school occurred on

Sept. 18, the anniversary of the 1931 Mukden/Shenyang incident and an earlier [attack](#) on a Japanese mother and child in front of a bus taking Japanese children to school are attributed to such actions, with the Chinese government responding to criticism by saying it as simply recounting what had happened. However, the government also vitriolically condemned anti-Japanese social media with an editorial in the official Renmin Ribao [stating](#) "We will .. not accept the hype of 'xenophobia' and hate speech by individuals...this is unacceptable to mainstream Chinese society and to us Chinese." Still, verbal attacks are ongoing and those netizens who [attributed](#) blame to their own government's teachings had their posts [removed](#) from social media.

In May Chinese milk tea brand Xiang Piao Piao [saw](#) a 400% surge on its live-streaming sales in China after a netizen discovered that MECO fruit tea, a Xiang Piao Piao brand, sold products in a store in Japan with slogans on their cup sleeves showing "the ocean is not Japan's sewer" and "0.1% of the land pollutes 70% of the ocean." The picture was then exposed on Chinese media social platforms. In October, China's ultra-nationalist "little pinks" called for a [boycott](#) of major milk powder company Feihe following reports that it signed a letter of intent to develop a lactoferrin-based infant formula product with Japan's Kyowa Hakko Biochemical Co. Yet Chinese state media lined up to support Feihe, which is listed as a key research and development company in China's 14th Five Year Plan, with a Xinhua op-ed claiming that Feihe had been "unreasonably slandered." The conclusion was that although China has long used nationalism as a tool to build "unity" in the face of a foreign opponent, there appear to be limits on how far Beijing will allow it to go.

In a gesture of goodwill applauded by Beijing's nationalistic *Global Times*, in August a Japanese foundation [began](#) Project Dongwang Xigui ("looking east, returning west") announcing an initiative to promote the return of Chinese cultural artifacts scattered in Japan to China. Japanese musicians are increasingly popular on Chinese stages, though the driving force behind this trend is not so much popularity but a disparity in appearance fees, since Japanese artists typically command lower fees than their Chinese counterparts. Nonetheless, [according](#) to Nikkei, this suits Japan's ambitions to tap into the lucrative Chinese market. A delegation from Fujian [led](#) by the province's party head in July,

said to be acting on the consensus reached between their respective state leaders, was described as continuing traditional friendships, further deepening the exchanges of sister-city relationships, and making new contributions to the comprehensive bilateral relationship. Japan is Fujian's sixth-largest trading partner, fifth-largest export market and an important source of foreign investment.

In October, China and Japan [held](#) their 17th round of high-level consultations on maritime affairs in Tokyo, agreeing to make the East China Sea a sea of peace, cooperation, and friendship.




Figure 2 Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba, left, and Chinese Premier Li Qiang shake hands before their meeting in Vientiane, Laos, on Oct. 10. Photo The Asahi Shimbun

Each side argued its case during foreign trips with, for example, separate visits to Paris by then-Prime Minister Kishida Fumio and Xi Jinping. French expert Celine Pajon [characterized](#) Xi Jinping's visit to Paris as lacking substance, contrasting it with Kishida's success in securing agreements on supply chains for critical minerals and beginning negotiations for a reciprocal access agreement to facilitate joint military training and exercises. She opined that although French officials tend to perceive Japan as overly aligned with the US and too assertive toward China, Japanese counterparts regard France as sometimes too yielding toward Beijing, with Pajon believing that it would make sense for France and Japan to embrace each other more closely, given the alignment of their positions. Pajon noted that Japan's multifaceted approach toward China, which includes deterrence, counterbalancing, and conditional cooperation against a backdrop

of guarding its economic security shares many similarities with the French and European de-risking stance that views China as a partner, competitor, and systemic rival.

In August, as part of a plan to diversify Central Asian states' dependence on China and Russia, Kishida [visited](#) Central Asia in mid-August, meeting with the leaders of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. At a summit in Kazakhstan, he signaled Japan's support for regional efforts to achieve carbon neutrality, offering technology from Japanese companies such as fossil-fuel power plants with low carbon emissions and helping the countries manufacture value-added exports, such as hydrogen and fertilizer produced with natural gas. Kishida's agenda included discussions on a Caspian Sea shipping route linking Central Asia and Europe that bypasses Russia, which Central Asian nations have favored since Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Japan will also provide intangible assistance such as implementing digital technology in customs procedures and encouraging countries to make use of Japan's skilled worker program to train talent and promote person-to-person exchanges. As the report period closed, the government [announced](#) that such items as radars for vigilance and surveillance would be provided free of charge to the Philippines, Indonesia, Mongolia, and Djibouti.

According to the *Wall Street Journal*, many wealthy Chinese who are attracted by the low prices occasioned by Japan's weak yen, declining economic growth in the PRC, and frustrated with Beijing's autocratic political system, are [moving](#) to Japan. At the end of 2023, Japan had 822,000 Chinese residents, up 60,000 from 2022 this being the biggest jump in recent years. People who invest the equivalent of at least \$32,000 in a Japanese business that has a permanent office and two or more employees can get a business-management visa. Beijing restricts how much its residents can take out of the country, but many Chinese buyers own companies with international operations or have overseas investments. Many have bank accounts in Hong Kong or Singapore from which they can wire money or can mobilize friends and relatives to carry cash little by little over a few months. While most are not political, Chinese officials are aware that in the early 20th century an exile group led by Sun Yat-sen attempted to mobilize support to overthrow the Qing dynasty,

and worry that the current community might do the same. In November, Human Rights Watch [reported](#) that Chinese authorities are targeting and intimidating expatriates in Japan. Most of those interviewed said they had been contacted by Chinese police, who pressured them to end their activities in Japan. Some reported receiving calls from authorities through their relatives back home, while others were approached at the Chinese embassy in Tokyo. The report states that several Tibetans said they faced pressure from the Chinese government after engaging in activities to promote Tibetan culture in Japan. One Tibetan individual told HRW that when they went to the Chinese embassy in Tokyo to renew their passport, embassy officials told them they needed to return to Tibet to do so. The person said they rejected the embassy's recommendation, fearing they would be detained or face punishment.

In November Japanese national security adviser Akiba Takeo [visited](#) China seeking to lay the groundwork for a meeting between the leaders of the two countries' leaders though critics argued that given the outstanding issues between their countries, such a meeting was premature.

Economic

Both countries' economies are described as [fragile](#). The Japanese economy [expanded](#) by an annualized 0.9% in Q3 highlighting Japan's tepid economic recovery, as domestic demand has not fully picked up while a growing risk of a slowdown in the US and further weakness in China's economy could weigh on exports ahead. China's economy expanded 4.6% year on year in the third quarter, slower than in the previous three months—significantly below the government's target for full-year growth of 5%—and underlining faltering growth as Beijing stepped up efforts to boost the economy as sluggish consumption and a property slump weighed on household sentiment. In September Beijing [announced](#) its biggest monetary stimulus since the pandemic and followed up with promises of heavy fiscal spending, with economists doubting that it would have the desired effect.

Japanese investment into China [declined](#). A survey by Japan's Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry reported that Japanese companies were pulling away from China, with capital investments by local subsidiaries declining for

the seventh consecutive quarter in April–June and falling below the amount invested in Europe. Reasons for the decline included the slowdown in the Chinese economy, increased competition from indigenous Chinese brands, concerns for safety after the detention of Japanese businesspeople on vaguely defined charges, and related uncertainty about the application of China's espionage law. Employees at four Japanese companies [told](#) Asahi that some big firms had given Japanese employees and their families the option to be relocated home at the company's expense, or are considering doing so. The executive and the employees declined to give any further details, and it is not known how many plan to take advantage of the offer.



Figure 3 Gen Nakatani and EU Foreign Policy Chief, Josep Borrell. Photo: Japan Times

In September, Mitsubishi chief executive officer Nakanishi Katsuya called for a more [active](#) strategy from the government to help Japanese companies counter increasing Chinese competition in their traditional stronghold of Southeast Asia. His comments echoed the alarm privately expressed by other executives and government officials, who fear Japanese market share in Southeast Asia is being eroded as Chinese companies increase exports and investment. Still, Mitsubishi, with \$6.4 billion in annual profits, remains one of the biggest of the sogo shosha, or general trading houses, with a long history of navigating complicated geopolitical situations.

Distressed Japanese businesses provide opportunities for Chinese interests. Sovereign wealth fund China Investment Corporation was reported [targeting](#) undervalued small and midsize Japanese businesses, many of them unlisted, with the potential to thrive in China's massive market. CIC has created an

international advisory council that includes former and current executives from American and European financial institutions to show transparency but the fund provides very limited information about the companies in which it invests and there are concerns that Chinese money might eventually pose an economic security risk to Japan.

Despite continuing to lose market share to China, Japanese auto manufacturers plan to stay. Aiming to [secure](#) a 30% share of the global software-defined vehicle (SDV) sales market, against leading US and Chinese manufacturers in automotive technologies, Toyota, Honda, and Nissan agreed to promote collaboration on developing in-car software and are considering standardizing specifications for functions of car computers such as window opening and wiper movement. SDVs are next-generation cars that can add new functions and enhance abilities by updating software via the internet. Hence, they enable the company to earn money even after selling the cars, with China already boosting the development of leading-edge technologies by the standardizing application programming interface (API) that serves as the link between the software and other systems.

Large Japanese corporations with outlets in several countries were able to weather losses and regroup. Major clothing retailer Uniqlo whose parent Fast Retailing reported a large profit fall in China and Hong Kong during the three months through May by July, [described](#) itself as at a turning point with its store-opening strategy in China. Uniqlo plans a “scrap and build” policy in the PRC, closing stores with low monthly sales and opening larger ones in better locations. Meanwhile Fast Retailing nonetheless recorded a 13.5% increase in sales from a year earlier, helped by a 19.4% rise in overseas sales driven by Europe and North America.

Frosty government-to-government relations notwithstanding, both sides are aware of the interlinked nature of their economic prosperity. In May, Jiji [reported](#) that while state-level exchanges between the two remained almost halted local government were actively interacting with each other to enhance trade. There were winners and losers in the competition. In July, Nippon Steel announced that it would [withdraw](#) from a joint venture with Baoshan Iron & Steel, marking a turning point in a 21-year relationship that was a symbol of

China's progress in modernizing its steel industry. This will result in a 70% reduction in Nippon Steel's steel production capacity in China. Chinese steelmakers, who continue to produce at high levels despite falling demand for their products as the domestic economy slows, present stiff price and quality competition, as the shift to EVs reduces Chinese demand for Japanese cars. On the other hand, factory automation supplier Fanuc [raised](#) its annual net profit outlook by \$117 million on a recovery in orders from China, where government subsidies drove demand despite a sluggish economy. Demand also grew for Fanuc's metalworking Robodrills which are used for making smartphone bodies. This occurred as Fanuc's sales fell worldwide due to lackluster demand in Europe and Japan.

Competition did not preclude cooperation where it was mutually beneficial. On October, the People's Bank of China (PBOC) and the Bank of Japan [agreed](#) to renew their bilateral currency swap deal amounting to 200 billion yuan (about \$28.13 billion), or 3.4 trillion Japanese yen. The agreement, which aims to stabilize the financial markets of both countries and support bilateral economic and financial activities, will be valid for a three-year period and can be extended by mutual consent. In early Nov. in its first visit to China in eight years, a [delegation](#) of the Japan Association of Corporate Executives (Keizai Doyukai) asked China to exempt short-term visitors from visa requirements (later granted) and called for China's active participation in the 2025 Osaka-Kansai Expo. Regional organizations also visited. As the report period closed, a delegation from Kansai Economic Federation (Kankeiren) [visited](#). While affirming its desire to trade also advised China to learn from the deflation that Japan experienced over the past 30 years and asked that China expand domestic demand to improve its business environment.

Defense



Figure 4 Defense Minister Gen Nakatani attends the NATO defense ministers' meeting held in Brussels on Oct. 17. Photo: The Asahi Shimbun, Nen Satomi

Both sides advanced their military capabilities with China facing resistance over its claims in the East China and South China seas and Taiwan and Japan principally worried about its control over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands and the effect that a PRC invasion of Taiwan would have for it.

Chinese media touted the [debut](#) of its J-35A stealth jet at the Zhuhai airshow. A variant, the J-35, is designed for use on aircraft carriers. With the J-35A joining the J-20 in service, China [became](#) only the second nation in the world to operate two different fifth-generation stealthy fighters: the US flies the F-22A Raptor and F-35 Lightning II. A variety of other weapons including a 10-ton drone [mothership](#) said to be capable of launching drones in mid-air and then managing them to carry out operations was also exhibited. Further raising anxieties was the expansion of the PRC's nuclear arsenal, now believed to total 500 warheads with over a thousand [expected](#) by 2030.

In May the Japanese government announced the creation of a new Japanese research center to [develop](#) both transformational breakthrough technologies and civilian applications for defense technologies during peacetime. Modeled on institutions such as the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and the Defense Innovation Unit based in Silicon Valley, the center will research new, more sensitive methods to detect submarines from a distance using subatomic particles and electromagnetic waves, since conventional sonar has become less effective following technological improvements that have made subs quieter.

Japan's 2024 Defense White Paper [stated](#) *inter alia*, that Japan is facing the most severe and complex security environment since the end of World War II, and that it could not be ruled out that a serious situation similar to Russia's aggression against Ukraine may occur in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly in East Asia, adding that China was intensifying its activities across the entire region surrounding Japan, including in the East China Sea, particularly in the area around the Senkaku Islands, the Sea of Japan, and the western Pacific Ocean and extending beyond the so-called first island chain to the second island chain.

In terms of weapons upgrades, in Sept. the Japanese defense ministry [signed](#) contracts for two Aegis-equipped vessels, to play a central role in ballistic missile defense. They are also expected to carry an improved version of the Type 12 surface-to-ship guided missiles to provide powerful counterattack capabilities, as well as missiles that can intercept hypersonic glide vehicle weapons. The ministry also plans to [build](#) a satellite constellation network for guided missiles to replace the current satellites which cannot be used to lock onto moving targets. The intent is to strengthen the nation's information-gathering capabilities. Japan also aims to enhance production capabilities of hypersonic guided missiles and to acquire an improved version of the Type 12 surface-to-ship guided missiles. Deployment of US-made Tomahawk cruise missiles and other new weapons will begin in fiscal 2025. Other budget requests will enhance production capabilities for hypersonic guided missiles and acquire an improved version of the Type 12 surface-to-ship guided missiles. And, to [improve](#) its ability to deal with Chinese encroachments in the East China Sea including the area around the Senkaku Islands, the coast guard is to construct its largest-ever multipurpose patrol vessel, to function as an offshore base capable of carrying a number of small boats and to deter incursions onto the islands. However, Japan's military capabilities continue to be bedeviled by personnel problems. Despite generous enhancements to enlist, the SDFs [recruitment](#) in 2023 was barely over half the desired number.

With far fewer financial resources to commit to defense than China and hindered by vocal, though diminishing, voices of opposition on military budgets, Japan reached out to like-minded countries for partnerships. Principal among these was the United States. At the end of

July, warning that China's aggressive posture [posed](#) the "greatest strategic challenge" in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond, the US and Japan outlined the most significant upgrade to their joint military alliance since 1960. Coordination between the allies had long been hampered because, although roughly 50,000 US military personnel are based in Japan, US Forces Japan lacked command and control authority, with its authority limited to supervising Japan-US joint training exercises and managing troops. Tokyo had to deal with the US Indo-Pacific Command in Hawaii, which is 19 hours behind Tokyo and 6,500 km away. The upgrade involves placing a three-star commander with accompanying staff in Japan, and the USFJ will be reconstituted as a joint force headquarters to allow the two militaries to co-operate and plan more seamlessly, particularly in a crisis such as a Taiwan conflict. Japan had [requested](#) a four-star commander but since US military units based in Hawaii and Guam would be the main force in the event of a crisis such as a Taiwan contingency, the ultimate command authority for US forces in Japan will remain with the Indo-Pacific Command, whose commander will likely be the counterpart of the head of the Japan's SDF Joint Operations Command. The Kishida administration, wanting to [demonstrate](#) the strength of the Japan-US alliance in response to developments in China and North Korea, expressed satisfaction that the operative commander who is responsible for Japan's defense will actually be stationed in Japan.

Strengthening ties with multinational organizations was also on Japan's agenda. To China's displeasure, Kishida [attended](#) the annual NATO meeting, with Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian [saying](#) that Japan must not interfere in China's domestic affairs and act as a "vanguard" of NATO's Asia-Pacific expansion. Japan has also [hinted](#) that it would like to join the Five Eyes intelligence sharing agreement of Australia, Britain, Canada, New Zealand, and the US. However, apart from Japan becoming the only non-Anglophone member, there are concerns about its ability to safeguard secrets. As Kishida's successor, Ishiba has come out in favor of the formation of an Asian NATO. though Biden administration officials [reacted](#) coolly with Daniel Kritenbrink, assistant secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific affairs, saying "it's too early to talk about collective security" in the region... "We're continuing to build this network of formal and informal relationships and then we'll see where

that goes to." Ishiba has also [suggested](#) that Japan could be added to ANZUS as JANZUS.

Support from other countries continues to be sought. In May, a meeting of the defense chiefs of Australia, Japan, the Philippines, and the US issued a joint [statement](#) expressing serious concern over China's "repeated obstruction of...freedom of navigation" in the South China Sea. Japan and the Philippines are discussing a reciprocal access agreement (RAA) that will facilitate exchanges between their militaries similar to an agreement concluded last year between Japan and Australia. At the same time, Kishida met French President Emmanuel Macron and [agreed](#) to start formal talks on a reciprocal troop access deal and strengthening military cooperation amid rising maritime tensions in the Indo-Pacific region and the war in Ukraine. Reciprocal access agreements (RAAs) make the entry of foreign personnel and equipment easier for the visiting force. France has territories in the Indo-Pacific and stations armed forces in the region, where it has sought to develop its presence, and wants to can play a bigger role in Japan's defense industry as Kishida adopts a more muscular military policy in the region. The Italian Navy's aircraft carrier Cavour and frigate Alpino [arrived](#) at the MSDF base in Yokosuka to conduct joint training exercises with the MSDF in response to China's increasing maritime presence In August, ships from Canada, New Zealand, Singapore, Italy, called at the Yokosuka base. Germany also expressed concerns, with Rear Adm. Axel Schulz, commander of the German navy's 2nd Flotilla, [telling](#) Nikkei that although Germany has no overseas territories, a conflict in the Asia-Pacific would have massive adverse consequences since it is a major export nation, and that it intended to strengthen ties with Japan.

Japan also reached out to support smaller nations to resist Chinese encroachment. It has [sent](#) the Maritime Self-Defense Force and coast guard to the Marshall Islands to help improve the Marshallese coast guard's capabilities through joint drills and other activities. This marked the first time that the MSDF and the JCG jointly landed on a Pacific island nation to offer such assistance. The China-leaning South China Morning Post [described](#) then-Foreign Minister Kamikawa Yoko's 10-day tour to Madagascar, Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Sri Lanka, and Nepal as aimed at selling itself as the Global South's China counterweight against China's aggressive

maritime expansion. Among other results was an announcement that the Japanese government will [provide](#) Sri Lanka with a vessel and sonar system worth about ¥1 billion (\$6.6 million) in total as Kamikawa emphasized Japan's position on realizing a free and open Indo-Pacific and demonstrated support for Sri Lanka, which sits in a strategic position along sea lanes. China has been making advances into the Indian Ocean in recent years.

The Future



Figure 5 LDP Diet member Nikai Toshiro shakes hands with Zhao Leji, chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, in Beijing on Aug. 28. Credit: Kyodo, accessed at Nikkei, Aug. 28, 2024.

Whether these hopeful signs will result in warmer Sino-Japanese relations remains to be seen. Even if Xi Jinping pays the state visit that Tokyo has long desired, Ishiba, due to his party and its coalition partner losing their majority in the Diet, will be in a weak negotiating position. He is known as a defense hawk which will give Xi little incentive to remove the offensive buoy, resume seafood imports, or reduce even temporarily the tempo of Chinese encroachments in the East China Sea. Conversely, Ishiba has little leeway to concede to China on territorial issues and Taiwan. The most likely outcome is a continuation of efforts to manage tensions rather than resolve underlying issues.

CHRONOLOGY OF JAPAN-CHINA RELATIONS

MAY - NOVEMBER 2024

May 3, 2024: Defense chiefs from the US, Australia, Japan, and the Philippines [meet](#) in Hawaii for their second-ever joint meeting and vowed to deepen cooperation amid concerns about China's operations in the South China Sea. The meeting comes after the four countries last month held their first joint naval exercises in the South China Sea.

May 3, 2024: Prime Minister Kishida [sends](#) a video message to a meeting of people in favor of revising the constitution on the Constitution Day holiday, saying that "amending the constitution is increasingly becoming an imminent and important issue." *Yomiuri* [editorializes](#) in favor of the revision, saying that in light of the "extremely deteriorated security environment, in-depth discussions of Article 9 are also essential" and citing the paper's survey indicating that 63% of respondents were positive about constitutional revision. *Asahi* [opposes](#) revision, saying that although preparing for security emergencies is obviously important protecting values such as the freedom and human rights advocated by the constitution, and preventing war should be the foremost priority.

May 4, 2024: A joint [statement](#) by the defense chiefs of Australia, Japan, the Philippines, and the US in Honolulu expresses serious concern over China's "repeated obstruction of ... freedom of navigation" in the South China Sea.

May 4, 2024: Aimed at reining in China's aggressive maritime expansion, the Japanese government announces it will [provide](#) Sri Lanka with a vessel and sonar system worth about ¥1 billion (\$6.6 million).

May 4, 2024: *South China Morning Post* [describes](#) Foreign Minister Kamikawa's 10-day tour to Madagascar, Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Sri Lanka, and Nepal as Japan selling itself as Global South's China counterweight.

May 6, 2024: Chinese milk tea brand Xiang Piao Piao [sees](#) a 400% surge on its live streaming sales in China after a netizen discovered that MECO fruit tea, a Xiang Piao Piao brand, sells

products in a store in Japan with slogans on their cup sleeves showing "the ocean is not Japan's sewer" and "0.1% of the land pollutes 70% of the ocean."

May 7, 2024: Chief Cabinet Secretary Hayashi Yoshimasa [announces](#) with no further details the government's intention to set up an expert panel to begin full-fledged deliberations on the introduction of "active cyber defense" to prevent serious cyber-attacks by infiltrating the attacking party's servers.

May 10, 2024: With bipartisan support, the Diet [approves](#) legislation restricting access to economic security information will require government officials, company employees and others to undergo background checks to obtain government clearance to handle sensitive information with leaks punishable by up to five years in prison or a maximum fine of 5 million yen.

May 13, 2024: Reports state that Japanese government will [send](#) the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) and coast guard to the Marshall Islands to help improve its coast guard's capabilities through joint drills and other activities.

May 13, 2024: Japanese intelligence agency [obtains](#) a document from a Shanghai-based tech company with ties to the Chinese government that it suspects of developing a system to manipulate public opinion via accounts on the X social media platform, believing that it is connected with China's activities to manipulate public opinion overseas.

May 14, 2024: *Yomiuri* [editorializes](#) against the SDFs' inadequate security, which allowed a drone to intrude into a military base and take aerial footage close to the deck of a destroyer.

May 16, 2024: Yuan Keqin, a Chinese national who taught at Hokkaido University of Education until detained by China in 2019, is [sentenced](#) to six years in prison for violating the PRC's anti-espionage law.

May 16, 2024: Cabinet office [discloses](#) that Japan's economy shrank at an annualized rate of 2%, or 0.5% on a nonannualized basis, in January–March in inflation-adjusted real terms, the first drop in two quarters.

May 17, 2024: To [encourage](#) enlistment, the MSDF will be providing global internet access to its personnel while deployed at sea. Previously, limited satellite connection times restricted crew members to sending or receiving emails, with pre-approved contacts only, twice a day for brief periods.

May 17, 2024: Although Yonaguni Island's 1,500 residents [voted](#) in favor of hosting an SDF base in 2015 Ambassador Rahm Emanuel's visit to the island—the first US ambassador to do so—arouses concerns on plans to expand the base and deploy surface-to-air missiles as a deterrent to any Chinese designs on Japan's vulnerable outlying islands.

May 19, 2024: Hoping to [increase](#) Japan's cyber defense capabilities to a level on par with North American and European countries by authorizing the government to access an attacker's server to neutralize their attack as well as other actions, the LDP begins discussions on enabling the government to conduct active cyber defense.

May 19, 2024: US State Department officer is reported to be [deployed](#) to the embassy in Tokyo to monitor problematic behavior of China and consider countermeasures.

May 19, 2024: Hong Kong Museum of Coastal Defence (HKMCD) will be [converted](#) into the Hong Kong Museum of the War of Resistance & Coastal Defence on Sept. 3, the date marking victory in the Chinese People's War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression (1931–45).

May 20, 2024: Ambassador to China Kanasugi Kenji holds [talks](#) with Anhui Gov. Wang Qingxian during his visit to the province, expressing hopes of enhancing the two countries' ties in culture and youth exchange as well as improving the business environment for Japanese-affiliated companies and increasing flows of people.

May 20, 2024: According to a Japanese source based in China, about 60 governors and mayors in Japan [visited](#) China in the Japanese fiscal year that ended in March. China visits by prefectural and municipal heads became active around last July and are expected to remain robust.

May 20, 2024: *Jiji* [reports](#) that while state-level exchanges remain almost halted local government leaders of Japan and China are actively interacting with each other.

May 21, 2024: *Yomiuri* reports that Taiwan's newly inaugurated President Lai Ching-te showed the importance he places on Japan on Monday by lunching with a Japanese nonpartisan group and meeting with various other guests from Japan immediately after taking office.

May 21, 2024: *Asahi* [editorializes](#) that Xi Jinping rethink his aggressive, unyielding policy toward Taiwan, which lacks tolerance and flexibility, in light of the mutual benefits.

May 22, 2024: Chief Cabinet Secretary Hayashi Yoshimasa's strong [protest](#) against Chinese ambassador's (see above May 21) remark that "the Japanese people will be dragged into the flames if Japan gets involved in any attempt to divide China" is widely reported in both Japanese and international media.

May 24, 2024: Unnamed diplomats [interviewed](#) by *Reuters* have low expectations that the first trilateral summit among China, Japan, and South Korea and hosted by Seoul can go beyond surface-level cordiality, though two anonymous Japanese foreign ministry officials said that the resumption of the summit after a long gap—since 2019—was important for optics.

May 24, 2024: [Meeting](#) with Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim in Tokyo, Kishida expresses willingness to strengthen bilateral cooperation on maritime security in view of China's hegemonic moves in the South China Sea.

May 25, 2024: An editorial in *Asahi*, normally sympathetic to China, [states](#) "Beijing's saber-rattling in a belligerent reaction to the newly inaugurated Taiwanese president's speech is completely off the rails."

May 26, 2024: During a meeting of a consultative expert group set up by the two governments China [demands](#) that Japan expand the scope of its environmental assessment around the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant.

May 26, 2024: [Speaking](#) with Premier Li Qiang on the sidelines of a trilateral summit in Seoul, Kishida asks for an immediate lifting of its ban on Japanese seafood products and conveys Japan's "serious concern" over China's recent military expansion, emphasizing that Tokyo believes stability in the Taiwan Strait is "crucial" not only for the region but also for the international community.

May 27, 2024: Trilateral summit [pledged](#) that China, Japan, and Korea would cooperate on: people-to-people exchanges; sustainable development including through climate change response; economic cooperation and trade; public health and aging societies; science, technology and digital transformation; and disaster relief and safety.

May 27, 2024: GSDF [holds](#) the Fuji Firepower Exercise 2024, its largest-scale annual live ammunition drill, in which 2,100 personnel practice responses against unnamed enemy forces landing on a remote Japanese island.

May 28, 2024: Slowdown in China's economy is affecting Japanese retail giant Uniqlo, with its parent company Fast Retailing announcing that it was [cutting](#) back its plans to open 80 new stores to 55. It may shut some locations and do more with ecommerce and livestream commerce, the latter becoming an increasingly popular form of shopping on Chinese social media apps.

May 28, 2024: ASDF fighters are [scrambled](#) when a Chinese military reconnaissance and strike unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), the W-10 flies into Japan's Air Defense Identification Zone over the East China Sea. The drone did not intrude into Japanese territorial airspace. Four types of Chinese UAVs have been making flights but this is the first time a WL-10 has been confirmed.

May 28, 2024: Marking the 158th consecutive day since Dec. 22, 2023 that Chinese coast guard vessels have entered Japan's contiguous waters,

the longest period on record, four vessels sail inside Japan's contiguous zone approximately 22 km outside its territorial waters.

May 29, 2024: Citing unnamed diplomatic sources, *Yomiuri* [reports](#) that Japan refused to agree to China's demand that the trilateral summit's joint declaration include the term "industrial chains" as an area in which to strengthen cooperation, believing that the expression reflects China's attempt to dominate the global market in key industrial sectors.

May 29, 2024: [Meeting](#) with Kishida in Tokyo, Liu Jianchao, head of the CCP's international department, admonishes Japan to abide by the "one China principle" and "earnestly" maintain a political foundation for its bilateral relations with China.

May 30, 2024: LDP Secretary General Motegi Toshimitsu and Liu Jianchao, head of the CCP's International Liaison Department, [agree](#) to restart a forum for exchange between the Japanese and Chinese ruling parties suspended after 2018.

June 1, 2024: Public [reporting](#) on the first meeting between Defense Minister Kihara Minoru and Chinese counterpart Dong Jun on the sidelines of the Shangri-La forum in Singapore indicated little.

June 4, 2024: Foreign ministry spokesperson Mao Ning [expresses](#) strong dissatisfaction and firm opposition against remarks made by military officials from Japan, the US, and South Korea to criticize China on issues regarding South China Sea and Taiwan.

June 4, 2024: Security cameras at the Yasukuni Shrine [show](#) a Chinese man spray painting "toilet" in English on the stone pillar bearing the name of the shrine and urinating against it.

June 4, 2024: Japanese government [names](#) prefectures mainly in the Kyushu region as planned shelters for residents of five municipalities of the Sakishima Islands in the event of a Taiwan contingency.

June 4, 2024: *Global Times* [accuses](#) Japan of cognitive warfare techniques to whitewash its irresponsible discharge of nuclear contaminated wastewater into the sea.

June 8, 2024: To [improve](#) its ability to deal with China's increasingly hegemonic behavior in the East China Sea including the area around the Senkaku Islands, the Japan Coast Guard will construct its largest-ever multipurpose patrol vessel, to function as an offshore base capable of carrying a number of small boats and to deter incursions onto the islands.

June 10, 2024: Cabinet office [revises](#) earlier 2.0% decline in GDP to 1.8% in the first quarter of 2014. Chief Cabinet Secretary Hayashi expects a moderate improvement in economic output in Q2.

June 11, 2024: China Coast Guard [harassment](#) of a Japanese surveillance vessel near the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands earlier this year included jamming the frequencies of some surveillance drones.

June 12, 2024: Japan's Panasonic [plans](#) to adopt China's minimalist approach to designing consumer electronics as it struggles to fend off challenges from Chinese rivals such as Haier Group and the Midea Group, particularly in Southeast Asia.

June 12, 2024: At least 50% of Japan's exports of semiconductor manufacturing equipment [went](#) to China for a third straight quarter in the three months through March, amid an apparent surge in demand for less advanced gear spurred by US-led trade restrictions.

June 16, 2024: A task force member for a comprehensive review of renewable energy regulations [resigns](#) after she carelessly submitted a document containing digital data from China's state-run power company, State Grid Corporation of China, to the Cabinet Office's discussion forum on Japanese energy policy. This raised suspicions that Japan's energy policy might be distorted by China's intentions.

June 17, 2024: Referencing a report published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute saying that Beijing is increasing its nuclear arsenal faster than any other country, Chief Cabinet Secretary Hayashi [expresses](#) worry about the "rapid and unclear" expansion.

June 18, 2024: Immigration consultants and analysts [observe](#) a sharp increase in inquiries

from Chinese people, both rich and middle class, looking to move to Japan.

June 19, 2024: As the regional security environment becomes more severe amid China's growing military assertiveness, Kishida and New Zealand Prime Minister Christopher Luxon effectively [agree](#) on a pact to enhance classified information sharing, express concern over the situation in the South China Sea, and affirm the significance of working together to realize a free and open Indo-Pacific, a vision advocated by Japan in a veiled bid to counter China.

June 20, 2024: Speaking at a press conference for a Japan Hong Kong Democracy Summit, exiled Hong Kong activists [call](#) for Japanese support against the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)'s transnational repression. Activist Finn Lau described having a bounty of a million Hong Kong dollars placed on him. Among the Diet members attending was former defense minister Nakatani Gen, who pledged to urge his government to send firm messages to Hong Kong, demanding human rights be protected.

June 20, 2024: In a [survey](#) conducted by *Reuters* from June 5-14, 61% of Japanese companies see no need for their government to follow the US in raising tariffs on Chinese imports, saying excessive production capacity in China's industrial sector does not affect them; about 53% replied that China's excessive production capacity had little to no impact on their business.

June 20, 2024: [Noting](#) the surprise victory of the LDP in Okinawan elections despite strong opposition to the presence of US bases on the island, Hong Kong's *South China Morning Post* suggests that Okinawans have been rethinking their views in response to China ramping up its pressure on Taiwan.

June 21, 2024: Japan [imposes](#) trade restrictions on China-based companies as part of a fresh round of sanctions against individuals and groups supporting Russia's war on Ukraine. The restrictions also apply to firms in India, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan.

June 21, 2024: [Responding](#) to the Japanese foreign ministry's statement of serious concern over repeated actions that obstruct freedom of navigation and increase regional tensions, a

spokesperson for China's embassy in Japan says that Japan is not a party to the South China Sea issue and has no right to intervene in China-Philippines maritime matters.

June 21, 2024: Due to a significant [drop](#) in sales due to the rise of low-priced electric vehicles in China, Nissan is shutting down its car plant in the city of Changzhou, Jiangsu province, one of eight plants that it operates under its joint venture with China's Dongfeng Motor.

June 22, 2024: Interviewed by *Nikkei* in Washington, commandant of the US marine corps Gen. Eric Smith [says](#) that the new Marine Littoral Regiment founded in November is meant to come to the defense of Japan's remote islands quickly in the event of an attack and also to protect the Philippines and South Korea.

June 24, 2024: According to the Japan Coast Guard's regional headquarters in Naha, two Haijing Chinese Coast Guard vessels [enter](#) what Japan considers its territorial waters off the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands for the fourth consecutive day. As they approach, a Japanese fishing JCG warn the vessels to leave.

June 26, 2024: DM Kihara [announces](#) that the ASDF will hold joint drills with the German, French, and Spanish air forces from July 19-25 for the purpose of deepening cooperative ties to realize a free and open Indo-Pacific.

June 26, 2024: Chinese national security officials [visit](#) the 87-year-old mother of Osaka-based Japanese citizen Liu Yanzhi at the family home in Hunan to demand that Liu not write unpatriotic books. Liu's book *Fushi no Bomeisha* (Immortal Emigré), published at the end of May, discusses 10 intellectuals in and outside of China.

June 27, 2024: A joint [statement](#) following the inaugural meeting of the commerce and industry ministers of Japan, South Korea, and the US voices "concerns over the weaponization of economic dependencies on certain supply sources for strategic goods," apparently with China in mind.

June 27, 2024: Citing media reports that the Japanese Cabinet has issued decrees to expand the continental shelf of the Ogasawara Plateau, which is located on the east side of the Father

Island in the Ogasawara Islands, by 120,000 sq. km., a Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson [protests](#) the move as contravening the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and international practice.

June 27, 2024: After a hiatus of over four years, [negotiations](#) for the China-Japan-South Korea Free Trade Agreement resume, with the focus on a higher level of liberalization that goes beyond the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership agreement, particularly in areas such as automobiles and key components.

June 28, 2024: A Chinese assistant on a Japanese school bus who intervened to protect a Japanese mother and her child from a knife attack [dies](#) of wounds she received.

July 1, 2024: A Japanese delegation to China led by former speaker of the House of Representatives Kono Yohei to promote economic relations with Japan expresses [concerns](#) about the safety of Japanese nationals engaged in bilateral economic interactions.

July 2, 2024: [Surveys](#) of Chinese factory managers show a mixed outlook in June, with growth steady. The Purchasers Managers Index (PMI) for new export orders slipped to 49.4 from 49.6, perhaps reflecting announcements by the EU and US of plans to increase their tariffs on imports of electric vehicles from China.

July 2, 2024: Chinese conglomerate Fosun International will [sell](#) Japanese ski destination Hoshino Resorts Tomamu for 40.8 billion yen (\$252 million), as Fosun sheds nonstrategic assets in the face of a slumping Chinese property market.

July 4, 2024: In [response](#) to news that the second 2+2 Japan-Philippines meeting since April 2022 will be held in July and that the two will sign a Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA), that will allow their respective militaries to visit each other's soil.

July 5, 2024: China Coast Guard (CCG) is more vigorously [attempting](#) to claim sovereignty over the waters around the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, warning off Japanese fishing vessels in the area and identifying some by name. Since October 2023 the CCG has also adopted stronger

wording, using “illegal trespassing” in its posts rather than “intruding into territorial waters

July 6, 2024: With China in mind, Japan’s Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency will [begin](#) manufacturing a prototype device for practical use on Okinawa Prefecture’s Yonaguni Island by the end of this fiscal year. Research continues on the development of an over-the-horizon (OTH) radar that can detect targets at ranges beyond the capabilities of standard radar, since the radio waves emitted by radar currently used by the SDF cannot reach beyond the horizon.

July 6, 2024: Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshimasa [tells](#) a news conference that a Chinese marine research vessel has installed a buoy in the waters north of Okinotorishima, adding that Chinese buoys have been observed near the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea, but it is unusual for a Chinese buoy to be set up on the Pacific side of Japan.

July 8, 2024: Foreign Minister Kamikawa Yoko, DM Minoru and Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. hold [talks](#) in Manila affirming their intention to strengthen security cooperation in light of China’s increasingly aggressive maritime expansion.

July 9, 2024: Japan and NATO set up a [dedicated line](#) for sharing highly confidential security information.

July 9, 2024: As NATO leaders [convene](#) in Washington to discuss the war in Ukraine and express concerns over China, a Pew poll reveals that 15 out of the 18 high-income countries surveyed expressed unfavorable views toward China, with Japan and Australia leading the pack with more than 8 in 10 in those countries viewing China negatively.

July 10, 2024: Toyota, Honda, and Nissan [report](#) a combined year-on-year 12.9% decline from January-June in China. This is the third consecutive year of decline.

July 11, 2024: Japanese clothing retailer Uniqlo [describes](#) itself as at a turning point with its store-opening strategy in China, after the chain's parent, Fast Retailing, announced a "large profit fall" in China and Hong Kong during the three months through May. Uniqlo plans a

“scrap and build” policy in the PRC, closing stores with low monthly sales and opening larger ones in better locations.

July 11, 2024: Gan Yu, a spokesperson for the Chinese Coast Guard, [says](#) that the CCG “took necessary control measures and drove away a Japanese fishing boat and several cruise ships that illegally entered the territorial waters of China's Diaoyu Islands on July 10,” urging the Japanese side to immediately stop all illegal activities in these waters and warning that China reserves the right to counter otherwise.

July 11, 2024: China protests as MSDF destroyer Suzutsuki [sails](#) within 12 nautical miles of the Zhejiang coast without notifying China. Japan's defense ministry has launched an investigation questioning the captain of the Suzutsuki, and the crew's intention remains unclear.

July 11, 2024: Citing unnamed diplomatic sources, Kyodo [reports](#) that China and Japan did not use their defense hotline to communicate when an MSDF destroyer temporarily sailed into Chinese territorial waters, diplomatic sources said Thursday, calling into question the direct line's effectiveness in crisis management.

July 12, 2024: Japan’s defense ministry [releases](#) its annual White Paper saying, inter alia, that “Japan is facing the most severe and complex security environment since the end of World War II, and that it cannot be ruled out that a serious situation similar to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine may occur in the Indo-Pacific region in future, particularly in East Asia.”

July 12, 2024: Following the publication of Japan's new defense white paper, which delivers its strongest words yet on Taiwan, and Prime Minister Kishida’s attendance at the recent NATO meeting, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian [says](#) that Japan must not interfere in China’s domestic affairs and not act as a "vanguard" of NATO's Asia-Pacific expansion.

July 13, 2024: With China in mind, Kishida and Olaf Scholz [agree](#) to establish a new bilateral framework for consultations on economic security. Measures to strengthen supply chains for semiconductors and other key products are expected to be on the agenda for consultations.

July 14, 2024: *Global Times* [responds](#) that if Japan-Germany cooperation solely focuses on the idea of "countering China" and distorts economic policy by overstretching the security concept, it will only hinder these countries' progress and limit their own potential for growth.

July 15, 2024: *Nikkei* China Bureau Chief Momoi Yuri [argues](#) that the paucity of recent personal exchanges represents a significant missed opportunity, risking weakening bilateral relations while depriving Japan of firsthand knowledge about developments in China, leaving it at a disadvantage compared to other nations.

July 16, 2024: Japan's 11th Regional Coast Guard Headquarters [reports](#) that two China Coast Guard vessels entered Japanese territorial waters off the Senkaku Islands carrying what appeared to be guns. A Japan Coast Guard patrol vessel warned the CCG vessels to leave the waters.

July 17, 2024: Reacting to the publication of the 2024 Defense White Paper, *Asahi* [editorializes](#) that Japan seems impatient to boost its deterrence power while communications with China remain inadequate on multiple levels.

July 19, 2024: Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting hosted by Tokyo [expresses](#) unity, but with noticeable differences among some nations' positions regarding China and some dissension on Japan's discharge of treated water from the Fukushima nuclear power plant.

July 20, 2024: A foreign ministry spokesperson [expresses](#) "China's strong dissatisfaction with and firm opposition to" the recent joint maritime drill between Japan and the Taiwan region. Taiwan's Patrol No. 9 inspection ship and Japan's aircraft-carrying Sagami conducted a joint exercise off the southern tip of the Boso Peninsula and the waters near Izu Island.

July 22, 2024: Given China's continuing aggression in the area, the Japanese defense ministry has moved [forward](#) the timeline for deployment of improved missiles to defend the Nansei Islands.

July 23, 2024: Moriyama Hiroshi, chairperson of the LDP's General Council, [meets](#) Chinese Foreign Minister and Politburo member Wang Yi in Beijing saying that "Today's Japan-China relationship is not necessarily ideal...and that to make it truly constructive and stable, the embodiment of the mutually beneficial strategic relationship is important."

July 23, 2024: Onizuka Mitsunori, mayor of remote Kita-Daitojima island, [agrees](#) to allow the Air Self-Defense Force to deploy mobile warning and control radar to track China's growing military presence in local waters, adding that he will "carefully explain their concerns in a manner that does not cause anxiety."

July 23, 2024: Japan's Nippon Steel will [withdraw](#) from a joint venture with Baoshan Iron & Steel, marking a turning point in a 21-year relationship that was a symbol of China's progress in modernizing its steel industry.

July 24, 2024: Japanese coast guard [confirms](#) that a China coast guard ship that had been sailing off Kubashima Island of the Senkakus left the contiguous zone on July 23, meaning that there are currently no current CCG vessels in the area.

July 26, 2024: Taiwan authorities announce [plans](#) to completely abolish import restrictions on Japanese food products, removing a major irritant to bilateral relations. China still restricts products from Fukushima and four other prefectures.

July 26, 2024: In what Beijing will [see](#) as the further militarization of Japan as well as the deepening of US-Japanese military cooperation, the Japanese and US governments aim to establish a production system in Japan for the AMRAAM medium-range air-to-air missile.

July 27, 2024: Wang Yi, meeting Kamikawa Yoko in Vientiane July 27 on the sidelines of a meeting of foreign ministers hosted by ASEAN ahead of the security-focused ASEAN Regional Forum. says [relations](#) are at a critical stage and must advance or be left behind.

July 28–31, 2024: Zhou Zuyi, Secretary of Fujian Provincial Committee and Chairman of the Standing Committee of Fujian Provincial People's Congress [leads](#) a delegation to Japan.

July 28, 2024: Warning that China's aggressive posture [poses](#) the “greatest strategic challenge” in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond, the US and Japan outline the most significant upgrade to their joint military alliance since 1960.

July 29, 2024: [Meeting](#) in Tokyo with China in mind, the Quad foreign ministers issue a joint statement opposing unilateral attempts to change the status quo in the East and South China Seas by force or coercion. They also affirm cooperation on maritime security and measures related to critical and emerging technologies and cybersecurity.

July 29, 2024: [Responding](#) to the Quad statement, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian says that the Quad keeps chanting the slogan of a free and open Indo-Pacific while all the while scaremongering, inciting antagonism and confrontation, and holding back other countries' development

July 30, 2024: Japanese factory automation supplier Fanuc [raises](#) its annual net profit outlook by \$117 million on a recovery in orders from China, where government subsidies are driving demand despite a sluggish economy.

July 30, 2024: A “Tainan Declaration” emanating from the 10th Japan-Taiwan Exchange Summit [calls](#) for both governments to establish a Taiwan-Japan basic relations law (台日關係基本法), initiate higher-level cooperation and urges the Japanese government to support Taiwan's application to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, WHO and other international organizations.

July 30, 2024: A thriving [community](#) of Chinese intellectuals has grown up in Tokyo. Describing themselves as the successors of China's 40 years of reform and opening up, they express gratitude for the ability to escape the PRC's constant surveillance and censorship.

July 31, 2024: A new [project](#), Dongwang Xigui (“looking east, returning west”) is launched in Tokyo to promote the return of Chinese cultural artifacts scattered in Japan to China, provide important resources for research into the history, culture and art of China, and promote in-depth exchanges and cooperation between China and Japan in the fields of historical research, cultural heritage protection and inheritance.

Aug. 1, 2024: Liu Jinsong, director general of the Chinese Foreign Ministry's department of Asian affairs, meets Yokochi Akira, chief minister of Japan's embassy in Beijing, on Tuesday to express strong [disapproval](#) of Japan's negative words and deeds about China during the meeting of the Japan-US Security Consultative Committee, at the two-plus-two security talks, by Japanese and US foreign and defense ministers, and at the meeting of foreign ministers of the Quad countries.

Aug. 2, 2024: In the latest collaboration between countries that have pushed back against China's regional assertiveness the Philippines and Japan [hold](#) their first joint military exercises in the South China Sea, within the Philippines exclusive economic zone.

Aug. 2, 2024: With Tesla and China's BYD leading the growing global EV market, Honda and Nissan will [partner](#) to jointly develop software-related technologies for EVs.

Aug. 2, 2024: *China Military Online* [complains](#) that the more aggressive US-Japan alliance implicit in the “2+2” US-Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC) threatens Asia Pacific security and stability.

Aug. 4, 2024: Japan, aiming to ensure its presence is felt in Central Asia against Russian and Chinese involvement, [agrees](#) with the five Central Asian countries of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan on priority areas for collaboration including green technologies and resilience, connectivity and development of human resources.

Aug. 5, 2024: Aiming to [encourage](#) Mongolia to lower its level of reliance on China and Russia, with which the country has national borders, the Japanese and Mongolian governments enter the final phase of coordination toward a basic agreement on the transfer of defense equipment and technologies, under which the two countries will be able to export defense equipment to each other.

Aug. 7, 2024: [Responding](#) to US ambassador to Japan Rahm Emanuel's statement to Bloomberg that America is looking to Japan to be a significant partner in Asia in terms of both hard power and soft power and that their relationship is "no longer an alliance of protection but projection," *China Daily* editorializes that the statement plays into the hands of some alt-right politicians in Japan.

Aug. 7, 2024: Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning [reiterates](#) China's opposition to Japan's unilateral discharge of water from the Fukushima site, the eighth batch of which was dumped on Aug. 7.

Aug. 8, 2024: [Interpreting](#) Kishida's instructions to the LDP to accelerate discussion on revising Japan's pacifist constitution as a bid to win support from conservative forces ahead of an upcoming party leadership election, the *Global Times* quotes Lü Chao, director of the Institute of the US and East Asian Studies at Liaoning University, as saying that doing so will allow the former aggressor and defeated country [Japan] to potentially engage in wars against other countries or use the threat of war."

Aug. 8, 2024: Beijing University economist Michael Pettis [refutes](#) previous comparisons between Chinese and Japanese economic imbalances, saying that what is striking is not that Beijing is attempting a radically different solution to its economic imbalances from Tokyo's solution in the late 1980s and early 1990s, but rather how similar its response has so far been to Tokyo's.

Aug. 10, 2024: Website of the Shishi municipal government of Fujian [prohibits](#) fishers from "operating in sensitive sea areas" just prior to the Aug. 16 expiration of the Chinese central government's fishing ban in the seas around the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands.

Aug. 13, 2024: *Yomiuri* [editorializes](#) in favor of the Honda-Nissan agreement to collaborate on EV production to counter Chinese gains in that sector.

Aug. 15, 2024: DM Minoru [visits](#) Yasukuni Shrine on the 79th anniversary of Japan's surrender in World War II, making a cash offering of his own money and explaining that he offered his heartfelt condolences and paid respect and reverence to those who sacrificed their lives. The Chinese foreign ministry [lodges](#) "serious protests" over the visit.

Aug. 15, 2024: Ahead of the anniversary, Hideo Shimizu, former member of Unit 731, the notorious Japanese germ-warfare detachment during World War II, [identifies](#) the crimes of the Japanese army at the site where he served 79 years ago in Northeast China's Harbin.

Aug. 16, 2024: Chinese fishing vessels have been [active](#) in waters near Japan despite a Chinese embargo on Japanese seafood products following the release of treated water from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant that began a year ago. Japanese fishermen complain that Chinese fishermen have been pressuring them to leave their fishing grounds.

Aug. 17, 2024: At the two-plus-two meeting, taking China's increasing maritime expansion into account, India and Japan prepare to [accelerate](#) space and cyber security cooperation and boost joint drills to deepen security ties. Prime Minister Modi is to visit Japan before the end of the year.

Aug. 17, 2024: After a [visit](#) to Taiwan by a bipartisan group of Japanese lawmakers, including former Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba, China's embassy in Tokyo warns Japan that it should be prepared "to pay a heavy price" if it interferes with Beijing's plans for Taiwan.

Aug. 19, 2024: Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department [issues](#) arrest warrants for three Chinese men after graffiti are discovered on a stone pillar at the Yasukuni Shrine, the second such act of this year. Two of the men have already returned to China.

Aug. 21, 2024: Reports note that Chinese prosecutors have [indicted](#) a Japanese employee of Astellas Pharma who was detained in March 2023 on suspicion of espionage. The Japanese government is calling for his early release, but his detention is expected to be prolonged further.

Aug. 22, 2024: Italian Navy's aircraft carrier *Cavour* and frigate *Alpino* [arrive](#) at the MSDF base in Yokosuka to conduct joint training exercises with the MSDF to cooperate in response to China's increasing maritime presence.

Aug. 23, 2024: Japanese machine tool producers' orders from China [increase](#) 66% to 29.5 billion yen year-on-year from the end of July, offsetting a drop in domestic order which shrank for the 23rd month in a row.

Aug. 24, 2024: Chinese fishing boats continue to [operate](#) in waters near Japan a year to the day after the release of treated water from the disabled Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant and despite a Chinese embargo on Japanese seafood products over the release of the water.

Aug. 26, 2024: Japan's Defense Ministry [reveals](#) that a Chinese Y-9 military intelligence-gathering aircraft violated Japan's airspace off the Danjo Islands in Nagasaki Prefecture for about two minutes. This is the first time for a violation of Japan's airspace by a Chinese military aircraft to be confirmed and announced.

Aug. 27, 2024: According to an anonymous [source](#) said to be linked to the CCP and cited by *Yomiuri* the reason for the violation of Japan's airspace on Aug. 26 was Japan's actively conducting joint training exercises with the naval and air forces of NATO member countries since July and to "gauge Japan's reaction."

Aug. 27, 2024: Chief Cabinet Secretary Hayashi [calls](#) China's incursion "not just a severe violation of Japan's sovereignty but a threat to our security," adding that Japan would take all possible measures to monitor and act against any future violations of airspace.

Aug. 27, 2024: Chinese Foreign Ministry [says](#) China has "no intention" to violate any country's airspace, adding that "the competent Chinese authorities are learning and verifying the situation."

Aug. 27, 2024: Japan Coast Guard will make a budget [request](#) for funds to construct what would be its largest multipurpose patrol vessel to respond to disasters and evacuate remote island residents in the event of emergencies.

Aug. 28, 2024: A *Global Times* commentary [applauds](#) the visit of Nikai's delegation while noting that problems between the two countries have piled up. Japan's provocative actions in the East China Sea and South China Sea challenge China's core interests, as well as its alignment with the US that destabilizes the region, have become a source of concern for China.

Aug. 29, 2024: Diet member and former LDP secretary-general Nikai Toshiro [leads](#) the first nonpartisan legislative group to visit China in five years. Nikai, 85, has close ties in China, has announced that he will not run again.

Aug. 30, 2024: Japan's defense ministry is to invest in AI, automation and improving troop conditions to address a worsening recruitment [shortfall](#) that has left its forces understaffed amid a buildup aimed at countering China's growing military power.

Aug. 30, 2024: Japanese steelmakers [urge](#) Tokyo to consider curbing cheap steel imports coming from China. China's steel exports rose 24% to 53.4 million tons in the first half of 2024, on track for 100 million tons for the year.

Aug. 31, 2024: A Chinese naval survey ship [enters](#) territorial waters southwest of Kuchinoerabu Island at around 6 a.m. and exited southwest of Yakushima Island at around 7:53 a.m. as MSDF vessels and aircraft were conducting surveillance and intelligence gathering.

Aug. 31, 2024: *Yomiuri* [editorializes](#) that China's statement that it has "no intention" of violating the sovereignty of other countries is unacceptable, and that if airspace violations, which are serious violations of sovereignty, are not fully addressed, China may further escalate its provocations.

Sept. 1, 2024: Defense ministry [requests](#) ¥323.2 billion to build a satellite constellation network for guiding missiles in its initial budget request for fiscal 2025.

Sept. 1, 2024: A Chinese man [contracted to](#) an affiliate of Japanese state broadcaster NHK goes off-script while reporting on graffiti at the Yasukuni Shrine saying in Chinese that the Senkaku Islands are “Chinese territory” and protesting “NHK’s historical revisionist propaganda” and “unprofessional practices.”

Sept. 3, 2024: Mitsubishi CEO Nakanishi Katsuya calls for a more [active](#) strategy from the government to help Japanese companies counter increasing Chinese competition in their traditional stronghold of Southeast Asia.

Sept. 3, 2024: Hong Kong’s government [revamps](#) a colonial-era coastal defense museum with a sharper focus on wartime anti-Japanese resistance, coinciding with the annual commemoration of Imperial Japan’s defeat 79 years ago.

Sept. 5, 2024: A joint statement [issued](#) after the 2+2 meeting of Japanese and Australian foreign and defense ministers expresses serious concern over China’s escalating dangerous and coercive activities against the Philippines and condemns attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion in the East China Sea and elsewhere.

Sept. 12, 2024: [Commenting](#) on China’s decision, reported in Hong Kong’s Sing Tao daily on Sept. 3, to establish a Ryukyu Research Center *Nikkei* correspondent Nakazawa Katsuji believes that China may have set its sights on Okinawa, perhaps in retaliation for Japan’s deepening ties with Taiwan.

Sept. 14, 2024: Digital Minister Kono Taro asserts on a Fuji Television program that Japan needs to deploy its own nuclear submarines which, he said, would “make it difficult for the Chinese navy to move out into the Pacific at will.”

Sept. 15, 2024: Former Environment Minister Koizumi Shinjiro [says](#) Japan-China relations would be “unlocked for the future through top-level diplomacy” while former LDP secretary general Ishiba Shigeru favors the creation of an Asian version of NATO as well as emphasizing to the US that it “is able to enjoy its interests in Asia because of Japan’s cooperation.”

Sept. 15, 2024: To [counter](#) illegal fishing in waters where China’s influence is growing, the coast guards of the Quad nations will launch joint patrols to monitor vessels in the Indo-Pacific.

Sept. 17, 2024: Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs [requests](#) 350 million yen for the next fiscal year to pay for the security measures for each of the eleven Japanese schools in China, which will include posting one guard for each bus. A total of 3,305 students attend.

Sept. 18, 2024: A 10-year-old boy is [stabbed](#) near a Japanese school in Shenzhen and dies while under treatment in a hospital. A 44-year-old man, surnamed Zhong, is taken into custody. Lin Jian, a spokesman for the Chinese Foreign Ministry, says the government will continue to take “effective measures” to protect “the safety of all foreigners in China.” Sept. 18, the anniversary of the 1931 Mukden incident that led to the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, is typically a time of [heightened](#) anti-Japanese sentiment.

Sept. 18, 2024: Chinese aircraft carrier Liaoning [accompanied](#) by two destroyers [enters](#) Japan’s contiguous zone for the first time.

Sept. 20, 2024: Foreign Minister Kamikawa Yoko expresses [condolences](#) and says that the attack on the student on Sept. 18 occurred despite Tokyo’s requests for caution and enhanced safety as China marks a key anniversary of its war with Japan.

Sept. 20, 2024: China and Japan reach a four-point [agreement](#) on the discharge of Fukushima nuclear-contaminated water that includes Japan establishing a long-term international monitoring arrangement and allowing stakeholders including China to conduct independent sampling and monitoring.

Sept. 20, 2024: Reports state that, beginning in 2025, the coast guards of the Quad states will [begin](#) carrying one another's personnel on their vessels that patrol the Indo-Pacific.

Sept. 21, 2024: Employees at four Japanese companies [say](#) that some big firms in China have given Japanese employees and their families the option to be relocated home at the company's expense, or are considering doing so.

Sept. 21, 2024: Kyodo [reports](#) that, aiming to further strengthen collaboration amid China's growing military assertiveness, Japan and the European Union plan to establish director general-level dialogue on security and defense issues.

Sept. 23, 2024: Quad leaders [issue](#) the Wilmington Declaration expressing "serious concern about the situation in the East and South China seas."

Sept. 24, 2024: Foreign Minister Kamikawa [meets](#) opposite number Wang Yi at the opening of the UN General Assembly demanding that China crack down on "unsubstantiated and malicious anti-Japanese social media posts [that are] directly related to children's safety and absolutely unacceptable."

Sept. 25, 2024: *Asahi* [editorializes](#) on the need for Japan's next prime minister to aim at improving ties with China.

Sept. 26, 2024: MSDF destroyer Sazanami [sails](#) through the Taiwan Strait on the 25th for the first time since the SDFs were formed. Kishida made the decision after consultation with his government and in response to the Chinese sending a reconnaissance plane into Japanese airspace in August.

Sept. 26, 2024: Miyamoto Yuji, newly [appointed](#) president of the Japan-China Friendship Center and former Japanese ambassador to China, having recently visited China, comments that exchanges between the two countries have never truly ceased and that most Japanese people are eager to understand and also value their relationship with the real China.

Sept. 27, 2024: Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian [says](#) at a routine daily press conference in response to Ishiba

Shigeru's election as LDP president that China has noted the election results but that it is Japan's internal matter, and that China does not comment on it.

Sept. 28, 2024: After Ishiba's election as president of the LDP, China's Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian [expresses](#) the PRC's strong opposition toward Japanese politicians visiting Taiwan.

Sept. 29, 2024: In an article [posted](#) on the Hudson Institute's website, Ishiba [says](#) that "the creation of an Asian version of NATO is essential to deter China by its Western allies" and that the creation of the Asian NATO he envisions "must also specifically consider America's sharing of nuclear weapons or the introduction of nuclear weapons into the region."

Oct. 3, 2024: Japan's new government [says](#) it hopes to improve ties with China after receiving a "forward-looking" congratulatory message from Beijing on the election of Prime Minister Ishiba.

Oct. 11, 2024: [Meeting](#) on the sidelines of the ASEAN summit in Laos, Ishiba and Premier Li Qiang confirm their commitment to promoting mutually beneficial ties as Ishiba expresses "serious concerns" over Chinese military movements in areas surrounding Japan.

Oct. 11, 2024: *China Military Online* [interprets](#) reports that Japan's defense ministry is in talks with several commercial ferry companies about using civil transport capacities to undertake military tasks as a move to cover up Japan's strengthened war preparedness with a civil cloak and to establish an amphibious transport and logistics supply model similar to that of the US, which will facilitate their defense cooperation.

Oct. 13, 2024: *Yomiuri* [observes](#) that Chinese mainstream media have remained silent on the news that Nihon Hidankyo, or Japan Confederation of A- and H-Bomb Sufferers Organizations, won the Nobel Peace Prize, interpreting the silence as reflecting the differences between Xi Jinping's administration, which is focused on strengthening its nuclear capabilities, and Hidankyo's efforts toward a world free of nuclear weapons.

Oct. 17, 2024: Responding to the latest round of large-scale Chinese military exercises encircling Taiwan, *Yomiuri* [editorializes](#) that if China thinks continued military threats and psychological intimidation can force Taiwan into submission, it would be a serious mistake.

Oct. 17, 2024: *Asahi* [editorializes](#) against China's military exercise around Taiwan following a similar intimidating show of force in May.

Oct. 17, 2024: Writing in *China Daily*, research fellow in the China Institute of International Studies Xiang Haoyu [advises](#) that Japanese leaders need to strike a balance between catering to the domestic public, which means they should manage to maintain cooperation with China rather than simply taking a populist tough stance against China.

Oct. 17, 2024: In a first, Defense Minister Nakatani Gen [attends](#) the NATO defense ministers' meeting in Brussels, expressing deep concern over the closer military cooperation between not only Russia and China, but also between Russia and North Korea.

Oct. 18, 2024: Concerns [remain](#) among Japanese due to the Chinese government's still not having provided a clear motive for the fatal stabbing of a Japanese boy on Sept. 18.

Oct. 19, 2024: *Yomiuri* [reports](#) that on Sept. 25 the MSDF destroyer Sazanami transited the Taiwan Strait to counter China's influence in East Asia.

Oct. 19, 2024: A 17-member expert panel of Japan's defense ministry [confirms](#) the necessity of strengthening domestic defense industry and promoting the export of defense equipment abroad.

Oct. 20, 2024: [Highlighting](#) China's repeated acts of hegemony in the East and South China seas, DM Nakatani calls for a free and open Indo-Pacific at a meeting of the G7 defense ministers in Naples, Italy.

Oct. 20, 2024: A *China Daily* editorial [calls](#) Ishiba's political agenda inherently contradictory: he wants to rebalance the alliance with the US to increase Japan's strategic autonomy and foster "constructive, stable" relations with neighboring China through

dialogue and cooperation while at the same time pursuing an Asian version of NATO.

Oct. 21, 2024: During a phone call with Japan's National Security Adviser Akiba Takeo, Chinese foreign minister [says](#) his country's relations with Japan have gotten off to a "good start," following the establishment of Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru's government.

Oct. 22, 2024: China may allow the [resumption](#) of imports of ornamental nishikigoi carp, which had been halted since Nov. 2023 in protest against the release of treated water from TEPCO's Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant.

Oct. 22, 2024: China's ultra-nationalist "little pinks" call for a [boycott](#) of major milk powder company Feihe following reports that it signed a letter of intent to develop a lactoferrin-based infant formula product with Japan's Kyowa Hakko Biochemical Co.

Oct. 23, 2024: A [report](#) released by the Academy of Contemporary China and World Studies titled "Chinese Modernization in the Eyes of Japanese" on Sept. 11 shows that 61.5% of respondents believe that Chinese modernization is positive for Japan's development and modernization and 43.4% believe that "Chinese modernization is an opportunity for Japan, and active participation in bilateral cooperation can promote common development."

Oct. 25, 2024: Sophie Luo Shengchun wife of jailed Chinese human rights lawyer Ding Jiaxi, [visits](#) Japan, calling for support for the release of her husband and all prisoners of conscience in the PRC.

Oct. 25, 2024: People's Bank of China and the Bank of Japan [agree](#) to renew their bilateral currency swap deal amounting to 200 billion yuan (about \$28.13 billion).

Oct. 25, 2024: China and Japan [hold](#) their 17th round of high-level consultations on maritime affairs in Tokyo, exchanging in-depth views on maritime affairs and agreeing to make the East China Sea a sea of peace, cooperation and friendship.

Oct. 30, 2024: *Yomiuri* [editorializes](#) in favor of Japan, the US, and South Korea strengthening support for the Philippines against Chinese

aggression while appealing to the international community on the need to maintain stability in the South China Sea and to deter China.

Oct. 31, 2024: In the first [transfer](#) in eight years under a bilateral agreement to help conserve the internationally protected crested ibis, 16 birds born in Japan to parents sent by China arrive in Beijing.

Nov. 1, 2024: First-ever Japan-EU Foreign Ministers' Strategic Dialogue is [held](#) in Tokyo. Concerned that "Ukraine today may be East Asia tomorrow," Japan and the European Union [agree](#) to launch a defense and security partnership that will lay the ground for closer cooperation.

Nov. 2, 2024: China [informs](#) Japan that an "unexpected obstruction" was what caused one of its military planes to breach Japanese airspace in August, seemingly attributing the blame to the Japanese defense force's activities prior to the unprecedented intrusion.

Nov. 3, 2024: Citing unspecified government sources, *Yomiuri* [reports](#) that one of the China Coast Guard's largest patrol ships made a rare move of sailing around the Senkaku Islands in June, apparently in response to the United States dispatching a patrol ship to help boost collaboration with Japan and the Philippines.

Nov. 3, 2024: China's National Defense University's College of Joint Operations and the State Key Laboratory of Intelligent Games in Beijing [simulate](#) a scenario involving an attack on Shanghai by stealth fighters from Japan.

Nov. 4, 2024: Japanese national security adviser Akiba Takeo [visits](#) China seeking to lay the groundwork for a meeting between the leaders of the two countries.

Nov. 6, 2024: In its first visit to China in eight years a [delegation](#) of the Japan Association of Corporate Executives calls for China to exempt Japanese short-term visitors from visa requirements. It also calls for China's active participation in the 2025 Osaka-Kansai Expo.

Nov. 6, 2024: Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) Senior Vice President Ishii Yasuo confirms that in July the organization was hit by multiple cyberattacks on staff accounts through

the Microsoft 365 cloud service but declines to provide details.

Nov. 6, 2024: Japan's defense ministry [reports](#) that fighters and helicopters took off from and landed about 20 times from the aircraft carrier Shandong south of Okinawa's Miyako Island.

Nov. 6, 2024: *Huanqiu* [objects](#) to a *Nihon Keizai Shimbun* article claiming that China was provoking the Ryukyu issue.

Nov. 7, 2024: A *Global Times* opinion piece [advised](#) being wary of Japanese nationalism since it has the potential to cause regional waves.

Nov. 9, 2024: [Saying](#) that breaches of Japanese airspace by Chinese and Russian warplanes earlier in the year "not only violated Japanese sovereignty but also threatened the safety of Japan, and are absolutely unacceptable," Ishiba renews a pledge to build up his country's military and deepen its alliance with the United States under President-elect Donald Trump.

Nov. 9, 2024: A new [report](#) from Human Rights Watch states that Chinese authorities are targeting and intimidating people living in Japan and engaging in activities deemed politically sensitive by the Chinese government.

Nov. 10, 2024: Over 800 representatives from government bodies, businesses and institutions from China and Japan [attend](#) the 17th China-Japan Comprehensive Forum on Energy Saving and Environmental Protection in Tokyo on Saturday to explore cooperation opportunities in green transformation.

Nov. 15, 2024: [Japanese economy expands by an annualized 0.9% in Q 3](#) highlighting Japan's frail economic recovery, as consumer spending held up but domestic demand has not fully picked up amid concerns that about a growing risk of a slowdown in the US and further weakness in China's economy that could weigh on exports ahead.

Nov. 16, 2024: Ishiba [holds](#) his first meeting with Xi on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Lima with Ishiba telling reporters that “While there are many differences of opinion between Japan and China, we did agree to continue to hold meetings in the future.”

Nov. 18, 2024: [Aiming](#) to further cooperation in the space domain between US and SDF forces to counter security threats from China and Russia, about 10 members of the US space force will be stationed at Yokota Air Base in December.

Nov. 17, 2024: [Interviewed](#) by *Global Times*, Takeshi Niinami, chair of the Japan Association of Corporate Executives, emphasizes that personal visits to China and firsthand experience of the current state of its economy and society are crucial to fostering a good Japan-China relationship.

Nov. 18, 2024: *Asahi* [editorializes](#) that conditions are ripe for Japan and China to work to improve ties, as with the confrontation between the US and China expected to continue for the foreseeable future, the Xi administration wants to keep China’s relations with neighboring countries as good as possible and has been exploring approaches to improving relations with Japan.

Nov. 21, 2024: Japanese officials are closely [watching](#) to see if China keeps its promise to prevent further violations of Japan's airspace after explaining that an incursion by a Chinese military aircraft nearly three months ago was unintentional and caused by turbulence.

Nov. 22, 2024: China's foreign ministry says that the [requirement](#) for short-term visas for Japanese will be waived from Nov. 30 through the end of next year. They were suspended in March 2020 amid the coronavirus pandemic.

Nov. 24, 2024: *Kyodo* reports that China [intends](#) to remove a buoy it installed inside Japan's exclusive economic zone near the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea.

Nov. 25, 2024: Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Agency (ATLA), an external bureau of the Japanese defense ministry, [plans](#) to develop a new model of radar to improve interception capabilities against hypersonic missiles.

Nov. 25, 2024: Japanese foreign ministry [moves](#) up its schedule for placing security guards on school buses for Japanese schools in China from April to the end of March by including the relevant expenses in the fiscal 2024 supplementary budget.

Nov. 28, 2024: A delegation from seven economic groups in the Kansai region [confirms](#) with Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng their desire to cooperate in improving and strengthening Japan-China ties.

Nov. 30, 2024: Uniqlo [faces](#) a storm of online criticism in China after a BBC report quotes the chief executive of its owner as saying the company does not source cotton from the far western region of Xinjiang

