The COVID-19 virus sent US-China relations into a tailspin as 2020 opened. Recriminations flew over who was responsible for the virus that killed hundreds of thousands of people and brought economic activity to a halt. The Trump administration took a series of measures against Chinese media organizations and journalists in the United States, which provoked Beijing to expel US journalists working in China. The Phase 1 trade deal was signed, and some tariffs were lifted, though the COVID-19 outbreak hampered China’s ability to purchase the promised amount of US goods and services. With the 2020 US presidential election picking up speed, Trump campaign strategists are actively targeting China.

COVID-19 and the Blame Game

The novel coronavirus that spread worldwide in the first four months of 2020 could have catalyzed a period of cooperation in US-China relations. Instead, it led to even greater acrimony between Washington and Beijing, revealing the depth of mistrust and suspicion both sides harbor toward each other. Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping made countless attempts to control the narrative about an uncontrollable virus to shore up domestic support. With the US presidential elections looming in November, Trump often took to Twitter to either brag about close cooperation with China or to blame China for the virus. To silence any legitimacy doubts, Xi and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) strategically placed blame on individuals at the local level and spun China’s handling of the virus as a success story. Despite glimpses of collaboration, the hostility injected into the bilateral relationship ensured that the impact of COVID-19 will be felt in US-China relations and around the world for a long time to come.

The Discovery of a Novel Coronavirus

On December 31, health officials in the city of Wuhan in China’s Hubei Province reported to the World Health Organization (WHO) multiple cases of “pneumonia of unknown etiology.” One week later, Chinese scientists confirmed that they had identified and isolated a novel coronavirus as the cause of the illness. The US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) responded by issuing a level 1 travel notice for those traveling to Wuhan, which simply encouraged travelers to “practice usual precautions.” Further information about the outbreak was released by the WHO on a near-daily basis, from its suspected link to the Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market in Wuhan to the first confirmed case of the novel coronavirus outside China, in Thailand on January 13. As the number of confirmed cases multiplied and the first deaths were reported, the US CDC ramped up its response on January 17 to include enhanced screenings at three major US airports with the most passengers from Wuhan: New York (JFK), Los Angeles (LAX), and San Francisco (SFO).

Trump acknowledged the outbreak in a tweet on January 24, three days after the first confirmed case in the US, complimentingChina’s “efforts and transparency” in managing the outbreak. A few days later, Trump touted his “very close communication with China concerning the virus” and publicly pledged to President Xi “any help that is necessary.” It was later revealed that US CDC director Robert Redfield made a formal offer of support to China as early as January 4 and US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Secretary Alex Azar made subsequent offers to send a CDC team to China. All went unanswered by Chinese officials.

Nevertheless, both sides remained committed to a continued dialogue on the virus, as evidenced by a January 29 phone call between US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and China’s Director of the Office of the Central Commission for Foreign Affairs Yang Jiechi. The same day, after what he called “a briefing on the Coronavirus in China,” Trump announced that the US was “working closely with China,” a sentiment he echoed on Twitter the next day. Meanwhile, the WHO officially declared the virus to be a Public Health Emergency of International Concern, with HHS Secretary Azar declaring a public health emergency in the US shortly thereafter. On January 31, the US Department of State elevated its travel advisory for China to Level 4—Do Not Travel—defined as “the highest advisory level due to greater likelihood of life-threatening risks.” The White House concurrently announced travel restrictions for any foreign national attempting to enter the US from China, which went into effect on February 2.

Within days of the travel restrictions taking effect, Trump and Xi spoke on the phone. According to the readout from China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Xi expressed his “hopes that the US will evaluate the situation calmly and develop and adjust its response in line with the actual situation,” an apparent reference to the US decisions to bar travelers from China and discourage all travel to the country. At the same time, the recap included vows to increase communication and collaboration on both sides. Trump underscored this positivity in his tweet exclaiming that the US was “working closely with China to help.” The US Department of State delivered on that promise on February 7, when it “facilitated the transportation of nearly 17.8 tons of donated medical supplies to the Chinese people, including masks, gowns, gauze, respirators, and other vital materials.” This goodwill gesture would later draw ire in the US after the domestic need for these items skyrocketed, but at the time it served as a testament to US-China cooperation to combat the novel coronavirus (officially named COVID-19 and deemed a pandemic on February 11 by WHO Director-General Dr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus). The US also pledged “up to $100 million in existing funds to assist China and other impacted countries,” though China’s foreign ministry spokesperson later said “as a matter of fact, we haven’t received $1 from the US government.”

China’s Response Timeline Questioned

February 7 marked the death of Dr. Li Wenliang, an ophthalmologist at Wuhan Central Hospital, who had tried to warn the Chinese public on December 30 that multiple people in Wuhan had fallen ill from a coronavirus. Li’s death prompted a backlash against China’s handling of the virus from Chinese netizens as well as the US and other countries. Authorities in Wuhan had accused Li of spreading false information and forced him to sign a confession admitting his misdemeanor. Li ultimately contracted COVID-19 through a patient at his hospital, and succumbed to the disease. Beijing was quick to pin the accusations of a cover-up on the local authorities, with the state-sanctioned Global Times writing that Li and others “tried to warn other medics of the coronavirus outbreak but were reprimanded by local police.”

Figure 1 Mourners at a vigil for Dr. Li Wenliang. Photo: The New York Times

Li’s death resulted in stepped-up accusations in the US that China’s slow reporting and attempts to control information allowed the exponential spread of the deadly virus. Pompeo’s February 25 remarks to the press criticized China’s response, asserting that “had China permitted its own and foreign journalists and medical personnel to speak and investigate freely, Chinese officials and other nations would have been far better prepared to address the challenge.” Another doctor at Li’s same hospital, Dr. Ai Fen, came forward in early March as the self-proclaimed “one who provided the whistle” in an interview with Chinese magazine Renwu. The interview exposed repeated actions to muzzle doctors in Wuhan attempting to warn others about the virus and take action, but was swiftly censored on Chinese social media. In remarks at the Heritage Foundation on March 11, National Security Adviser Robert O’Brien referenced the silencing of doctors like Li and Ai, declaring that “this outbreak in Wuhan was covered up” and “it probably cost the world community two months to respond.” These initial criticisms were just the tip of the iceberg in what was soon to turn into a war of words.

Fanning the Flames

On March 12, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian tweeted the shocking accusation that “it might be [the] US army that brought the epidemic to Wuhan,” when 280 athletes from the US military participated in the Military World Games. In response, US Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs David Stilwell summoned Chinese Ambassador Cui Tiankai to rebuke Zhao’s unsubstantiated theory. A State Department spokesperson said that the meeting allowed the Trump administration to make clear that the US would not condone the spread of such “dangerous and ridiculous” rumors, and condemned Beijing for “seeking to deflect criticism for its role in starting a global pandemic and not telling the world.” A mutually acrimonious phone call between Secretary Pompeo and Yang Jiechi on March 16 further exacerbated tensions. China’s CGTN reported that Yang warned that US efforts to “slander and smear China’s efforts” would be countered, and defended China’s handling of the virus as “open, transparent, and responsible.” A US readout of the call stated bluntly that “Secretary Pompeo conveyed strong US objections to PRC efforts to shift blame for COVID-19 to the United States.”

Zhao’s attempt to pin blame on the US for the virus provoked a strong response from President Trump. In a tweet that evening, Trump wrote, “The United States will be powerfully supporting those industries, like Airlines and others, that are particularly affected by the Chinese Virus.” His description of the virus as “Chinese” subsequently came under fire in the US as racist and xenophobic, and likely to feed discrimination against Asians and Asian-Americans who were being stigmatized due to fear and misinformation about the virus. Just over one week later, in a March 24 interview with Fox News, Trump notably signaled he would cease using that terminology. Insisting that he did not regret saying it previously, he declared that “everyone knows it came out of China, but I decided we shouldn’t make any more of a big deal out of it.”

However, others in the Trump administration continued to heap blame on China. In remarks to the press on March 25 regarding that day’s G7 ministerial meeting, Pompeo renewed the issue by referring to COVID-19 as the “Wuhan virus.” According to Pompeo, China’s “intentional disinformation campaign” was a central topic of conversation among the G7 foreign ministers. While Pompeo glossed over the lack of a joint communique from the ministers after the meeting, European officials allegedlyreported that Pompeo’s insistence on including the “Wuhan virus” terminology was the source of disagreement that led to the failure to produce a statement. Pompeo later refuted that story, chalking it up to “some pretty bad reporting.”

An SOS for PPE

The rapid spread of COVID-19 left countless hospitals, cities, and entire countries with a dire shortage of personal protective equipment (PPE), including face masks, respirators, and rapid test kits. China’s robust manufacturing sector sought to fill the void with large-scale exports of PPE, which some in the US saw as a move to exploit the COVID-19 pandemic for China’s own political and economic benefit. The alleged push to score gains, however, quickly raised concerns about the quality of Chinese-produced medical supplies. In the Czech Republic and Spain in late March, doctors found over 300,000 rapid test kits in each country to be useless after discovering an alarmingly high rate of error. In a move to protect China’s reputation, Chinese state-owned newspaper China Daily responded by attributing the low accuracy to “some doctors in Spain us[ing] the test kits the wrong way.” At the same time, the Chinese Embassy in Madrid distanced the government from the manufacturing company, Shenzhen Bioeasy Biotechnology, insisting that the company did not have an official license to sell their products. The very next day, the Netherlands Ministry of Health was forced to recall approximately 600,000 N95 masks delivered to medical personnel due to poor fit quality.

The manufacturing blunders by these Chinese companies did little to change the views of many countries that China was behaving irresponsibly in its handling of the pandemic. One week later, Pompeo announced that the US would commit $225 million toward a global response to the virus. In what some thought to be a dig at China, he emphasized the “high-quality, transparent, and meaningful assistance” the US was providing to its partners.

At the same time, the US, which had depleted its domestic supply of PPE resources, was forced to rely on China’s dominant position in the supply chain for its stock. Through the “Project Airbridge” initiative, led by White House Office of American Innovation Director Jared Kushner, the US received a Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)-funded plane of PPE from China on March 29, including approximately 130,000 N95 masks, over 70,000 thermometers, and millions of surgical masks, gowns, and gloves. Despite the positive PPE exchange between the two countries, White House Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy Director Peter Navarro still had harsh words for China on its previous quality control issues. He criticizedChina for globally exporting “fake tests and counterfeit tests” and “profiteering” from its PPE market domination. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Geng Shuang delivered a scathing critique of Navarro’s credibility, labeling him a “habitual liar.”

Growing COVID-19 Deaths, Shrinking Opportunities for Cooperation

President Trump appeared loath to allow the US-China relationship to spiral downward. On March 27, Trump and Xi spoke over the phone in what many thought was meant to be a verbal ceasefire after weeks of heated rhetoric. Trump complimentedChina’s “strong understanding” of COVID-19 in a tweet and again trumpeted close collaboration between both countries. Just three days later, however, Pompeo was again making headlines accusing China of spreading disinformation, particularly “confusion about where the virus began.” When a March 30 phone call between HHS Secretary Azar and Chinese National Health Commission Minister Ma Xiaowei pointed toward renewed interest in cooperation, it was swiftly followed by the leak of a US intelligence community report that alleged China’s reporting on its COVID-19 cases was “intentionally incomplete” and not to be trusted.

Individual US states expressed anger toward China’s alleged lies in various ways. In Wisconsin, the state senate received an ill-conceived request from the Chinese consulate to introduce legislation lauding China’s response to the novel coronavirus, including its “unprecedented and rigorous measures for disease control and prevention.” Wisconsin Senate President Roger Roth was irate and instead introduced a resolution stating just the opposite: that “the Communist Party of China deliberately and intentionally misled the world on the Wuhan Coronavirus.” US Senator Tom Cotton of Arkansas and Texas Congressman Dan Crenshaw brought their own bill to the US Senate floor that would “allow Americans to sue China in federal court to recover damages for death, injury, and economic harm caused by the Wuhan Virus.” Both instances resurrected the controversial ascription of the virus to Wuhan. Missouri took things one step further on April 22, when the state’s attorney general suedBeijing and the CCP for “the enormous death, suffering, and economic losses they inflicted on the world, including Missourians.”

The Blame Game Continues

As April came to a close, the bad blood between the US and China only worsened. Earlier in the month, Trump mused on Twitter that the WHO was “funded largely by the United States, yet very China centric,” and deemed their early recommendations in combating the coronavirus as “faulty.” Trump later announced that the US would halt funding to the organization, accusing it of “push[ing] China’s misinformation about the virus” and regurgitating the Chinese party line without verification.

By the end of April, Trump seemed to be losing patience with China. In an April 27 press briefing, he told reporters that the US was “not happy with China…because we believe [the virus] could have been stopped at the source.” This was a far cry from his tweets flattering China’s handling of the virus as recent as one month prior. The next day, Chinese Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Le Yucheng spoke to NBC News in a sit-down interview to defend China’s reporting of the virus, deny a cover-up, and instead question the US government’s domestic handling of the disease.

Inside the Trump administration, an all-out effort appeared to be underway to identify the cause of COVID-19. A rare statement by the US Office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI)  issued on April 30 maintained that the virus originated in China and “was not manmade or genetically modified.” The DNI statement noted that it was investigating “whether the outbreak began through contact with infected animals or if it was the result of an accident at a laboratory in Wuhan.” Yet within hours, Trump claimed that he had been given definitive evidence that the virus was indeed from a lab, only adding to the swirl of rumors surrounding COVID-19.

Spat Over Journalists

On February 18, the Trump administration declared that five state-run Chinese news organizations—Xinhua, China Daily, People’s Daily, CGTN, and China Radio—would henceforth be regulated as foreign government functionaries. In other words, they would be officially treated as representatives of the Chinese party-state, not as journalists. The new designation would require the five organizations to report to the State Department the names and personal details of their staff, as well as whether they own or lease property in the United States.

Two weeks later, the Trump administration ordered four Chinese news outlets to reduce the number of staff they have working in the United States. The order would permit the four media outlets—Xinhua News Agency, CGTN, China Radio, and China Daily Distribution Corp.—to employ a total of only 100 Chinese citizens, which would require a cut of 40% of their staff. In addition, a senior Trump administration official anonymously revealed plans to restrict the length of time that Chinese citizens are allowed to work in the US on journalist visas. The goal, according to US officials, was to enforce reciprocity between the way the US and China treat each other’s journalists, even as the Trump administration insisted that those working for Chinese media companies are not real journalists.

In retaliation against the US measures, China announced on March 17 that it would expel US journalists working for The New York Times, Wall Street Journal, and Washington Post. US journalists employed by those newspapers were not only banned from working in mainland China, but were also prohibited from working in Hong Kong and Macao. It also required those three media outlets, as well as Time and the Voice of America, to provide the Chinese government with details about their operations in China. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs asserted that its actions were “reciprocal countermeasures that China is compelled to take in response to the unreasonable oppression the Chinese media organizations experience in the US.”

Pompeo said China’s decision was “unfortunate,” and added that he hoped Beijing would reconsider the expulsions. In a subsequent phone call with the publishers of the three major US newspapers, Pompeo reportedly acknowledged that the US actions had been poorly timed, and perhaps, even wrong. Yet, the Trump administration is apparently contemplating further actions, including expelling specific Chinese journalists it believes are spies.

Phase I Trade Deal Signed

On January 15, the US and China signed a trade deal that both countries described as the first phase of a more extensive agreement. The eight-chapter trade pact commits Beijing to purchase at least $200 billion in goods and services from the US over the next two years and implement more effective measures to crack down on Chinese theft of US technology and corporate secrets. China also agreed to make “enforceable commitments to refrain from competitive devaluation” of its currency. In addition, the deal includes increased access to China’s financial services market for US companies.

The US agreed to cut by half the tariff rate it imposed last September 1 on $120 billion of Chinese goods, bringing the rate down to 7.5%. The tariffs on nearly $160 billion worth of Chinese goods that were scheduled to go into effect on December 15 were suspended indefinitely. However, the 25% import taxes on $250 billion worth of Chinese products were kept in place.

China’s lead negotiator, Vice Premier Liu He, attended a signing ceremony at the White House along with US Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin. Trump delivered remarks in which he maintained that the trade deal, which he termed “historic” and an “incredible breakthrough,” was “righting the wrongs of the past.” He praised Xi, whom he described as “a very, very good friend of mine.” A letter from Xi that was read aloud by Trump at the signing ceremony said that the trade agreement proved that the two countries could work together to manage their differences.

Figure 2 President Donald Trump and Vice Premier Liu He present the signed trade deal at the White House. Photo: Bloomberg

Having closed a limited deal, the US was eager to launch negotiations on thornier matters like Chinese state subsidies to its companies and state-backed cyber espionage for commercial advantage. Trump told the attendees that “as soon as this kicks in, we’re starting phase two.” With the onset of the coronavirus, however, the trade agenda took a back seat to pressing domestic concerns in both countries. In early February, Beijing slashed tariffs on $75 billion of US goods that had been imposed in retaliation against tariffs the US applied to Chinese goods in the fall. Observers viewed China’s action to be primarily about limiting the economic damage to China from the virus, rather than a gesture to the United States.

Senior Trump administration officials signaled that the US recognized that the outbreak could delay China’s purchases of American goods. For example, US Agriculture Secretary Sonny Perdue said on February 5 that the US would have to be patient if the spread of the coronavirus hampered Beijing’s ability to buy US farm products. Yet Trump appeared to be closely tracking Chinese purchases. On April 6, the US president told reporters that China was “buying anywhere from $40 to $50 billion worth of our agricultural product.”

At a press conference on April 14, a China customs spokesperson said that the US-China phase one trade deal was being gradually implemented. Later that month, a US official told reporters that the US Trade Representative Office was in regular contact with Chinese counterparts to make sure that targets were being met. According to Chinese customs data, in the first quarter of 2020 China imported twice as many US soybeans and six times as much pork than a year ago. Uncertainty persists, however, regarding both US ability to produce large quantities of pork due to supply chain problems created by the pandemic, as well as China’s ability to buy the pledged amount of soybeans. In late April, there were reports that China is exploring ways to accelerate purchases of farm products by asking state-owned firms to buy them for government reserves.

In a long-awaited move, the Trump administration proposed new restrictions on semiconductor production equipment and other high-tech exports to China with the aim of preventing the Chinese military from acquiring these advanced capabilities. The rules were posted for public inspection on April 29. If they go into effect, licenses will be required for US companies to sell numerous items to Chinese companies whose products support the People’s Liberation Army. Announcing the action, Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross said “it is important to consider the ramifications of doing business with countries that have histories of diverting goods purchased from US companies for military applications.”

A few weeks earlier, the Trump administration granted a license to General Electric to supply engines for China’s COMAC C919 passenger jet. Trump rejected calls by some of his advisers to block the license. “I want China to buy our jet engines, the best in the World,” President Trump tweeted on February 18, adding that he favors making it easy, not difficult, to do business with the United States.

South China Sea Developments

The US Navy conducted four Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) in the South China Sea in the first four months of 2020. On January 25, the USS Montgomery, a littoral combat ship, sailed near Fiery Cross and Johnson Reefs in the Spratly Islands. In response to a statement by the US Seventh Fleet spokesman that such missions are based on principle, conducted peacefully, and are not aimed at any particular country, China’s South Theater Command spokesman insisted that the US warship’s operation was an “intentional provocation” and a “flagrant attempt at navigation hegemony.”

Six weeks later, the USS McCampbell, a US Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyer, conducted a FONOP around the Paracel Islands. This time the spokesman of China’s Southern Theater Command accused the US of entering Chinese territorial waters without permission, which suggests the US warship likely challenged the straight baselines that China established in the Paracels in 1996. The US Navy maintained that the destroyer was conducting “security and stability operations while transiting through the South China Sea.”

On two consecutive days in late April, the guided-missile destroyer USS Barry conducted a FONOP near the Paracel Islands and the US guided-missile cruiser USS Bunker Hill sailed an innocent passage operation past Gaven Reef in the Spratly Islands. China’s Southern Theater Command spokesman condemned the acts as “provocative” and warned that they “could easily trigger an unexpected incident.”

Figure 3 USS Bunker Hill and USS Barry transit the South China Sea (April 18, 2020) Photo: US Navy

In an unusual episode, the US Navy dispatched two warships in mid-April to waters near Malaysia that are claimed by China, Vietnam, and Malaysia. The precipitating factor appeared to be the appearance of a Chinese flotilla of coast guard and maritime militia vessels as well as a Chinese survey ship, the Haiyang Dizhi 8, with the goal of coercing Malaysia’s state-run energy company Petronas to halt energy exploration. The US Navy ships were apparently conducting joint exercises with an Australian frigate in the South China Sea. According to one report, the US warships sailed within 50 nautical miles of the West Capella, a British drilling ship contracted by Petronas conducting exploration activities off the Malaysian coast. The involvement of US warships was notable since the US did not send any vessels when the same Chinese survey ship was engaged in a standoff with Vietnam in 2019.

On April 24, Pompeo declared in a video call with Southeast Asian foreign ministers that China’s actions were aimed at “intimidating other claimants from engaging in offshore hydrocarbon development.” In a public statement, Pompeo accused Beijing of seeking to take advantage of the COVID-19 pandemic to further its control over the South China Sea.

Rather than condemn US military interference, China’s foreign ministry spokesman maintained that its survey ship was “conducting normal activities in waters under Chinese jurisdiction” and described the situation in the South China Sea as “basically stable.” A US State Department spokesperson had previously condemned China for allegedly sinking a Vietnamese fishing vessel on April 2.

US-China Military Ties: COVID and a Lasing Incident

Speaking at the Munich Security Conference in mid-February, Secretary of Defense Mark Esper charged the CCP with stealing Western technology, intimidating its neighbors, and “seeking advantage by any means, and at any cost.” He highlighted the risks of including telecommunication equipment manufactured by Chinese companies in 5G networks “that could render our partners’ critical systems vulnerable to disruption, manipulation and espionage.” Esper called on China to “change its policies and behaviors.” He also insisted that the US hopes to cooperate with China where American and Chinese interests converge, including fighting COVID-19. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, who also attended the forum, dismissed Esper’s accusations as lies and part of a US government campaign to prevent the rejuvenation of China.

Figure 4 Secretary of Defense Mark Esper speaks at the Munich Security Conference. Photo: Reuters

In testimony before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission a few days later, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for China Chad Sbragia outlined PLA progress in developing capabilities to project power and offset US military advantages. Echoing Esper’s remarks, Sbragia stated that “competition with China does not mean confrontation, nor must it lead to conflict.” The DoD seeks to maintain a constructive, stable and results-oriented defense relationship with China that includes reducing the risk of miscalculation that could escalate to conflict, Sbragia emphasized.

As the coronavirus pandemic spread in the United States and around the world, Sbragia held a briefing at the Pentagon on April 9 to address the impact of COVID-19 on the US-China military relationship. Noting that the Chinese military has sought cooperation with the US military in fighting the virus, he asserted that “The US certainly welcomes China’s call to combat the COVID-19 pandemic together.” Sbragia emphasized that the leaders of the two militaries have a consensus that they should avoid issues relating to the virus “being militarized, instead remaining as an area of cooperation.” He called China’s attempt to blame the US for bringing COVID-19 to China last October when US military athletes competed at the military games in Wuhan “unfounded, futile, and really counterproductive.”

On February 17, a Chinese Luyang III-class destroyer lased the pilot of a US Navy P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft that was operating over international waters about 380 miles west of Guam. The Pacific Fleet called the action “unsafe and unprofessional” and a formal protest was issued to China over the incident. Although the US previously called out China for using lasers against US military operators in Djibouti, this is the first time that a Chinese warship lased a US Navy aircraft. A spokesman from China’s Ministry of Defense denied the charge, saying that the US claim did not “accord with reality.” On the contrary, he insisted that the US aircraft’s actions were “unfriendly in intention and unprofessional by operation.”

On March 3, Esper held a phone call with his counterpart Chinese Defense Minister Gen. Wei Fenghe. According to the Chinese readout of the call, the discussion focused on the pandemic and the steps being taken to control it, including efforts by the Chinese armed forces. The Chinese account included Esper’s offer to “enhance dialogue and consultation between the two militaries and strengthen exchanges and cooperation in areas including epidemic prevention and control.” The US side indicated that the lasing incident was also discussed on the call.

Taiwan Tensions Simmer

Almost a month after Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen was re-elected in a landslide victory, her Vice President-elect William Lai attended the annual National Prayer Breakfast hosted by President Trump in Washington DC. Lai’s participation was widely publicized and he was honored with a seat in the first row, near the highest-ranking US officials. During his 8-day visit, the former Taiwan premier and vice president-elect had a meeting at the National Security Council and met senior members of Congress. China was irked and demonstrated its ire by conducting two consecutive days of provocative military exercises with dozens of bombers, jets, and early warning aircraft crossing the centerline of the Taiwan Strait. In one instance, a Chinese fighter jet’s radar reportedly locked on to one of Taiwan’s F-16 aircraft. A spokesman for mainland China’s Taiwan Affairs Office insisted that the PLA was protecting the country’s national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and preserving cross-Strait peace.

In a clear signal to China of US concern, a few days later two B-52 bombers dispatched from Guam flew along Taiwan’s east coast while an MC-130J special mission aircraft from Kadena Air Base in Okinawa flew from north to south across the Taiwan Strait. Persistent Chinese military activities near Taiwan may have also prompted the US to increase its transits through the Taiwan Strait. After conducting one transit per month in January, February, and March, the US Navy sent the USS Barry guided-missile destroyer through the Taiwan Strait on April 10 and again on April 22.

On March 26, Trump signed into law the Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative Act, known as the TAIPEI Act, after both houses of the US Congress passed the bill unanimously. The legislation is aimed at promoting Taiwan’s ties with other countries and its participation in international organizations. Much of the language in the law is “sense of Congress” language, meaning that the law contains Congress’ recommendations; the executive branch is not obligated to implement them. For example, the Act calls for the executive branch to consider “increasing its economic, security, and diplomatic engagement with nations that have demonstrably strengthened, enhanced, or upgraded relations with Taiwan” and also consider downgrading relations with countries that “take serious or significant actions to undermine the security or prosperity of Taiwan.” The Act requires the secretary of State to report to Congressional committees annually for the next five years on the steps taken to implement it.

China’s Foreign Ministry spokesman denounced the legislation as a violation of Beijing’s one-China principle and the three US-China joint communiques. He “strongly urged the US to correct its mistake, refrain from implementing this act and obstructing other countries’ pursuit of relations with China” or face “resolute countermeasures.”

Looking Ahead

The downward slide in US-China relations will probably continue unabated for many months to come. The race for a COVID-19 vaccine is widely viewed as crucial to the broader competition for global power and influence. Rejuvenating economic growth as countries ease social distancing and return to work will be another arena of competition involving supply chains and advanced technology. With both Washington and Beijing having taken off the gloves and hurled spiteful attacks at each other, it will be impossible to restore a modicum of civility and decorum to the bilateral relationship in the near term.

In the coming months, the US presidential campaign will pick up speed. With nine-of-10 Americans now holding the view that China poses a threat—up from 48% in 2018—Trump campaign strategists are actively targeting China. Efforts to uncover how and where the virus started are aimed at pinning blame on China and paving the way for efforts to compel Beijing to pay reparations. Trump’s campaign messaging is already attacking the Democratic candidate, Vice President Joe Biden, as soft on China. Beijing will try to stay out of the fray, while taking advantage of opportunities to advance Chinese interests.