Comparative Connections - May - December 2024

The “year of elections” culminated in the allegedly (but not actually) “too close to call” US presidential elections on Nov. 5, which resulted in Donald Trump’s scheduled return to the oval office on Jan. 20, 2025. Trump has wasted no time identifying his preferences for key leadership positions in his incoming administration, some surprising, some shocking, and a few somewhat disturbing (to us, at least), although most of his national security/foreign policy choices appear more mainstream. While we would not be bold (or foolish) enough to make firm predictions regarding future policy, we will speculate on expected trends and characteristics, while acknowledging at the onset that Trump prides himself on being unpredictable (and has largely succeeded in this quest).

While elections elsewhere have gone largely as expected, two unexpected domestic political developments promise to impact US policy and regional stability; namely, the failed attempt by Republic of Korea President Yoon Suk Yeol to declare martial law which resulted in his impeachment, and the political turmoil in Japan that has left the Liberal Democratic Party for the first time in decades finding itself at the helm of a minority government.  Elsewhere (and largely overlooked), the usual spate of multilateral meetings took place in the second half of the year—the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Leaders’ Meeting, the G20 gathering, the East Asia Summit and companion ministerial-level ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the BRICS Summit, etc. —amid enhanced military activity and enhanced trilateral/minilateral cooperation.

Temp Placement of Figure 1 G20 Leaders Meeting

Trump Triumphs

Figure 1 PM Modi made the remarks at the G20 session on “Social Inclusion and the Fight Against Hunger and Poverty.” (Photo: X/@narendramodi)

There should be no repeat of the Jan. 6, 2020 mayhem as Vice President Kamala Harris graciously accepted defeat and congratulated president-elect Donald Trump on his Nov. 6 victory. Trump was quick in identifying his planned nominees for key national security posts, including Sen. Marco Rubio of Florida to be secretary of state and Florida Republican Rep. Michael Waltz as National Security Advisor. Rubio is expected to sail through the Senate confirmation process and National Security Council members are not subject to ratification. This holds true as well for Trump’s choice of former State Department official Alex Wong to serve as deputy national security adviser. Wong served as deputy special representative for North Korea during the first Trump administration and was closely involved in arranging Trump’s summits with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un.

One thing Rubio and Waltz and other national security-related potential nominees, like U.S. ambassador to the United Nations nominee Congresswoman Elise Stefanik (R-NY) and CIA Director-designate (and former Director of National Intelligence) John Ratcliffe have in common is strong anti-China and anti-authoritarian views. Prospective Secretary of Defense (and former Fox News host) Pete Hegseth would join this chorus if his nomination is approved (which seemed somewhat likely but is by no means assured at this writing).

The real wild card on the national security team is former Hawaii Democratic Rep. Tulsi Gabbard who Trump has chosen to serve as his director of national intelligence, a job for which (in our not-so-humble opinions) she is uniquely unqualified. At this writing she appears to be the candidate most likely to be rejected by the Senate.

On the economic front, Trump has identified hedge fund CEO Scott Bessent to be Treasury secretary and billionaire Harold Lutnick as Commerce secretary. Both are strong proponents of tariffs; Lutnick, among other duties, oversees the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative.

Still to come will be the under-secretaries and assistant secretaries for the various Asia-related posts who will be presenting their bosses with policy alternatives and assessments. They in turn will be guided by the new administration’s key strategy documents such as the White House-produced National Security Strategy and the Pentagon’s National Defense Strategy.

What we think we know . . .

. . . based on what he’s done before.

Unlike most who have come before or since, Trump is more transactional, more unpredictable (which he sees as a virtue and many others see as a vice), more confrontational (with friends and potential foes alike), and more mercurial. When it comes to the promotion of democracy and values-based policies, however, he is much less ideological (some would say less sanctimonious) than many of his predecessors. His foreign policy approach is more trade-based (or more accurately deficit-based), than security-oriented. He is more unilateralist than multilateralist and places less value in alliances and like-minded security relationships than both Democratic and Republican predecessors.

His focus is primarily domestic, not international, and while his policies can have significant impact on others, “America First” means how does it impact the US’ (or his own personal) bottom line, with little concern for the consequences to others. He also seemingly rejects any belief in US exceptionalism and all the burdens and responsibilities that it creates.

Most importantly, we have learned that you can’t take what he says at face value. Normally, if the president says something, it is usually seen as a policy pronouncement. But with Trump, it may just be a bargaining point, or a wild random thought, or even a deliberate lie (or “alternative truth”). Then-President Trump once referred to Chinese President Xi Jinping as a “brilliant leader” and “great man” only a few days after calling him an “enemy” who is ripping off America. When pressed about this inconsistency, he responded: “Sorry. It’s the way I negotiate,” further noting that “it’s done very well for me over the years, and it’s doing even better for the country.” Separating when he is speaking as “commander-in-chief” from when he is acting as “negotiator-in-chief” has been, and will remain, no easy task.

Someone once said “Wagner’s music is not as bad as it sounds.” The same can be said for Trump’s foreign policy in his first administration, if you focus on what he actually did and on stated policies in documents like the National Security Strategy, not tweets. Countering this somewhat comforting thought, however, is the fact that many of the internationalists surrounding and advising Trump during his first administration, like former Defense Secretary Jim Mattis, former-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, and his former UN Ambassador (and main primary opponent) Nikki Haley are not likely to be involved in the upcoming administration.

. . . based on what he’s saying and doing now.

While the world has changed in many ways since he was last president, there appears to be very little change in the way Trump sees the world.

While his relentless focus on the bottom line for the US and the disregard for other nations’ interests is often derided, the same can be said about virtually every national leader; they are elected (or self-appointed) to look out for their own country’s national interests, first and foremost. Americans like to believe we have been held, and/or have held themselves, to a higher standard. Trump, in this regard, is more like every other world leader, and less like the ideal picture we have painted for ourselves.

Trump is also doubling down on his America First mantra, based on the eclectic assortment of potential cabinet and other senior officials being proposed thus far (and remember, with the exception of his national security advisory staff, most face confirmation hearings, a task made easier, but by no means certain even with Republican control of the Senate). On the other hand, unlike many of his domestic-oriented choices, most of his national security choices, as noted above, are mostly internationalists who are more pro-alliance and pro-engagement, and more anti-authoritarian than Trump often appears to be.

Meanwhile, the hardening of anti-China sentiment, which grew during the first Trump administration and then was at least perpetuated if not intensified during the Biden administration, appears likely to continue to intensify, for economic and ideological reasons as well as security concerns. To be fair, a lot of this is driven not by US preferences or predetermination but by Chinese predatory practices and increased aggressiveness, which also seem destined to continue if not increase.

Even before the failed declaration of martial law (more on this below), South Koreans were nervously awaiting the onset of Trump 2.0. The sense of urgency that drove the Biden/Kishida/Yoon administrations (now all gone or going) to further institutionalize the Camp David agreements was to prevent backsliding if Trump were reelected. Koreans were also nervous about a possible renewed “bromance” between Trump and Kim Jong Un; Alex Wong’s selection as deputy national security advisor has added to this anxiety. Trump’s intentions and desires (or lack thereof) aside, one wonders if Kim would agree to another summit even if one were proposed. He’s already gotten what he desired most (international recognition) and is unlikely to agree on the next diplomatic step, which would be a visit to Trump’s home turf. It’s also hard to imagine Xi or Putin pressuring Kim to make nice with Trump, at least not while Ukraine is still boiling over and China-US relations remain strained.

Despite headlines to the contrary, what Trump plans to do about Ukraine is also unclear. His fascination with Putin aside, his pledge to end the Ukraine War on day one requires Putin’s acquiescence. Note that Trump spokesmen have claimed the two have spoken and Trump has told Putin not to make things worse, advice Putin has clearly ignored. While Trump is likely to cut back if not curtail US financial support to Ukraine, he is equally likely to remove remaining restrictions on Ukraine’s use of US-provided weapons if Putin drags his feet, thus making the great negotiator look bad. Only time will tell.

. . . but really don’t know!

While all that we have just said may very well continue to hold true, we must caveat it all by saying that, when it comes to Trump’s future policies, we are all guessing. Everything we just said could be wrong. Or, even if it is initially correct, it could change. Biden, like many of his predecessors, has had, among other senior Cabinet officials, the same national security advisor, secretary of State, and secretary of defense he began with four years ago. Trump, in his first term, had four national security advisors, two confirmed and four acting secretaries of state, two secretaries of defense, and four chiefs of staff. With each leadership change came subtle and, on occasion, not so subtle policy changes; again, stay tuned.

More importantly, recall the words of former UK Prime Minister Harold MacMillan, when asked what had been the greatest influence on his administration: “Events, my dear boy, events,” he replied. Trump’s first administration didn’t see COVID coming, and the Ukraine invasion and events of Oct. 7 and its aftermath in Gaza had a profound impact on the Biden administration. Who knows what great challenge lies just around the next corner?

Domestic Politics Spill Over

Speaking of surprises, while considerable column inches have been devoted to the impact of Donald Trump’s return to the White House, domestic political developments in other countries have potentially significant consequences as well. Two—the collapse of the Kishida government in Tokyo and the botched auto-golpe by South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol—warrant mention here.

LDP turmoil. Kishida’s government collapsed under the weight of accumulated scandal and policy incoherence. The political funds scandal that decapitated the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was only the latest in a series of revelations about misbehavior that undermined public trust in the party. Kishida’s dithering response to the crisis exposed him as weak. His government’s inability to prioritize among competing objectives—increased defense spending, strengthening the social safety net, and more support for child care—further eroded public confidence.

The political funds scandal also deprived the LDP of its ability to organize party elections.  The factions that were disbanded in the aftermath of the scandal served as the vehicle to distribute positions within the government and the party; without them, politicians were left to vote as they pleased in party elections rather than in accordance with the backroom decisions of senior officials who served as faction heads. This vacuum allowed Ishiba Shigeru, the five-term contender for party president, to prevail in the October party vote and then be elected as prime minister.

While qualified to serve as PM and holder of views that align him with the party (and national) mainstream, he is reviled by the rightwing of the LDP for being “the anti-Abe,” adopting political positions and a style that were the antithesis of Japan’s longest-serving prime minister. Days after Ishiba’s victory in the LDP vote, Taniguchi Tomohiko, Abe’s speechwriter who carries the flame for his former boss and speaks for the group within the LDP, published a commentary that essentially declared war on the new prime minister.

A little over a month into his tenure, Ishiba clings to power but the media focus on his weakness reflects both the reality of his government and some nudging from the right. The truth is Ishiba is weak, leading a minority government in which small opposition parties are trying to maximize their influence and the prime minister has little alternative but to try to accommodate them.

This matters for our purposes because Japan has played a key role in regional politics in recent years, following Abe’s lead and with support from the US to step up. It is not clear that he has the diplomatic chops or the political power to maintain that leading position in the region, a shortcoming that will become palpable if Trump runs roughshod through the Indo-Pacific and the US-supported alliance structure as he did in his first term. Moreover, it isn’t clear that Ishiba has the power to deliver on the promise of increased defense spending that Kishida made and which is likely to be a key factor in, if not determinate of, relations with the US.

Yoon’s self-inflicted disaster. The second important domestic political development is the botched coup launched by President Yoon in early December. Yoon was a weakened political figure before he committed that act of self-immolation, and now his fate is now in the hands of the Constitutional Court, which has up to 180 days to determine if the impeachment stands. If so (which seems likely), a new presidential election must be held within 60 days of the court’s ruling. Until then (and even if the impeachment is overturned), he is a husk of a leader.

Again, for our purposes the issue is the durability of his foreign policy after he leaves office, in particular the rapprochement with Japan that he engineered. Yoon displayed real vision and no small amount of courage to push that project, and while it is popular among the South Korean public, relations with Japan have proven susceptible to political manipulation and Yoon’s outreach to Japan has been severely criticized by the opposition. A politician determined to use history issues as a tool for advancement invariably finds fertile soil for such a strategy. A weakened partner in Tokyo and a disinterested White House could prove fatal to the rejuvenated bilateral and trilateral relationships.

More Multilateralism, Mostly under the Radar

There were, as always in the last half of the year, several multilateral meetings of note. First in the list was the 16th BRICS summit, held Oct. 22-24 in Kazan, Russia. The summit was a pageant for several reasons. It was the first BRICS meeting to include Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates as members—nine in all—who were joined by another 29 guests/observers. Even more important was President Vladimir Putin’s role as host of the summit. That turnout and the continuing interest in the BRICS are proof that attempts to make Putin an international pariah have failed and he remains a powerful figure in world politics—and not only for his ability to wreak havoc and destruction.

The BRICS summit produced the Kazan Declaration. It called for “comprehensive reform of the UN, including its Security Council, with a view to making it more democratic, representative, effective and efficient,” condemned terrorism, expressed concern “about the rise of violence and continuing armed conflicts in different parts of the world,” and called for the peaceful resolution of conflicts. While endorsing an immediate ceasefire in the Gaza Strip, it was far less decisive when it came to the Ukraine war, merely recalling national positions on the Ukrainian crisis, and it “noted with appreciation relevant proposals” aimed at a peaceful settlement of the conflict through diplomacy. The statement also called for reform of the institutions of the global economic order, to reduce US influence (and that of the West more generally) and increase the role of developing countries.

Second was the APEC Economic Leaders Meeting on Nov. 15-16 in Lima, Peru. APEC represents 3 billion people – nearly 40%of the world’s population—and almost half of global trade and more than 60% of global GDP. That gathering produced the Machu Picchu Declaration, which detailed the usual objectives. As always, the leaders called for enhanced economic cooperation to promote sustainable and inclusive economic growth, and address regional challenges. In addition, the leaders endorsed the Lima Roadmap to Promote the Transition to the Formal and Global Economies (2025-2040) and the Ichma Statement on A New Look at the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific Agenda. The leaders’ Declaration had a companion Chair’s Statement, which addressed, as in most other similar meetings, the discussion on Russia’s aggression in Ukraine and other geopolitical issues.  Issuance of a separate statement reflects the inability of the group to reach consensus on those issues.

For the most part, the APEC meeting got little attention save for the seeming decline in US influence in Latin America. Considerable media space was devoted to the opening of a $3.5 billion megaport in Peru funded with Chinese money and President Xi’s attendance at that ceremony, a sign of growing Chinese influence in the region. Biden was described as “seemingly dazed” at the usual photo op, and thought to have been “dissed” when placed in the far back corner, between Thailand and Vietnam—even though the positioning is alphabetical.

Figure 2 Newly elected president Luong Cuong arrives at the National Assembly in Hanoi, Vietnam on Monday, Oct. 21, 2024. Photo: Minh Hoang/Associated Press.

The following week, many of those same leaders convened in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil for the annual G20 summit. The summit declaration hammered home the meetings three priorities: social inclusion and the fight against hunger and poverty, reform of the institutions of international governance, and sustainable development and the energy transition. The statement again failed to condemn the war in Ukraine—repeating the omission of last year’s declaration – because of Russian resistance. The leaders supported international trade and WTO reform, but the sections were lukewarm at best, calling for respect for rules without a forceful condemnation of protectionism. The climate sections were similarly tepid, again a product of a membership that includes major fossil-fuel producing countries. While more representative than other institutions of global order, we are inclined to agree with the observer who cautioned against expecting much of the G20, which because of its membership, is likely to “follow other international institutions in which little, if any, meaningful progress is made for the foreseeable future.”

Speaking of “little, if any, meaningful progress,” the 19^th annual East Asia Summit convened in Vientiane, Laos on Dec. 6-11, absent a number of key leaders: the United States was represented by Secretary of State Tony Blinken, Russia by Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, and China by Premier Li Qiang. The Chairman’s Statement contained the usual bromides, reaffirming the importance of maintaining and promoting peace, security, stability, safety, and freedom of navigation in and overflight above the South China Sea,” expressing “deep concern over the escalation of conflicts and humanitarian situation” in Myanmar while reaffirming support for the ASEAN Leaders’ Five-Point Consensus (5PC), and expressing “grave concern over the dire humanitarian situation in Gaza, which has been exacerbated following the 7 October attacks.” Regarding Ukraine, “as for all nations, [the leaders] continued to reaffirm our respect for sovereignty, political independence, and territorial integrity” and “reiterated our call for compliance with the UN Charter and international law.” The leaders’ words largely echoed the comments earlier in the year in the ASEAN Regional Forum Chairman’s Statement, also attended by Secretary of State Blinken.

Ever More Military Cooperation, and Rising Dangers

Multinational ships sail in formation July 22, off the coast of Hawaii during Exercise Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) 2024. Twenty-nine nations, 40 surface ships, three submarines, 14 national land forces, more than 150 aircraft and 25,000 personnel are participating in RIMPAC in and around the Hawaiian Islands, June 27 to Aug. 1. The world’s largest international maritime exercise, RIMPAC provides a unique training opportunity while fostering and sustaining cooperative relationships among participants critical to ensuring the safety of sea lanes and security on the world’s oceans. RIMPAC 2024 is the 29th exercise in the series that began in 1971. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Larissa T. Dougherty)

One of the great dangers that stalks the Indo-Pacific region these days is the threat of a crisis emerging from mistake or miscalculation. The immediate danger stems from the gray-zone tactics pursued by governments that seek to gain advantage and shift the status quo in their favor by subtle means that remain below the threshold of conflict.

Almost as worrisome—if not more so—is the proliferation of military exercises throughout the region. Many of these drills are intended to signal commitment and readiness to defend alliance obligations, along with the expanding capabilities of the US and its allies as they work together in new ways. In June, US, Japan and ROK held the first trilateral Freedom Edge exercise, a multidomain exercise that was announced at the summit of the three leaders last year at Camp David as part of their efforts to deter evolving nuclear and missile threats from North Korea.

In September, the Royal Australian Navy, Air Force, Japan’s MSDF, Royal New Zealand Navy, the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and the US Navy conducted a Maritime Cooperative Activity (MCA) within the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone in the South China Sea. The MCA included training on routine multilateral surface operations, deck landings, hoisting, and search and rescue.

At the 14^th Trilateral Defense Ministers’ Meeting (TDMM) that was held Nov. 17 in Darwin, the ministers—Australian Minister for Defense Richard Marles, Japanese Minister of Defense Nakatani Gen, and US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin III—agreed to deepen defense cooperation by including Japanese forces in the annual US-Australia Talisman Sabre and Southern Jackaroo from next year. They also agreed to include or enhance Australia’s participation in annual US-Japan exercises That participation will boost “trilateral interoperability” among the three countries’ militaries. (Their statement also included the usual talking points on “commitment to a peaceful, stable, and prosperous Indo-Pacific region,” respect for rule of law, support for ASEAN centrality, concern about destabilizing actions by China and North Korea, the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, and the like.)

The meeting announced establishment of the “Trilateral Defense Consultations” to support alignment of policy and operational objectives of the JSDF, the Australian Defense Force, and US forces from peacetime to contingency. The statement identifies ways to promote or strengthen trilateral cooperation from intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region, enhanced trilateral air interoperability, Japan’s participation in AUKUS under pillar 2, and increased interaction among the three countries defense industries.

The next week, Australian Minister for Defense Industry Pat Conroy, Japanese DM Nakatani, Philippine Secretary of National Defense Gilberto Teodoro, Republic of Korea Minister of National Defense Kim Yong-hyun, and Secretary of Defense Austin met for the first time in Vientiane, Lao PDR, along the sidelines of the 11^th ASEAN Defense Ministerial Meeting-Plus (ADMM+).  They repeated the commitment to advance a vision for a free, open, secure, and prosperous Indo-Pacific, where international law and sovereignty are respected, and emphasized the importance of close multilateral cooperation to secure regional security and stability.  (The ADMM+ meeting itself was largely uneventful, with the Joint Vision Declaration containing the usual platitudes about “peace, security, and resilience.”)

This spirit of cooperation was realized in December when the three militaries joined for Yama Sakura 87, which was held simultaneously with the first US Army Warfighter command post exercise held in Japan Dec. 6-14.  YS 87 features the first full participation from the U.S. III Marine Expeditionary Force with expanded ADF participation for the second consecutive year. Participants in the US-Japan Extended Deterrence Dialogue took a side trip from their meeting to observe the exercise.

While strategists and planners cheer the cooperation and growing interoperability of their forces, the sheer volume of the exercises and the logistics involved court dangers. There is an extraordinary number of military assets crossing the region and the possibility that some could bump or collide without any genuine intent to do so is real, and exacerbated by the tendency of other governments to observe, and sometimes interfere, with drills as they take place. There is also a cycle of action and reaction as one country or group of countries holds drills and the ostensible target responds with its own exercises to show that it is not deterred or intimidated. A detailed list is available in the chronology, but note

• The tendency of North Korea to have missile tests immediately after the US and South Korea hold their drills (in May and June).
• China’s joint naval and air exercises around Scarborough Shoal the day after the five country MCA in Philippine waters.
• The increased tempo of China-Russia exercises in East Asia as the US and its allies step up their exercising in the region.

AUKUS, JAUKUS, ROKAUKUS, or ….

Finally, it is worth noting the continuing debate over the future of the Australia-UK-US (AUKUS) enhanced strategic partnership, the multidimensional agreement to cooperate among the three nations that is emerging as “the cool kids club for hard security in the Indo-Pacific.” Most attention has focused on Pillar 1 of the plan, which will transform Australia’s submarine force, and likely its defense industrial base as well. There have been doubts about the viability of the project, even as the three governments continue to voice support for it. The first set of obstacles have been overcome as the US modified restrictions on the export of advanced technologies that would blocked the entire project. Now, however, questions swirl around the capacity of the US industrial base and its ability to build the subs demanded by the deal. Simply put, it isn’t clear that the US can meet its own needs and that has US lawmakers concerned about the commitment to build boats for its ally. Supporters insist that all can be constructed, but the debate will continue.

Most experts believe that for all the attention to the subs, the substance of the AUKUS agreement is in Pillar 2, which aims to develop new defense technologies. This pillar has aroused the most interest among other countries when they contemplate joining the group. In May, the ROK government said that it was thinking of joining Pillar 2, and the US DoD announced the next month that Japan was being considered for membership as well. (In October, Tokyo sent observers to an AUKUS exercise.) In May, New Zealand was reported to be involved in “information gathering discussions” on joining but a decision was far off. That triggered a warning from China to Wellington about doing so.

In September, the three members said that they in discussions with Canada, Japan, and New Zealand about potential collaboration. Most of the reporting, however, suggests less enthusiasm about expanding the group, with an Australian diplomat characterizing the addition of members as “complicated.” Reportedly, the chief concern is dilution of the focus on getting Pillar 1 done, while information security remains a worry. Other observers note a shift in focus regarding Pillar 2, with the three governments indicating that the goal of the work in that area is now regulatory harmonization rather than product innovation. “They are quietly moving the goal posts,” explained Tom Corben of the US Studies Center in Sydney.

Logic and common sense would argue that all these exercises and initiatives would continue during the upcoming Trump administration since they support US national interests. It remains to be seen if this will indeed be the case. It also raises the question as to who will step up if the United States steps back?

2024 closes with new governments primed to lead in the US and Japan. A surprise decision by Prime Minister Kishida Fumio to step away from leadership of his party in August led to an unprecedented race to succeed him. Nine members of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) fought for the chance to become president of the LDP on Sept. 27, and in a surprisingly tight race, Shigeru Ishiba won the honor and thus became the 102nd prime minister of Japan on Oct. 1. Within days, Ishiba called a Lower House election for Oct. 27. The LDP lost dramatically, and in the Nov. 11 vote in the Diet, Ishiba’s LDP and its partner Komeito formed a minority coalition government. The US similarly was in the throes of political contest. On Nov. 5, Donald Trump won a decisive victory in the presidential election, and in the days that followed, the Republicans were declared winners in both the House and the Senate as well. 

While Trump’s inauguration will not be until January 2025, his transition team began immediately to announce candidates for his Cabinet and for the many political appointments needed to fill out his new administration. There was little doubt that this would be a far more robust challenge to the status quo than Trump marshaled during his first term. 

The US-Japan alliance continues to be a fundamental feature of US strategy in the Indo-Pacific. The bilateral agenda for strategic coordination has grown considerably, and significant changes in Japanese defense preparedness are underway. US forces, too, are adapting to the needs of the growing military imbalance in the region. Trilateral US-Japan-South Korea security ties have deepened, and a new trilateral with the Philippines seems promising. Across the region and globally, the US and Japan have joined in broader coalitions of strategic cooperation. And yet, there is concern that this burgeoning agenda of strategic cooperation could flounder as domestic priorities take center stage in both Washington and Tokyo.

A Fall Full of Elections 

The fall brought national elections in both Japan and the US, though under notably different circumstances. In Japan, a snap election came as a surprise, following Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s resignation, the subsequent LDP leadership race that elevated Shigeru Ishiba to power, and Ishiba’s abrupt decision to dissolve the Lower House. In contrast, the date of the US election may have been fixed and known, but the political landscape otherwise offered little predictability. President Joe Biden’s late decision not to seek reelection paved the way for Vice President Kamala Harris to step in as the Democratic nominee, only for former president Donald Trump and the Republicans to reclaim not only the presidency but also control of both the House and Senate.

Figure 1 Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and U.S. President Joe Biden shake hands at the White House on Friday. Photo: Masanori Genko / The Yomiuri Shimbun.

On Aug. 14, Prime Minister Kishida announced that he would not run for reelection in September’s LDP leadership race, setting the stage for a fiercely contested and unusually open competition. The race initially featured nine candidates but quickly narrowed to three frontrunners: Koizumi Shinjiro, who would have been Japan’s youngest prime minister; Takaichi Sanae, vying to become the first female prime minister; and Ishiba Shigeru, a seasoned politician marking his fifth bid for party leadership. Ishiba consistently led public opinion polls, reflecting strong grassroots support, but he had long struggled to win backing from fellow Diet members. In the Sept. 27 election, Takaichi emerged as the top candidate in the first round of voting, but in the second round, Ishiba narrowly secured victory. His unexpected win highlighted divisions within the LDP but also marked an effort among some members to turn the page on recent scandals and rebuild public trust.

On Oct. 1, Japan’s parliament formally elected Ishiba as prime minister. Just over a week later, on Oct. 9, Ishiba surprised many by calling a snap election for Oct. 27, a move that appeared aimed at capitalizing on his initial popularity, taking advantage of a fragmented opposition, and securing a stronger mandate for his leadership. However, the gamble backfired. On Oct. 27, voters handed the ruling coalition of the LDP and its junior partner Komeito a decisive defeat. The LDP lost power for the first time in 15 years. While the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDPJ), led by former Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda, gained significantly, much of the attention was drawn to the unexpected rise of the Democratic Party for the People (DPP) and its leader Tamaki Yuichiro, whose strong performance underscored the shifting political landscape.

The failure of any party or coalition to secure a majority of seats in the Lower House left uncertainty about the shape of Japan’s next government. On Nov. 11, Prime Minister Ishiba won a parliamentary vote to remain in office, making him the leader of Japan’s first minority government in three decades. Governing without a legislative majority presents significant challenges. The opposition now controls key committees, including the influential Budget Committee, which could complicate efforts to secure funding for next year’s priorities. Public approval of Ishiba’s Cabinet remains low, though it has improved slightly from 32% in late October to 40% in mid-November, according to Kyodo polling. Questions abound about how Ishiba will navigate this precarious political environment, including the extent to which smaller parties like the DPP will influence his policy agenda. With Upper House elections looming in July 2025, Ishiba’s ability to maintain leadership and deliver results will be closely watched, both at home and abroad.

In the US, the 2024 election campaign began with an air of familiarity, as it initially appeared to be shaping up as a rematch of 2020 between Biden and Trump. On July 15, the Republican Party officially selected Trump as their presidential nominee, alongside Senator JD Vance (Ohio) as his running mate. Trump had been the presumptive nominee since March 12, when he secured enough delegates in the Republican primary race. Despite unprecedented challenges—including his conviction on May 30 for 34 felony counts of falsifying business records to cover up a sex scandal tied to his 2016 campaign—Trump solidified his hold on the party. His path to the nomination was further punctuated by two assassination attempts, the most prominent of which occurred just days before the Republican National Convention. On July 13, Trump was shot and wounded in his right ear during a public appearance but was released from the hospital shortly thereafter and attended the convention as scheduled. A second attempt on Sept. 15 in Florida, while Trump was golfing, was thwarted before the would-be assassin could get close to him.

As the incumbent, President Biden initially appeared to have a clear path to securing the Democratic Party nomination, facing no primary challengers. However, his performance in the first debate on June 27 raised serious concerns among voters and within his party. Biden appeared visibly unwell, with a strained voice and moments of hesitation that cast doubts about his age and ability to serve another term—despite being less than four years older than Trump. These concerns quickly translated into declining public support and growing unease among Democratic leaders. On July 21, Biden announced he would not seek reelection, citing the need for new leadership and endorsing Vice President Kamala Harris as the party’s nominee.

On Aug. 2, Vice President Kamala Harris officially secured the Democratic nomination at the party’s national convention, becoming the first woman of color to lead a major party’s presidential ticket. Four days later, she announced Minnesota Gov. Tim Walz as her running mate, a choice seen as an effort to balance the ticket with a Midwestern governor who had garnered bipartisan support in his state. Initial polling suggested strong public enthusiasm for Harris, with many Democratic voters rallying behind her historic candidacy and optimism about her chances in the general election.

However, the Nov. 5 election saw Donald Trump ultimately emerge victorious, defeating Harris by a vote margin of 312 to 226 in the Electoral College. Trump carried all the key swing states, including Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin, flipping several districts that had narrowly supported Biden in 2020. Nationwide, most areas showed a pronounced shift toward the right. The Republican Party not only reclaimed the presidency but also gained control of both the House and Senate, signaling a significant shift in American politics.

Looking ahead to US-Japan relations in 2025, new teams in both countries will take the lead in managing the alliance. In Japan, Prime Minister Ishiba, a former defense minister, has signaled his focus on defense by appointing four former defense ministers to key posts, including Takeshi Iwaya as foreign minister and Gen Nakatani as defense minister. On the US side, Trump’s cabinet nominees reflect a mix of experience and controversy. Senator Marco Rubio of Florida has been nominated for secretary of state, while former Army National Guard officer and Fox News host Pete Hegseth is Trump’s choice for secretary of defense. Rubio’s nomination is expected to sail through Senate confirmation, but Hegseth’s has drawn significant scrutiny over past allegations of sexual misconduct, excessive drinking, and financial mismanagement.

These new teams will inherit a complex and demanding alliance agenda, spanning bilateral priorities, regional security challenges, and pressing global issues.

The US-Japan Security Agenda

Bilateral security cooperation is burgeoning. Japan’s security review in 2022 produced a massive increase in security-related investments, including new conventional strike capability, improved operational integration and readiness for the Self Defense Force, and a new program of overseas security assistance. In January, the Japanese government agreed to purchase 400 land-based Tomahawk missiles, and in April, the Maritime Self Defense Force began training for their use. Deployment is expected in Japanese fiscal year 2025, which begins in April 1, a year earlier than originally planned.

Figure 2 South Korea, the US and Japan began their first trilateral multi-domain exercise on June 27, 2024, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said, amid efforts to deepen security cooperation against threats from North Korea, recently emboldened by its deepening ties with Russia. Photo: Yonhap

A new Joint Permanent Operational Command will also be stood up in the coming fiscal year, a first for Japan’s three branches of armed forces. This will integrate Japanese military operations to respond jointly to aggression and will place a single combatant commander in charge of Japan’s military readiness. To match this Japanese move to enhance operational integration, the US Forces Japan will gradually match operational requirements to provide smooth integration of operations between Japanese and US forces.  

Finally, the Japanese government has begun to provide overseas security assistance to its neighbors in an effort to enhance their capacity to meet the growing instability in the region. By the end of the Japanese fiscal year 2023, this assistance included support for surveillance, radar, and patrol boats provided to the armed forces of the Philippines, Malaysia, Bangladesh, and Fiji.

All told, the Japanese government committed to enhancing its spending to 2% of GDP by 2027 when the current five year build up plan will be complete. In its third year, the plan will require consistent revenue if it is to be successful. A new defense tax is under consideration in the Diet, and preliminary cooperation between the LDP, DPP, and Ishin no Kai has been reached. 

The US has also led efforts to institutionalize trilateral military cooperation between the Japanese, South Korean, and US forces in multidomain exercises named Freedom Edge. These were initiated after a bilateral Japan-South Korean defense agreement was reached in June at the Singapore gathering of the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue. Two of these trilateral exercises have been held since then, one in June and another in November, bringing the air, maritime, and space forces of all three allies together for a combined exercise dedicated to cooperation in case of a contingency on the Korean peninsula. 

Keeping the US and Japan in Regional and Global Alignment

Much of the bilateral effort over the past several years has been focused on building coalitions of like-minded countries to cope with the growing challenge to the rules-based order. Two sets of relationships were emphasized by the Biden Administration. The first was the recovery of the Japan-South Korea bilateral relationship and the strengthening of institutionalized trilateral cooperation between the US and its two northeast Asian allies. Consultations between National Security Advisors, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Intelligence heads bolstered a shared vision of strategic cooperation. Presidents Yoon and Biden and Prime Minister Kishida also committed to a set of shared strategic principles, outlined in the Spirit of Camp David joint statement in 2023, that were then amplified in November 2024 in a second leader’s meeting with Prime Minister Ishiba attending on the sidelines of the APEC meeting in Peru. In addition to the regular trilateral military exercises, noted above, the three leaders agreed to create a secretariat designed to facilitate trilateral cooperation. 

Figure 3 US President Joe Biden hosted Australia’s Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Japan’s Prime Minister Fumio Kishida for the latest summit of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) in Wilmington, Delaware on September 23, 2024. Photo: South China Morning Post

Second, Japan and the US worked closely on building stronger ties among the Quad nations: US, Japan, Australia, and India. Leaders’ summits began in 2020 virtually but then became annual in-person meetings in 2021. In 2024, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese joined Japanese Prime Minister Kishida in Wilmington, Delaware to honor President Biden’s support of the Quad. A full agenda of Quad projects has developed over time, largely focused on aiding the Indo-Pacific nations in the provision of healthcare, infrastructure development, maritime domain awareness, and other collective goods required for regional stability. India is expected to host the 2025 Quad Leaders meeting. 

Of course, concerns loom large over the fate of Taiwan. The US and Japan will continue to consult on the increased Chinese military exercises around Taiwan. Much of this is interpreted as pressure on President William Lai Ching-te. For example, a recent surge of Chinese military activity around Taiwan occurred shortly after Lai’s first overseas trip, which included visits to Pacific Island nations and transit stops in Hawaii and Guam—moves that were widely expected to elicit a strong response from Beijing.

But the growing assertiveness of China’s military beyond the Taiwan Straits continues to prompt enhanced security cooperation among US, Japanese, and other national forces. Chinese maritime pressure on the Philippines has also grown, challenging their maritime defenses and drawing a US restatement of its commitment to the US-Philippine alliance. During his fourth visit to the Philippines in November 2024, Secretary of Defense Austin announced the establishment of an information sharing agreement with the Philippines, designed to enhance the ability of the US and the Philippines to have real-time information on the activities of Chinese forces. Over the course of 2024, the PLA Navy has also increased its activity in and around Japanese waters, and Chinese-Russia strategic exercises have also increased. In August, Chinese government survey vessels intruded repeatedly into Japanese waters. 

Conclusion

As the Ishiba Cabinet seeks to navigate its difficult position in the Japanese Diet, a second Trump Administration prepares to take the reins in the US. Trump’s Cabinet picks have created controversy already, and there is a sense that a major shakeup is coming to Washington. How this will affect US foreign policy remains to be seen, and personnel responsible for the day-to-day management of US Asia policy have yet to be identified. On the surface, however, there is little to suggest that the US-Japan alliance will suffer from a second Trump Administration. 

Two issues will likely be of deepest interest to alliance watchers. The first is President-elect Trump’s position on tariffs and on trade more broadly. His announcement after his electoral victory that he is looking to place 25% tariffs on Canada and Mexico and “an additional 10% tariff, above any additional tariffs” on China will, of course, have spillover effects for many countries. Japan’s automakers have a stake in however the Trump Administration seeks to revamp the USMCA trade agreement, up for review in 2026. More short term, the political hot potato of the purchase of US Steel by Nippon Steel will be determined by the CFIUS decision expected on Dec. 18. President-elect Trump has stated he will reject the deal. 

Figure 4 Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida meets with U.S. President Joe Biden and other Group of Seven leaders at NATO Headquarters in Brussels in March. Photo: REUTERS

Burden-sharing will also likely be on the agenda for the US-Japan alliance, as it will for the NATO allies. Already, there are rumors that the NATO commitment to spending 2% of GDP on defense might be raised to 3% in a new Trump administration, again with possible spillover effects for US Indo-Pacific allies. The five-year Host Nation Support agreement between the US and Japan is set to expire in 2027 and thus will need to be renegotiated during the next administration. 

But it is likely the larger questions of US strategy under the Trump administration that will be of most concern. Three foreign policy areas are particularly important for Japan. First, US strategy toward China will be of deepest import to Tokyo. Given that Japan has identified China as its gravest strategic threat, Washington’s choices and how much Japan’s interests will be considered in those choices are paramount. Second, how the US decides its role in Ukraine and in the larger context of European security remains to be seen. Japan has committed extensive resources to Ukraine and to the effort to rebuild the nation. Similarly, Japan, like other G7 nations, has imposed sanctions on Russia, drawing retaliation from Moscow. Finally, Japan has a deep stake in the global economy and relies on a free and open global order. A retreat to mercantilist practices would have devastating effects on Japan’s future economic prosperity. Of course, the LDP will face yet another election next year, and Prime Minister Ishiba will have to juggle pressures from within to keep on top of the domestic dynamics at play in Tokyo even as he seeks to ensure a strong US-Japan partnership under a second Trump Administration.

US-China relations through 2024 remained marked by a paradox. On the one hand, ties displayed a distinct stabilization. The two sides translated their leaders’ modest “San Francisco Vision” into reality. Cabinet officials and the numerous working groups met in earnest and produced outcomes, functional cooperation was deepened though differences emerged, sensitive issues were carefully managed, and effort was devoted to improving the relationship’s political optics. US electoral politics, or threat of Chinese interference in the elections, did not materially impinge on ties. On the other hand, the negative tendencies in US-China relations deepened. With its time in office winding down, the Biden administration went into regulatory overdrive to deepen the “selective decoupling” of the two countries’ advanced technology ecosystems. China methodically responded in kind using its now-robust economic lawfare toolkit. The chasm in strategic perceptions remained just as wide. Donald Trump’s return to the Oval Office portends a period of disruptive unpredictability in ties, although “Tariff Man” Trump can reliably be expected to enact additional impositions on Chinese imports.

Two years to the day that they met on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Bali, Indonesia to place a floor under their troubled relationship and initiate a process of emplacing guardrails, Joe Biden and Xi Jinping met for their third in-person meeting as presidents in Lima, Peru, on the sidelines of the APEC Economic Leaders Meeting. In Lima, the two presidents took stock of the gradual rehabilitation of ties over the past two years, despite its early interruption by the balloon incident, and pledged to consolidate the fragile stability and make the relationship more predictable. They also patted themselves for harvesting some of the low-hanging fruit since their summit in Woodside, California, 12 months ago. US-China relations have made important incremental progress over the past 18 months, starting with Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s visit to Beijing in June 2023 (Blinken returned to Beijing again this April). In Spring 2023, aside from meetings of their senior-most officials, there was practically no active communication channel between the two sides. Fast forward to today and there are more than 20 dialogue frameworks that span the range from diplomacy, security, economy, trade, fiscal affairs, finance and military to counternarcotics, law enforcement, agriculture, climate change, and people-to-people exchanges. 

Figure 1 US President Joe Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping greet one another prior to a bilateral meeting on Saturday, Nov. 16, 2024 in Lima, Peru. Photo: Official White House Photo by Oliver Contreras

In Spring 2023, the US Treasury Department was sanctioning Chinese entities for their involvement in supplying chemical precursors to US-bound fentanyl trafficking networks. Today, 55 dangerous synthetic drugs and precursor chemicals have been class scheduled by Beijing, online platforms and pill presses shut down, and arrests connected to the illicit chemical industry made. Reciprocally, China’s Ministry of Public Security-linked Institute for Forensic Studies has been delisted from the Entity List—a rare case of an adversary state entity being delisted without any underlying change in the listed reason for its blacklisting. 

In Spring 2023, US-China people-to-people as well as academic ties were frail, having suffered body blows stemming from the polemics associated with the origins of the COVID-19 virus and the Justice Department’s earlier “China Initiative.” There were only 12 weekly roundtrip passenger flights in service. Today, the two sides are on the verge of renewing their landmark Science and Technology Agreement (STA), the first major agreement to be signed by the two governments following the re-establishment of diplomatic relations in January 1979, pandas are returning to zoos in San Diego, Washington, DC and San Francisco, the number of roundtrip passenger flights has risen to 50 (prior to COVID-19, the number exceeded 150), and the health authorities of the two countries recently held their first ministerial-level dialogue in over seven years. The cases of “wrongfully detained” Americans have been resolved (although many others remain on exit bans), reciprocal repatriations of illegal migrants and fugitives have been conducted, and the Mainland’s Level 3 travel advisory status (Reconsider Travel) has been lowered to Level 2 (Exercise Increased Caution) by the State Department. For his part, President Xi has committed to inviting 50,000 young Americans to China on exchange and study over the next half-decade. 

Figure 2 A screenshot from a Smithsonian National Zoo video showing the FedEx truck driving through Washington, DC transporting two pandas newly arrived from China on October 15, 2024. Photo: National Zoo via X/Twitter

In Spring 2023, US-China climate change discussions—a mutually beneficial area of cooperation – were at a standstill and would only resume after the visit to Beijing by Special Climate Envoy John Kerry in July 2023. Today, the US-China bilateral Working Group on Enhancing Climate Action in the 2020s has met twice and, in keeping with their Sunnylands Statement of November 2023, the two parties jointly hosted a Methane and Other Non-CO2 Greenhouse Gases Summit at COP 29 in Baku, Azerbaijan. In Spring 2023, the idea of hosting exchanges on AI hadn’t even been broached, even as US and Chinese organizations were moving forward with transformative breakthroughs in Generative AI. Today, the two sides have begun a constructive and candid policy dialogue on AI, co-sponsored each other’s resolutions on AI at the UN General Assembly, and affirmed the need to ensure that unsupervised AI must not allowed to dictate command-and-control of critical weapon system – especially the decision to use a nuclear weapon. The fear that China would be treated as a political football during the US election season or that it would interfere in the elections using disinformation operations did not materialize either (although there may have been interference in down-ballot races).   

For all the positives that have flowed from their newly established or restarted dialogue frameworks, not all conversations ended in constructive outcomes. This is understandable. As the “new normal” in US-China relations takes shape, there is no one typology of interaction that can cut across the various “baskets” of US-China issues. A complex relationship demands complex choices that are built as much on ideology and values as much on interests, objectivity and realism. 

Mil-Mil Conversations Go Sideways on Strategic Arms Proliferation Concerns

The decision to restart mil-mil communications at the Biden-Xi Woodside summit in November 2023 was a bright spot in bilateral ties, to the extent that “jaw-jaw” is vastly preferable to “war-war.” Mil-mil ties had been suspended by China, it bears remembering, following Speaker Pelosi’s visit to Taipei in August 2022. This included the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA) talks, an operational safety dialogue between US INDOPACOM and PLA naval and air forces, which had convened regularly since 1998. The full range of institutionalized high-level mil-mil communications stand restored as of this writing. 

In January and September 2024, the 17th and 18th editions of the Defense Policy Coordination Talks, an annual deputy assistant secretary level policy dialogue, were respectively conducted. The MMCA working group met earlier in April and again in November, and a theater commanders video-teleconference featuring the Commander of the US Indo-Pacific Command and the PLA’s Southern Theater Commander was held in early-September (the two met later in September at the Indo-Pacific Chiefs of Defense Conference in Hawaii). Topping these engagements was the first in-person meeting between the two countries’ defense chiefs, Secretary Lloyd and Minister Dong, in a year-and-a-half on the margins of the Shangri La Dialogue (SLD) in late-May. While both sides had tough words for the other in their SLD remarks, they also agreed to convene a crisis communications working group by the end of 2024. For added measure, National Security Advisor Sullivan was afforded the opportunity to meet the Vice-Chairman of the Party’s Central Military Commission (CMC), Zhang Youxia, during his late-August visit to Beijing, the first such NSA-CMC vice chair meet in eight years. 

The mil-mil communications were wholesome but could not mask the wide chasm between the two sides on strategic arms-racing and deterrence concerns. It was reported in August that Biden had reoriented a highly classified US nuclear strategic plan, the Nuclear Employment Guidance, in March 2024 to account for an era of multiple nuclear-armed adversaries in the context of China’s rapidly growing nuclear arsenal. Whether linked or not, China discontinued the bilateral arms control and nonproliferation consultations in July (lamely using Taiwan arms sales card as an excuse) and, later that month, unleashed broadsides against AUKUS’ nuclear submarine cooperation pillar as well as NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements (it issued a No-first-use Nuclear Weapons Initiative too). It also conducted its first ICBM test in 44 years in late-September, with the projectile splashing down in the South Pacific. The US and China also clashed over the deployment of the Typhon Mid-Range Capability missile system in the Philippines. The US side cautioned the PLA for its dangerous, coercive, and escalatory tactics in the South China Sea which could trigger Article V of the US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty; the Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson admonished the US side for the first deployment of a strategic offensive weapon system outside its territory and in the Asia-Pacific since the end of the Cold War. 

Careful Management on Taiwan Amidst Lobbing of Rhetorical Salvos

The Taiwan Question remained a bone of contention in US-China relations during the mid and latter part of 2024, to nobody’s surprise. In early-May, China’s foreign ministry spokesperson blasted Secretary Blinken’s encouragement as well as that of seven other allied nations to the WHO to invite Taiwan as an observer at the 77th World Health Assembly meeting. Later that month, the ministry spokesperson “deplore[d] and oppose[d]” Blinken’s note of felicitation to Lai Ching-te on his inauguration as president of the self-governing island. Lai had angered Beijing by noting that “the PRC and the ROC are not subordinate to each other” in his inaugural address. He was called out by name; treatment that took Beijing three years to mete out to his predecessor Tsai Ing-wen. 

The Biden administration, for its part, was critical of the PLA’s Joint Sword 2024 A and B military exercises that were conducted in the wake of Lai’s inaugural address in May and his “Double Ten Day” address in October, respectively. Joint Sword 2024-A had focused on seizing the initiative in the Taiwan Strait battlefield, with the training content aimed at precision strikes on critical land, air and sea targets; Joint Sword 2024-B featuring the PLA Navy and the Coast Guard sought to execute a blockade of ports and other key locations. The exercises were denounced as “irresponsible, disproportionate and destabilizing.” The Biden administration also strongly condemned the June 2024 judicial guidelines issued by China’s Supreme People’s Court which imposes criminal punishments on “diehard Taiwan independence separatists” for conducting or inciting secession, noting that threats and legal warfare would not achieve peaceful resolution of cross-strait differences. And in conjunction with like-minded ANZUS, NATO and Japanese government allies, the US State Department sought to develop a common front to debunk China’s conflation and “mischaracterization” of UNGA Resolution 2758 with its “One China Principle.” China’s foreign ministry was having none of it, and political parties at the National Assembly in Taipei too were unable to arrive at a consensus on this point. All along, the Biden administration maintained a consistent clip of arms sales to the island, including by utilizing presidential drawdown authority, as well as periodic transits through the Taiwan Strait in international waters and airspace. China, for its part, built out its Taiwan arms sales-related list of sanctioned US parties under the framework of its Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law. 

Figure 3 A schematic diagram of the area of the military exercise “Joint Sword 2024B,” released by the Eastern Theater Command. Photo: Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China, Public Domain

Tit-for-tat skirmishes between the two sides were not the whole story on the Taiwan Question. In Lima, Peru, Biden again assured his counterpart that the US does not support Taiwan independence (Xi had attempted—unsuccessfully—in Woodside to alter the phraseology to “oppose Taiwan independence’) and added that the US does not use the Taiwan card to compete or contain China. More broadly, Biden yet again reemphasized his “Five Noes’: that the US does not seek a Cold War with China; does not seek to change China’s system; the revitalization of its alliances is not directed at China; does not support Taiwan independence; and does not seek conflict with China. Whether believed or not in Beijing, these assurances offer a steadying framework for future-oriented ties. 

Playing Cleanup on Advanced Technologies Decoupling 

In an important speech in September 2022, NSA Jake Sullivan had listed three “families of technologies” —computing related technologies; biotechnologies and biomanufacturing; clean energy technologies—as “force multipliers” that would define the geopolitical landscape of the 21st century. Given their foundational nature, the US would seek to “maintain as large a lead as possible” over adversary nations, including by resorting to a “small yard, high fence” approach on strategic trade controls. Following the speech, the US Commerce Department issued an expansive regulation that instituted controls on China’s access to advanced computing chips as well as semiconductor manufacturing equipment essential to producing such chips. 

With the clock winding down on its term in office, the Biden administration maintained its frenetic rulemaking pace, issuing a number of regulations in quick succession to deepen the “selective decoupling” of the two economies’ advanced technology ecosystems. On Sept. 23, the administration released a Proposed Rule to secure the supply chain for connected vehicles, which prohibits the import of Chinese hardware and software integrated into vehicle connectivity system (VCS) and software integrated into automated driving system (ADS). VCS is the set of systems that allow the vehicle to communicate externally, including telematics control units, Bluetooth, cellular, satellite, and Wi-Fi modules. The ADS includes the components that collectively allow a highly autonomous vehicle to operate without a driver behind the wheel. The Proposed Rule follows an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) issued earlier this February. 

On Oct. 29, the US Justice Department issued a massive 422-page proposed rule to prevent access to Americans’ bulk sensitive personal data as well as government-related data by countries of concern, such as China. The rule proposes to establish a new national security-based regulatory regime governing the collection and transfer of personal data. Two types of commercial transactions between a “US person” and a “country of concern” are to be prohibited – transactions involving “data brokerage” (with the term defined broadly) and transactions involving human genomic data. The proposed regulation contains an exemption for certain data transfers in connection with biopharmaceutical clinical investigations and post-marketing surveillance data. The Proposed Rule follows a White House executive order accompanied by an ANPRM issued earlier this March. It also follows instances of damaging cyberespionage breaches by China-linked hackers, which include the infiltration of US broadband providers” networks to sweep up the private communications of hundreds of thousands of Americans as well as access the “lawful intercept” system maintained by the Justice Department to place wiretaps on suspected Chinese spies in the US. Earlier in July, the “Five Eyes” countries, joined by Germany and Japan and South Korea for the first time, had issued a rare joint advisory attributing malicious cyber activities to China. President Xi, for his part, disavowed any such conduct in his Lima meeting with Biden, with his foreign ministry spokesperson having earlier thrown the ball back into the US’ court. 

Also on Oct. 29, the US Treasury Department released a voluminous final rule to prohibit outbound investment in semiconductors and microelectronics, quantum information technologies, and AI systems to China. The purpose of the Outbound Order is to shut down a pathway for Beijing to exploit the “intangible benefits” – including enhanced standing and prominence, managerial assistance, investment and talent networks, market access, and enhanced access to additional financing – that accompany the flow of US investments to China. The order marks the first instance of the US government controlling outbound capital flows for national security reasons. And while the regulation is framed as addressing capital flows, it effectively regulates the coverage of “greenfield” and “brownfield” investments in these national security technologies and products, too. The Final Rule follows a White House Executive Order issued in August 2023 and a Proposed Rule issued earlier this July. 

Finally, on Dec. 2, the US Commerce Department issued a final rule that upgrades the existing controls on China’s access to semiconductor manufacturing equipment so as to impair its capability to produce advanced node semiconductors. Twenty-four types of semiconductor manufacturing equipment and three types of software tools are to be additionally denied to Chinese end-users. Beijing response to the measure was swift. On Dec. 3, it announced a ban on several minerals essential to semiconductor, communications and military technologies, as well as a prohibition on exports of dual-use items to US military end users. Alongside the semiconductor manufacturing equipment rule, the US Commerce Department also imposed controls on the transfer of high-bandwidth memory (HBM) chips, which are crucial for accelerating AI training and inference as well as added 140 entities spanning tool companies, chip fabs and investment firms to the Entity List. Earlier this May, a number of Chinese quantum technology companies and research institutes had been added, too, to the List. Overall, the number of Chinese entities placed in the Entity List during the 2018-2023 period have increased over 300% (from 218 to 787). As for license applications submitted that involve a Chinese Entity List-ed party, they increased from five in 2018 to a high of 1,751 in 2021, with approximately 33 percent of applications either denied or revoked. 

In addition to these advanced technologies and data flow controls, successive rounds of sanctions were enforced on China for its policies on “forced labor” in Xinjiang and support for Russia’s war in Ukraine. This included the first US sanctions imposed on a Chinese entity for joint development and production of a complete weapon system (the Garpiya series long-range attack unmanned aerial vehicle) with the Russians. No Chinese financial institutions have as yet been sanctioned, despite Secretary Blinken’s threat to do so in his late-April meetings in Beijing. To the contrary, the US Treasury Department and China’s Finance Ministry maintain a cordial working dialogue that spans the range from financial sector operational resilience to debt relief for low-income countries to central bank scenario testing of climate change risks. Earlier in April, the two sides had established dedicated workstreams on Balanced Growth in the Domestic and Global Economies and on Cooperation and Exchange on Anti-Money Laundering under the aegis of their financial and economic working groups. 

“Small yard, high fence” export controls has been one component of the Biden administration’s toolkit to vigorously compete with China in the advanced technologies of tomorrow. Alongside, the administration also passed landmark legislation, such as the CHIPS and Science Act and the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), as well as employed an impressive array of industrial policy authorities, such as the Defense Production Act, Buy American Act and the Bayh-Dole Act, to incentivize the expansion of domestic productive capacity in key strategic and high value-added manufacturing industries. To this end, and in its waning days in office, the administration aggressively pushed out CHIPS Incentives Awards totaling in the many billions to the likes of Intel, BAE Systems, GlobalFoundries, and TSMC. There are uncertainties whether this industrial buildout will continue under President Trump and a Republican Congress, particularly with regard to the proposed IRA project investments (fully 80% of announced Korean and Japanese investments are tied to IRA money). Trump had vowed to “terminate” the IRA on the campaign trail and no Republican supported passage of the legislation in 2022. On the other hand, three-quarters of announced investments are in Republican-controlled districts and 65% of them located in counties that voted for Trump. 

China Responds in Kind 

China was active on the “selective decoupling” front too in 2024, having methodically built a robust economic lawfare toolkit over the past five years. These include the Unreliable Entities Regulation (Sept. 2020), the updated National Security Review Mechanism (Dec. 2020), the Unjustified Extraterritorial Measures Regulation (Jan. 2021), the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law (June 2021), and more lately, a new Dual-Use Export Control Regulation (September 2024) under the framework of its Oct. 2020 Export Control Law. Having absorbed blow after blow of US technology denial measures, China began deploying these tools in earnest in 2024. In March 2024, new procurement guidelines were introduced phasing out foreign operating systems, microprocessors and database software from government PCs and servers. In May, the Cyberspace Administration of China banned the use of the US semiconductor firm Micron’s products in China’s critical information infrastructure following a failed cybersecurity review. There have been calls for a cybersecurity review of Intel too and more lately, a coordinated advisory issued by four Chinese industry bodies to discontinue the usage of US-made chips given that they are “no longer safe.” 

In August, the Ministry of Commerce (MofCom), announced export controls on antimony, a critical mineral with military and civilian applications including battery storage. The antimony controls follow on the heels of controls on gallium, germanium, and high-purity natural and synthetic graphite materials introduced in 2023. These controls were effectively upgraded in early-December 2024 to a full ban “in principle” vis-à-vis the US following the latter’s imposition of export controls on China-destined semiconductor manufacturing equipment. Controls on “superhard materials” such as industrial-grade diamonds and tungsten carbide, used in chip manufacturing-related cutting, grinding, and polishing processes, is anticipated to be the next export control shoe to drop. In September, MofCom announced an investigation into the US parent company of Calvin Klein and Tommy Hilfiger under its Unreliable Entity List mechanism for its exclusion of Xinjiang-originating cotton from supply chains. And in October, sales of key Chinese battery components to the largest US drone maker, Skydio, was revoked under the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law for its role in arms sales to Taiwan, forcing Skydio to ration batteries to one per drone to customers. 

Wave-upon-wave of Taiwan arms-sales related countermeasures against US military companies and senior executives were imposed too in April, May, June, July, September, and December by China’s foreign ministry under its Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law. For added measure, General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, General Dynamics Land Systems, and Boeing Defense, Space & Security were separately added to the Commerce Ministry’s Unreliable Entities List in May. In February 2023, Lockheed Martin and Raytheon Missiles & Defense became the first US entities to be placed on this list for their role in arms sales to Taiwan. The upshot is clear: China’s countersanctions and reciprocal export control regime is being ramped up which will inevitably lead to more US (and foreign) companies being caught in the crossfire between the US and Chinese regimes. 

Doubling-down on Section 301 Tariffs 

Trade frictions returned to the fore in US-China relations during the latter half of 2024. The first shot of this new great power rivalry, it bears remembering, was fired in the trade policy arena in the Summer of 2018 when the Trump administration introduced Section 301 List 1 tariffs on $34 billion of Chinese imports. In total, $370 billion of Chinese imports spread across four lists were thereafter subjected to tariffs, with China imposing lesser retaliatory tariffs also. On May 14, 2024, following a statutory four-year review of the Trump-introduced tariffs, the Biden administration not only retained the tariffs but selectively augmented them to the tune of $18 billion for semiconductors, electric vehicles, batteries, battery parts and critical minerals, solar cells, and certain personal protective equipment (final modified rates were notified in September). Concurrently, the White House and the Treasury Secretary accused China of engaging in non-market practices that was creating excess supply to the detriment of industry and workers abroad. China was failing to meet its industrial subsidies-linked notification requirements at the WTO too, especially regarding proliferation of sub-central level “public-private investment funds” which were driving this structural overcapacity. The additional Section 301 tariffs were justified, in the administration’s telling, to protect the historic Chips Act and IRA investments in strategic sectors (semiconductors, batteries, EVs, solar, medical equipment) from being unfairly undercut by Chinese exports. 

The administration’s accusations are not without merit. China’s domestic savings remains excessively high. The fear that these excess savings (and domestic under-consumption) will macroeconomically manifest itself in the form of overproduction that is dumped overseas is genuine. And because a component of this overproduction is the product of non-transparent industrial subsidies, this would amount to unfair trade-distorting competition in international markets. Beijing rejects this characterization. In its view, the current global production landscape is the result of market competition and the international division of labor. Within China, competition in its new energy marketplace is intense; as such, only the fittest survive and therefore tend to prosper in international markets. Export volumes too should not be taken as a benchmark for determining overcapacity either. US, Japan, and Germany’s auto exports for instance account for 23%, 75%, and 50%, respectively, of domestic production; China’s EV exports by comparison account for only 12.5% of production. Besides, there is a huge demand for new energy products in global markets, and it is the fragmentation of global industrial and supply chains due to the adoption of discriminatory subsidy measures by the West that is the primary contributor to “so-called overcapacity,” Beijing counters. China’s subsidy programs adhere to fair competition and non-discrimination rules, are mainly for R&D, are targeted at the consumption end, and are not contingent upon export performance. The WTO secretariat and the European Commission might beg to differ with some of these contentions. 

Figure 4 A Donald Trump impersonator standing in front of the White House in Washington, DC in a mask and pointing at the camera. Photo: UnSplash, CC2.0

The Return of “Tariff Man” and the Uncertain Future of Bilateral Ties 

“I am a Tariff Man. When people or countries come in and raid the great wealth of our Nation, I want them to pay for the privilege of doing so. It will always be the best way to max out our economic power. We are right now taking $billions in Tariffs. MAKE AMERICA RICH AGAIN.” 

So tweeted President Donald Trump, three days after a tense but positive meeting with President Xi on the sidelines of the G20 Summit in Buenos Aires, Argentina, in December 2018 as the two sides tried to head-off tit-for-tat tariffs on billions of dollars of bilateral trade. 

Trump may be notorious for his unpredictability and embellishment. But on the issue of trade and tariffs, he has been a pillar of consistency. From his formative 1980s days as a young Manhattan real estate developer, it has been his cardinal belief that goods consumed in the US must be produced at home using US workers. To the extent that some of these goods are imported, an equivalent dollar amount of US goods should be purchased by that country. At day’s end, bilateral trade must be balanced. Anything less is a “loss” for the US. And hence his dislike of the large bilateral trade surpluses run by China and his sense of personal affront when run by allies, such as Japan and Germany originally and South Korea and the Europeans today, which doubly happen to benefit from expensive treaty-underwritten US defense guarantees. 

As president-elect in 2016, Trump vowed to withdraw the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement; renegotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement under threat of withdrawal; label China a currency manipulator; bring cases against China at the WTO; and use every lawful presidential power to remedy trade disputes with China and other countries, including the application of tariffs consistent with Section 201 and 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 and Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. Each vow was fulfilled. With Trump now promising to impose tariffs of at least 60% on all Chinese goods (he had threatened China with 45% tariffs during his 2016 political campaign and ended up imposing 25% tariffs), the president-elect deserves to be taken not just seriously but (quite) literally. 

Be that as it may, Beijing is not likely to be in any hurry to flatter the president-elect, having learnt from bitter experience of the limits of its own flattery. Within three months of Trump’s inauguration in 2017, Xi had snagged a high-profile meeting in Mar-a-Lago, which delivered a shiny 100-Day Action Plan under the framework of the US-China Comprehensive Economic Dialogue. Later that November, Trump was feted with a “state plus” visit to Beijing where he became the first foreign leader since the founding of the People’s Republic to dine inside the Forbidden City. None of this flattery prevented his national security team from listing China as a “revisionist power” and inaugurating a new era of great power rivalry just a month later in its National Security Strategy of December 2017. Or prevented his trade policy team from slapping Section 301 tariffs in Summer 2018 and launching the trade war. 

It is not lost on Xi’s China either that engaging “dealmaker” Donald Trump has the potential to backfire, should the attempt at dealmaking fail. The US-China technology war, with its initial focus on kneecapping Huawei, almost-literally dates back to the day in May 2019 when the “90 Day [trade] talks”—that the two leaders initiated at the December 2018 G20 Buenos Aires summit – formally collapsed. China’s drive toward technological “self-reliance” can be specifically dated to this collapse, too. Xi Jinping reportedly observed to his closest confidants that he had considered the 90-Day talks to be an economic matter and “demonstrated utmost sincerity” but the Trump administration deliberately scuppered the negotiation (by insisting that Beijing sign an unfair bargain) to pursue its true objective: complete suppression of China. China would not succumb to pressure, Xi noted. “We have to come together to survive this situation.” 

Where this leaves US-China engagement, remains to be seen. At minimum, the two sides will approach the other warily during the likely-chaotic first year of the second Trump presidency. Almost none of the senior officials who had played a major role in charting the outlines of China policy during Trump’s first term—Secretary of State Pompeo, NSA Robert O’Brien, Deputy NSA Pottinger, and USTR Robert Lighthizer—will be returning in Trump 2.0. Some were even sanctioned by Beijing on their way out in January 2021. One thing is fairly certain though. The multitude of working groups that the two sides had successfully stumbled upon during the Biden-Xi years will be disbanded. In Trump 1.0, the clunky and top-heavy Obama-era Strategic and Economic Dialogue was discarded in favor of four newly established dialogue mechanisms in the areas of diplomacy and security, economic and trade, law enforcement and cybersecurity, and people-to-people exchanges. In Trump 2.0, the wheel will once again be reinvented. 

From a longer-term policy standpoint though, the overarching approach toward China will more-or-less remain the same. Two weeks before the first Trump administration left office, NSA O’Brien had declassified the administration’s overarching strategy document for the Indo-Pacific region, titled the US Strategic Framework for The Indo-Pacific. The strategy document featured five elements: (1) advance economic decoupling and prevent China’s industrial policies and unfair trading practices from distorting global markets and harming US competitiveness; (2) maintain US industry’s innovation edge over China; (3) promote US values and influence in the Indo-Pacific and counter Chinese models of governance, coercive behavior and influence operations; (4) maintain an intelligence advantage over China, and against Chinese intelligence activities; and (5) deter China from using military force against the US and its allies and partners by maintaining the capability to deny China sustained air and sea dominance inside the first island chain in a conflict, defending the first island chain nations, including Taiwan, and dominating all warfighting domains outside the first island chain. These elements will continue to guide China policy in Trump 2.0. And Beijing, for its part, will continue to pursue its interests reactively but firmly within this framework. 

The last several reporting periods of Comparative Connections have featured little drama in US relations with the two Koreas. A lot of important changes happened—a burgeoning Washington-Seoul-Tokyo trilateral, Pyongyang’s advancing nuclear weapons program, etc.—but these developments were mostly incremental. However, the June-December 2024 reporting period—the final Comparative Connections—has featured bombshells, both metaphorically and literally. The most spectacular event was South Korean president Yoon Suk Yeol going full rogue authoritarian and recklessly declaring martial law at 11pm on December 3 in order to carry out a military “self-coup d’état.” That is, Yoon annulled democratic processes and civil constitutional protections, arrogated all political and executive power to himself and the military, and attempted to suspend the national assembly. This shocking step toward tyranny—considered long-relegated to the distant past of South Korea’s developmental dictatorships of the 1950s-1980s—was as badly conceived as it was executed, farcically falling apart after less than three hours, when legislators (mostly from the opposition) breached the cordon of deployed soldiers around the national assembly, entered the plenary chamber, and voted 190-0 to revoke the martial law decree.

Figure 1 South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol speaks at the presidential office in Seoul, South Korea, Saturday, Dec. 7, 2024. Photo: AP

In addition to a raft of political and security instabilities (see next section) introduced by the self-coup attempt, the “values-based” US-South Korea alliance is now shaken to the core by a wanton power-grab of an allied leader close to the US.

And it is not as though the US-South Korea alliance was steaming toward placid political waters in any event, as the re-election of another noted destroyer of domestic democratic norms—Republican Donald Trump—won re-election as US president in November, following the dramatic cognitive and physical decline of Democratic president Joe Biden, who was forced out of his re-election campaign and replaced by hapless vice-president Kamala Harris. Beyond Trump’s own capacity to undermine the democratic values that supposedly support the US-South Korea alliance, his negative proclivities toward alliances, which he views primarily transactionally, and plans for tariffs and other measures potentially unfavorable to South Korea, were already promising friction between Seoul and Washington. The likely impending replacement of Yoon (a pro-US conservative) by a (typically) US-lukewarm progressive South Korean president would make the friction greater.

Finally, North Korea has provided the literal bombshell—many bombshells, in fact—during this Comparative Connections reporting period, as the Kim Jong Un regime has supplied Russia with millions of artillery shells and (likely) hundreds of short-range ballistic missiles and multiple launch rockets to support Moscow with materiel for the prosecution of its illegal war of aggression against Ukraine. This has been augmented by North Korea’s dispatch of at least 10,000 troops to the Kursk region of Russia. This not only marks a clear escalation in Pyongyang’s support for Moscow, but also likely furthers the arms/technology transfer flowing into North Korea, which in turn complicates deterrence and warfighting by the US-South Korea combined forces. All of this is undergirded by a newly forged Russia-North Korea military alliance, another element of the “axis of upheaval” destabilizing East Asia and sharpening the external security challenges faced by the US and South Korea.

US-South Korea Relations: South Korea Goes Rogue, the US Tees Up Trump 2.0

Figure 2 Lawmakers hold placards reading “Yoon Suk Yeol should resign” on 4 December. Photo: BBC News

Following months of mounting domestic political turmoil, at 10:23pm on December 3 South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol delivered a six-minute televised address in which he cited “legislative dictatorship,” “pro-DPRK, anti-state forces,” and a raft of political subversion measures by the opposition Democratic Party as justification for an “emergency martial law” decree that went into effect at 11pm. There seems to be no policy, political, or constitutional foundation or justification for this measure, which was thus illegal, illegitimate, and authoritarian.

The thought process behind Yoon’s decision remains unclear, as does his state of mind at the time and his ostensible endgame for martial law. What is clear, however, is that Yoon—and his co-conspirators, especially the minister of national defense, Kim Yong-hyun—intended to annul democratic processes and civil constitutional protections, arrogate all political and executive power to Yoon and the military, and suspend the national assembly for an indeterminate period of time. More darkly still, Yoon and Kim apparently instructed special operations forces to arrest senior legislators and party leaders—including the conservative People Power Party head, Han Dong-hoon—and detain them at a government facility. This is especially noteworthy, given South Korea’s authoritarian history of black site torture of political dissidents.

However, the whole martial law circus collapsed within hours, as legislators managed to reach the interior of the national assembly building and convene a plenary session, during which they voted 190-0 to rescind martial law (in accord with the South Korean constitution). Although several hundred soldiers entered the national assembly building in an attempt to stop the proceedings, their efforts were clearly half-hearted, as were their efforts to prevent legislators from entering the national assembly building in the first place. Testimony from the deployed special operations commander revealed that he ordered soldiers participating in martial law enforcement not to use live rounds in their weapons, enter the plenary chamber of the national assembly, or hurt civilians. That—along with the fact that Yoon, the defense minister, and martial law commander general Park An-su did not control major media outlets—strongly suggests that the coup attempt was badly conceived and organized. It seems that Yoon had little support from and control over the military.

In any event, by 2 am on December 4 the military withdrew to its normal posts and Yoon conceded to the national assembly vote by announcing the retraction of the martial law decree, a decision that was ratified by cabinet ministers meeting in their State Council formation. Thus, by the morning of December 4 the farcical state of exception was over, with Yoon, conspiring ministers and military, and elite hard-right conservative supporters suffering a humiliating defeat. The consequences of this attempted self-coup d’état—among the most bizarre and embarrassing in modern political history—are still far from clear, but the most likely outcome is that Yoon will no longer be president. Yoon was impeached by the National Assembly on December 14, with his final removal from office now dependent on a Constitutional Court decision in 2025. The entire cabinet and suite of presidential senior officials have tendered their resignations (although many remain in post pending acceptance of their resignation), the ruling conservative People Power Party (PPP) is discredited and in shambles, and South Korea is engulfed in political chaos. Kim Yong-hyun (the now former defense minister) is under arrest for insurrection. Other cabinet ministers, senior officials, and military and police officers are likely to follow. The police and special prosecutor’s offices are now investigating Yoon himself for insurrection, conviction for which in South Korea carries penalties ranging to the death sentence. 

As of the time of writing, the political situation in South Korea is chaotic and fluid. Yoon eventually indicated the inevitability of the legislative impeachment process and his will to fight post-impeachment conviction in the Constitutional Court, but at first attempted to remain in office with the support of PPP lawmakers who initially refused to support impeachment because it would (following potential conviction) lead to a snap presidential election that a candidate from the hated progressive Democratic Party would likely win. Worse still, during the first chaotic week after martial law, the PPP attempted to stay in power through a byzantine and extra-constitutional plan for Yoon to surrender his administrative power to an opaque governing committee consisting of the prime minister (Han Duk-soo) and party politicians (notably Han Dong-hoon). At best this created a power vacuum; at worst, there was for several days an unelected cabal of conservative PPP members and the prime minister engaged in a second coup d’état. Both situations represented security risk on the peninsula. For instance, it was uncertain who de facto held the top position in the South Korean chain of military command. If North Korea had attacked, it is unknown who would have been able to command the South Korean military.

Even if South Korea’s politics are restored quickly to a normal democratic state of the rule of law, Yoon’s attempted self-coup (and the apparent follow-on coup attempt by his party) will leave scars, including in terms of relations with the US. To begin with, the military dimension of the alliance was implicated in a way that casts major doubt on South Korea’s reliability as a partner. Yoon’s presidential office apparently did not inform the US in advance of the martial law decree. Chief among those uninformed was US Forces Korea and Combined Forces Command general Paul LaCamera, which means that the US unified combatant commander on the Korean Peninsula was unaware in advance of a deeply destabilizing political shift that (a) deployed allied South Korean forces under US-ROK combined wartime operational control, and (b) could have incentivized North Korea to opportunistically attack South Korea (for instance, by taking disputed islands south of Northern Limit Line) without US and South Korean military units being on heightened alert. Trust issues may also form at the civilian level of armed forces control, which could both call into question current mil-mil arrangements and make future high-level military cooperation a more difficult sell in Washington. Indeed, the US has suspended the meeting of the Nuclear Consultative Group, designed to give South Korean defense leaders a stake in and insight into US nuclear strategy regarding the Korean Peninsula.

On the diplomatic-political level, the Biden administration is clearly upset, although it took some time for US messaging to indicate as much apoplexy for the desecration of democracy as for the destabilizing of US-South Korea relations. Initial public statements—from the US ambassador, as well as administration spokespeople—expressed relief at the return to democratic processes post-martial law, eschewing direct criticism of Yoon for the self-coup attempt. Only two days later did deputy secretary of state Kurt Campbell issue a statement criticizing Yoon for a “badly misjudged,” “illegitimate” act. Even after the blunter criticism of Yoon, however, secretary of state Antony Blinken (in the readout of a meeting with South Korean foreign minister Cho Tae-yul) and Vedant Patel (deputy state department spokesperson) provided boilerplate answers about South Korean democratic resilience and US-South Korea ironclad democratic values, failing to openly criticize Yoon and the conservative PPP. Perhaps more forceful communications occurred in private, but at least in public the US has hardly appeared to meaningfully demand democratic accountability and the rule of law from its ally. What the incoming Trump administration would think about the situation in Seoul is unknown.

The US’s weak public support for democracy during this South Korean crisis will hardly come as a surprise to Cold War political history students, but the Biden administration has spent an extraordinary amount of time extolling its alliances (including with South Korea) as “values-based,” “like-minded” defenders of democracy and the rule of law. In the future, this rhetoric will ring hollower, as will, obviously, South Korean invocation of democratic values as support for its foreign policy choices.

The political fallout of South Korea’s chaotic situation will likely include a progressive party president succeeding Yoon—and sooner rather than later, although the Constitutional Court’s impeachment review could last for months, leaving a leadership vacuum. This has dramatic consequences for the US-South Korea alliance. There was a reasonable expectation that Yoon and Trump would be able to cooperate in numerous areas, including advancing the Washington Declaration and the Camp David summit agenda of US-South Korea-Japan trilateralism, both of which are among the crown jewels of Yoon’s (and Biden’s) foreign and security policy accomplishments. The hope—from both the Biden and Yoon administrations—was that Yoon and Biden’s successor (either Trump or Harris) would have at least two years (the remainder of Yoon’s term) to institutionalize these accomplishments before the possibility that the South Korean presidency would likely swing in 2027 to a progressive president less prone to be naturally supportive of these directions in the development of the alliance. 

With Yoon likely soon out of office, and a progressive possibly taking over the presidency, the window for institutionalization of the Washington Declaration and Camp David trilateralism is likely to be much reduced. Despite the ongoing establishment of a secretariat, the trilateral relation with Japan is especially vulnerable, as the progressive Democratic Party has a deep-seated distrust of Japan and typically vilifies Tokyo at every opportunity, including opportunistically for domestic political benefit. This would obviously greatly undermine the ability of Japan to cooperate with South Korea, even in a trilateral context and a fortiori given new Japanese prime minister Shigeru Ishiba’s weak political position.

For most Comparative Connections reporting periods, the election of a US president—especially one as volatile and skeptical of alliances as Donald Trump—would top the agenda. Yoon’s inexplicably mad self-coup attempt momentarily relegates Trump’s November election victory to second place, but the incoming Trump administration will of course have major short-, medium-, and long-term impacts on the US-South Korea alliance.

Four cardinal rules apply to analysis of Trump’s foreign policy. 1) Trump is risk-acceptant, with a wider (compared to most presidents) aperture of conceivable action; 2) Trump is generally hostile to alliances; 3) Trump is highly transactional in his dealings; and 4) the people surrounding Trump play a critical role in all of the above (as Trump is unstudied/unfocused and thus reliant on aides, swayable such that who influences him at the beginning and end of the day is important, and has senior officials who can both catalyze and obstruct his decisions). All of this was on display vis-à-vis South Korea during Trump’s first term, during which he met with Kim Jong Un on multiple occasions, denigrated the US-South Korea alliance, attempted to extort massive host nation support payment increases, and was slow-walked by his National Security Council on negotiations with North Korea.

The Trump 2.0 administration will doubtless display differences to the first administration, but Trump’s campaign rhetoric (commenting on ingrate alliance partners, extolling tariffs, etc.) was largely consonant with expectations based on past behavior. His personnel decisions since election victory also hint at continuity with his first administration. 

So far, much of the expert discourse regarding Seoul-Washington relations under Trump 2.0 has speculated on the incoming administration’s potential willingness to:

• force renegotiation of the SMA (Special Measures Agreement) or damage the KORUS Free Trade Agreement (including via tariffs), 
• withdraw troops from the Korean Peninsula and/or otherwise undermine the US-South Korea alliance, 
• weaken US extended nuclear deterrence for South Korea,
• neglect the blossoming US-South Korea-Japan trilateral relationship,
• allow South Korea to develop nuclear weapons,
• provoke crisis with North Korea, thus creating instability for South Korea,
• or negotiate an unfavorable deal (from South Korea’s perspective) with North Korea regarding Pyongyang’s nuclear arsenal.

These are all areas deserving attention, although some areas (SMA renegotiation, tariffs) are more likely to occur than others (US troop withdrawal, unfavorable nuclear deal). And of course the aftermath of the self-coup attempt in South Korea will mean that the trilateral with Japan will be undermined, while the already low probability of US support for Seoul’s nuclear weapon development should be nearly nil. 

There is one dynamic of the US-South Korea alliance that is highly likely to emerge during a second Trump administration: increasing pressure on the alliance due to sharpening US-China rivalry. The new Trump administration—both in policy statements and presidential nominations for security/defense/foreign policy cabinet positions—has signaled that China will receive extraordinarily high priority from a group of hawks. Trump’s new national security advisor, Michael Waltz, as well as his deputy, Alex Wong, are known China hawks. The same holds for Marco Rubio and John Ratcliffe, the respective choices for secretary of state and director of the CIA. Pete Hegseth, the controversial and inexperienced selection for defense secretary, also has a reputation for a tough line on China. 

It is very probable that US allies and partners will be expected to join efforts to counter China. This could involve a range of actions, including military aspects of the US-South Korea alliance. Although previous US presidential administrations have taken small, quiet steps to begin this expansion of the focus of the US-South Korea alliance, Trump and his team will probably push farther and faster. To wit, incoming NSA Waltz is on the record in a 2022 House of Representatives hearing demanding to know if South Korea would allow US forces stationed on the Korean Peninsula to be used in a Taiwan contingency. In this vein, the Trump administration may push for US Forces Korea to be postured more for a role in a regional (read: China-focused) conflict, rather than only for defense of South Korea. Trump may also press for US assets to be allowed to use airfields, ports, and sustainment facilities on the Korean Peninsula as a part of US efforts to respond to a China-Taiwan conflict. 

China would, of course, respond angrily, and thus all of this would be very difficult even with a conservative, pro-US, anti-China Yoon administration. It will be even more contentious with a progressive, US-lukewarm, China-moderate Democratic Party president in office. Arguably the situation would be even worse for South Korea if Yoon’s impeachment case before the Constitutional Court drags on for the first months of Trump’s presidency, leaving a leadership vacuum that the US could exploit.

Although less likely, another way in which US-China rivalry under Trump may affect the US-South Korea alliance is that Trump 2.0 may attempt to weaken China’s regional position via Washington’s interactions with Pyongyang. If the Trump administration were interested in isolating China, one option might be to drive wedges between Beijing and Pyongyang (China’s only de jure ally). It is unclear what it would take for such a deal to emerge—presumably both the US and North Korea would have to make some sacrifices on priority issues in order to create a rapprochement sufficient to significantly weaken North Korea’s ties to China—but Trump is noted for his interest in attempting big, strategic alignment-inducing negotiations, including with dictators and other odious leaders. In the case of North Korea, such an attempt by the new Trump administration would likely implicate some form of de facto recognition of the Kim regime’s nuclear arsenal, which would greatly complicate South Korea’s security in the medium-/long-term, as well as upend decades of inter-Korean policy. It is unclear how a progressive South Korean president would deal with this situation, but in principle Seoul’s progressives support US diplomatic outreach to Pyongyang.

Although a bit convoluted, Trump’s apparent desire to end the war in Ukraine also has an effect on South Korea. To wit, a primary strategic reason that Trump (along with some senior officials) wants to reduce support for Ukraine (and thus force it to the negotiating table) is so that the US can better focus on China, yet this has major indirect implications for North Korea. Namely, North Korea is currently enjoying a splendid emergence from diplomatic and economic isolation (as well as over-reliance on China) due to Pyongyang’s new alliance and strategic partnership with Moscow (see section below), which is providing North Korea with cash, food, energy, and military-technology support in exchange for artillery shells, short-range ballistic missiles, and troops. If the war in Ukraine were to end due to US pressure, this could dramatically reduce (from Moscow’s perspective) the need for Russia-North Korea cooperation, which would be a positive for South Korea.

In the end, Trump 2.0 is likely to be unpredictable. Some of the above may happen, or all of it, or none.

Finally, one notes that during the June-December reporting period all the typical alliance management, coordinated foreign/security policy, military exercises, cultural exchange, and trade and investment activities (see chronology below) took place between the US and South Korea—right up until all hell broke loose on December 3 and retroactively cast doubt on the underpinnings of the relationship.

US-North Korea Relations: North Korea Goes Supervillain

Figure 3 North Korean leader Kim Jong Un walks with President Trump north of the military demarcation line that divides North and South Korea, in the Joint Security Area of Panmunjom in the Demilitarized Zone, on Sunday. Photo: Brendan Smialowski/AFP/Getty Images

The case for re-electing Donald Trump, originally the consummate political outsider, has largely relied on his willingness to do what other presidential candidates will not. This is true for both domestic and foreign policy, with Trump’s outreach to North Korea in the 2018-19 period being especially noteworthy. After all, North Korea went from conducting regular medium-/long-range missile and nuclear tests up through the end of 2017 to their graduated cessation following Trump’s denunciations, vows to “completely destroy” North Korea should it threaten the US, and his willingness to resolve their disputes over dialogue. Whatever one thinks of Trump’s direct outreach to North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, such testing ostensibly halted by early 2018, before missile testing slowly resumed after the failed 2019 Hanoi summit and then picked up pace under Joe Biden, a president North Korea has largely regarded as not worth addressing.

Or so the story goes. In reality, North Korea, having demonstrated the increased potency of its nuclear arms and the ability to reach any part of the continental US via its long-range missiles—and seeing potentially pliant administrations in both Washington and Seoul—probably broke its diplomatic isolation in 2018 for reasons all its own. The failure of the 2019 Hanoi summit seemingly indicates that Trump’s vision of himself as a tough negotiator did not proceed him, and that Kim was furious that he did not receive a favorable deal.

This matters in assessing events from the last half of 2024 because—with the Biden interlude giving way to Trump 2.0—hopes of a return to the summitry of Singapore and Hanoi (with a hopefully better outcome) are already circulating, at least among those inclined to support diplomacy with Pyongyang. For others, this provokes worry—the Washington “blob” is nervous about the prospect, while the international press has already reported on South Korea’s concerns that Trump may seek to bypass them. Indeed reports have floated that some on the Trump team may indeed favor something of that nature. It is unclear how this would play out if South Korea were to soon have a left-leaning president rather than Yoon, who is skeptical of engagement with North Korea.

But the North Korea of 2018 is not the North Korea of 2024 or 2025. Its nuclear and missile programs have grown considerably (with significant ballistic missile (and rocket) testing and demonstration taking place during this reporting period), including a new Hwasong-19 ICBM seemingly successfully launched in November. Pyongyang now refers to South Korea as a hostile state, rather than a misguided brother state to be led toward unification (an attitude backed up by a hybrid war campaign of trash-filled balloons floated over South Korea). To be sure, Pyongyang’s harsh messaging toward Washington and Seoul has been consistent (even rising), but its diplomatic priorities have shifted. As noted in this issue’s China-Korea chapter, Pyongyang’s direct outreach to Beijing atrophied in the latter half of this year, and the Kim regime thus far has not deigned to respond to Trump’s electoral victory—a statement not long after the election result in which Kim called for “limitless” nuclear expansion to counter the US is the closest he has come to acknowledging the return of his old pen pal.

Both elements of this diplomatic shift likely have a common root. North Korea has found a kindred spirit in Vladimir Putin’s Russia, also regarded as an international pariah and revisionist power, and the two have developed a mutually beneficial arrangement that in the short-term goes beyond what they can get from China, much less the US. In the first reporting period of 2024, North Korea was already engaged in large-scale arms sales (notably artillery shells and missiles/rockets) to Russia in exchange for fuel, funding, modern (by North Korean standards) fighter jets, and missile defense support. This list reflects what is more or less publicly known, but informed speculation has broached the possibility of additional in-kind military assistance, including military satellite and re-entry vehicle technology, help with submarine design, and support in building out North Korea’s defense industrial base. 

The June-December reporting period saw this relation deepen further. First, North Korea dispatched at least 10,000 troops to Russia to support Putin’s war against Ukraine. The current status of those troops—their training level and combat readiness, deployment areas, warfighting role, tactical and strategic value, etc.—is unknown, but the assumption is that they are likely engaged in the Kursk region of Russia in the counter-offensive to push back Ukraine’s incursion. Second, North Korea and Russia have strengthened their partnership diplomatically, signing a bona fide treaty alliance in June (during a Putin-Kim summit in North Korea), which came into force on December 4. Whether this alliance is sustainable—or rather an artifact of the Russia-Ukraine war, both states’ sanctions challenges, and perceived shared threats—remains to be seen, as dictators are not historically adept at long-term cooperation. For the moment, however, the Moscow-Pyongyang alliance helps both states alleviate their isolation. The US and South Korea have expressed deep concern about the advancement of North Korea-Russia relations, as it links together the Euro-Atlantic and East Asian theaters in ways that threaten both the US and South Korea individually and as alliance partners.

As mentioned above, Trump’s return to office likely means a different level and time horizon of US support for Ukraine, with the goal being to force an end to the war sooner rather than later (Ukraine may have to accept a settlement allowing Moscow to retain some of the territory the Russian army has seized). The knock-on effect may be that the Moscow-Pyongyang arms transfer ecosystem could dry up, which would be a positive for the US-South Korea alliance, insofar as that would presumably result in North Korea advancing more slowly on selected military programs. How one views this from Pyongyang would be a matter of perspective. On the one hand, there might be disappointment that the arrangement would become less beneficial; on the other hand, one could say that Kim rolled the dice on support for Putin and won. 

Yoon Suk Yeol’s botched martial law declaration was not the only “December surprise” relevant to the Korean Peninsula and its diplomatic outlook. North Korea actually took an (unsurprisingly) cautious approach to the South Korean crisis, before eventually using it for domestic propaganda. But developments in the Middle East surely caught Pyongyang’s eye as well. Namely, the North’s sometime partner and fellow Russian client state, Bashar al-Assad’s Syria, fell to rebel forces on December 7, nearly 14 years after the Syrian Civil War began. Assad had over time regained control of his state, and stamped out resistance with Russian help, and that had persisted… until suddenly it didn’t. 

A swift new rebel offensive swept through Aleppo and Homs before continuing into the Syrian capital and sending Assad fleeing to Moscow. In addition to Israel’s role in decimating Hezbollah and punishing Iran, the speed of the change demonstrated the extent to which Assad had relied on Russian support, which had dried up due to Russian forces being tied down in Ukraine’s eastern front. Russia’s reputation as a revisionist power able to halt the progress of the international order (and in some cases roll it back) while supporting dictatorial partners, has taken a major hit. Pyongyang was doubtless watching with some concerned interest.

Given that, rumors of Kim’s dissatisfaction as to how his troops have been employed in Ukraine, and Russia’s heavy losses during its recent offensive, one may conclude that the emerging Russia-North Korea axis might not be built for the long term. Pyongyang has historically profited from Beijing’s and Moscow’s willingness to compete for its attention, and, given the failure of its outreach to the US—another potential counterweight to China—in 2019, Kim appears to have reverted to the old habit of asking Russia to provide what China will not. If Moscow does not reverse its current losing streak, Pyongyang may be back on the market for new partners, even if the “new” partner is the same one that left Kim Jong Un at the altar in Hanoi.

In short: Comparative Connections has gone the length of the entire Biden administration with no meaningful diplomatic interactions between North Korea and the US to report. The Trump redux offers some possibilities of renewed outreach, but readers are urged to temper their expectations. Should it take place it will largely depend on the wishes of Kim, rather than Trump, and thus on how Kim assesses the options available to him. 

Conclusion: Into the Unknown

Figure 4 U.S. President Joe Biden, Japan’s Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, and South Korea’s President Yoon Suk Yeol on the day of trilateral engagement during the G7 Summit in Hiroshima, Japan, on May 21, 2023. Photo: Jonathan Ernst/Reuters

This issue closes the book on Comparative Connections as an outlet for detailed triannual updates on bilateral relations in the Indo-Pacific. Few bilaterals have been harder to document than that of the US and North Korea, the “rogue state” par excellence that prides itself on its willingness to withstand pressure from the world’s strongest military power for decades. There has, on the other hand, been much to document in the relations between the US and South Korea, one of Washington’s oldest alliances in Asia, but one beset by fluctuations, such as progressive parties skeptical of long-term reliance on the US and conservative parties that, while usually reliable US partners, retain disconcerting ties to the country’s period of military rule that they have, based on recent events, not put completely behind them. 

Pacific Forum has treated Comparative Connections as an extension of its overall mission, which is to foster dialogue between the US and the major players in Indo-Pacific diplomacy, including both the governments and publics in countries considered friendly, hostile, or ambivalent toward US interests. Doing so has required rigorous attention to detail, as captured in our meticulous attention to bilateral events, but also a commitment to honesty when it comes to US interests and values, some of which have left the US at odds with even long-term partners. 

In that spirit: Much of the US foreign policy community welcomed the election of Yoon Suk Yeol in 2022, given his commitment to alignment with the US on regional security issues, openness to engagement with Japan, and well-deserved skepticism toward China. This welcome came despite the very clear flaws in Yoon as a candidate and statesman, manifest in his consistently low approval ratings, pushed down by his swirling scandals and gaffes. Now that Yoon has seemingly reached back to the spirit of Yushin to overthrow South Korea’s constitutional order—and revealed the deep contempt the military and even his own party have for him—it appears the effort spent on him by the Biden and Kishida administrations to deepen trilateral cooperation will not produce the expected benefits. Donald Trump’s return to office, along with a likely progressive successor to Yoon, will probably push Seoul toward greater autonomy in diplomatic and military affairs. The responsibility of the US foreign policy community may now shift to making this transition a smooth one—and preventing the outright collapse of Seoul-Tokyo ties. Those distraught by the return of the Democratic Party to power in Seoul can take comfort in that it is only popular relative to Yoon’s party, and even that may be short-lived. 

North Korea will remain a thorny diplomatic issue regardless of how relations with Russia evolve, and whether Pyongyang reaches out to the Trump administration (much less reaches a deal). Even if Trump and Kim forge an understanding that lowers tensions for a time, North Korea has a decades-long history of hostility toward the US, Japan, and conservative elements in South Korea that will die hard. Trump, and all others who attempt to work with Pyongyang, should be prepared for tensions over the long term.

Administrations change, as will the format of Comparative Connections, but Pacific Forum’s mission will not.

In the second half of 2024, Southeast Asia faced growing headwinds that challenged its longstanding principles of neutrality in external conflict and, above all, “ASEAN Centrality” in regional affairs. Maritime competition between the Philippines and China around the Second Thomas and Sabina Shoals intensified, causing Philippine President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos, Jr., to warn Beijing that there would be serious repercussions if Chinese naval vessels crossed a “red line” in the Philippines Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Overtures from Moscow to several Southeast Asian nations for increased security cooperation presented two worrisome complications: a more pro-active Russian military role and the implications of the strengthening China-Russia alliance on the region’s security. A threat internal to the region, the civil war in Myanmar, developed new complications when China stepped up its diplomatic and security presence in the country to protect its economic interests. In Indonesia, however, an internal threat may be abating as the Jemmah Islamiyah publicly agreed to dissolve.

During these challenges, political shifts could color Southeast Asian responses to security threats. Political transition in Vietnam and Indonesia ushered in new leaders whose geo-political alignments are not yet clear. Thailand underwent a peaceful shift of prime ministers, but the process demonstrated that the country could remain internally focused for the near-term. The political transition in Japan raised questions of whether Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru would continue Tokyo’s growing security relations with its Southeast Asia partners. Throughout the summer and into the fall, US presidential politics loomed over the region. The election in November of Donald Trump raised concerns in Southeast Asia over Washington’s future relations with its security partners; the impact on Southeast Asia of a stiffer US posture toward China; and blanket tariffs, which could erode bilateral relations and impede cooperation in security and other key policy areas.

The Increasing Centrality of the Philippines

Figure 1 The Philippines reaffirmed its position on Sabina Shoal in the South China Sea even as it agreed with China to explore ways to lower tension in the area, its foreign ministry said on September 12, 2024. Photo: Reuters

By mid-year the Philippines was rapidly gaining salience in US policy paradigms for maritime security in the Asia-Pacific. China’s accelerating attacks on Philippine vessels, especially those around on Second Thomas Shoal; the proximity of the Philippines (and its bases) to the Taiwan Strait; and the warming US-Philippines alliance all contribute to this focus. Beyond that, President Marcos had styled himself as a negotiator of the conflict in the South China Sea, a vision that neither China nor the other Southeast Asian claimants appeared to share. Lastly, in the heated political environment in the United States, the Philippines had become the poster child for a US ally threatened by China, although Taiwan remained the greater focus. However, many statements from both the executive branch and Congress paired Taiwan and the Philippines together.

Maritime conflict between China and the Philippines this year has larger been around Philippine attempts to resupply the Sierra Madre, to provide the naval personnel aboard with water, food, and other essentials. China has claimed that Manila is attempting to restore the ship and use it as the foundation for a military base in Second Thomas Shoal. This is not without some foundation–in the pat Philippine officials have occasionally said just that. A small number of US politicians have also surfaced the idea, although some suggest that the wrecked ship would not be useable, and that a new dock and pier would have to be built on Second Thomas Shoal. 

In May a clash between Chinese and Philippine vessels resulted in injuries to Filipino sailors, prompting Marcos to issue his “red line” warning to Beijing when he delivered the keynote address at the Shangri-la Security Dialogue on May 31. This was presumed to mean that Manila would invoke the self-defense clause of the US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT), although it is not clear that China’s “grey zone” tactics in the Philippines Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) rise to that level in Washington’s view.

Nevertheless, the May incident was the catalyst for opaque discussions between Manila and Beijing in June to avoid accelerating the conflict around Second Thomas Shoal. Earlier in the summer China claimed that it had forged a “gentleman’s agreement” with former President Rodrigo Duterte, in which they agreed that Manila would only resupply the Sierra Madre with essential supplies, and that Marcos was abrogating that agreement. There is no such agreement on record, and Duterte has not confirmed the existence of any. The outcome of these negotiations closely paralleled the hypothetical Duterte agreement: Manila agreed to resupply the Sierra Madre only with essential goods for the naval personnel on it, and Beijing agreed not to interfere with that process. On July 27 the Philippine Navy conducted a resupply mission, and for the first time in several months China did not interfere. 

However, the agreement covered only the Second Thomas Shoal. While China conspicuously did not interfere with the resupply mission on July 27th, it anchored its largest coast guard vessel at Sabina Shoal east of Second Thomas Shoal. Some Filipino officials have said they believe that China is attempting to build on Sabina Shoal which, although smaller than Second Thomas Shoal, is still strategically important.

Defense Cooperation Intensifies

As “grey zone” activity accelerated so did US-Philippines defense diplomacy. On July 30 the Philippines and the United States completed its fourth “2+2” Ministerial Dialogue, bringing together cabinet secretaries for foreign affairs and defense from both countries. The dialogue was held in Manila for the first time, a signal of the maturing alliance. The most notable deliverables from the meetings were in the flow of funds to come from the United States to the Philippines. Washington to provide $500 million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and $128 million for infrastructure related to the expansion of EDCA sites. The generous FMF pledge—which US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken described as a “once in a generation” sum—was intended to support the modernization of the Philippine armed forces and Coast Guard as, in Blinken’s words, “they transition to focus on external defense.” 

Figure 2 Secretary of State Blinken, Secretary of Defense Austin, Secretary of Foreign Affairs Manalo, and Senior Undersecretary and Officer in Charge (OIC) of National Defense Galvez convened the third U.S. Philippines 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue in Washington, D.C., on April 11, 2023. Photo: The America Times

This uptick in defense diplomacy was matched by the eighth iteration of the US-Philippines Sama Sama Exercises, which were a statement of solidarity between Manila and Washington, as well as like-minded security partners. The two-week maritime exercises on Oct. 7-18, also included Australia, Canada, France, the United Kingdom, and Japan. The exercises were particularly notable for the equipment deployed. Participating assets from the United States included the Navy’s Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Howard (DDG 83), the presence of which drew sharp protests from Beijing and claims that the United States was attempting to escalate conflict in the South China Sea.

Intra-ASEAN Efforts

Attempts among the Southeast Asian states to calm tensions in the South China see have been largely ineffectual. In keeping with his higher profile on the South China Sea, President Marcos proposed that the Southeast Asian claimant countries run the South China Sea might resolve their disputes among themselves first. Vietnam and Malaysia rejected this idea out of hand. Marcos’ response was to petition the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) Arbitration Tribunal to declare that the Philippines’ EEZ extends across the continental shelf to the shores of Sabah, a Malaysian province. This keeps alive the Philippines’ claim that Sabah was leased but not given to Malaysia during the British colonial period and that Manila had a right to reclaim it.

In the meantime, ASEAN delayed finalization of the ASEAN-China Code of Conduct on the South China Sea until 2026, when the Philippines will chair the group, following Malaysia’s chairmanship in 2025. Laos, this year’s chair, appeared to be more focused on the Myanmar civil war and, as a landlocked country, would not be inclined to tackle a complicated maritime conflict. In any case, expectations for a COC remain low in ASEAN, even if the agreement is finalized. Southeast Asian leaders have tended to view the Code of Conduct (and its predecessor, the ASEAN-China Declaration on a Code of Conduct on the South China Sea) not a treaty but as a dialogue mechanism.

Russian-Indonesian Naval Ties

Forging new security ties or expanding existing ones with external powers is a common theme in the Southeast Asian states, particularly the maritime ones. On November 4-8, on the heels of the inauguration of President Prabowo Subianto, Indonesia initiated a new phrase in relations with Russia with Orruda Joint Training, a five-day joint exercise in the Java Sea near Surabaya. The Russian Navy brought three corvette-class warships and a medium tanker to the exercises, which were divided into harbor and sea phases. 

The exercises were a strong signal from Prabowo that he intended to follow Jakarta’s traditional posture of non-alignment in Indonesian foreign and defense policy. Jakarta has declined to take a position on the war in Ukraine. The Orudda exercises were one in an expanding defense portfolio that recently has also included joint exercises with Germany. In scope, they are dwarfed by the Super Garuda Shield Exercises that Indonesia has conducted with the United States since 2006. That said, they follow recent developments in the Indonesia-Russia relationship that could complicate Jakarta’s relations with the United States and Europe in the near-term. In 2023 Prabowo, in his capacity as Defense Minister in the administration of former president Joko Widodo, quietly revived a $1.1 billion agreement with Russia to purchase eleven Su-35S fighter jets that had been dormant since 2019, defying international sanctions on Moscow over Ukraine. 

Has Indonesia Rolled Back Terrorism?

On June 30, 16 leaders of the Jemah Islamiyah (JI), Southeast Asia’s regional terrorism network, announced that they were dissolving the group. JI’s origins were in the mujahideen, the global Muslim resistance to the Soviet presence in Afghanistan in the 1980s; the group, led by Indonesian and Malaysian fighters, was allegedly tutored by Osama bin Laden. JI has been the most important terrorist group in Southeast Asia for three decades; has been active in the conflicts in Syria and Yemen; and even has a presence in Australia.

JI’s long-term goal has been to develop cells across Southeast Asia and eventually establish an official Islamic state—a caliphate—in the region. Although the joint Indonesian-Malaysian leadership has endured, the group is more Indonesian than Malaysian and its most famous attacks–such as the 2002 Bali bombing and the 2004 bombing the Marriott hotel in Jakarta. JI is on most international terrorist sanctions lists and was officially outlawed by the Indonesian government in 2007. Several JI leaders are in prison in Indonesia but most will be released in the next few years.

Most Southeast Asian leaders and analysts doubt that JI will disappear altogether, and many think the announcement is a ruse. That said, it is probably no accident that the announcement comes after the election of Prabowo Subianto in February, since Indonesia’s extremists may fear a particularly strong response from him to terrorist attacks. Prabowo has a complicated relationship with Indonesia’s Muslim community: he has considerable political support from Muslim groups, but he has a history of repressive tactics. Moreover, as Minister of Defense he has been the link between the Indonesian military and international partners on counter-terrorism cooperation. 

A major break-up of Jemah Islamiyah could significantly lower the terrorist threat to Indonesia. It would be the most benign outcome to the announcement. and it is within the realm of possibility. However, many Indonesians believe that the dissolution could be a tactic that would enable the leadership to regroup while it continues to pursue its long-term goals. In addition, appearing to dissolve the group and reorganizing with different leadership under a new name could make JI less a target for arrest. In the past decade, over 30 Indonesian civil servants, military officers and police officers were arrested for suspected ties to JI.

Many also argue that it is immaterial if JI does dissolve, because it will likely have splinter groups, of younger and more radical extremists who disagree with the dissolution. This is often the case with terrorist networks—JI was itself a splinter from the Darul Islam network in the 1990s. In that case, terrorism could rise with JI’s dissolution.

The Indonesian security sector has improved its counter-terrorism response considerably since the early 2000s, and even if JI recoups under other auspices, the government will likely take it in stride. Countering new splinter groups will be more difficult but still within Jakarta’s bandwidth. Because it has been the lynchpin for Southeast Asia terrorism for three decades, however, the impact of JI’s dissolution could be greater on some Southeast Asian countries, because they will be tempted to become more extremist and more violent:

• The greatest impact would likely be on Philippine jihadist groups in Mindanao. These groups are often prey to larger terrorist networks, and would likely ally themselves with more radical groups if JI dissolves. This could be complicated by the growing rivalry between the Marcos and Duterte clans, and Duterte’s determination to keep Mindanao on his side. 
• Singaporeans were shocked in 2002 to uncover a homegrown JI cell in their territory—prior to that, they tended to view Islamic extremism as an external threat. A rise in Islamic extremism on the island would challenge Lawrence Wong’s new administration to crack down on the terrorism threat without alienation the country’s Muslim population.

China Moves More Deeply into Myanmar

As Myanmar moves toward the fifth anniversary of the military coup in February 2021 there are no signs that the internal conflict is moving toward a peaceful resolution. In recent months the opposition forces and the ethnic armed organizations (EAO’s) allied have made significant gains on the battlefield, particularly in eastern Myanmar. On Aug. 3 the resistance captured the northern city of Lashio in northern Shan State after a month’s battle. It represented the first time that had a Tatmadaw command had been seized by resistance forces; moreover, it underscored the reality that the Tatmadaw had become one of several armed groups contesting for power rather than the major block to an opposition assault. Their defeat in Lashio raised alarm not only within the military but also in Beijing. 

China has much to worry about in the current political and security environment in Myanmar. The China-Myanmar border has become increasingly less secure over the past four years, with upticks in trafficking in illegal drugs and other forms of international crime. The Chinese pipelines that extend through Rakhine State to deliver oil and gas to Kunming have been targeted by opposition forces, occasionally prompting China to rely on their own security forces to guard them. Armed ethnic groups opposed to the junta are attacking Chinese mining operations that extract critical minerals vital to electronics manufacturing in China. Although they have been curtailed, Chinese criminal gangs continue to operate “scam campuses” on Myanmar territory near the border with Thailand. Beijing has conducted police and military actions to break up the camps, as has Interpol. 

China still intends to build an economic corridor with Myanmar, which includes road and rail projects and a deep sea port that will give the PLA-Navy a strategic outpost on the Indian Ocean. Although the two countries agree in principle to go forward with this cluster of projects, full implementation is deferred until a peaceful resolution of the conflict is in sight. Lastly, both China and Russia have increased their economic stake in Myanmar, particularly in arms sales; however, the war in Ukraine has reduced Russian supplies, which China is now obliged to replace.

With this deterioration of the security environment–and the military’s control of territory–after the Lashio battle Beijing adopted a more pro-active role in attempting to revoke the conflict that unabashedly tilts toward the junta. Accordingly, China has increased its presence in Myanmar in several states and for multiple. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited the country in August, and a special Chinese envoy for the ethnic armed groups was dispatched to urge that those fighting with (or parallel to) the People’s Defense Force (PDF) refrain from attacking the junta forces. Junta leader Min Aung Hlaing was invited to visit China, a clear sign of Beijing’s partisan support for him, and did so in November.

Figure 4 Myanmar’s military chief Min Aung Hlaing (R) meeting with China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Naypyidaw on Aug. 14, 2024. VOA File

Beijing appears to have little confidence in Min Aung Hlaing, but Chinese officials continue to back him. Beijing is pressing the junta to organize elections, presumably an attempt to legitimate Min Aung Hlaing and the junta in the eyes of the international community. However, organizing elections would be extremely difficult, particularly given the fact that the military controls only a corridor of territory, from Yangon to Mandalay and could not ensure adequate conditions for polls in other territories. 

In any case, there is little likelihood that neither the international community not the significant portion of the Myanmar public that supports the opposition would accept the legitimacy of elections conducted under these circumstances. At present the junta appears reluctant to schedule new polls, but Beijing will likely step up pressure on Min Aung Hlaing to move forward with them.

In and among this flurry of diplomatic activity, Beijing secured an agreement from Myanmar to deploy Chinese private military corporations (PMCs) to operate in the country. A minimum of four Chinese PMC are believed to be operating in Myanmar. These mercenary groups provide static security, each stationed at a specific point to protect the interests of Chinese companies. Despite their narrow commercial mandate, the presence of foreign forces in Myanmar of any kind has the potential to destabilize the conflict further.

In the second half of 2024 Washington cautiously expanded support for the Myanmar opposition. The current budget authorization, the 2023 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) provides for funds “to support the people of Burma in their struggle for democracy, freedom, human rights and justice”; authorizes additional sanctions; and permits the provision of “non-lethal, technical assistance” to resistance groups. Although humanitarian assistance to Myanmar, totaling more than $140 million since the beginning of the conflict, make up the bulk of American aid, US officials began to make cautious contact with opposition groups in late 2024. 

On August 17, three days after Ming Aung Hlaing’s visit to Myanmar, two US officials–Tom Sullivan, Senior Advisor to Secretary of State Blinken, and Michael Schiffer, Assistant Administration for Asia of the US Agency for International Development (USAID), met with officials of the National Unity Government and with key ethnic groups, including the Karen National Union. They promised to “expand direct support and assistance to pro-democracy actors” in Myanmar, although the administration has not made public precise plans. That said, the United States has little interest in entering a proxy war with China in Myanmar, although Washington will watch carefully for developments that affect the strategic balance between the US and China in this area of the Indo-Pacific.

Key Political Transitions

In late 2024 Southeast Asia underwent three political transitions: a change of party secretary-general in Vietnam, from Nguyen Nhu Trong to Tô Lâm; an internal reshuffle in the Pheu Thai Party in Thailand, leader of the parliamentary coalition, that brought Thaksin Shinawatra’s 38-year-old daughter Paetongtarn to power; and the inauguration in October of Prabowo Subianto as President in Indonesia. 

Of these three, the transition most likely to have an impact on US security interests in Southeast Asia is the move from Joko Widodo to Prabowo Subianto in Indonesia. Although closely allied politically—Joko’s son, Gibran Rakabuming Raka, is Prabowo’s vice president—the new president will take a more pro-active approach to foreign relations and national defense. 

Prabowo will be influenced by his most recent position as minister of defense but as well by his and his family’s deep involvement with the New Order of former president Suharto. In his inaugural address, he promised to strengthen Indonesia’s neutrality in foreign affairs. In the near term, this has translated into deepening Jakarta’s relations with both Moscow and Beijing, although he promises to balance deeper ties to China and Russia with stronger relations with the West and Japan,

Prabowo has made two moves in the direction of China and Russia. Joint naval exercises with the Russian Navy were the most obvious step. Additionally, on Nov. 13, Jakarta also signed an agreement with China to jointly develop maritime resources near the Natuna Islands. Indonesian security experts have warned that it will undermine Indonesia’s territorial rights and reinforce Beijing’s claims to a “nine-dash-line.” They point out that Jakarta might learn from the experience of the Philippines, which has periodically attempted to conduct joint oil exploration projects with China in the South China Sea, all of which were abandoned when Beijing proposed terms that were overwhelmingly in their favor.

Prabowo’s other foreign policy goals are less defined, but he has floated several possibilities. Although Jakarta maintains formal neutrality on the war in Ukraine, in June Prabowo renewed his interest in helping to settle that conflict in his address at the Shangri-la Security Dialogue. He is unlikely to play a prominent role, but Moscow will seek Jakarta’s support in any solution they pursue. As well, Prabowo appears to be more inclined to bring Indonesian into BRICS than was Joko, although he also will also seek entry for Jakarta in the OECD.

Vietnamese Communist Party Secretary-General Tô Lâm began his climb to the top in July, when he made the transition from minister of public security to president in July, largely the result of his successful management of the “Burning Furnace” anti-corruption purge that has consumed Vietnam in recent years. When Party Secretary-General Nguyen Phu Trong died shortly thereafter, on July 19, Lam became acting secretary-general and was subsequently confirmed as the permanent leader by the Party Central Committee on Aug. 4. In 2026 he will face re-election as party secretary-general at the National Party Congress. 

Lam’s longtime experience as public security minister has raised expectations that he will keep tight control over political dissent, and that he is likely to continue the anti-corruption purge in some form. However, his goals in foreign policy are less clear. In contrast to Trong, who was a strict doctrinaire, Lam is more pragmatic and is likely to seek a middle lane between China and the West. In the near-term, he will tread delicately on relations with Washington, not least because Vietnam will be in the crossfire for potential tariffs in the Trump administration because of its $102 billion trade surplus with the United States.

Former Prime Minister Srettha Thavasin’s removal as prime minister was a function of the increasing politicization of Thailand’s judiciary, but the Constitutional Court stopped short of dissolving the Pheu Thai Party. His replacement by Paetongtarn Shinawatra, daughter of former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, was not surprising but raised inevitable questions of whether Thaksin himself would be the de facto leader of the Pheu Thai Party and thus the parliamentary coalition. This issue was settled legally when the Constitutional Court ruled in Thaksin’s favor on a petition charging that he had improperly influenced the party. However, for the time being, the Thai military appears to accept Pheu Thai’s continued role in leading the government, if only because it is a hedge against more pro-democracy parties. However, the military will watch closely for signs that Thaksin is accruing greater political power and could take measures to depose Pheu Thai, in the courts if not on the streets, if he crosses a red line.

Looking Ahead to Trump 2.0

Southeast Asian leaders watched the US presidential election campaign with marked nervousness. In contrast to Europe, fewer leaders believed that the United States would abandon or seriously downgrade its security alliances in the Indo-Pacific if Trump won, although they do anticipate greater pressure on burden-sharing. Moreover, the Pentagon’s efforts to reconfigure the US alliance system in the Indo-Pacific from a hub-and-spokes to a “lattice” configuration had encouraged the expansion of security cooperation to include Japan and Australia in US-Southeast Asian security relations. This new dynamic offers some scaffolding even if bilateral defense relations with Washington deteriorate. 

However, Southeast Asians worry about a hardening of the US position toward China, and the greater likelihood that they would be drawn into US-China conflict in the region, however much they insist that they should not be made to choose. The specific concern is that greater conflict in the Taiwan Strait would inevitably draw in the Philippines; however, the silver lining to such a scenario is that the Pentagon would likely seek to maintain, or even strengthen, the US-Philippines alliance as a result.

Although trade does not usually have a direct connection to security, many Southeast Asian leaders fear that a rigid tariff regime, of the kind that Trump has promised, could upend the region economically and, at the least, damage some bilateral relations and security cooperation within those relations. Vietnam and Thailand have the largest trade surpluses with the United States and expect to be the prime targets of tariff increases. In that case, both countries are likely to bring their security relations into negotiations on trade, reminding Washington that damage on the trade side would inevitably be felt in security.

If there is a Southeast Asian country that is least impacted by these policy changes, it is likely to be Singapore. The country continues to run a trade deficit with the United States and its relative wealth makes it a more equitable security partner. Moreover, US “flexible basing” in Singapore is a powerful card that Prime Minister Lawrence Wong will likely play if relations with the new administration become rocky.

This chapter was made possible through a grant from the Hindu American Foundation.

In 2021, when President Biden took office, the US-India relationship was riding on the positive momentum created by successive US presidents since President George W Bush. Over the four years of the Biden administration, with few positive developments and several other tensions, the partnership was stress-tested across domains. For watchers of the US-India bilateral partnership, the Biden administration’s denouement vis-a-vis the partnership with India was disappointing and underwhelming. While several key supply chain diversification initiatives materialized, issues surrounding India’s position toward Russia—in the aftermath of the latter’s invasion of Ukraine—its alleged involvement in the killing of a Khalistan separatist and lastly Washington’s position on the interim government in Bangladesh highlighted the divergences between the two democracies. For the US-India partnership, President Biden’s term in office could be described as one that alienated an already allyship/treaty-averse India, pushing it further into groupings such as BRICS and other emerging non-Western multilateral institutions. The last eight months were no different. Nonetheless, domestic political developments in both India and the US could potentially set the stage for a recourse in the spiraling US-India bilateral partnership. 

Election Polls ≠ Election Results

Around the world, pollsters are increasingly having a hard time deciphering the exact outcome of elections in boisterous democracies. In both India and the US, elections polls predicting results were off by significant margins, particularly in India. In India, elections last a few months, with different parts of the country going to the polls one after the other. The election contest that began in April 2024 ended in June 2024. Most pollsters had predicted a sweep for the ruling Bhartiya Janata Party and return of Prime Minister Narendra Modi for a third term in office. 

Figure 1 US President Joe Biden hailed US-India ties, while rolling out the pomp and pageantry for visiting Prime Minister Narendra Modi on Jun. 22, 2023. Photo: Getty Images

The pollsters were partly correct. Modi returned for a third term in office. However, unlike the first or second terms, it would not be with an absolute majority in the parliament. For the first time the Modi government turned to its coalition partners in the north and southeast to form a government. Some strategic analysts deemed it a weakening of Modi’s position. Opinions are mixed as to whether the opposition truly made inroads or not, since the leading opposition party, Indian National Congress, secured only 99 seats out of the available 543, versus the BJP’s 240. With 272 seats required to form a government, BJP’s path to 7 Lok Kalyan Marg (the PM’s office) was easier with its partners in the northern state of Bihar and southeastern state of Andhra Pradesh sweeping the polls, bringing its seat tally to 293. The unexpected election results caused an initial panic in the Indian stock markets. However, things settled soon after when speculation and rumors were put to rest, signaling policy continuity in Modi 3.0. 

For Washington, Modi 3.0 signals macroeconomic stability and policy continuity to continue cooperation in critical and emerging technologies, supply chain diversification and defense and security cooperation. Unlike coalition partners from past Congress governments, the BJP’s coalition does not include members of the Indian far left, such as Communist Party of India (CPI) and Communist Party of India (Marxist), also known as CPI-M. These two parties have opposed several initiatives aimed at strengthening US-India relations. In complete contrast, BJP’s coalition partner in the south, the Telugu Desam Party led by Chandrababu Naidu, has consistently advocated for stronger US-India ties. In fact, the chief minister in his terms in office has brought in significant American investment to Hyderabad. The election results in the US were no different. Opinion polls predicted a close and tight race between Vice President Kamala Harris and Donald Trump, incumbent Joe Biden’s predecessor. On Nov. 5, the 45th president won a decisive victory, claiming all swing states from Pennsylvania in the east to Arizona in the southwest, also bringing down what was known as a blue wall for the Democrats in Midwest. While reactions to Trump’s victory were largely mixed in the Indo-Pacific, New Delhi was among the few that was ecstatic with the news that the former president will return to the Oval Office in January 2025. 

There are multiple reasons for the Indian strategic community’s celebration. In the first Trump administration, there were multiple policy convergences. From defense officials overtly supporting India in its clash with China at the border, to a revitalized and strengthened Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (“Quad”), increased security cooperation between the two nations, supplemented by Modi-Trump bromance, the partnership between the world’s largest and oldest democracies was strengthened. 

In complete contrast to these developments, the Biden administration postponed and canceled Quad meetings, pressured India on its non-aligned position on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, handled allegations surrounding India’s involvement in the plot to kill a Sikh separatist (labeled a terrorist in India) in a haphazard way by leaking intelligence to the press and validated an interim government in Bangladesh that ousted the former prime minister Sheikh Hasina through violent protests. 

Strategic analysts believe Trump’s transactional foreign policy coupled with his nomination of several champions of the US-India partnership will lead to a smooth or at least smoother ride in his second administration. From the leader of the India caucus, Michael Waltz, as national security advisor, to Marco Rubio—the Florida senator who advocated for elevating the US-India partnership to a defense treaty level, on par with Japan, Korea, Israel, and NATO—as secretary of state to the former Rep. Tulsi Gabbard of Hawaii as director of national intelligence, several key nominations indicate a strong support for US-India partnership and increased synergies between Trump 2.0 and Modi 3.0.

Granted, trade and commercial ties between the two could experience turbulence given the president-elect’s penchant for using tariffs and trade barriers as leverage against both allies and partners. India was not spared his first administration and with the ballooning trade deficit between the two, it likely won’t be spared in his second administration. 

Nonetheless, a major headache for Delhi may be solved—Washington’s pressure to abandon Russia, severing its ties with its Cold-War era- and time-tested partner. A key bone of contention for the Biden administration since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 may not be one for the Trump administration.

Cold-War Era Differences are Here to Stay 

In the months leading up to the election in the US, Hindu priests in New Delhi were organizing prayers for Trump’s victory. This phenomenon reflected overlapping priorities between many in India and the Trump administration. It is not news that strengthening the bilateral partnership between the US and India is a bipartisan effort in Washington DC. However, in the months between May and December, there was increased skepticism in the direction of the partnership, both in Washington and New Delhi. Despite making significant progress in expanding the scope of the partnership across traditional and non-traditional security domains, allegations surrounding the Indian government’s involvement in a plot to kill a separatist, particularly by the judiciary in the US, did not bode well for the partnership. The US District Court for Southern District of New York named the government of India, National Security Advisor Ajit Doval, and former Secretary of the Research and Analysis Wing Samant Goel in a summons right before Modi’s visit to the US. While the summons came in response to a civil lawsuit filed by a Khalistan separatist, the optics of a court in New York summoning their nations NSA and former intelligence chief reinforced Indians’ concerns of the West’s overreaching arm. The India government dismissed the summons as “unwarranted and unsubstantiated imputations.”

Figure 2 Secretary of State Antony Blinken speaks with Indian External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, Thursday, Sept. 28, 2023, at the State Department in Washington. Photo: AP Photo/Stephanie Scarbrough

In an ironic turn of events, Modi and Indian External Affairs Minister Subramanyam Jaishankar were in Washington celebrating the progress of iCET, a brainchild of the Indian NSA. These ironies reflect a broader theme in the US-India partnership. While challenges in the Indo-Pacific, such as China’s aggression, have served as a catalyst for increased cooperation between the two democracies across various domains, Cold-War era allegiances and ideological fealties continue to hamper the relationship. 

Not to mention that the divergences have raised doubts about Washington’s seriousness toward supporting India in the Indo-Pacific region. Delays in shipment of the Apache helicopters ordered by India and slow progress on other fronts have not helped the US-India partnership. While the Biden administration positioned India as a key “friendly shore” in the diversification of key supply chains, initiated sector specific programs such as iCET, including with partners such as South Korea, political concerns and these distractions have held back the partnership from realizing its full potential. 

One of the major contentions of the Cold War were the United States and India’s partnerships with their adversaries. India had a defense partnership with the Soviet Union while the US supported Pakistan. Plus, in former secretary of state, Henry Kissinger’s attempts at establishing a rapprochement between the US and China, he further isolated India. US involvement in South Asia has not supported India but often challenged its hegemony or supposed sphere of influence. In the months between May and December 2024, New Delhi found its sphere of influence threatened with the friendly Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina ousted by violent protests. While she has sought refuge in India, among the first governments to recognize the new unelected leader of Bangladesh—with an official title of advisor—Muhammad Yunus, was the United States. 

Signaling a different approach, at the end of October, shortly before the election, Trump tweeted: “I strongly condemn the barbaric violence against Hindus, Christians, and other minorities who are getting attacked and looted by mobs in Bangladesh, which remains in a total state of chaos. It would have never happened on my watch.”

Figure 3 President Donald Trump with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in 2017. Photo: Mark Wilson/Getty Images

From the Cold War era to present day, sections within the Washington establishment continue to undermine New Delhi’s influence in the region. The unfolding crisis in Bangladesh add to an already unstable South Asia. For New Delhi, the civil strife in its northeastern state of Manipur and the unfolding situation in Bangladesh increase volatility in its neighborhood. With China actively trying to consolidate footholds in Pakistan, Maldives, Sri Lanka, Nepal, and elsewhere, and Bangladesh turning increasingly hostile to Indian interests and religious minorities, especially Hindus, India’s neighborhood has turned challenging over the last few years. These developments highlight stress points in New Delhi and Washington’s divergent approaches to the Indian Ocean and the broader Indo-Pacific. In mid-November, US and India held the inaugural Indian Ocean dialogue to discuss security issues affecting the region. While there were several high-level exchanges between Modi and Biden, and across various levels of the government, including in track 1 dialogues such as the recently inaugurated Indian Ocean dialogue, talks and walks have been diametrically different on several instances.

The chaos in India’s neighborhood, postponed and canceled Quad meetings in 2023 and in early 2024, and friction over the alleged plot to kill a separatist may have prompted an expedited rapprochement with the PRC. In the last six months, New Delhi and Beijing’s diplomatic efforts at resetting ties to pre-Galwan levels took shape. Both sides have agreed to disengage and continue border patrols. On the sidelines of the BRICS summit, both sides agreed to border patrol arrangements and disengage from their earlier offensive stand. The last four years witnessed tense relations between the two, affecting trade and commercial ties and even people-to-people ties with both countries, making travel difficult between the two.

The perceived threat of China was a catalyst for expanded cooperation between the US and India. In the absence of an active threat, and multiple divergences over regional and global issues, the impetus for increased cooperation could wane over time without proper intervention. 

Blow Hot, Blow Cold

There were multiple developments signaling expanded cooperation and convergence on interests and even values. For example, the Indian consulates in the US engaged in several sub-national diplomatic efforts highlighting shared values of democracy and equality. In Lansing, Michigan, the Indian Consul General in Chicago, participated in the Annual Indian American Legislative Day at the State Capitol, highlighting the shared democratic values of both countries. Similarly, senior officials from both the US and India signed a Statement of Intent to establish the Gandhi-King Development Foundation named after Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr.

Figure 4 Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, US President Joe Biden, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi pose prior to a Quad meeting last year on May 24, 2023 in Tokyo, Japan. Photo: The Asahi Shimbun/Getty Images

From Indian diplomats organizing a celebration of International Yoga Day in Mississippi State Capitol to American diplomats supporting LGBTQ rights in Pune, India, subnational diplomacy was alive and well—even when diplomacy at the top was strained. For example, in early May, President Biden accused India, China and Japan of being “xenophobic” at a fundraising event for his presidential campaign. In early December, the BJP, Modi’s party at the center, accused the State Department of colluding with billionaires such as George Soros to destabilize the Modi government. Deputy Secretary Kurt Campbell along with senior Indian officials was convening the inaugural US-India Indian Ocean dialogue in November all while India was upset with Washington’s approach to the government in the Indian Ocean neighbor Bangladesh. At the G20 meeting in Rio De Janeiro, Biden expressed support for India’s climate actions. Not long after, the Indian billionaire Gautam Adani, behind India’s Make in India movement to reduce reliance on Chinese solar panels, was accused by the SEC and the district courts in New York of securities fraud and bribery among other charges. These push and pull frictions have not helped the US-India bilateral partnership. 

Over the last two decades, the US-India partnership was fostered by all branches of the US government across different administrations. The US-India partnership was among the few partnerships that enjoyed bipartisan support. However, recent accusations by the BJP and frictions in ties since Biden took office, would indicate a shift in the bipartisanship. Members of the Democrat party such as representatives Ilhan Omar (D–Minnesota), Rashida Tlaib (D–Michigan) and Jamaal Bowman (D–New Yorkt) have consistently voiced concerns about the US partnership with India. While initially these were considered fringe, and not shared by the larger Democrat party, alleged actions by the Indian government or the Democrat party itself moving farther left from core ideology, has strained the relationship, raising concerns of the relationship turning a partisan endeavor. 

This pull and push dynamic in the relationship has certainly proved to be an impediment to unfettered growth. 

Strategic analysts are of the view that the BJP is counting on Trump 2.0 to reset ties. The Indian government if not publicly exuberant, is not anxious as many in Europe and the broader Indo-Pacific seem to be. India’s External Affairs Minister Jaishankar, speaking at a public event, said, “Prime Minister Narendra Modi was among the first three calls, I think, that President (elect) Trump took”…while a lot of countries are nervous about a Trump presidency, India is not among them” 

The expectation is understandable. The bromance between the leaders, witnessed at events such as Howdy Modi and Trump’s welcome in India helped stabilize the relationship in Trump’s first term even as the two administrations diverged on trade issues. Minus the jabs at India for its tariffs, Trump has consistently spoken highly of Modi and the Indian government. Multilateral initiatives such as Quad were on much stronger footing in Trump 1.0 and Modi 1.0 than they were under Biden. Nonetheless, the incoming Trump administration may not necessarily have the same priorities as the Biden administration, not just in democracy promotion but in global common interests such as addressing climate change. 

One of the key convergences between the Biden and Modi administration was on increasing engagement with G20 countries on global issues such as climate change and environmental protection. In multilateral platforms such as G20 and Quad, the two countries emphasized the need to address climate change and work collectively to promote environmental protection and climate resilience. In such areas where the US under Trump may not have an appetite for increased engagement, such as public good delivery and infrastructure development, New Delhi may have to go alone. 

New Delhi Steps in Where Washington Retreats

Trump’s transactional foreign policy that prioritizes zero-sum trade interests over goodwill and greater public good, could leave voids in places that offer little commercial incentive for increased engagement. The Pacific Islands are one such place that hold immense strategic value to the United States but little commercial value, at least relative to the large economies in the Indo-Pacific. While Washington steps up its focus on commercial ties and defense posturing in the Indo-Pacific, New Delhi can stick to its playbook in the Pacific by continuing public goods delivery and supporting the inclusive development of small-island states. 

Over the last eight months, India has extended its official outreach to the Pacific Islands at the highest levels. President of India Droupadi Marmu visited Fiji and Timor Leste to meet with government officials and address the parliament in Fiji. In 2023, Modi visited Papua New Guinea to attend the India-Pacific Islands meet. Albeit slow and limited to public goods support, India has consistently delivered to these nations, even during times of crisis, including the COVID-19 pandemic. 

With the risk of a Trump administration abandoning commitments to multilateral initiatives, including on climate change, New Delhi could be along in its global projects. However, increasing convergence on the need for coordinated approach to infrastructure development in the Indo-Pacific region by New Delhi and Washington’s other partners in the region may have to fill the void in the event of Washington’s retreat to zero-sum economic partnerships. 

Light at the End of the Tunnel 

Washington and New Delhi have witnessed challenging times. From the brink of war to sanctions, the two democracies have managed relations through thick and thin. The last six months would be one such difficult period in the US-India bilateral partnership. As previous chapters of Comparative Connections have highlighted, for Washington and New Delhi to truly maximize the potential of their partnership, both nations must get past the muscle memory of the Cold War era. Washington’s penchant for democracy promotion, particularly by the Democratic Party, does not instill confidence in New Delhi on Washington’s support for its autonomy. Instead, it validates its concerns of undermining its influence in the Indo-Pacific. As the political winds have shifted, there will be a renewed opportunity for the Trump administration to reset ties based on shared strategic interests over arbitrary values. The first 100 days of the Trump administration may set the stage for that policy realignment.

China marked the end of 2024 and four years of often intense competition for regional influence with the Biden administration and its allies and partners by continuing strong opposition to outside interference and working to advance China’s leading position among most Southeast Asian governments. The Biden government made significant gains at China’s expense, notably in the Philippines, a contrast with the decline in US regional influence and China’s ascendance that occurred during the first Trump administration. Looking forward, Beijing will seek to advance Chinese influence as a reliable partner and stabilizing presence amid widespread regional and global uncertainties caused by growing economic protectionism, wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, and perceived negative implications of a second Trump administration.

Assessing China, US Regional Influence 

Amid surveys showing China’s position as Southeast Asia’s leading power, President Biden in the 2024 presidential campaign repeatedly highlighted his administration’s achievements in checking Beijing’s challenges to the US and ambitions in Asia and elsewhere. US efforts involved domestic strengthening through massive spending bills and working with allies and partners in Asia and elsewhere to counter China’s regional advances at others’ expense. Supporting evidence was provided by Xi Jinping over the past year—reacting to perceived US encirclement and serious domestic problems by compromising with the Biden administration in agreeing to the US government’s longstanding calls for talks with China to set guardrails to manage rising tensions and beginning a modest charm offensive seeking to reduce tensions and stabilize relations with the United States and many US partners and allies, though not Taiwan or the Philippines. 

The authoritative annual Lowy Institute Asia Power Index in late 2024 compared US and Chinese regional influence by highlighting China’s inability to close a large gap between its influence and that of the United States on account of slower Chinese economic growth and domestic challenge. Meanwhile, the United States advanced via growing activism and networking with regional partners and strong US economic fundamentals. It noted that China notably narrowed the gap and advanced in influence relative to the United States during the first Trump administration, predicting a similar rise in China’s relative influence was likely under a second Trump presidency.  

A report in late 2024 synthesizing the views of 25 Southeast Asian specialists of China’s influence in the region relative to that of the United States showed continued shortcomings in China’s quest for regional leadership. It balanced China’s economic, diplomatic and other advantages with under-appreciated US investments far surpassing China’s and the US emerging as the largest market for ASEAN exports. This reflects anticipated strong US economic growth that contrasts with continued decline in China’s growth rate. It noted regional countries remain ambivalent about China’s long-term ambitions. A summary assessed Beijing as far from dominant with a spectrum of regional countries’ relations ranging from close alignment by Cambodia and Laos to strident opposition by the Philippines, with most others showing differing degrees of attraction and wariness in relations with Beijing. 

Meanwhile a CSIS assessment by two Southeast Asian specialists added insight in evaluating China’s influence relative to the United States. Notably, regional governments pragmatically seek closer economic ties with China because economic security is indispensable to regime survival and legitimacy and China is an essential partner in sustaining economic growth. 

Leadership Meetings Reflect Continued Strong China-US Rivalry in Southeast Asia

US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and Chinese counterpart Defense Minister Dong Jun and his delegation members offered starkly different views of the regional order in their remarks at the annual Shangri-La Dialogue in late May. Austin highlighted US growing military ties with several Southeast Asian and other Indo-Pacific counties while the Chinese speakers denounced the United States as the source of regional tension. They claimed that the US allegedly sought advantage in creating division, provoking confrontation and undermining stability. In a separate meeting with Austin, Dong objected to US support for the Philippines in disputes with China over the South China Sea and US deployment of advanced mid-range Typhon missiles in northern Philippines with a range covering much of southeastern China.

Chinese media in mid-June sharply attacked the G7 Summit statement’s criticism of Chinese actions in the South China Sea disputes. The summit statement took a strong position in support of “lawful” Philippine actions in the disputed South China Sea in the face of “dangerous” Chinese actions based on expansive claims “with no legal basis” and deemed irrelevant by a legally binding award by an UNCLOS arbitral tribunal in July 2016. There followed Chinese media criticism in early July of the 2024 RIMPAC exercises showing US intentions to confront China in the South China Sea and elsewhere with a broad alignment of NATO and Indo-Pacific allies.

Attending the ASEAN Regional Forum and related meetings in Laos on July 27, Chinese Politburo Member and Foreign Minister Wang Yi warned Secretary of State Antony Blinken against US interference in the South China Sea disputes between China and the Philippines. 

Figure 1 Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, also a member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, meets with U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken in Vientiane, Laos, July 27, 2024. [Photo/Xinhua]

Chinese Prime Minister Li Qiang represented China at the East Asian Summit and related ASEAN meetings in Laos on Oct. 10-11. Secretary Blinken substituted for President Biden, who was preoccupied with the war in the Middle East in the lead-up to the US elections. Chinese media criticized Blinken’s alleged intention to drive a wedge between China and ASEAN. They attacked Blinken’s statement at the US-ASEAN meeting on Oct. 11 referring to “dangerous and unlawful” 

Chinese coercive actions in the South China Sea. Chinese and Russian officials blocked a US-supported leaders’ statement on the East Asian Summit seen as challenging China’s broad claim to the South China Sea. Chinese Premier Li and related commentary emphasized the positive in China-ASEAN relations as the two sides announced “the substantial conclusion” of negotiations creating Version 3.0 of the China ASEAN Free Trade Agreement. 

Xi Jinping’s prominent role at the APEC summit in Peru and the G20 summit in Brazil put Biden, now a “lame duck,” into the background. At Xi’s meeting with Biden at the G20 summit, both sides made their points on the South China Sea and other disagreements. During the publicized summit meetings, Xi and supporting Chinese commentary emphasized the positive, highlighting China’s commitment to economic globalization as a source of regional and global stability in times of pervasive uncertainty caused by the implications of the second Trump administration and other factors. Chinese experts maintained that Beijing is prepared for adverse moves by the Trump government as Chinese commentary endeavors to exploit angst about a Trump presidency. The commentary argues that export-oriented Southeast Asian economies will face serious negative consequence from Trump’s widely predicted increases in US tariffs.

China-Philippines Tensions over South China Sea Disputes

China-Philippines relations continued to deteriorate with the government of President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. defying Chinese expansionism and intimidation over disputed South China Sea claims. Marcos has sought and received wide ranging US military, economic, and diplomatic support and is backed by US Indo-Pacific allies and partners and supporters in the G7, NATO, and other Western organizations. US and allied backing showed in joint exercises with Philippine forces involving the US, Japan, Australia, Canada, Great Britain, France, and South Korea; a $500 million US military aid package announced in July; and repeated statements of support against Chinese bullying in the South China Sea by these and other governments and organizations. Against this background, tensions rose dramatically over the disputed Philippines-occupied outpost at Second Thomas Shoal ,reaching a highpoint on June 17 when armed conflict broke out among Chinese and Philippines security forces who skirmished with knives and axes near the disputed outpost. The Chinese forces successfully blocked Philippine forces attempting to supply the outpost. Both sides pulled back and sought dialogue. Secret negotiations helped to reduce tensions for a time. Global Times on Sept. 2 that the China-Philippines Bilateral Consultation Mechanism on the South China Sea had met nine times, with the ninth meeting in early July. The eighth occurred in January. Following the July talks, both sides avoided confrontations over Philippine supply missions to the outpost. 

Figure 2 Chinese President Xi Jinping and other leaders and representatives from APEC member economies pose for a group photo in Lima, Peru, Nov. 16, 2024. Xi on Saturday delivered an important speech at the 31st APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting under the title “Shouldering Responsibility to Our Times And Jointly Promoting Asia-Pacific Development.” [Photo/Xinhua]

New confrontations between Philippine supply ships attempting to reach a Philippines Coast Guard vessel anchored at Sabina Shoal since April and Chinese Coast Guard ships pushing them back led to collisions on Aug. 19. The collisions came amid a large show of force of Chinese Coast Guard and Maritime Militia vessels intending to intimidate Manila and force it to withdraw the anchored ship at the Shoal. After the Philippines government on Sept. 14 withdrew the ship, which had stayed at Sabina Shoal since April 17, Chinese commentary approved the move but Philippine spokespersons affirmed that another Philippine ship would be sent to the shoal. Global Times reported on Sept. 18 that the withdrawal of the Philippines Coast Guard vessel from Sabina Shoal was preceded by a meeting of the China-Philippines Bilateral Consultation Mechanism on Sept. 11.

Meanwhile, Scarborough Shoal, occupied by China but claimed by the Philippines, remained a periodic hot spot. 

Tensions again rose when President Marcos on Nov. 8 signed into law the Maritime Zones Act and the Philippines Archipelagic Sea Lanes Act that defied Chinese claims to Philippines claimed territories in the South China Sea with legislation consistent with UNCLOS and with the interpretation articulated by the arbitral tribunal on July 2016 ruling against Chinese claims. The US State Department promptly supported the Philippines action while Beijing was very critical. On Nov. 10 the Chinese Foreign Ministry released baselines for territorial sea adjacent to Chinese occupied Scarborough Shoal, a move taken to counter “infringement actions” by the Philippines. 

Also raising tensions was the Philippine plan reported in November to purchase the US Typhon advanced intermediate range missile system that has been deployed in the country since April. A Chinese Defense Ministry spokesman on May 30 complained that this “strategic and offensive weapon” will “break strategic balance” in the region and “cause great risk of war” as it endangered targets throughout southeastern China.

Related developments

The spokesperson of the Chinese Embassy in Manila on May 2 rebutted Philippines complaints of April 30 concerning Chinese Coast Guard ships harassing, blocking, and using water cannons against Philippine official vessels entering the 12 mile waters surrounding disputed Scarborough Shoal. Beijing claimed there had been “a temporary special arrangement” that allowed Philippines fishing in areas outside the lagoon but no official Philippines vessels were to enter the 12-mile limit. It said the Marcos government had violated this agreement and past commitments regarding Second Thomas Shoal. 

Regarding what it said were secret Philippines-Chinese agreements regulating Philippine supply missions to the outpost at Second Thomas Shoal, the Chinese embassy in Manila released to the media on May 7 the transcript of a two-minute section of a 12 minute phone conversation with a Philippines general on Jan. 3. In it, the general agreed to notify China at least two days ahead of a supply mission to the outpost at Second Thomas Shoal and limit the number of Coast Guard and supply ships to one each for each supply mission. The Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson that day also reiterated earlier Chinese claims that “a gentleman’s agreement” on Second Thomas Shoal was reached with former Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte, and claimed that an understanding with the Marcos government was reached at the start of that government. The spokesperson criticized Marcos government for denying such agreements. The Philippines National Security Advisor called for the expulsion of Chinese diplomats over the reported Chinese embassy leak to the media of the Philippine general’s Jan. 3 remarks.

On May 11, the Philippines confirmed it sent a Coast Guard ship to stay at Sabina Shoal amid reports Beijing planned to occupy and develop the Philippine-claimed territory as another South China Sea outpost. Beijing deployed dozens of Coast Guard and Maritime Militia ships to fend off a large flotilla of Filipino fishing boats seeking to challenge Chinese fishing restrictions regarding Scarborough Shoal but the flotilla ended its trip on May 16, well before reaching the shoal. On May 19, the Philippines Navy air dropped supplies to the outpost at Second Thomas Shoal and Philippine officials criticized nearby Chinese Coast Guard forces for retrieving some supplies from the sea and destroying them. 

Beijing strongly criticized President Marcos for using his keynote speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue and answers to questions on May 31 to warn China against “acts of war” in the South China Sea. During those remarks, he asserted that if a Philippine service person or a citizen were killed in a willful act, “that is very close to what we define as an act of war.”

The Philippines government on Aug. 13 filed a diplomatic protest charging Chinese jet fighters fired a volley of flares at a Philippine patrol plane over disputed Scarborough Shoal. At that time, Manila had reportedly filed over 150 complaints against the practices of Chinese security forces in the disputed South China Sea since the start of the Marcos government in 2022.  

Figure 3 Philippine RHIBs are surrounded and boarded by the China Coast Guard at Second Thomas Shoal. AFP Photo

The Aug. 19 collisions of Chinese Coast Guard ships blocking Philippine Coast Guard ships attempting to enter waters at Sabina Shoal was one of seven scuffles between Chinese and Philippines security forces over the shoal during that month as Chinese rhetoric demanded removal of the anchored Philippine Coast Guard ship at the shoal. 

The Philippine Navy reported that in the week Sept. 17-23 that 251 Chinese Maritime Militia, Coast Guard and Navy vessels were active around disputed areas in the South China Sea, the highest levels this year, with 83 deployed to Sabina Shoal and 72 to Second Thomas Shoal.

China-Myanmar Relations

Myanmar junta leader Min Aung Hlaing arrived in China in November for the first time since he launched a coup in February 2021. The junta leader was invited to attend the Greater Mekong Subregion Summit of Leaders in Kunming. While not a state visit, the official reception and meetings with Chinese Premier Li Qiang sent an important signal. China is concerned with the continued instability and civil unrest in Myanmar, especially along the two countries’ borders, and it would like the junta leader to take action to help stabilize Myanmar’s domestic affairs. Beijing also would like to see cross-border trade restored, Chinese investments in Myanmar protected, a timetable for elections to be laid out, and for the insurgents to enter negotiations with the junta. 

China has attempted to intervene in various ways. In August, the PLA organized its army units and joint air-ground police patrols near its border with Myanmar in Ruili and Zhenkang to maintain security as fighting between the junta and rebel forces has been escalating. China has also been more involved in conflict mediation. In late November, one of the ethnic minority army groups, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army, announced that it would hold talks with the junta after a year-long battle along the China-Myanmar border. The TNLA acknowledged China’s mediation effort and agreed to halt air strikes in the northern Shan state of Myanmar as it prepares for talks with the junta. 

China-Vietnam Summitry

China’s relations with Vietnam were closer in recent months in spite of competing claims and ongoing disputes in the South China Sea. In August, Chinese President Xi held talks with Vietnam’s President To Lam in Beijing. It was Lam’s first state visit since becoming Vietnam’s top leader. The two discussed the importance of maintaining a positive neighborhood diplomacy. Xi pointed to their good working relations and personal friendship as the basis for strengthening party-to-party ties as well as bilateral cooperation. Similarly, Lam described relations with China as a “top priority in Vietnam’s external policy.” In their joint statement, China and Vietnam announced the signing of 14 documents spanning cooperation in cross-border railways to defence and security ties.

In October, Chinese Premier Li Qiang visited Hanoi for meetings with his Vietnamese counterpart and other senior Vietnamese officials. Both countries agreed to carry out feasibility studies for standardizing railway routes and survey activities between Kunming and Haiphong, Guangxi to Hanoi, and a potential new route linking Shenzhen to Haiphong, all of which would increase connectivity, cross-border trade, and people-to-people exchanges.

Even as trade, economic, and business ties deepen between China and Vietnam, the two countries remain at odds over competing claims in the South China Sea. Vietnam maintains actively engaged in dredging and landfill activities in the Spratly Islands, although at a scale that is still smaller than that of China in recent years in the contested waters. Hanoi is also employing gray-zone tactics to counter China’s presence in the South China Sea, having established maritime militias in coastal provinces to support its navy and provided funding to help strengthen and fortify Vietnamese fishing vessels in case they are rammed by Chinese counterparts. For the time being, the maritime dispute is being managed in ways that avoid escalation, which can be attributed in part to Hanoi’s adroit diplomacy of maintaining an arm’s-length relationship with Washington while engaging in pragmatic ways with Beijing.

Indonesia Engages in High-Profile Diplomacy with China and the United States

Relations between China and Indonesia warmed in this reporting period. Within weeks after taking office, Indonesia’s President Prabowo Subianto embarked on his first official state visit to China, meeting with President Xi in Beijing in early November. In their discussion, the two leaders affirmed the state of China-Indonesia relations, with Prabowo stressing how China is an “important friend and partner,” a key reason behind choosing China as his first foreign trip as president. This was followed by the joint announcement of the signing of deals worth $10 billion at the Indonesia-China Business Forum in Beijing, spanning sectors including food, new energy, technology, and biotechnology. The two leaders also agreed to increase more two-way exchanges through the introduction of new visa measures, including multi-entry long-term visas, and more direct flights and destinations. 

During the visit, Beijing and Jakarta also inked a maritime development agreement which mentioned that both countries had “reached important common understanding on joint development in areas of overlapping claims.” This signing of the agreement prompted some backlash and controversy in Jakarta, with the Indonesian foreign ministry clarifying that Jakarta is not a claimant state to the South China Sea, and has no overlapping claims or jurisdiction with China. The ministry further reassured that the maritime development agreement would have no impact on Indonesia’s sovereignty.

The high-profile visit to China was immediately followed by Prabowo’s visit to Washington, DC, meeting with President Joe Biden, as well as making a highly publicized call to President-elect Donald Trump. Prabowo said, “I would like to call personally on you wherever you are. I’m willing to fly to congratulate you in person, sir.” In the clip’s backdrop and on Prabowo’s desk was a copy of the China Daily newspaper. Analysts in Southeast Asia discerned a subtle yet important message behind the flurry of state visits and the phone call with Trump: amidst the intensifying geopolitical competition between the United States and China, Indonesia is willing to rally and lead the region, taking on a more visible and active foreign policy while underscoring Indonesia and the region’s centrality and neutrality. Some are even comparing him to Sukarno, Indonesia’s first president and chief architect of the Non-Aligned Movement. As Prabowo’s presidency unfolds, and as US-China competition intensifies in the region, it remains to be seen whether Indonesia can elevate its regional and global stature and further its foreign policy and diplomatic objectives. 

Anwar Advances Malaysia’s Relations with China 

Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibraham’s two years in power have featured remarkable personal efforts to solidify close relations with China, which has been well received in Beijing. When combined with the Malaysian leader’s consistently strong criticism of US support for Israel in the armed conflicts in the Middle East, Anwar’s activism is viewed by critics in Malaysia and abroad as favoring China in the US-China competition for influence in Southeast Asia, which he denies.

Figure 4 President Xi Jinping meets with Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim in Beijing on Thursday. FENG YONGBIN/CHINA DAILY

2024 marked the 50th anniversary of the establishment of Malaysia-China relations in July 1974. Chinese Premier Li Qiang visited Malaysia in June to celebrate the anniversary. In November, Anwar made his third trip to China since taking power in late 2022. The four-day working visit included a meeting with Xi Jinping and attending the opening ceremony of the seventh annual China International Import Expo in Shanghai. 

Both governments have emphasized many positives in the relationship, acknowledging the importance of Malaysia as the incoming chair of ASEAN for the next year and the incoming ASEAN-China dialogue partner coordinator for the next three years. Bilateral trade reached $190 billion in 2023, 17% of Malaysia total foreign trade, with Malaysia ranked as China’s second largest trade partner in ASEAN. China has ranked as Malaysia’s top trading partner for 15 years. By 2023, Malaysia’s cumulative investment in China was $9.2 billion and China’s cumulative investment in Malaysia was $17 billion. Malaysia was one of the top 10 participating countries in China’s Belt and Road Initiative. More than 3 million Chinese tourists visited Malaysia annually prior to the COVID-19 pandemic and 5 million were expected in 2024. In 2023, 40,000 Chinese students were studying in Malaysia and more than 10,000 Malaysian students were studying in China. 

Chinese commentary strongly supported Anwar’s decision to apply to join the BRICS during the Russian foreign minister’s visit to Malaysia in July. It noted an adjustment in Malaysia’s nonaligned foreign policy, with “stronger leanings toward China” seen as “a shift from the previous governments that maintained closer ties with western powers.” References to Sino-Malaysian differences over the South China Sea were rare. An exception was the leak in September of a Chinese message to the Malaysian embassy in Beijing in late August demanding a halt of Malaysian survey and drilling efforts in the South China Sea infringing on Chinese sovereignty. Those efforts have persisted despite Chinese opposition and Chinese Coast Guard ships harassing and endeavoring to force the withdrawal of the Malaysians. Anwar said the Malaysian efforts would continue. 

China-Cambodia Relations

With strong backing of his father, long-serving former Prime Minister Hun Sen, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet on Aug. 5 presided over a 10,000-person groundbreaking ceremony marking the start of construction of the $1.7 billion, 180-km, China-backed Funan Techo Canal, which will provide Cambodia direct access from the Mekong River to the South China Sea rather than routing through Vietnam’s Mekong Delta. China welcomed the occasion and followed in September with the announced gift of two Chinese naval corvettes to the Cambodian Navy to be delivered by 2025. China has become Cambodia’s primary supplier of modern military equipment outpacing the United States which set an arms embargo targeting Cambodian military officials in 2021. The developments underscored Cambodia’s strong alignment with China even as it endeavored to diversify foreign contacts, including visits by the US Defense Secretary and the Director US Agency for International Development in June and October respectively. In November, however, Reuters reported that Chinese funding for the canal project may be in doubt after Beijing expressed misgivings about the project’s feasibility.

China, Timor-Leste Relations

Xi Jinping on July 1 warmly welcomed Jose Ramos-Horta, president of Timor-Leste, for a four-day visit. This was first visit to China by the president of the country, an applicant to join ASEAN, since China established relations in 2022. China was the first country to establish relations with the country and has more recently signed over 20 Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects. The joint communiqué marking Ramos-Horta’s visit emphasized the need for closer ties in various areas, including a section on security relations with China.

Up to now, China has offered low amounts of investment and aid compared with ASEAN countries, Australia, Japan, the EU, and the United States. This stands in contrast with more generous Chinese aid to the Solomon Islands and other small Pacific Island countries. Commenting on the visit, China’s Defense Ministry spokesperson noted that the two militaries have maintained active exchanges and would deepen cooperation including joint exercises and training.

Lai Ching-te insisted at his May inauguration that Taiwan is sovereign and not subordinate to China.
Beijing reacted by increasing cross-Strait tensions. China’s latest rounds of military exercises make clear that it is preparing to use force or at least gray-zone intimidation to effect reunification. Taiwan’s opposition Kuomintang continued unofficial contacts with the Chinese Communist Party, seeking reconciliation but risking aiding China’s efforts to fragment Taiwan. Taiwan’s TSMC continues to expand in Taiwan and overseas in ways that keep it at the center of the global high-tech economy. Taiwan has increased its purchases of military equipment from the US and opened negotiations on a bilateral tax agreement. Beijing views US support for Taiwan as collaboration in Lai’s separatism. US President-elect Donald Trump has said that Taiwan stole the production of semiconductors from the US and should pay for US military support. However, this animus may be balanced by the outspoken Taiwan supporters he has chosen for his national security team. Can Taiwan overcome its internal divisions and Trump’s Taiwan skepticism? Can China, Taiwan, and the US step back from a confrontational spiral? None of this will be easy, but failure may put Taiwan’s future at risk.

Lai Ching-te’s Inaugural Address and Cross-Strait Relations

The most important development in relations between Taiwan and China over the past six months has been the inauguration of Taiwan’s new president, Lai Ching-te, and China’s reaction. Lai was elected on Jan. 13 to succeed Tsai Ing-wen and continue the Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) leadership of Taiwan’s government. In his inaugural address on May 20, Lai echoed themes familiar from Tsai’s presidency. Lai began by proclaiming that the people of Taiwan had elected him as “president of the Republic of China in accordance with the Republic of China Constitution system” and that “the Republic of China Taiwan is a sovereign, independent nation in which sovereignty lies in the hands of the people.” He praised the people of Taiwan “for refusing to be swayed by external forces.” He promised to “continue working with other democratic nations to form a democratic community.”

Figure 1 In his inauguration speech, Taiwan’s new President Lai emphasized China must stop military intimidation. Photo: PBS News.

Recalling “Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and conflict between Israel and Hamas,” Lai warned that “China’s military actions and gray-zone coercion are considered the greatest strategic challenges to global peace and stability.” And “no one wants [Taiwan’s] achievements to be destroyed by war.” Lai promised that his new government would uphold Tsai’s Four Commitments, which include that “the ROC (Taiwan) and the [the People’s Republic of China] PRC should not be subordinate to each other.” Continuing to echo Tsai’s words, Lai said that Taiwan would “neither yield nor provoke, and maintain the status quo.” What Lai did not say May 20 was that his administration would continue conducting cross-Strait relations on the basis of the ROC Constitution and Cross-Strait statute.

Lai then issued a challenge to Beijing: “I hope that China will face the reality of the Republic of China’s existence, respect the choices of the people of Taiwan, and in good faith, choose dialogue over confrontation, exchange over containment, and under the principles of parity and dignity, engage in cooperation with the legal government chosen by Taiwan’s people.”

Using language apparently designed to appeal to Washington, Lai concluded that “Taiwan is strategically positioned in the first island chain, and what affects us here affects global geopolitical development,” and Taiwan remains “a frontline guardian of world peace.”

To Beijing, Lai Looks Just Like Tsai

Beijing undoubtedly read Lai’s words as a continuation of the policies in Tsai’s first inaugural address in 2016. Lai’s call for dialogue almost certainly reminded Beijing of Tsai’s offer to open a dialogue based on her reading of cross-Strait talks starting in 1992.

Tsai had promised “to maintain the existing mechanisms for dialogue and communication across the Taiwan Strait,” including the “various joint acknowledgments and understandings” reached by the two sides in 1992 as well as the “over twenty years of interactions and negotiations” since 1992. She called on China to “set aside the baggage of history and engage in positive dialogue, for the benefit of the people on both sides.”

Because Tsai did not identify the outcome of the 1992 talks as “the 1992 Consensus,” a term coined by a KMT commentator almost a decade afterward and then adopted by Beijing, China’s Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) rejected Tsai’s offer out of hand. It insisted that Taiwan acknowledge itself part of “one China,” which Tsai refused to do. Beijing sees Lai’s offer of dialogue as more of the same.

Lai’s Inaugural Speech and Reactions Were Predictable

In the wake of Lai’s inaugural speech, the TAO responded in the same vein as they had to Tsai eight years earlier: “The Democratic Progressive Party stubbornly adheres to the separatist position of ‘Taiwan independence,’ refuses to recognize the ‘1992 Consensus’ that embodies the one-China principle . . . spreads separatist fallacies, incites confrontation between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, and attempts to ‘rely on foreign countries to seek independence’ and ‘seek independence by force’.” Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi was even more outspoken: “The treacherous acts of Lai Ching-te and his ilk, who betray the nation and their ancestors, are despicable” (translation from 5-21-2024 Sinocism.)

Figure 2 Taiwanese soldiers salute during National Day celebrations in front of the Presidential Building in Taipei, Taiwan, October 10, 2021. Photo: AP, Chiang Ying-ying.

Lai’s critics in Taiwan worried that his speech might have weakened any chance for cross-Strait dialogue. Lai’s speech was “tougher than expected” and might be “moving towards a sovereign nation without formally declaring independence under the name of Taiwan,” according to James Yifan Chen at Tamkang University.

The US State Department congratulated Lai and Taiwan: “The United States congratulates Dr. Lai Ching-te on his inauguration as Taiwan’s fifth democratically elected president.  We also congratulate the Taiwan people for once again demonstrating the strength of their robust and resilient democratic system.” The Wall Street Journal captured the US reaction in its headline: “Taiwan’s New President Serves Up Predictability in Era of Turmoil.”

Perhaps the single most striking feature of Lai’s inaugural address and the reactions to it was the sense that there is no longer any hope for dialogue. Taiwan’s offer to open a dialogue were offered not for Beijing but to appear responsible in the eyes of Taiwanese independents and foreign audiences, most importantly the US. Lai and the TAO both seemed well aware that Beijing’s prerequisites for dialogue—acknowledging the 1992 Consensus by name and describing Taiwan as part of “one China”—were simply not feasible politically for a DPP president of Taiwan in 2024.

Lai’s National Day Speech Offered Half an Olive branch

On Oct. 10, Lai gave his second major speech of the year on the National Day of the Republic of China. Lai said that the ROC began in 1911, when a group of democratic dreamers in China overthrew the Qing Dynasty; it was defended in 1949, when ROC soldiers defended the island of Kinmen; and it claimed its democracy in 1979 when Taiwan dissidents demonstrated in Kaohsiung to celebrate International Human Rights Day. For Lai, the message was clear: Taiwan’s democracy is the fulfillment of the aspirations of the founders of the ROC in 1911, a dream that began before the Chinese Communist Party was founded. In doing so, Lai linked Taiwan with China in a way no DPP leader before him had done. When President Tsai celebrated the National Day of the Republic of China in 2023, she praised “the unwavering spirit that has underpinned the Republic of China since establishing itself in Taiwan 74 years ago,” words which seemed to suggest that for her the ROC was only the ROC after it came to Taiwan and was distinct from the ROC in China.

Although the dream began in China, Lai made it clear that today it was not the dream of China’s current rulers but instead “the dream that Taiwan’s 23 million people all share.” To drive home that point, Lai said again that “the Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China are not subordinate to each other. On this land, democracy and freedom are growing and thriving. The People’s Republic of China has no right to represent Taiwan.” In short, Beijing’s one-China principle does not apply in Taiwan.

The rhetorical and military responses from China were predictable and unmistakable. According to the TAO, Lai “continued to advocate the ‘new two-state theory’ of “mutual non-subordination” in his speech [and] fabricated the fallacy of “Taiwan independence.” The US rebuke to the TAO was equally predictable: “The PRC response with military provocations to a routine annual speech is unwarranted and risks escalation.” The spokesperson for China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) responded in kind: The US should “stop arming Taiwan and stop sending any wrong signal to the ‘Taiwan independence’ separatist forces.”

Two Double-edged Sword Exercises

Both Lai’s inaugural speech and his Oct. 10 National Day speech were followed by large-scale military exercises launched by China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA), dubbed Joint Sword 2024a and 2024b. China’s designating these exercises Joint Sword 2024a and 2024b linked them to the Joint Sword 2023 exercise that the PLA conducted in the wake of President Tsai’s meeting with US Speaker of the House Kevin McCarthy in April 2023 and less directly to the extended PLA exercise in the aftermath of Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August 2022.

Figure 3 The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) launched ‘Joint Sword-2024B’ military drills near Taiwan on Monday, the country’s Defense Ministry said in a statement. Photo: MEHR News Agency

The exercises had two purposes. The first was propaganda. China’s foreign ministry described Joint Sword 2024a, launched three days after Lai’s inauguration as “a necessary and legitimate move to safeguard national sovereignty and territorial integrity, crack down on ‘Taiwan independence’ separatist forces and their separatist moves, and send a warning to external interference and provocation.” The second purpose of Joint Sword 2024a was to strengthen PLA capabilities to interdict commercial traffic in the Taiwan Strait and between Taiwan and the islands it controls near the Chinese coast. For the first time, the exercise incorporated Chinese Coast Guard vessels, which practiced inspections of foreign vessels.

Joint Sword 2024b was the briefest in the Joint Sword series to date, occurring over a 13-hour period on Oct. 14, but it was nonetheless intense. The exercise included 125 PLA aircraft flying close to Taiwan, a new single-day high, as well as 14 PLA navy vessels and an additional 12 Chinese government vessels operating near the island. Perhaps the most striking aspect of the exercise was that Chinese Coast Guard vessels completely surrounded Taiwan in an apparent effort to practice the deployment that would be required to blockade the island. The progressive expansion of the Chinese Coast Guard role also may signal that China is treating the Taiwan Strait and the area around Taiwan as internal waters and therefore within the purview of its law-enforcement activities. More ominously, the PLA and the Chinese Coast Guard appear to be systematically intensifying military activity in ways that will make them better able to shift quickly from gray-zone intimidation to directly coercive military actions against Taiwan and against foreign merchant and military approaching near Taiwan.

Fishing is Risky Near Offshore Islands

The increasing presence of the PLA Navy and the Chinese Coast Guard in waters around Taiwan’s Kinmen (also known at Jinmen or Quemoy) and Matsu islands near the Chinese coast and the Penghu islands in the middle of the Taiwan Strait have made these waters and the Taiwanese who fish there an ever more prominent flashpoint. On May 29, Taiwan’s Coast Guard warned two PLA vessels to retreat from restricted waters they had entered near Kinmen. A month later, four Chinese Coast guard vessels sailed to within five miles of Kinmen despite Taiwanese Coast Guard attempts to warn them off. On July 2, the Chinese Coast Guard seized a Taiwanese fishing vessel in what it said were Chinese waters near Kinmen. In a rare US comment on such incidents, the White House spokesperson told reporters it was monitoring the situation. The Taiwanese ship, which had sailed from the Penghu islands, and its crew were seized and held for over a month; the captain was detained until mid-November. In one sense, these sorts of fisheries incidents have been business as usual for some time, but the increasing prominence of the PLA Navy and Chinese Coast Guard as agents of gray-zone coercion means that each incident risks becoming a cross-Strait crisis. Even the release of detained fishermen, once a matter of several hours, is now delayed by days or months. China is increasingly choosing to negotiate such releases with KMT local officials as part of United Front efforts to treat Taiwan’s KMT opposition as the only intermediary they will deal with.

Figure 4 Chinese coast guard ships entered prohibited or restricted waters around Taiwan’s frontline islands of Kinmen on Monday, a Taiwan minister told reporters on Tuesday amid a rise in tension with Beijing. Photo: Ted Aljibe | Afp | Getty Images

Opposition KMT Challenges Lai and the DPP—Wise Counsel or Risk?

The Jan. 13 elections gave the opposition KMT effective control of the Legislative Yuan (LY), the national legislature. The KMT immediately used its control of the LY to challenge the DPP government. KMT attempted to legislate laws making the executive branch under President Lai more accountable to the LY. These efforts were opposed by the Lai administration as a power grab, and his administration appealed the proposed rules to Taiwan’s Constitutional Court, which for the most part found the rules unconstitutional. The KMT has also initiated a series of challenges to the government budget submitted by Lai’s Premier Cho Jung-tai. The two sides reached a compromise on Nov. 8, enabling the LY review of the budget to proceed. However, this skirmish portends a deadlock that could threaten Taiwan’s ability to increase defense spending as both the DPP and KMT say they are committed to do.

The opposition KMT also criticized Lai’s approach to China as it had criticized Tsai’s. In response to Lai’s inaugural address, former President Ma Ying-jeou challenged Lai’s cross-Strait approach: “He should have dialogue with the government across the Strait by returning to historical and cultural common ground with the Chinese. Only in this manner can there be a chance for peace in the Taiwan Strait.” In November, Ma invited China to send a delegation of students to visit Taiwan, reciprocating the visit of Ma and Taiwan students this April during which Chinese President Xi Jinping had a high-profile meeting with Ma. After a flurry of concerns that the Chinese Communist Party had handpicked the students, which they obviously had, Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) approved the visit. The MAC then invited China to allow Chinese students to study in Taiwan on a regular basis, but China has thus far not responded. Former KMT leader of the LY Wang Jinping also visited China, and a delegation from Shanghai is scheduled to visit Taipei in December in another signal that China welcomes contacts with KMT politicians such as Taipei Mayor Chiang Wan-an.

Although China welcomed KMT visitors, it issued a stark warning that others might not be welcome. A month after Lai’s inauguration, China issued regulations to enforce the Anti-Secession Law it promulgated in 2005. These guidelines “detailed the steps it might take to punish supporters of Taiwanese self-rule. The new rules adopted by China authorize execution for what it describes as exceptionally severe cases of Taiwanese separatism, though they do not say exactly what actions might constitute a severe offense.” After a member of a tour group from Taiwan was detained in China in early June without explanation, Taiwan’s MAC issued a warning to anyone considering travel to China. On Aug. 3, a Chinese court sentenced a Taiwanese, Yang Chih-yuan, to nine years in prison for what it identified as pro-independence activities, specifically because Yang had helped organize the Taiwan National Party. Yang had been in China to teach Go. On Sept. 1 China detained an executive from Formosa Plastics without explanation.

Can Taiwan Acquire the Military Equipment It Needs?

As the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East have continued to challenge the ability of the US to supply needed weapons systems to its allies and partners, the US State Department acknowledged that “insufficient production capacity” had slowed weapons deliveries to Taiwan. That backlog was reported to have reached $20.5 billion by August. Speaking virtually to an AI forum in Washington two months earlier, Taiwan’s Vice President-elect Bikhim Hsiao bemoaned “deficiencies in the traditional US defense industry production base, ” saying that they meant that “the current US defense industry base is producing neither enough nor on time the hardware to meet global demand.” She called for the US manufacturers to enter into coproduction arrangements with Taiwan companies.

The US Department of Defense (DOD) Inspector General found that not only the speed but also the quality of deliveries was deficient, stating “the DOD’s delivery of non–mission-capable items [as part of Presidential Drawdown authority] to Taiwan inhibits the DoD’s ability to achieve its security cooperation goals and risks degrading Taiwan’s confidence in the United States.” At least one US defense industry analyst said that the delivery deficit had been cut to approximately $9 billion since then, due less to any corrective actions and more due to the normal process of transferring equipment and munitions ordered earlier.

Despite these acknowledged difficulties, on Sept. 27 the US committed to provide Taiwan up to $567 million in defense articles and services under Presidential Drawdown Authority in 2024, its largest assistance package ever for Taiwan, following its commitment of $345 million in 2023. On June 18, the US Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) offered to sell Taiwan anti-personnel Switchblade drones and anti-armor Altius drones, together worth $360 million. These contracts were then signed by Taiwan on Oct. 15 and would expand Taiwan’s acquisition of asymmetric defense capabilities.

Biden Administration Lends Support to Lai Government

Relations between Lai’s new government from the Biden administration have started on a positive note. In August, Taiwan Foreign Minister Lin Jia-lung and National Security Advisor Joseph Wu held security talks with senior Biden officials outside Washington, according to the Financial Times. The most recent gathering under this “Special Channel” convened in February 2023. In early December, the Biden administration afforded Lai courteous treatment during his transits through Hawaii and Guam en route to Taiwan’s South Pacific allies. Biden officials have viewed Lai as basically maintaining Tsai Ing-wen’s pragmatic and responsible approach toward cross-Strait relations.

On the other hand, Washington has uniformly viewed Beijing’s behavior toward Lai as belligerent, prompting demonstrations of support. Notably, US Navy vessels continue to sail through the Taiwan Strait individually and with partner nations. The week following the PLA’s brief yet expansive Joint Sword 2024B exercises in mid-October, a US Navy destroyer and a Canadian frigate transited the Taiwan Strait on Oct. 20. The PLA reacted with live-fire drills nearby Pingtan island off Fujian province two days later.

Trump’s Support Less Certain

Donald Trump’s election has added further uncertainties. On June 25, Trump told Bloomberg Businessweek that “I think Taiwan should pay us for defense. You know, we’re no different than an insurance company.” As Trump has assembled his national security team, his choices overwhelmingly reflect a far stronger commitment to defending Taiwan and a far greater emphasis on reinforcing Taiwan’s military capabilities as part of the first island chain. Secretary of State Designate Marco Rubio and National Security Advisor Designate Michael Waltz are both generally identified as China hawks and advocates for increased US military sales to Taiwan. On the sidelines of the Republican Convention, Rubio told Fox News, “I don’t have any worries about the US being supportive of Taiwan and doing everything we can to discourage the Chinese from invading.” In addition to the impact of his own nominations, Trump will walk into a US defense establishment already intently focused on defending Taiwan. Adm. Samuel Paparo, head of the US Indo-Pacific Command, told The Washington Post that “I want to turn the Taiwan Strait into an unmanned hellscape using a number of classified capabilities, so that I can make their lives utterly miserable for a month, which buys me the time for the rest of everything.”

Trump’s former National Security Advisor, Robert O’Brien, put a positive spin on Trump’s remarks to Bloomberg, saying that Trump was simply calling for burden sharing, adding that Taiwan should increase its defense spending to 5% of gross domestic product. The Taiwan government counters that it is already at 2.5% of GDP and that President Lai proposed an increase of 6% on that. Nonetheless, David Sacks of The Council on Foreign Relations captured the attitude of American analysts: “The consensus is that Taiwan is still not taking the existential threat that it faces seriously enough and should raise defense spending far more rapidly.”

Can Taiwan Build the Military Capability It Needs?

Over the past six months, Taiwan has taken a number of steps that suggest it is beginning to reform its approach to its defense. President Lai chose a civilian Minister of National Defense, Wellington Koo, who had served Tsai as National Security Advisor since 2016. Earlier efforts to reform the military by imposing a civilian minister of National Defense by President Lee Teng-hui (KMT) in the early 1990s and by President Chen Shui-bian (DPP) in 2008 both faltered, but there is hope that Koo’s extended service under Tsai may enable him to break the resistance of the uniformed military to civilian oversight and modernize the force. Koo’s announcement that the ROC military would end goose-step marching and bayonet training was considered a symbolic watershed.

In domestic procurement, Taiwan commissioned two naval corvettes equipped with Hsiung-feng anti-ship missiles, designed to counter the PLA’s growing fleet of aircraft carriers. These two will join four already in service, and Taiwan’s MND has said it expects to add five more of these corvettes by the end of 2026.

Beyond Defense Spending and Acquisitions

On Sept. 26, President Lai convened the first meeting of a special committee to strengthen civil defense and resilience on the island. Its task is to integrate civilian forces into responses to potential attacks from Beijing, manage emergencies, and maintain social order and stability. The plan would train 400,000 civilians to respond to a civil or military emergency. Taiwan civil society began a series of initiatives that would complement the government’s efforts. On Facebook, one group, the Kuma Academy, explained that it was “awakening the spirit of resistance in Taiwanese society.” China’s Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) responded by sanctioning Taiwanese businessman Robert Tsao Hsing-cheng, who founded United Microelectronics Corporation (UMC), and Taiwanese lawmaker Puma Shen for funding and organizing the group.

The darker side of Taiwan’s response to China’s increasing campaign of gray-zone intimidation may be glimpsed in the trailer for a TV miniseries, Zero Day, planned for 2025. It will offer a dystopian view of how China might concoct an excuse to blockade and then invade Taiwan, all the while barraging Taiwan with defeatist disinformation through broadcast and social media.

Strong US-Taiwan Economic Ties Make Further Progress

Following an intensive in-person negotiating round in Taipei in early May, US and Taiwan trade negotiators continued discussions on the labor, environment, and agriculture provisions of The 21^st Century Trade Initiative. A follow-on negotiating round did not convene as anticipated, indicating gaps remain. In November, US Trade Representative (USTR) Katherine Tai met her new Taiwan counterpart, Minister without Portfolio Jen-ni Yang, in Peru at the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC) trade ministerial. The USTR readout notes the “important progress” achieved under the trade initiative to date but gives no indication of future talks. Separately, the trade initiative’s first agreement, signed in June 2023, is poised to go into effect by the end of 2024 following certification by USTR and a final nod from the US Congress.

The US Treasury Department in late October announced the launch of negotiations with Taiwan on a comprehensive double taxation agreement. Long sought by Taipei, a double tax agreement had struggled to gain traction inside the US government. Views have shifted with the expanding footprint of TSMC and its suppliers in the United States since 2021. In addition, Congress this year inched closer to legislating adjustments to the US tax code that would benefit Taiwan investors in the United States. Such Congressional action could not address the double taxation concerns of US investors in Taiwan without action by Taiwan’s government, presumably after reaching agreement with the US. The Treasury Department’s announcement specifically touts the prospective agreement’s tax benefits for small and medium-sized Taiwan firms within the US semiconductor supply chain. A first round of negotiations is expected before the end of the year, and the final agreement will require the blessing of Congress.

The booming US-Taiwan commercial relationship, supported by a handful of active governmental dialogues, could face headwinds if President Trump follows through on a campaign promise to impose a 10-20% tariff on all US imports. Taiwan’s export-driven economy has grown increasingly reliant on the United States in the last half dozen years, with exports to the US poised to exceed $100 billion in 2024. At the same time, Trump has pledged even higher tariffs on China, which could cause Taiwan firms supplying the US market from China to shift manufacturing back to the island. The Lai government has expressed interest in a second trade agreement with the United States, but trade negotiations with the second Trump administration could invite scrutiny of the growing US-Taiwan trade imbalance and pressure on Taiwan to purchase more US goods.

TSMC Deepens Its Alignment with the United States

Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company brought online its first fab (semiconductor production plant) in Arizona during the fall, after having overcome a myriad of labor disputes and construction delays since 2021. Initial output batches have shown chips with slightly higher yields, meaning fewer defects per wafer, than the leading TSMC fabs in Taiwan. In a vote of confidence for TSMC’s Arizona site, the US Commerce Department on Nov. 15 finalized a $6.6 billion cash subsidy it had provisionally offered to the Taiwanese chipmaker earlier in the year.

TSMC’s reputation took a hit, however, when Canadian news platform TechInsights discovered a TSMC-manufactured chip inside Huawei’s latest AI processor in October. TSMC launched an internal investigation and identified Sophgo Technologies, a Chinese customer, as the culprit. TSMC promptly stopped shipments to Sophgo and notified the US Commerce Department, which has imposed extensive export controls on Huawei since 2019. On Nov. 10, TSMC reportedly received a letter from the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security requiring it to suspend advanced semiconductor sales to all Chinese customers manufacturing AI processors. This so-called “is informed” letter has underscored the US government’s expectation that TSMC and other chip suppliers will conduct thorough “know your customer” checks and remain vigilant. TSMC appears unlikely to face penalties over this incident.

The incoming Trump administration will likely prioritize the continued onshoring of chip manufacturing. Trump, without evidence, accused Taiwan of “stealing the US chip industry” while on the 2024 campaign trail. He also described CHIPS funding incentives as “so bad” and instead called for tariffs on imported semiconductors to spur domestic manufacturing. Taiwan’s commanding lead in advanced semiconductors and TSMC’s now finalized contract with the US Commerce Department on its $6.6 billion subsidy provide some safeguards. A more acute risk could be pressure on TSMC to begin in Arizona production of its most cutting-edge chips, at the 2-nanometer level, ahead of the scheduled 2030 target date.

Perils Ahead

As we conclude this series of periodic updates on Taiwan and its relationship with China, cross-Strait conditions are more perilous than they have been since 1950 when the US inserted the Seventh Fleet into the Strait at the beginning of the Korean War.

Under President Lai, and almost any successor imaginable, Taiwan will continue to develop its political identity as a responsible and de-facto independent member of the global order. China will continue to insist it has the unilateral right to control Taiwan. It will expand its efforts to move Taiwan toward what it calls peaceful reunification without any prospect of success. Anticipating failure, China will continue expanding its military capability to compel reunification. Taiwan’s survival will rely on its ability to build and arm a military sufficient to deter and, if necessary, resist PLA military action. Taiwan’s efforts to ensure a peaceful status quo will depend well on its growing economic and high-technology importance as well as the support and US partner and allies. The US will find that its high technology economy is increasingly dependent on Taiwan and that supporting Taiwan is a useful component of its economic and strategic pressure against China.

This triangular clash portends a growing risk that cross-Strait political confrontation might become a military confrontation, devastating China, Taiwan, and their neighbors in East Asia and undermining US regional leadership. Is Taiwan willing to spend enough and strengthen its social cohesion and resilience to deter a Chinese assault or blockade or, if necessary, to delay one long enough for the US to choose to intervene? The challenge for Taiwan and China will remain what it has been since 2000, at least. Can they argue over their incompatible visions for Taiwan’s future without undermining their stability and prosperity? Will the US under a second Trump administration continue the US policy of “strategic ambiguity” or “dual deterrence” without dragging Taiwan into its own intensifying confrontation with China? Will China and the US find that their broader geostrategic and economic interests sufficiently outweigh their dissatisfaction with the cross-Strait status quo and trends to enable them to kick the can down the road? Finally, can wisdom and compromise overcome intransigence on all three sides?

Inter-Korean relations, already bad, got worse in 2024. North Korea launched a bizarre new campaign, sending balloons bearing trash. South Korea reacted by fully suspending the already defunct North-South military pact and resuming propaganda broadcasts at the DMZ. In August, ROK President Yoon Suk Yeol announced a new policy of unification under liberal democracy, which despite offering dialogue left no place for the DPRK or Kim Jong Un. The latter took umbrage at Seoul for exaggerating flood casualties in the North, but offered no figure of his own. It is unclear whether North Korea has revised its constitution to declare South Korea irredeemably hostile, as no text has been published. In October the North blew up inter-Korean road and rail links. In December. Yoon blew up his own presidency by briefly declaring martial law, plunging South Korea into political chaos. As of now the North has not taken advantage of this.

New Northern Dirty Tricks: What A Load Of Rubbish! 

Figure 1 Balloons full of trash and filth from North Korea are seen in south Chungcheong province, South Korea. Photo: CNN

The main inter-Korean news during the period  under review was a new dirty tricks campaign— literally—by Pyongyang. Since late May, North  

Korea has launched between 6,000 and 9,000  missiles of a new kind across the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). Fortunately none bore explosive warheads or flew at supersonic speeds to rain  death and destruction on the South. Instead they floated slowly through Southern skies, before depositing unpleasant but at worst mildly harmful payloads of a most peculiar kind:  assorted rubbish. 

Some background first. As regular readers know, North Korea has long bridled at Southern activists, some defectors, who launch helium balloons into the North laden with anti-DPRK propaganda; cargoes can also include medicines, dollar bills, memory sticks, and more. This became a political issue in South Korea when the previous liberal administration of Moon Jae-in in 2020 controversially banned such launches, though in practice they continued. Under Moon’s conservative successor Yoon Suk Yeol, the Constitutional Court struck down that ban in September. 2023 as infringing freedom of speech. Activist NGOs like Fighters for a Free North Korea (FFNK) duly redoubled their efforts, infuriating the North, which vowed to retaliate. 

Now it is doing so. The context is important.  Weird as North Korea’s action seems, this is not random in at least two ways. Sending rubbish echoes and mirrors the North’s characterization of Southern balloon cargoes as rubbish sent by “human scum.” Indeed, Pyongyang gave notice in advance, unusually. After yet another balloon launch by FFNK on May 10, DPRK Vice Defense Minister Kim Kang II warned: “Mounds of wastepaper and filth will soon be scattered over the border areas and the interior of the ROK, and it will directly experience how much effort is required to remove them.” Two days later he was as good as his word.  

Official DPRK statements consistently framed this as giving the South a taste of its own medicine. Kim Kang Il followed up on June 2: “We made the ROK clans (sic) get enough experience of how much unpleasant they feel and how much effort is needed to remove the scattered wastepaper.” (For full quotation and more detail, see the Chronology.) Subsequent waves of Northern balloons have also been portrayed by Pyongyang as ripostes for Southern actions, since needless to say FFNK and their ilk have continued their own launches. 

What to make of this odd turn? Some figures first. According to Beyond Parallel, a DPRK focused website which has been keeping score, as of Nov. 29—after almost exactly six months of this—North Korea had sent between 6,430 and 8,950 trash-filled balloons into South  Korea, on 32 occasions (they are launched in batches, not continuously). Of these, 3,147— between a third and half—landed successfully, in 3,359 locations nationwide (so the latter figure, being higher, must include unsuccessful landings, whatever that means). The great majority came down in Seoul and the surrounding Gyeonggi province, but some have reached every ROK province except South Jeolla and Jeju island. 

Rubbish comes in many forms, and payloads have varied. In Beyond Parallel’s summary, “These balloons have been found to contain trash such as animal and human feces, batteries, cigarette butts, clothes, dark soil, plastic bottles, toilet paper, wastepaper, and vinyl.” The nastier stuff was mainly earlier on. Fears at one point of disease-bearing vectors proved groundless.  Some soil was found to contain parasites like roundworms, whipworms, and threadworms, reflecting the fact that North Korea largely uses human feces as fertilizer. 

Seoul reacted with understandable anger. On June 2 National Security Adviser Chang Ho-jin  threatened Pyongyang with “unendurable”  consequences for its “despicable provocations  that could not have been imagined by a normal  country.” This was after a second wave, whose cargo included cigarette butts, paper, and plastic bags—but no more poop. In addition to the filthy balloons, for four days (May 29—June 1) the North tried to jam GPS signals near ROK islands in the West/Yellow sea, causing glitches to some vessels’ navigation systems. Another brief bout of GPS jamming followed in November. 

On June 4 South Korea responded in deed as well as word, by fully suspending 2018’s inter-Korean tension reduction agreement.  Pyongyang had already repudiated the whole accord, after Seoul partially suspended it in November. For the ROK, full suspension meant it could resume previously banned military exercises and other activities near the DMZ, which it duly did. On June 26 the ROK Marine Corps staged its first live-fire drills for seven years on Yeonpyeong and Baengnyeong islands  in the West/Yellow Sea, which lie close to the DPRK. Live-fire artillery drills on the mainland  near the DMZ resumed on July 2. 

After another wave of Northern balloons, Seoul  took further action. On June 9 it reinstalled  loudspeakers at the DMZ and resumed  propaganda broadcasts, for the first time since  2016. The speakers blared for just one day in the  first instance. But in July, as the balloons kept  coming the speakers were turned on again, for  longer and more often.  

In due course the North riposted with  loudspeakers of its own; only once again—as  per the balloons—in a weird way. Rather than  propaganda, Southern residents in some areas  near the DMZ were disturbed and kept awake by  very loud eerie howling and other strange  sounds. At this writing (early December.) both  sides were continuing their respective aural  bombardments. 

Floods Rattle Kim: He Takes It Out on Seoul 

In late July northern North Korea was hit by  severe floods. In itself that would be a domestic  event, all too familiar in the monsoon season  given the impoverished DPRK’s failure to invest  in the necessary infrastructure—although Kim  Jong Un’s response was to scapegoat and sack  officials rather than admit this system failure.  But there is also an inter-Korean dimension,  indeed two. Seoul naturally offered aid, and was  ignored. (When Putin did the same, Kim thanked  him politely but said they will manage on their  own.) 

Figure 2 North Korean leader Kim Jong Un inspects a flood-affected area in North Pyongan Province, North Korea, on July 28. South Korean media has estimated the number of dead or missing to be over 1,000. Photo: Korean Central News Agency

The other, more intriguing connection is that  Kim used part of a long speech to flood victims  to vent his spleen against South Korea (see  Appendix I). His whole response to this disaster  is revealing of the dilemmas he faces and the  strategies he adopts. On the positive side, as also  seen in other areas such as failed satellite  launches—there was another of those, promptly  admitted, on May 27, just before the balloon  launches began—this Kim does permit a bit  more glasnost than his father or grandfather.  The floods were reported, and some material  damage was detailed. State media portrayed a  concerned leader on the spot: risking his shiny  new Maybach SUV in wheel-high floodwaters,  or looking grim and getting soaked as he toured  the area in an open rubber dinghy. One  remarkably candid shot showed him ducking to  avoid being thwacked by an overhanging branch  on a watercourse that used to be a road. 

But there are limits. DPRK media gave no  casualty figures, although satellite photos  showed considerable devastation—including at  least one entire village swept away. Naturally,  South Korean media and the ROK government  sought to assess this aspect as well. On Aug. 1 TV  Chosun quoted an ROK official as estimating  that up to 1,500 people perished, “including  rescue workers who died from over-exertion.”  MOU concurred that there must have been “considerable casualties,” while noting that material damage appeared less than in previous floods in 2010, 2016, and 2020. 

Such claims clearly got Kim’s goat. I suggest you read Appendix I now. As you do, ponder thousands of sodden flood victims, herded to listen to a typically long speech. Must they not have wondered, as you may too, why he was banging on about South Korea so much? And how did they react when he revealed that Southern claim of over 1,000 casualties? They  would never have known that, had the Leader  not said it, though rumors doubtless swirled. He  did not say what the true figure was. Yet we  know there were casualties, for elsewhere Kim  admitted this. Sacking two party secretaries and  the minister of Public Security on July 29, he  said their neglect of flood prevention “caused  even the casualty that can not be allowed.”  

When you’ve just lost everything, being told  over and over to hate South Korea is hardly the  message you expect or want or need to hear. But  that is evidently what was on Kim’s mind.  Having to ram it home suggests that this  message is encountering some skepticism, as  well it might. (No mention, needless to say, that  the evil ROK had actually offered to help.) 

Yoonification Under ‘Liberal Democracy’: Bye  Bye DPRK! 

Figure 3 President Yoon Suk Yeol delivers the 47th Singapore Lecture on “A Vision for Korean Unification Towards a Free, Peaceful and Prosperous Indo Pacific Region” at a hotel in Singapore, Wednesday. Photo: Yonhap

 In Seoul, meanwhile, President Yoon was preparing to announce what was trumpeted as a wholly new vison of Korean unification. He duly did so on Liberation Day (from Japanese rule in 1945), Aug. 15, a public holiday in both Koreas.  What wags dubbed ‘Yoonification’ was indeed new. Hitherto, the varied stances adopted by ROK governments in the post-1987 democratic era all shared some version of a process by degrees. The end-point was reunification, but the starting point here and now had to be the two existing states. So the first step must be dialogue between Seoul and Pyongyang, leading over time to reconciliation. 

Yoon wanted no truck with any of that. Despite a pro forma offer of talks, which many media misleadingly headlined—Reuters, Bloomberg, Nikkei, DW—did you not read the full speech? — his core message was uncompromising:  unification under liberal democracy. His words  left no room for doubt or indeed dialogue. “The  freedom we enjoy must be extended to the  frozen kingdom of the North, where people are  deprived of freedom and suffer from poverty  and starvation.” True enough—but what exactly  does that leave for Kim Jong Un to discuss? 

NK News, by contrast, got the true message  exactly right in its headline “ROK president  makes no room for Kim Jong Un in a unified  Korea. Yoon’s call for unification under  democracy makes North Korean regime change  unspoken goal, aiming to divide its society.” 

In its own way, this stance is no less hostile  toward North Korea as a state than Kim Jong  Un’s new doctrine of South Korea as an  implacable foe. One big difference is that Yoon  recognizes North Koreans as fellow-Koreans: a  truer and more logical stance, which also gives  Seoul the moral high ground. Kim rages against  the ROK as a state, says the DPRK is entitled to  destroy it, but is silent on how 52 million South  Koreans fit into this malevolent vision. They are  no longer kin or compatriots, so perhaps they  don’t count. As discussed in our last article, this  is one of several ways that Kim’s doctrine makes  no sense.  

SPA Damp Squib 

Clarification had been anticipated in October, when the Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA) — North Korea’s rubber-stamp Parliament, as it is often correctly tagged—was due to meet in order (inter alia) to revise the DPRK Constitution to reflect the new line on the South, as Kim had announced earlier in the year. Much attention was focused on this, to see how the changes would be worded. Kim had also spoken of clarifying territorial borders, threatening fire and brimstone should any foe cross them. This naturally raised fears of renewed tensions in the West/Yellow Sea around the Northern Limit Line (NLL), the de facto maritime boundary. 

In the event this proved a damp squib, or perhaps a pig in a poke. The SPA duly met on Oct. 7-8, but went unreported until afterward.  Kim did not attend, instead giving a speech at what—in a further sign of his growing personality cult in his own right—is now renamed Kim Jong Un University of National Defense. Subsequent brief reports suggest that the SPA did indeed revise the Constitution, but  as of December the new text has yet to be published.  

This silence looks like a retreat. It is a stretch to imagine how one would draft such an absurd and incoherent notion into a Constitution. Chad O’Carroll of NK News suggests two different possible motives: domestic opposition to Kim’s new anti-unification policy and Pyongyang’s preference for strategic ambiguity, to keep its enemies guessing. Both may well be true. 

North Delinks From South, Explosively 

But maybe for Pyongyang actions speak louder than words. Never mind redrafting, let’s just stage an explosion! A week after the SPA met, on Oct. 15 North Korea ceremoniously blew up the roads and railway tracks—two of each, in the east and west of the peninsula—which in happier times earlier this century had physically reconnected the two Koreas (all paid for by Seoul, needless to add). True, this had been a very limited relinking. No regular train services ever ran, and the eastern road was only briefly used to ferry Southern tourists to the Mount Kumgang resort before tours were suspended in  2008 after a middle-aged female visitor was shot dead. The western road saw more use, as Southern businesses trucked supplies in and finished goods out from the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC), which lasted until 2016. But no further. Except for rare high-level meetings, no one drove between Seoul and Pyongyang.

Those seeking consolation may note that the destruction is symbolic too. In some future thaw, unimaginable currently, these now severed arteries could easily be reconnected.  Interestingly, the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff noted that the visually impressive large mounds of earth which the North has piled up to fortify the blockage are not militarily effective ramparts, much less the tank traps they claim. But they look good on camera. Here, as often, North Korea seems content with merely symbolic histrionics. We should be thankful Kim settles for that. 

Yoon Loses The Plot—And His Job? 

Figure 4 Demonstrators from a labor group take part in a protest calling for the ouster of South Korea President Yoon Suk Yeol outside City Hall in Seoul on Dec. 12, 2024. Photo: ANTHONY WALLACE/AFP via Getty Images

North Korea is often described as unpredictable:  led by an isolated and unloved ruler, whose paranoia might tempt him to misjudge situations and lash out. Wrong Korea, it would seem. 

As I write, the political chaos unleashed by Yoon Suk Yeol’s mad declaration of martial law (swiftly rescinded) on Dec. 3 is ongoing. While primarily about South Korean domestic politics, this has clear implications for inter-Korean relations. This dismal affair is obviously negative for the ROK’s security: exposing weaknesses that Kim Jong Un might see as vulnerabilities. While we do not share the view that Kim is bent on all-out aggression—pin pricks and gestures are more his bag—in principle he may seize such a golden opportunity to exploit Yoon’s and South Korea’s discomfiture. But as of this writing, he has not done so. 

More specific issues also arise. Glad as we may  be in this instance that some senior military  commanders apparently refused or ignored  orders they deemed unwarranted or even illegal,  thereby ensuring a peaceful denouement, chains  of command need to function properly and  reliably. The subsequent formal power vacuum  is also troubling. On Dec. 11, with Yoon sidelined but not yet impeached, who is South Korea’s commander-in-chief? 

Also, crucially, the North was Yoon’s avowed excuse, however specious, for what he did. In his own words: “I declare martial law to protect the Republic of Korea from the threats of North Korean communist forces, to immediately eradicate the unscrupulous pro-Pyongyang anti-state forces that pillage the freedom and happiness of our people and to protect free constitutional order.” 

It is a familiar rightwing McCarthyite ploy to smear democratic liberals as crypto-commies.  There was in fact no specific DPRK threat. The same pretext may have been cited to soldiers involved, perhaps to pre-empt any doubts they might have. An opposition lawmaker claims that  2.5 hours before Yoon declared martial law, the ROK Army’s 707th Special Mission Group—the same unit sent to the National Assembly shortly after—received orders saying “the situation regarding North Korea is serious, and immediate deployment may be required.” 

Moreover, as B R Myers notes in a typically contrarian commentary, rumors of a possible declaration of martial law had swirled since September—but were dismissed as leftist paranoia. While the full truth must await the multiple investigations now under way in Seoul, this casts a new light on a drone which dropped leaflets on Pyongyang in early October. The  possibility cannot now be ruled out that Yoon— or his (now ex-) defense minister and  schoolmate Kim Yong-hyun, the seeming brains  (if that is the word) behind what increasingly  looks like an attempted coup—deliberately  sought to antagonize the North, in hope of  provoking a reaction which they could then use  to justify abolishing democracy (in order to save  it, of course). 

As for North Korea, they waited a week to  comment, perhaps as bemused as the rest of us.  On Dec. 11 the party daily Rodong Sinmun finally carried quite a detailed factual account, albeit peppered predictably with phrases like “puppet.” We reproduce this in full as Appendix II.  

One can only wonder what North Korean readers are making of all this. Their government has just told them that in enemy South Korea there is a political opposition; you can come out on the streets in protest and denounce the leader, and he may yet fall. Those are heady thoughts to ponder in Pyongyang, even if none can be safely uttered aloud. 

Sunrise, Sunset: A Roller-Coaster Quarter Century 

As this is the final issue of Comparative Connections in its current form, it seems apt to stand back from immediate events and try to frame the bigger picture. What is the overall story of inter-Korean relations in the first quarter of the 21st century? And what are the  lessons? 

Let us remind ourselves of the main events. The century, and these articles, began with the radically new “Sunshine” policy pursued by Kim Dae-jung (ROK president 1998-2003), who sought to end decades of North-South hostility.  The name derives from an Aesop fable, where sun and wind compete to make a man take off his coat. Warm sun triumphs over chilly wind. 

For a decade under Kim and his fellow-liberal successor Roh Moo-hyun (2003-08), each of whom went to Pyongyang for summits with the North’s then leader Kim Jong Il—who never repaid the compliment by visiting Seoul—the two Koreas took baby steps, if giant-seeming compared to the past, to interact and reduce tensions. Two joint ventures, financed by the South, were built on Northern soil. From 1998 to 2008 1 million South Korean tourists visited scenic Mount Kumgang on the east coast: first by boat, but later by bus or car through the hitherto impassable Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), staying in Southern-built facilities. Near the west coast, the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC, 2004-16) at its peak saw some 120 mostly small ROK companies employ over 50,000 DPRK workers to make various goods for South Korean and overseas markets. 

In 2008 South Korean voters turned right. Two conservative Presidents—Lee Myung-bak  (2008-13) and Park Geun-hye (2013-2017)— were skeptical of Sunshine. Lee decided not to implement any of the numerous new joint ventures agreed by Roh at the second North South summit in 2007, near the end of his presidency (South Korean presidents serve a single five-year term). Presumably in reprisal, in 2010 the North sank the Southern corvette Cheonan with 46 deaths—Pyongyang denies responsibility—and shelled a Southern island, killing four. Lee retaliated by banning inter-Korean trade, with the large exception of the KIC. That JV continued till 2016, when Park abruptly shut it down after Pyongyang launched a satellite. Park Geun-hye’s impeachment gave Sunshine a second chance, as Seoul’s pendulum swung left again (for reasons unconnected to North Korea).  

Her liberal successor Moon Jae-in (2017-22) had visited Pyongyang as Roh’s chief of staff. 2018 appeared an annus mirabilis, starting with Northern participation (in hastily formed pan Korean teams) in the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics. The North’s leader Kim Jong Un, who  for his first six years after inheriting power in  late 2011 on the death of his father Kim Jong Il  had met no other foreign leader, emerged on the  global stage in a whirlwind of summitry:  meeting Moon three times, the same with Xi  Jinping of China, and a first ever US-DPRK  summit with Donald Trump, held in Singapore.  

But after the second Trump-Kim summit (held in Hanoi in early 2019) collapsed, Moon’s reward for being an assiduous go-between was to be shunned by Kim and dissed by Trump. Though Moon insisted until the end of his term that a North-South peace process continued, the  fact is that there have been almost no direct inter-Korean contacts for almost six years. (And yet these updates have never lacked issues to discuss.) 

The latest ROK presidential election, in March 2022, narrowly voted in a conservative of a different kidney from Lee or Park, each of whom intermittently pursued dialogue with the North (not always publicly). Yoon Suk Yeol, a prosecutor new to politics, made an initial perfunctory “audacious offer” of aid, but soon showed he had no more interest in dealing with Kim than vice versa. As discussed above, his vision of unification has no room for the DPRK. Meanwhile the North sends trash balloons. We have come a long way since 2000: backward. 

Was Sunshine Moonshine? 

With chilly winds blowing colder than ever, it is tempting to conclude that sunshine failed. Certainly, that era is over for the foreseeable future, partly due to wider geopolitical changes beyond our bilateral remit here: China’s hardening under Xi Jinping, and Kim’s enthusiastic new military support for Russia in Ukraine. Yet the value of Comparative Connections is to have provided a granular, blow by blow account of events as they unfolded. I hope scholars and policy-makers will mine this archive carefully, before rushing to a priori or superficial conclusions. Here are my own tentative thoughts, looking back. 

Indeed, Sunshine had grave flaws and issues, which must be acknowledged. Let us list some: 

• It was exceedingly one-sided. Seoul did all the running and paid all the bills. 
• Initially it included large secret payments, which not only broke ROK law but could be seen as enabling Pyongyang’s nuclear program.
• Very little was actually accomplished in any sphere. This encounter was marginal at best.
• Fundamental security issues, notably DPRK WMD, went unaddressed. North Korea’s first nuclear test, and subsequent ones, occurred during and despite Sunshine.
• Also unaddressed were North Korea’s appalling human rights abuses, as a corollary of respecting each other’s systems.

These are major negatives. Looking back, no one could claim that Kim Dae-jung’s Aesopian gamble worked out as he hoped. Hawkish skeptics, who from the start dismissed Sunshine as moonshine, may well feel vindicated.  Undeniably, at no point did either Kim Jong Il or Kim Jong Un take major tangible—much less irreversible—steps to signal true reciprocity or an unmistakable willingness to change.  

Many such would have been possible. Imagine, for instance, if reunions of separated family reunions had been genuine—in towns, unchaperoned, for longer, more often and on a larger scale—rather than the ghastly brief media-driven blub-fest mockery that they became. Or if that be deemed too risky, as the Kims evidently judged: Imagine if trains and trucks had actually run on the reconnected cross-border roads and railways, rather than these remaining unused and merely symbolic. A little more courage from the North could have seen the sinews of a reunified Korea begin to be built, in cumulative ways not easily reversible. 

That was the road not taken. Above all, the fact that Sunshine coincided with growing global concern about the DPRK’s nuclear ambitions was fateful, and ultimately fatal. Pyongyang’s refusal to abandon its nuclear quest inevitably set limits to how far South Korea, a US ally hosting US bases and troops, could go on the inter-Korean front. One such moment came in Feb. 2016, when Park Geun-hye closed the KIC—not for any inter-Korean reason, but to punish Pyongyang for a satellite launch. Some  might deem that an over-reaction: shutting  down the last area of concrete North-South  cooperation, for extraneous reasons. 

Should we therefore conclude that Sunshine was misguided from the start? Was its net effect merely to enable or even strengthen a malign, cynical regime: happy to pocket ROK money, but which never had any intention of giving anything back, much less abandoning its WMD?  

Historical counterfactuals (“what if …?”) have their limits, but perhaps lessons may be learnt. What if more substantial inter-Korean economic relations had been built, like for instance those between China and Taiwan? As that case shows, such ties do not eliminate military risk but they certainly mitigate it.  Bluntly, Xi Jinping will think twice before damaging TSMC. 

The detail afforded by Comparative Connections enables us to zero in on key moments and episodes. 2008 still seems to me a turning point. What if South Korea’s incoming President, Lee Myung-bak, had gone ahead with the economic joint ventures inked by his predecessor Roh Moo-hyun? The structural links thus created would have made the North increasingly dependent on the South economically, a valuable card on many levels, not least in building constituencies in Pyongyang with a solid material interest in inter-Korean betterment. As it was, and as I wrote elsewhere some time ago, South Korea lost the North to China. 

This relates to another clear lesson. Regardless of Pyongyang’s intentions, a big problem was South Korea’s failure—unlike West Germany, back in the day—to craft and implement a bipartisan Nordpolitik: one which could endure despite the frequent changes of government in Seoul. Policy continuity is admittedly easier for dictatorships. But if DPRK archives are ever unsealed so we can read the discussions, I bet we’ll find their hawks raising a perfectly fair point: How can you make a deal with the South, when their next government might tear it up? 

For all these reasons, bilateral inter-Korean relations, fitful and incipient as they were, never became more than a dependent variable in the broader regional and global geopolitical picture,  at the mercy of extraneous events and developments. I still reckon that North-South ties, if better handled, could in principle have become a driver—but it didn’t happen. Looking Ahead: Never Say Never! 

So much for the past. What of the future, which sadly I shall no longer be chronicling and analyzing here? Murky though current prospects look, let me venture a few thoughts. 

First, the point just made applies in spades. In the short term, more than ever inter-Korean ties will be subject to wider geopolitical developments. Three in particular loom large.  Kim Jong Un’s ever deepening commitment to support Putin’s aggression in Ukraine, now with boots on the ground, has profound ramifications which are beyond our scope here. Second, the imminent return of Donald Trump to the White House is a wild card. In his first term Trump successively pursued two opposite North Korea policies: from sneering at ‘little rocket man’ to bromance. Which will he plump for this time?  And third, South Korea’s sudden political crisis means that at this writing it is unclear—if increasingly unlikely—that Yoon Suk Yeol will serve out his presidential term. Progressives already looked likely to regain power in Seoul after Yoon, but that could now happen in 2025 rather than 2027—in which case the ROK’s Nordpolitik will change drastically, yet again. 

Another lesson: Never say never in Korea. As of now, both Korean governments have taken mutual hostility to the point of formal repudiation—but that can turn on a dime.  Should the opposition Democrats (DPK) form the next ROK government, they will certainly reject Yoon’s hard-line stance and revert to some form of outreach (hopefully having learnt lessons from Moon Jae-in’s misguidedly one-sided bending over backward toward Pyongyang.) 

If that happens, how will Kim Jong Un respond? Having gone so far as to define the ROK as an enemy state in the DPRK Constitution, any U turn could be difficult and embarrassing. Nonetheless, should Ukraine become an unpopular quagmire and Putin’s friendship prove limited and transactional, them given North Korea’s poverty and permanent economic crisis (self-inflicted by Kim’s refusal of market reforms), the lure of a rich and generous neighbor ready once again to wave checks—not blank, but substantial—may prove hard to resist, not least as counterweight to an increasingly irritated Beijing. Moreover, should Trump pick a fight with Seoul over payments for USFK, as he has threatened, any resulting spats may afford the ROK more flexibility than in the past to go its own way in dealing with Pyongyang. 

Extending our gaze to the medium- and longer term, further issues loom. Kim Jong Un’s health remains a concern. If he drops dead tomorrow, that could unleash a power struggle in Pyongyang with alarming ramifications. Old hypothetical questions, never answered, would arise anew, starkly and for real. If there were chaos in North Korea, would South Korea and/ or China intervene: to secure the North’s loose nukes or perhaps restore order more broadly? If so, would Seoul and Beijing consult first—or might they, and the US, once again confront each other on the peninsula? One hopes there are agreed contingency plans, but I fear not. 

Absent such collapse, more likely North Korea will limp on—but with an ever more restive populace, well aware that South Koreans live better and increasingly discontented with their own poverty and unfreedom. As Kim Jong Un’s early pledge that they will no longer have to tighten their belts rings ever hollower, and youths are shot for watching South Korean movies, the control and stability the DPRK has always achieved hitherto cannot be taken for granted. Future South Korean governments, and their citizens, may need to brace for contingencies and decide whether these constitute threats or opportunities. 

There I shall leave it—and leave you, dear readers. It has been a privilege to spend the first quarter of this century chronicling the vicissitudes of inter-Korean relations for Comparative Connections. Whatever the future holds, I hope the archive thus created will prove useful to future scholars, policy makers and others. Let me conclude with Gramsci: Pessimism of the intelligence; optimism of the will. History is not foreordained. Korean reunification may be beyond reach, but inter-Korean reconciliation is still possible—and well worth striving for. 

Appendix I 

Excerpt from speech by Kim Jong Un, headlined: “Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Clarifies in His Speech Stand of Party and Government on Repairing Flood Damage and Consoles Flood Victims”, KCNA 10 Aug. 2024  

Comrades, 

It is necessary for us to impress on our mind once again that the current rehabilitation project is not simply an undertaking for our own but also a serious struggle against the enemy. 

At present, the enemy, misusing the occasion when we have suffered damage, is continuing to make foolish attempts to tarnish the image of our state. 

It is important to inform Party organizations and working people’s organizations at all levels, various networks of education and the people of these facts and thus make them have a correct understanding of the ROK scum bordering on us. 

The rubbish ROK’s media are desperately slandering all the socialist benefits and measures taken by our Party and government for the flood victims and also the communist traits displayed throughout the society, abusing them as a means of achieving some sort of internal unity and a type of demonstration. They are also fabricating such false information, in their frantic maneuvers to slander our government and system, that the missing persons in the afflicted areas exceed 1,000 in number and that its intelligence authorities found out that several helicopters had fallen on  rescue mission. 

Worse still, they are spreading a baseless rumor that the V-day celebrations took place in Pyongyang on the 27th of last month when loss of life occurred in the flood-hit areas. 

Because the rumor is in wide circulation in the ROK society that its government is always late in coping with all sorts of accidents that happened there and such is an everyday occurrence in the country, they seem to weave absurd sophistry that slanders and slights us in an attempt to  coax their citizens and stir up world public sentiments. 

When I visited the helicopter unit that rescued you, I gave full account of the rescue operation, including the crash-landing by one helicopter during the operation, and expressed my gratitude that there had been no casualties in the turmoil.

The enemy even went so far as to say that I reacted personally to the report fabricated by their media because there were heavy casualties, I intended to cover it up. 

What is their dogged insistence on making you, safe and sound like this, missing or dead? It is an open and shut case. 

This is a smear campaign and a grave provocation against our state as well as an insult to you. 

I have reason and feel it necessary to say this about the media of the dirty, rubbish country. 

There is no need for us to make separate materials for education. It is because these clear facts are actual and educational materials good enough to clearly bring home to the people how filthy the enemy clan is, what ancient and old-fashioned way they resort to for fabrication and political smear campaign to tarnish the image of our state, what their ulterior motives are and why we call the enemy the enemy and scum. 

No country in the world has such media which does nothing but to invent groundless and exaggerated lies. 

What we must clearly realize is that the enemy is what we see them now. 

Referring to these actual facts, the whole country should have a correct understanding of the enemy and cultivate a correct feeling against them. 

Our enemy is an unchangeable enemy. 

We should make the current opportunity, which helps us to have a correct understanding of what our enemy is, an opportunity of having a correct stand towards the enemy. 

Appendix II 

The DPRK’s first comment on the martial law  crisis in South Korea 

Headline: In the puppet Korea, social unrest expands due to martial law, more than 1 million people across the country take part in protests demanding the impeachment of Yoon Seok yeol, the international community is keeping a close eye on it.

Rodong Sinmun, 11 Dec. 2024, page 6 (unofficial translation) 

The puppet Yoon Seok-yeol, who is facing a serious crisis of governance and impeachment, declared martial law without any hesitation and unleashed the guns of the fascist dictatorship on the people. This shocking incident has turned the entire puppet Korea into a mess. 

On the night of December 3, the puppet Yoon Seok-yeol declared martial law in order to escape the worst crisis of his rule, and sent in fully armed martial law troops, including several direct-controlled planes and a group of thugs from the Army Special Warfare Command, to blockade the National Assembly. However, as the resolution demanding the lifting of martial law was passed in the plenary session of the National Assembly, which was urgently convened, the puppet Yoon had no choice but to  lift it just six hours after declaring martial law. 

The puppet Yoon Seok-yeol, who was in a tight spot both inside and outside of his term in office and was immediately forced out of his position of power, committed a crazy act reminiscent of the coup d’état during the military dictatorship decades ago, which drew strong condemnation from all walks of life, including the opposition party, and further exploded the public’s impeachment fever. 

The Democratic Party of Korea and other opposition parties immediately declared that they would file a complaint of sedition against the puppet Yoon Seok-yeol, who caused the martial law situation, and those involved, the Minister of National Defense and the Minister of Public Administration and Security, and push for their impeachment. 

On the 5th, six opposition parties, including the Democratic Party of Korea, and independents totaling 191 lawmakers proposed an impeachment motion. However, as the People Power Party members who had decided to oppose impeachment left the conference room  en masse, the Yoon Seok-yeol impeachment motion was invalidated without even being able to open the ballot box due to a lack of voters. 

When this news was delivered, not only the area surrounding the puppet National Assembly but also Korea itself became a national protest ground. A crowd of 1 million people rallied around the National Assembly building and staged a “siege march.” 

They held up propaganda materials such as “Impeach Yoon Seok-yeol,” “Arrest Yoon Seok yeol,” and “Oppose impeachment = Participate in rebellion,” and chanted, “Yoon Seok-yeol is no longer the president of the people. Impeach Yoon Seok-yeol!”, “Impeach the ringleader of rebellion, Yoon Seok-yeol!”, “Disband the People Power Party, a collaborator in rebellion!”, and “The National Assembly must immediately process the Yoon Seok-yeol  impeachment motion!” They released a statement emphasizing that they would not stop fighting until Yoon Seok-yeol was suspended from his duties, resigned, and punished, and that the people would not tolerate the existence of the People Power Party. 

On the 7th, the 118th candlelight vigil and demonstration was widely held in Seoul under the theme of “Impeach the insurgent Yoon Seok-yeol immediately! Arrest him immediately!” 

The rally and demonstration that day, which was carried out as a nationwide emergency protest action, was attended by 200,000 people from all over the place, including workers, farmers, and young students. 

Speakers at the rally claimed that Yoon Seok yeol’s existence itself was a war and a disaster, that Yoon Seok-yeol should be impeached immediately, and that he should be held accountable and punished without fail. 

The rally participants chanted slogans such as “Yoon Seok-yeol, step down!” and “Disband the People Power Party!” and marched toward the National Assembly. 

They then held a rally in front of the National Assembly, calling for “Yoon Seok-yeol, step down for insurrection!” We joined the “National Sovereignty Realization! Social Reform!  National People’s March for the Resignation of the People”. 

On this day, cries of anger against the puppet Yoon Seok-yeol and his party erupted in other regions as well. 

At a rally hosted by the Incheon Movement Headquarters for the Resignation of the Yoon Seok-yeol Regime in Incheon, participants expressed their outrage at the National Assembly’s failure to declare martial law and impeach Yoon Seok-yeol for committing a crime of sedition and declared that they would launch a nationwide protest to force Yoon Seok-yeol out and disband the People Power Party. 

In Daegu, the Daegu City National Assembly for the Resignation of Yoon Seok-yeol, comprised of 85 social groups in the Daegu and Gyeongbuk  regions, held a rally for the resignation of Yoon  Seok-yeol and declared that they would definitely fulfill the people’s wishes. 

Protests also took place in front of the headquarters of the People Power Party in various places where the accomplices of the puppet Yoon Seok-yeol, the People Power Party, are nesting. On the 8th, 9th, and 10th, protest candles continued to burn in Seoul and all over the country. 

With boiling anger toward Yoon Seok-yeol, who committed an indelible sin against the people through dictatorship, tyranny, and martial law, crowds of people from all walks of life declared a long-term impeachment struggle with the “Immediate Impeachment! Immediate Arrest!  Candlelight Cultural Event” in front of the puppet National Assembly in Seoul. 

Shouts such as “Immediately impeach and arrest the special criminal Yoon Seok-yeol!”, “Yoon Seok-yeol, who committed an atrocious crime by pointing guns at the people, is no longer the president!”, and “We will wage a nationwide struggle!” erupted everywhere. The  puppet media reported that the whole country  was shaking with protests, with headlines such  as “Chants for Yoon Seok-yeol’s resignation  from all walks of life”, “1 million candles  surrounding the National Assembly”, “Cheerful  candle struggle prepared for a long-term war”,  and “Yoon Seok-yeol has difficulty avoiding  impeachment trial”, and reported that the  whole country was shaking with protests, that  each region was forming a huge sea of candles  demanding Yoon Seok-yeol’s impeachment  once again, and that Yoon Seok-yeol could not  avoid destruction as the candles were burning  like an active volcano. 

The international community is closely watching the emergency martial law and impeachment commotion in the puppet Korea, saying that the vulnerability of Korean society has been revealed, that Yoon Seok-yeol’s sudden declaration of martial law is an expression of despair, and that Yoon Seok yeol’s political life could end early. [Korean Central News Agency] 

Appendix III 

Full text of “All DPRK citizens vent rage at  ROK’s provocation upon receipt of FM’s crucial statement”, Pyongyang Times 14 October 2024. 

“It made my blood boil when I received the news about the crimes puppet ROK scum committed at dead of night in October. Even the dirty dead bodies of the puppets should not be left, but be squashed in the crusher of our workshop.” Chae Song Il, worker of ore-dressing workshop No. 2 of the Musan Mining Complex.

“The noxious insects irritating humans should completely be exterminated for the healthy development of humankind.” Ri Jong Hui, researcher at Pyongyang University of Medical Sciences.

“If those brutes don’t want to live any longer, our coal miners will finish them off by beating them to pulp and throw their bodies into disused mines.” Ri Jong Ho, manager of a pit at the Kogonwon Coal Mine under the Kyongwon Area Coal-mining Complex.

“It is sickening and disgusting even to talk about the loathsome pack of dogs. I want to turn their stronghold into a sea of flames.” Ju Jae Song, department director of the Ministry of Machine-building Industry. 

“I eagerly wait for the day of condemning the ROK puppets to the most gruesome and horrible death.” Ri Song Mi, staffer at the Pyongyang Jonghyang Building-materials Factory.

“The unparalleled human rejects playing with fire should be given, not ultimatum, but the most terrible shower of shells at once.” Workers of the Kim Jong Thae Electric Locomotive Complex. 

“The harshest punishment should be meted out to the enemies actually, not by word of mouth.”  Kye Yong Gil, workteam leader of the Samyang Farm in Sonchon County. 

“At present, the whole university is burning with resentment. The enemies we are confronting are the wicked foes we should surely exterminate.” Ju Kyong Sang, student of the forestry science faculty of Kim Il Sung University.

Even elderly persons and Children’s Union members say they want to take up arms to destroy the enemies by reducing their stronghold to ruins at once.

A rebound in China-ROK diplomacy raised optimism after a slow start to 2024, paving the way for the summit between Xi Jinping and Yoon Suk Yeol on Nov. 15. They met on the sidelines of APEC Peru before attending the G20 summit in Brazil. Foreign Ministers Wang Yi and Cho Tae-yul met in Beijing on May 13, facilitating the China-ROK-Japan trilateral summit and Yoon’s meeting with Premier Li Qiang in Seoul. As China-DPRK exchanges dwindled compared to the first third of this year, Xi Jinping and Kim Jong Un’s summits with Putin in May and June raised questions about the direction of China’s Korea policy. Donald Trump’s reelection in November intensified debate on the regional security and economic implications of US-China competition.

New Momentum in China-South Korea Partnership?

ROK Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul’s May 13-14 visit to Beijing set a positive tone for this year’s high-level exchanges. It marked his first face-to-face talks with Foreign Minister Wang Yi since taking office in January, and the first visit to China by a ROK foreign minister since 2017. Cho raised hopes for a “new phase” of sustainable cooperation, “fostering mutual trust rather than solely focusing on the speed and volume of the development of the bilateral relationship.” They recognized space for further expanding economic cooperation, and agreed to boost local government and societal exchanges to improve mutual public perceptions. Setting up Yoon’s summits with Chinese Premier Li Qiang and Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio in Seoul later that month, South Korea’s foreign ministry concluded the ministers’ meeting “created a new momentum for the development of the Korea-China relationship.”

President Yoon met Premier Li on May 26 in Seoul, a day before trilateral talks with Prime Minister Kishida. While focused largely on economic priorities, a key outcome of Yoon-Li talks was the reactivation and expansion of strategic communication channels. They agreed to create the Foreign Policy and Security Dialogue between foreign and defense ministries, after the halting of similar mechanisms a decade ago. Initiated on June 18 in Seoul, the “2+2” meeting was led by China’s Vice Foreign Minister Sun Weidong, Deputy Director of the Central Military Commission’s Office for International Military Cooperation Zhang Baoqun, South Korea’s Vice Foreign Minister Kim Hong Kyun, and Director General of the PRC Defense Ministry’s International Policy Bureau Lee Seung-buhm. It facilitated separate talks between Sun and Foreign Minister Cho. Cho met China’s vice Foreign Minister Ma Zhaoxu on July 24 in Seoul, where Ma and Korean counterpart Kim Hong-kyun led the 10th China-ROK high-level strategic dialogue, last held virtually in December 2021. ASEAN forums in Laos allowed foreign ministers Wang Yi and Cho Tae-yul to meet again on July 26 to reaffirm active progress in enhancing bilateral dialogue. 

China and South Korea’s 9th trilateral summit with Japan on May 27 was highly anticipated after a four-year suspension. This year’s summit marked the 25th anniversary year of China-ROK-Japan cooperation stemming from the ASEAN+3 mechanism. Making “our bilateral relations and trilateral cooperation mutually reinforcing” topped Li’s five-point proposal, extending to trade, innovation, cultural exchange, and sustainable development. China’s foreign ministry stressed the summit’s “highly meaningful” value symbolizing a “new start” for trilateral cooperation. Supporting the Yoon administration’s optimistic reviews, Korean public opinion praised the summit’s significance for Northeast Asian security, the “central theme” of China-ROK ties, and overall “progress” despite China’s “different tone” on North Korea. The 8th trilateral business summit was held alongside the leaders’ meeting, hosted by the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade, Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and Japan Business Federation.

The Xi-Yoon November summit renewed high-level support for developing the China-ROK “strategic cooperative partnership” in security, economic, and cultural fields. Xi and Yoon last met in November 2022 on the sidelines of the G20. China’s foreign ministry emphasized joint commitments to “the original intention of establishing diplomatic relations” despite “many changes” in the international environment since 2022. Yoon reiterated his vision for building a partnership based on “mutual respect, reciprocity, and common interests.”

Friction Points: Third Parties and Internal Affairs

The resurgence of China-ROK diplomacy from May failed to mask enduring strategic challenges. This year’s earlier lull in contacts magnified US-China competition and Yoon’s US-ROK alliance focus constrained the China-ROK partnership. For South Korean skeptics, besides agreeing to hold a good trilateral summit and intensify bilateral meetings, Foreign Ministers Wang and Cho in May “merely said what they wanted to say in diplomatic ways.” According to Yun Sun at the Stimson Center, Beijing’s primary motive for the trilateral summit was to “counterbalance US influence.” Featuring interviews with China’s Korea experts Zhang Huizhi at Jilin University and Da Zhigang at Heilongjiang Academy of Social Sciences, Chinese state media warned Japan and South Korea “should not lose their own interests following US’ suppression of China.” South Korea’s trilateral vice foreign ministerial meeting with US and Japanese allies right after the China-ROK-Japan summit was disappointing news indicating “Seoul’s diplomatic immaturity” and “hasty declaration of loyalty,” according to state think tank scholars like Dong Xiangrong. 

Competing views of third-party actors, and interference in each other’s internal affairs, resurfaced in China-ROK diplomatic interactions. In Peru, Yoon held trilateral talks with Biden and Kishida the same day he met Xi. Launching a new Trilateral Secretariat, they renewed their 2023 Camp David pledges on Indo-Pacific and South China Sea maritime security, and Taiwan. South Korean media attention on November’s multilateral summits focused on Seoul’s quest to build global support on Korean security, and “free and fair trade” as host of APEC 2025. As Yoon’s key advisor Kim Tae-hyo reported after the Xi-Yoon summit, Yoon expressed hopes for cooperation with China “in response to North Korea’s repeated provocations, the war in Ukraine and military cooperation between Russia and North Korea.” While jointly applauding the “vitalization of bilateral exchange and cooperation in various areas,” Foreign Minister Cho told Vice Minister Ma in July, “North Korea’s continued provocations and its close ties with Russia are seriously threatening peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in the international community.” Although Cho communicated similar concerns to Wang in May, Foreign Minister Wang reaffirmed China’s “unchanged” Korea policy and “constructive role” on the peninsula.

Figure 1 Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, also a member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, holds talks with Cho Tae-yul, foreign minister of the Republic of Korea (ROK), in Beijing, capital of China, May 13, 2024. [Photo/Xinhua]

The Implications of Xi and Kim’s Summits with Putin 

Beijing-Pyongyang high-level communication was limited to Xi and Kim’s exchange of anniversary messages on the DPRK’s founding in September and on PRC-DPRK diplomatic ties in October. Their bilateral summits with Putin in May and June raised more important implications for China-Korea relations. To commemorate the China-DPRK Friendship Treaty in July, the DPRK Embassy in Beijing hosted the foreign affairs chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, He Ping. The lower level of DPRK representation at the Chinese Embassy reception compared to last year’s anniversary sparked speculation about the impact of Pyongyang’s cooperation with Russia. South Korean media in July interpreted various signs of widening division, including Beijing’s push to return DPRK workers in China in line with UN resolutions, its tightened monitoring of bilateral trade, and Kim Jong Un’s reported directive to China-based diplomats to “ignore China.” Pyongyang’s immediate denunciation of the May 27 China-ROK-Japan statement, coinciding with a failed satellite launch that night, raised similar speculation, reinforced by Beijing’s less explicit triangular alignment with Russian and DPRK allies.

Putin’s June 18-19 visit to Pyongyang for his historic summit with Kim raised China’s dilemma of managing historically-strained ties with North Korea and Russia, as 2024 marked the 75th anniversaries of China’s ties with both allies. In a July 23 Yonhap interview, DPRK defector and former diplomat Ri Il-gyu explained Pyongyang’s “estranged” ties with China since late 2022: “For North Korea, it is not a top priority to recover its ties with China. The North’s primary goal is to elicit the maximum benefit from Russia and map out its strategies to brace for Trump’s possible return…North Korea believes China does not make it live well, but it also thinks Beijing would not let it die of hunger.” The Putin-Kim summit’s timing with China-ROK 2+2 strategic talks on June 18 prompted China’s foreign ministry to assure that dialogue plans with Seoul have “no particular link to other countries.” Some observers saw the Putin-Kim summit as an opening for “Seoul-Beijing détente,” concluding “South Korea’s cooperation with China may prove to be more significant than Russia’s support for North Korea.” A JoongAng Daily editorial argued, such a scenario for Seoul first requires “exploiting Beijing’s concerns about its weakening leverage on Pyongyang and repercussions of a strengthened unity of the West,” before responding with the United States and other allies. At a June 17 Wilson Center forum, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, who met President Yoon in Washington a month later, noted the growing importance of transatlantic cooperation with Indo-Pacific partners.

Xi’s summit with Putin on May 16 in Beijing, and Pyongyang’s ballistic missile test a day later, heightened skepticism about deterring North Korean aggression through UN sanctions. The meeting was even more disappointing for South Koreans in light of Foreign Minister Cho’s May 13-14 visit to Beijing, raising calls for South Korea’s own nuclear development or “NATO-style” cooperation. DPRK missile tests from May included a new record-setting Hwasong-19 intercontinental ballistic missile test on Oct. 31, Pyongyang’s 11th ICBM launch since 2021. While pointing to “large loopholes” in the global sanctions regime, ROK Ambassador to the UN Hwang Joon-kook called the test a move “to distract the world’s attention from its troops in Russia, demonstrate themselves as larger than life, or gain diplomatic leverage amid the US presidential election.” PRC Ambassador Fu Cong traced the peninsula security problem to a lack of US-DPRK “mutual trust,” and blamed US military expansion for threatening Chinese and regional security. 

Talks between PRC and ROK nuclear envoys Liu Xiaoming and Lee Jun-il on the sidelines of the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue in Tokyo on May 9 released no results. As Troy Stangarone at the Korea Economic Institute indicated, the April expiration of the mandate for the UN Panel of Experts on North Korea called into question the future of nuclear diplomacy. At a post-US election forum in Seoul, Trump’s former envoy Joseph Yun anticipated that Kim Jong Un is unlikely to resume denuclearization talks with Washington given stronger DPRK capabilities and Russian support. 

China-ROK Economic Diplomacy and Trade Reset

China regained its position as South Korea’s biggest export market in January-July after ROK exports to the United States surpassed China’s share in April-June 2023. A 38% decline in memory chip exports to China last year contributed to South Korea’s first trade deficit with China since 1992. By December 2024, a recovery in semiconductor exports injected more optimism into South Korea’s trade performance. But the declining rate of ROK export growth from August implied longer-term concerns. 

Figure 2 Finance Minister Choi Sang-mok speaks during the 18th Korea-China Meeting on Economic Cooperation held virtually with Zheng Shanjie, chairman of China’s National Development and Reform Commission, on May 16, 2024, in this photo provided by the Ministry of Economy and Finance. (PHOTO /Yonhap)

Agreements between President Yoon and Premier Li in May included the launching of a senior-level trade dialogue, resumption of the 2nd phase of FTA talks to promote the services sector, and revival of a bilateral investment cooperation committee after a 13-year pause. 

The latest meeting of trade officials on Nov. 28 in Yancheng supported such priorities and facilitated a China-ROK business forum on the sidelines to explore new opportunities. Supply chain stability remained a top focus of bilateral economic diplomacy from May. China’s National Development and Reform Commission chairman Zheng Shangjie and ROK Finance Minister Choi Sang-mok led the 18th China-ROK Meeting on Economic Cooperation online on May 16. Choi pointed to a critical time for managing supply chains to “jointly lead the global industry,” citing raw materials and critical minerals, and new industries like clean energy. South Korea’s trade ministry announced new bilateral talks on July 11 “aimed at exchanging opinions on export controls.” The initiative complemented director general-level economic talks in Beijing on July 29, an exchange led by China’s Commerce Ministry and South Korea’s Foreign Ministry since 1993.

Regional Economic Security and Unfair Play

US-China technology competition and China’s e-commerce practices continued to drive China-ROK economic frictions. As US-China “protectionist moves” loomed over South Korea’s export recovery path, the latest exchange of the tightest-yet export controls under Xi and Biden drew mixed responses from South Korea. The trade ministry quickly projected limited repercussions for Korean semiconductors, reassuring the public on Seoul’s close coordination with Washington. Korean analysts suggested the barriers to China’s technology advancement could boost South Korea’s competitiveness, but also lower future Chinese demand and raise dependence on the US market. Ahead of US elections, a Korea Herald editorial summarized worsening fears in the shifting chip market: “Previously, roles were clearly assigned: the US led chip design; Europe excelled in related equipment; Korea and Taiwan spearheaded chip production for the global market; and China consumed the final chip products. This old chip production structure is now expected to undergo a wave of drastic changes now that the US is pivoting to “friendshoring” to keep China’s technology advance at bay.”

Figure 3 President Yoon Suk Yeol (R) and Chinese Premier Li Qiang pose for a photo during their meeting at the presidential office in Seoul on May 26, 2024. (PHOTO /Yonhap)

Such structural shifts framed Beijing and Seoul’s clashes over economic security and coercive diplomacy since the 2016-2017 THAAD dispute. During June 2+2 talks, Chinese officials  opposed “turning economic issues into political or security ones,” and “all forms of trade protectionism.” ROK Industry Minister Ahn Duk-geun joined US and Japanese partners a week later in Washington to launch trilateral cooperation addressing “a wide range of non-market policies and practices” and “the weaponization of economic dependencies on certain supply sources for strategic goods.” South Korean opinion in May focused on the heightened need to manage mineral import reliance given “China’s strategic use of its core material resources as a geopolitical tool.”

Frictions over “unfair” practices also heated up in e-commerce. South Korea’s Fair Trade Commission (FTC) announced on May 13 the signing of voluntary agreements with AliExpress and Temu to address hazardous Chinese products and protect Korean consumers. By late November, the FTC ordered the online retailers to revise terms and conditions violating Korean legal standards on personal data protection and consumer compensation. Online purchases from China drove an annual 28% growth in direct overseas purchases by Korean consumers to 6.8 trillion won ($4.9 billion) in 2023, when China represented half of South Korea’s total overseas purchases. But the volume of user complaints about product quality and services has soared with China’s rapid expansion into the Korean market.

Against such consumer frustrations, the Xi-Yoon summit highlighted China’s granting of visa-free entry to South Koreans in early November, its first such move since 1992, as an immediate indicator favoring friendship through cultural exchanges. Xi “especially” welcomed more youth exchanges, and expressed hopes for more steps to boost China-ROK travel from the Korean side. Foreign Minister Cho also told Wang in May that freer access to cultural content would “help bridge the emotional gap between the youths of the two countries.” But China’s recent visa exemption drew cautious reactions in South Korea amid geopolitical uncertainties. While some supported the effort to mitigate recent strain, skeptics called China’s “sudden visa waiver” a strategic act to counter US influence, called for Seoul’s “prudent diplomacy,” and cautioned that reciprocal benefits to China require balancing economic gains and “less than favorable” public attitudes. 

Resumption of China-DPRK Trade and Repatriation

Figure 4 President Yoon Suk Yeol (L) shakes hands with Chinese President Xi Jinping during their meeting at a hotel in Lima, Peru, on Nov. 16, 2024, on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit. (PHOTO /Yonhap)

Post-pandemic reopening and increased trade with China and Russia drove North Korea’s economic recovery, as South Korean data showed in July. After negative economic growth from 2020, North Korea marked 3% growth in 2023, a doubling of exports to $0.33 billion, and 71% growth in imports to $2.44 billion. Trade with China constituted 83% of total DPRK trade last year. As the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy indicated in March, although remaining below 2018-2019 pre-pandemic levels, trade with China grew by more than 120% in 2023 to $2.29 billion, including $2 billion in imports and $0.29 billion in exports. Friendship Year initiatives also supported the resumption of China-DPRK people exchange. Student exchange programs resumed with the arrival of more than 80 PRC government scholarship and self-funded students in North Korea by May. The Chinese students represented the first foreign students to enter the country since North Korea’s August 2023 border reopening.

Global attention sharpened most importantly on China’s resumption of the forced repatriation of DPRK defectors, identified as illegal “economic immigrants.” Seoul repeated its requests for Chinese support though this year’s high-level meetings. In May, Foreign Minister Cho shared “domestic and international concerns” with Wang Yi, calling for “China’s special attention and cooperation to ensure that North Korean defectors are not repatriated against their will.” Seoul continued to push the human rights issue on the UN Security Council agenda by linking Pyongyang’s weapons development and human rights violations. ROK Ambassador Hwang Joon-kook said at a June 12 meeting: “If human rights violations stop, nuclear weapons development will also stop…This is why we need to look at the DPRK human rights situation from the perspective of international peace and security.” As Security Council president that month, he also delivered a joint statement by 57 UN member-states and the EU delegation calling for stronger collaborative action. China’s deputy representative Geng Shuang maintained that the UN Security Council “should not intervene in country-specific human rights issues…We’ve always opposed the politicization of human rights issues or using human rights as a pretext to exert pressure on other countries.”

Amid Seoul’s China-ROK-Japan summit preparations in May, various reports on China’s repatriations raised public calls for stronger diplomacy. A May 7 Korea Times editorial argued China “should pay more attention to improving its global reputation” as a UN Security Council permanent member and “major trading nation,” and called on the Yoon government to “adopt a more assertive approach and urge China to cease such improper actions.” Recent trends extend pessimism on Chinese cooperation. North Korea’s growing isolation poses a key challenge to South Korea’s rising activism, as Seoul’s UN Human Rights Office representative James Heenan indicated in May. Reports in June of North Korea’s construction of walls within the Demilitarized Zone affirmed views of tightening regime control against external influences. At a July CSIS event, ROK Unification Minister Yung Ho-kim pointed to the rising forces of South Korean popular culture against the DPRK regime’s juche culture of self-reliance, to promote cultural tools of influence. Such engagement strategies raised Chinese unease over threats to DPRK sovereignty. Citing President Yoon’s Oct. 9 Singapore Lecture on unification, Wang Junsheng at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences criticized Yoon’s intensified “ideological offensive” “to influence DPRK citizens” as a leading driver of escalating peninsula tensions.

The 75th anniversary year of China-DPRK relations heightened Beijing’s challenge of promoting its global image while also consolidating its traditional friendship with Pyongyang. Mounting global criticism last year, in response to China’s October 2023 repatriation of more than 500 DPRK defectors, raised hope for constraining China’s actions. In August, the UN Human Rights Council Working Group on Arbitrary Detention urged China and North Korea to take steps to address the issue, after finding the case to be an “arbitrary deprivation of liberty” violating human rights norms. As Human Rights Watch reported in May, Beijing has detained more than 90 North Koreans since January, and forcibly repatriated more than 670 since Pyongyang’s 2020 border closure. China’s repatriation of about 60 North Koreans from Jilin and Liaoning on April 26, two weeks after China’s top legislator Zhao Leji met Kim Jong Un in Pyongyang, affirmed fears of increased repatriations.

Post-2025 Prospects for China-Korea Relations

Beijing-Seoul dialogue efforts this year recharged their “strategic cooperative partnership” forged in 2008 under Hu Jintao and South Korea’s conservative Lee Myung-bak administration, intended to expand ties to regional and global levels. China’s Korea watchers saw “multiple positive signals” this year of Yoon’s shifting China policy “beyond bilateral significance.” South Korea’s hosting of APEC 2025 raises much anticipation over a possible visit by Xi Jinping next year. But even Korean advocates of practical diplomacy cautioned, “President Yoon needs to moderate the speed of getting along with China” given the “mishaps” of previous administrations since Park Geun-hye, whose engagement with Xi from 2013 yielded a short-lived peak in partnership. Advancing the China-ROK partnership will require maintaining state and public diplomacy initiatives, delinking regional economic and security strategies, and avoiding discursive clashes on ideological differences. 

The November election of Trump marked a critical juncture in China-Korea relations. On the security front, supporters of thawing China-ROK relations after the Xi-Yoon summit suggested “strengthening ties with Beijing could serve as a hedge against potential disruptions in the US-South Korea alliance.” Yoon’s media remarks on the G20 sidelines, indicating that relations with China and the United States is not “a case of choosing one country or the other,” signaled a major shift in his US alliance-centered foreign policy. While cautioning against “third party” influences, PRC Ambassador Xing Haiming in May agreed that “South Korea’s efforts to develop ties with the US, and also with China, do not go against one another.” Sharpened by the Xi-Putin summit, Yoon’s domestic criticism in May already projected an “inevitable” policy turn raised by voices favoring a “balanced” security approach. The June Kim-Putin summit raised Beijing and Seoul’s shared unease about Pyongyang’s tightening military ties with Russia. But the impending return of Trump’s “America First” revealed deeper South Korean anxieties about “choosing sides” on key priorities like Taiwan, and the security risks posed by Trump’s hardliners on China for resolving the North Korean nuclear issue. 

The downward adjustments in South Korean growth projections after Trump’s November election reflected even stronger pessimism about the risks from US economic policy. As the presidential office reported after assessing the potential impact of Trump’s tariff plans, “A decline in China’s exports to the U.S. could affect Korea’s intermediate goods exports to China and may also intensify competition in third-country markets.” Korean public opinion captured the worsening economic outlook featuring ripple effects from US protectionism, the direct trade impact of technology restrictions on China, and wider repercussions from Chinese economic slowdown. From such perspectives, US-China competition dampens South Korea’s export drive if it is “forced to join a messy trade battle.” The Korea International Trade Association identified Trump’s tariff threats as the biggest risk facing ROK export recovery. A South Korean survey found that more than 80% of Korean companies expect Trump’s protectionist policy to hurt the Korean economy, while less than 8% think his China policy would benefit it. Such pessimism is amplified by an increasingly challenging foreign investment environment in China, where ROK direct investment dropped by 78% in 2022-2023 to $1.87 billion. One scholar affirmed in November, “China is country where political logic is strong…one cannot merely trust China as a business partner based purely on economic logic.”

Regaining trust at both state and societal levels remains a top priority for Beijing and Seoul. During his June meeting with former ROK Prime Minister Lee Hae-chan in Beijing, Wang expressed hopes for Korean efforts “to promote a correct understanding of China in the ROK society.” As South Korea’s Ambassador to China Chung Jae-ho argued in 2012 during the transition to China’s Xi era, “the wealthier and stronger China becomes, the larger the perceptual disparity may grow between China and its regional neighbors, including South Korea.” South Korea’s internal political turmoil compounds the geopolitical and economic risks from US-China competition under Trump. While Beijing declined commenting on Korean “domestic affairs,” the Chinese state media saw Yoon’s Dec. 3 imposition of martial law as a sign of “serious divisions in ROK politics.” 

In conclusion, I want to thank Rob York, Brad Glosserman, Ralph Cossa, Carl Baker, and especially Scott Snyder for the valuable opportunity to contribute to Comparative Connections since 2008.

Signs of a possible improvement in Sino-Japanese relations followed a meeting between newly elected Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru and Xi Jinping on the sidelines of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) gathering in Peru on November, with the two exchanging vague promises of cooperation. Separately, China softened its position on various issues, saying that an unexpected obstruction had accidentally pushed its spy plane into Japanese airspace, allowing the resumption of imports of Nishikigoi tropical fish that had been suspended since November 2023 and reinstating visa-free entry that had been suspended in the wake of CovidCOVID. The government also indicated that it will gradually resume imports of Japanese seafood and remove a buoy in what Japan considers its exclusive economic zone, though neither has happened yet. Japanese skeptics pointed out that with no resolution on these and a number of other issues such as the detention of Japanese nationals on vaguely worded charges and sporadic violent attacks against Japanese children, it is premature to speak of Xi’s long-postponed state visit to Tokyo.

Political

While the hopeful signs mentioned above led optimistic sources in both countries to conclude that the time for improved Sino-Japanese relations had arrived, contraindications abounded. Chinese ships and planes continued to fly and sail in contested areas, and in May it was announced that a US State Department officer would be deployed to the embassy in Tokyo to work under the State’s Office of China Coordination, informally known as China House, to monitor Chinese “problematic” behavior and consider countermeasures. The position’s duties include cooperation with the Japanese government to collect more information about China’s coercive activities.

Figure 1 Japanese Foreign Minister Yoko Kamikawa, on the left, shakes hands with Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi. Photo: Japanese Foreign Ministry

On China’s part, and also in May it was announced that the Hong Kong Museum of Coastal Defense was to be converted into the Hong Kong Museum of the War of Resistance & Coastal Defense with the inauguration taking place on Sept. 3, the date marking victory in the Chinese People’s War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression (1931-45). The four existing exhibition galleries about the War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression in the HKMCD cover different parts of war history such as the Japanese invasion of China, the fall of Hong Kong, the Hong Kong and Kowloon Independent Brigade of the East River Column behind enemy lines and the fighters’ contributions, and the surrender of Japan. Such efforts, plus the attention given to Japanese behavior during World War II in school curricula are believed to be instrumental in attacks on Japanese in China. The killing of a 10-year-old Japanese boy on his way to school occurred on Sept. 18, the anniversary of the 1931 Mukden/Shenyang incident and an earlier attack on a Japanese mother and child in front of a bus taking Japanese children to school are attributed to such actions, with the Chinese government responding to criticism by saying it as simply recounting what had happened. However, the government also vitriolically condemned anti-Japanese social media with an editorial in the official Renmin Ribao stating “We will .. not accept the hype of ‘xenophobia’ and hate speech by individuals…this is unacceptable to mainstream Chinese society and to us Chinese.” Still, verbal attacks are ongoing and those netizens who attributed blame to their own government’s teachings had their posts removed from social media. 

In May Chinese milk tea brand Xiang Piao Piao saw a 400% surge on its live-streaming sales in China after a netizen discovered that MECO fruit tea, a Xiang Piao Piao brand, sold products in a store in Japan with slogans on their cup sleeves showing “the ocean is not Japan’s sewer” and “0.1% of the land pollutes 70% of the ocean.” The picture was then exposed on Chinese media social platforms. In October, China’s ultra-nationalist “little pinks” called for a boycott of major milk powder company Feihe following reports that it signed a letter of intent to develop a lactoferrin-based infant formula product with Japan’s Kyowa Hakko Biochemical Co. Yet Chinese state media lined up to support Feihe, which is listed as a key research and development company in China’s 14th Five Year Plan, with a Xinhua op-ed claiming that Feihe had been “unreasonably slandered.” The conclusion was that although China has long used nationalism as a tool to build “unity” in the face of a foreign opponent, there appear to be limits on how far Beijing will allow it to go.

In a gesture of goodwill applauded by Beijing’s nationalistic Global Times, in August a Japanese foundation began Project Dongwang Xigui (“looking east, returning west”) announcing an initiative to promote the return of Chinese cultural artifacts scattered in Japan to China. Japanese musicians are increasingly popular on Chinese stages, though the driving force behind this trend is not so much popularity but a disparity in appearance fees, since Japanese artists typically command lower fees than their Chinese counterparts. Nonetheless, according to Nikkei, this suits Japan’s ambitions to tap into the lucrative Chinese market. A delegation from Fujian led by the province’s party head in July, said to be acting on the consensus reached between their respective state leaders, was described as continuing traditional friendships, further deepening the exchanges of sister-city relationships, and making new contributions to the comprehensive bilateral relationship. Japan is Fujian’s sixth-largest trading partner, fifth-largest export market and an important source of foreign investment.

In October, China and Japan held their 17th round of high-level consultations on maritime affairs in Tokyo, agreeing to make the East China Sea a sea of peace, cooperation, and friendship.

Figure 2 Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba, left, and Chinese Premier Li Qiang shake hands before their meeting in Vientiane, Laos, on Oct. 10. Photo The Asahi Shimbun

Each side argued its case during foreign trips with, for example, separate visits to Paris by then-Prime Minister Kishida Fumio and Xi Jinping. French expert Celine Pajon characterized Xi Jinping’s visit to Paris as lacking substance, contrasting it with Kishida’s success in securing agreements on supply chains for critical minerals and beginning negotiations for a reciprocal access agreement to facilitate joint military training and exercises. She opined that although French officials tend to perceive Japan as overly aligned with the US and too assertive toward China, Japanese counterparts regard France as sometimes too yielding toward Beijing, with Pajon believing that it would make sense for France and Japan to embrace each other more closely, given the alignment of their positions. Pajon noted that Japan’s multifaceted approach toward China, which includes deterrence, counterbalancing, and conditional cooperation against a backdrop of guarding its economic security shares many similarities with the French and European de-risking stance that views China as a partner, competitor, and systemic rival.

In August, as part of a plan to diversify Central Asian states’ dependence on China and Russia, Kishida visited Central Asia in mid-August. meeting with the leaders of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. At a summit in Kazakhstan, he signaled Japan’s support for regional efforts to achieve carbon neutrality, offering technology from Japanese companies such as fossil-fuel power plants with low carbon emissions and helping the countries manufacture value-added exports, such as hydrogen and fertilizer produced with natural gas. Kishida’s agenda included discussions on a Caspian Sea shipping route linking Central Asia and Europe that bypasses Russia, which Central Asian nations have favored since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Japan will also provide intangible assistance such as implementing digital technology in customs procedures and encouraging countries to make use of Japan’s skilled worker program to train talent and promote person-to-person exchanges. As the report period closed, the government announced that such items as radars for vigilance and surveillance would be provided free of charge to the Philippines, Indonesia, Mongolia, and Djibouti.

According to the Wall Street Journal, many wealthy Chinese who are attracted by the low prices occasioned by Japan’s weak yen, declining economic growth in the PRC, and frustrated with Beijing’s autocratic political system, are moving to Japan. At the end of 2023, Japan had 822,000 Chinese residents, up 60,000 from 2022 this being the biggest jump in recent years. People who invest the equivalent of at least $32,000 in a Japanese business that has a permanent office and two or more employees can get a business-management visa. Beijing restricts how much its residents can take out of the country, but many Chinese buyers own companies with international operations or have overseas investments. Many have bank accounts in Hong Kong or Singapore from which they can wire money or can mobilize friends and relatives to carry cash little by little over a few months. While most are not political, Chinese officials are aware that in the early 20th century an exile group led by Sun Yat-sen attempted to mobilize support to overthrow the Qing dynasty, and worry that the current community might do the same. In November, Human Rights Watch reported that Chinese authorities are targeting and intimidating expatriates in Japan. Most of those interviewed said they had been contacted by Chinese police, who pressured them to end their activities in Japan. Some reported receiving calls from authorities through their relatives back home, while others were approached at the Chinese embassy in Tokyo. The report states that several Tibetans said they faced pressure from the Chinese government after engaging in activities to promote Tibetan culture in Japan. One Tibetan individual told HRW that when they went to the Chinese embassy in Tokyo to renew their passport, embassy officials told them they needed to return to Tibet to do so. The person said they rejected the embassy’s recommendation, fearing they would be detained or face punishment.

In November Japanese national security adviser Akiba Takeo visited China seeking to lay the groundwork for a meeting between the leaders of the two countries’ leaders though critics argued that given the outstanding issues between their countries, such a meeting was premature.

Economic 

Both countries’ economies are described as fragile. The Japanese economy expanded by an annualized 0.9% in Q3 highlighting Japan’s tepid economic recovery, as domestic demand has not fully picked up while a growing risk of a slowdown in the US and further weakness in China’s economy could weigh on exports ahead. China’s economy expanded 4.6% year on year in the third quarter, slower than in the previous three months—significantly below the government’s target for full-year growth of 5%—and underlining faltering growth as Beijing stepped up efforts to boost the economy as sluggish consumption and a property slump weighed on household sentiment. In September Beijing announced its biggest monetary stimulus since the pandemic and followed up with promises of heavy fiscal spending, with economists doubting that it would have the desired effect.

Japanese investment into China declined. A survey by Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry reported that Japanese companies were pulling away from China, with capital investments by local subsidiaries declining for the seventh consecutive quarter in April-June and falling below the amount invested in Europe. Reasons for the decline included the slowdown in the Chinese economy, increased competition from indigenous Chinese brands, concerns for safety after the detention of Japanese businesspeople on vaguely defined charges, and related uncertainty about the application of China’s espionage law. Employees at four Japanese companies told Asahi that some big firms had given Japanese employees and their families the option to be relocated home at the company’s expense, or are considering doing so. The executive and the employees declined to give any further details, and it is not known how many plan to take advantage of the offer.

Figure 3 Gen Nakatani and EU Foreign Policy Chief, Josep Borrel. Photo: Japan Times

In September, Mitsubishi chief executive officer Nakanishi Katsuya called for a more active strategy from the government to help Japanese companies counter increasing Chinese competition in their traditional stronghold of Southeast Asia. His comments echoed the alarm privately expressed by other executives and government officials, who fear Japanese market share in Southeast Asia is being eroded as Chinese companies increase exports and investment. Still, Mitsubishi, with $6.4 billion in annual profits, remains one of the biggest of the sogo shosha, or general trading houses, with a long history of navigating complicated geopolitical situations. 

Distressed Japanese businesses provide opportunities for Chinese interests. Sovereign wealth fund China Investment Corporation was reported targeting undervalued small and midsize Japanese businesses, many of them unlisted, with the potential to thrive in China’s massive market. CIC has created an international advisory council that includes former and current executives from American and European financial institutions to show transparency but the fund provides very limited information about the companies in which it invests and there are concerns that Chinese money might eventually pose an economic security risk to Japan. 

Despite continuing to lose market share to China, Japanese auto manufacturers plan to stay. Aiming to secure a 30% share of the global software-defined vehicle (SDV) sales market, against leading US and Chinese manufacturers in automotive technologies, Toyota, Honda, and Nissan agreed to promote collaboration on developing in-car software and are considering standardizing specifications for functions of car computers such as window opening and wiper movement. SDVs are next-generation cars that can add new functions and enhance abilities by updating software via the internet. Hence, they enable the company to earn money even after selling the cars, with China already boosting the development of leading-edge technologies by the standardizing application programming interface (API) that serves as the link between the software and other systems.

Large Japanese corporations with outlets in several countries were able to weather losses and regroup. Major clothing retailer Uniqlo whose parent Fast Retailing reported a large profit fall in China and Hong Kong during the three months through May by July, described itself as at a turning point with its store-opening strategy in China. Uniqlo plans a “scrap and build” policy in the PRC, closing stores with low monthly sales and opening larger ones in better locations. Meanwhile Fast Retailing nonetheless recorded a 13.5% increase in sales from a year earlier, helped by a 19.4% rise in overseas sales driven by Europe and North America.

Frosty government-to-government relations notwithstanding, both sides are aware of the interlinked nature of their economic prosperity. In May, Jiji reported that while state-level exchanges between the two remained almost halted local government were actively interacting with each other to enhance trade. There were winners and losers in the competition. In July, Nippon Steel announced that it would withdraw from a joint venture with Baoshan Iron & Steel, marking a turning point in a 21-year relationship that was a symbol of China’s progress in modernizing its steel industry. This will result in a 70% reduction in Nippon Steel’s steel production capacity in China. Chinese steelmakers, who continue to produce at high levels despite falling demand for their products as the domestic economy slows, present stiff price and quality competition, as the shift to EVs reduces Chinese demand for Japanese cars. On the other hand, factory automation supplier Fanuc raised its annual net profit outlook by $117 million on a recovery in orders from China, where government subsidies drove demand despite a sluggish economy. Demand also grew for Fanuc’s metalworking Robodrills which are used for making smartphone bodies. This occurred as Fanuc’s sales fell worldwide due to lackluster demand in Europe and Japan.

Competition did not preclude cooperation where it was mutually beneficial. On October, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) and the Bank of Japan agreed to renew their bilateral currency swap deal amounting to 200 billion yuan (about $28.13 billion), or 3.4 trillion Japanese yen. The agreement, which aims to stabilize the financial markets of both countries and support bilateral economic and financial activities, will be valid for a three-year period and can be extended by mutual consent. In early Nov. in its first visit to China in eight years, a delegation of the Japan Association of Corporate Executives (Keizai Doyukai) asked China to exempt short-term visitors from visa requirements (later granted) and called for China’s active participation in the 2025 Osaka-Kansai Expo. Regional organizations also visited. As the report period closed, a delegation from Kansai Economic Federation (Kankeiren) visited. While affirming its desire to trade also advised China to learn from the deflation that Japan experienced over the past 30 years and asked that China expand domestic demand to improve its business environment.

Defense

Figure 4 Defense Minister Gen Nakatani attends the NATO defense ministers’ meeting held in Brussels on Oct. 17. Photo: The Asahi Shimbun, Nen Satomi

Both sides advanced their military capabilities with China facing resistance over its claims in the East China and South China seas and Taiwan and Japan principally worried about its control over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands and the effect that a PRC invasion of Taiwan would have for it.

Chinese media touted the debut of its J-35A stealth jet at the Zhuhai airshow. A variant, the J-35, is designed for use on aircraft carriers. With the J-35A joining the J-20 in service, China became only the second nation in the world to operate two different fifth-generation stealthy fighters: the US flies the F-22A Raptor and F-35 Lightning II. A variety of other weapons including a 10-ton drone mothership said to be capable of launching drones in mid-air and then managing them to carry out operations was also exhibited. Further raising anxieties was the expansion of the PRC’s nuclear arsenal, now believed to total 500 warheads with over a thousand expected by 2030.

In May the Japanese government announced the creation of a new Japanese research center to develop both transformational breakthrough technologies and civilian applications for defense technologies during peacetime. Modeled on institutions such as the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and the Defense Innovation Unit based in Silicon Valley, the center will research new, more sensitive methods to detect submarines from a distance using subatomic particles and electromagnetic waves, since conventional sonar has become less effective following technological improvements that have made subs quieter. 

Japan’s 2024 Defense White Paper stated inter alia, that Japan is facing the most severe and complex security environment since the end of World War II, and that it could not be ruled out that a serious situation similar to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine may occur in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly in East Asia, adding that China was intensifying its activities across the entire region surrounding Japan, including in the East China Sea, particularly in the area around the Senkaku Islands, the Sea of Japan, and the western Pacific Ocean and extending beyond the so-called first island chain to the second island chain. 

In terms of weapons upgrades, in Sept. the Japanese defense ministry signed contracts for two Aegis-equipped vessels, to play a central role in ballistic missile defense. They are also expected to carry an improved version of the Type 12 surface-to-ship guided missiles to provide powerful counterattack capabilities, as well as missiles that can intercept hypersonic glide vehicle weapons. The ministry also plans to build a satellite constellation network for guided missiles to replace the current satellites which cannot be used to lock onto moving targets. The intent is to strengthen the nation’s information-gathering capabilities. Japan also aims to enhance production capabilities of hypersonic guided missiles and to acquire an improved version of the Type 12 surface-to-ship guided missiles. Deployment of US-made Tomahawk cruise missiles and other new weapons will begin in fiscal 2025. Other budget requests will enhance production capabilities for hypersonic guided missiles and acquire an improved version of the Type 12 surface-to-ship guided missiles. And, to improve its ability to deal with Chinese encroachments in the East China Sea including the area around the Senkaku Islands, the coast guard is to construct its largest-ever multipurpose patrol vessel, to function as an offshore base capable of carrying a number of small boats and to deter incursions onto the islands. However, Japan’s military capabilities continue to be bedeviled by personnel problems. Despite generous enhancements to enlist, the SDFs recruitment in 2023 was barely over half the desired number.

With far fewer financial resources to commit to defense than China and hindered by vocal, though diminishing, voices of opposition on military budgets, Japan reached out to like-minded countries for partnerships. Principal among these was the United States. At the end of July, warning that China’s aggressive posture posed the “greatest strategic challenge” in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond, the US and Japan outlined the most significant upgrade to their joint military alliance since 1960. Coordination between the allies had long been hampered because, although roughly 50,000 US military personnel are based in Japan, US Forces Japan lacked command and control authority, with its authority limited to supervising Japan-US joint training exercises and managing troops. Tokyo had to deal with the US Indo-Pacific Command in Hawaii, which is 19 hours behind Tokyo and 6,500 km away. The upgrade involves placing a three-star commander with accompanying staff in Japan, and the USFJ will be reconstituted as a joint force headquarters to allow the two militaries to co-operate and plan more seamlessly, particularly in a crisis such as a Taiwan conflict. Japan had requested a four-star commander but since US military units based in Hawaii and Guam would be the main force in the event of a crisis such as a Taiwan contingency, the ultimate command authority for US forces in Japan will remain with the Indo-Pacific Command, whose commander will likely be the counterpart of the head of the Japan’s SDF Joint Operations Command. The Kishida administration, wanting to demonstrate the strength of the Japan-US alliance in response to developments in China and North Korea, expressed satisfaction that the operative commander who is responsible for Japan’s defense will actually be stationed in Japan. 

Strengthening ties with multinational organizations was also on Japan’s agenda. To China’s displeasure, Kishida attended the annual NATO meeting, with Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian saying that Japan must not interfere in China’s domestic affairs and act as a “vanguard” of NATO’s Asia-Pacific expansion. Japan has also hinted that it would like to join the Five Eyes intelligence sharing agreement of Australia, Britain, Canada, New Zealand, and the US. However, apart from Japan becoming the only non-Anglophone member, there are concerns about its ability to safeguard secrets. As Kishida’s successor, Ishiba has come out in favor of the formation of an Asian NATO. though Biden administration officials reacted coolly with Daniel Kritenbrink, assistant secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific affairs, saying “it’s too early to talk about collective security” in the region…“We’re continuing to build this network of formal and informal relationships and then we’ll see where that goes to.” Ishiba has also suggested that Japan could be added to ANZUS as JANZUS.

Support from other countries continues to be sought. In May, a meeting of the defense chiefs of Australia, Japan, the Philippines, and the US issued a joint statement expressing serious concern over China’s “repeated obstruction of…freedom of navigation” in the South China Sea. Japan and the Philippines are discussing a reciprocal access agreement (RAA) that will facilitate exchanges between their militaries similar to an agreement concluded last year between Japan and Australia. At the same time, Kishida met French President Emmanuel Macron and agreed to start formal talks on a reciprocal troop access deal and strengthening military cooperation amid rising maritime tensions in the Indo-Pacific region and the war in Ukraine. Reciprocal access agreements (RAAs) make the entry of foreign personnel and equipment easier for the visiting force. France has territories in the Indo-Pacific and stations armed forces in the region, where it has sought to develop its presence, and wants to can play a bigger role in Japan’s defense industry as Kishida adopts a more muscular military policy in the region. The Italian Navy’s aircraft carrier Cavour and frigate Alpino arrived at the MSDF base in Yokosuka to conduct joint training exercises with the MSDF in response to China’s increasing maritime presence In August, ships from Canada, New Zealand, Singapore, Italy, called at the Yokosuka base. Germany also expressed concerns, with Rear Adm. Axel Schulz, commander of the German navy’s 2nd Flotilla, telling Nikkei that although Germany has no overseas territories, a conflict in the Asia-Pacific would have massive adverse consequences since it is a major export nation, and that it intended to strengthen ties with Japan.

Japan also reached out to support smaller nations to resist Chinese encroachment. It has sent the Maritime Self-Defense Force and coast guard to the Marshall Islands to help improve the Marshallese coast guard’s capabilities through joint drills and other activities. This marked the first time that the MSDF and the JCG jointly landed on a Pacific island nation to offer such assistance. The China-leaning South China Morning Post described then-Foreign Minister Kamikawa Yoko’s 10-day tour to Madagascar, Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Sri Lanka, and Nepal as aimed at selling itself as the Global South’s China counterweight against China’s aggressive maritime expansion. Among other results was an announcement that the Japanese government will provide Sri Lanka with a vessel and sonar system worth about ¥1 billion ($6.6 million) in total as Kamikawa emphasized Japan’s position on realizing a free and open Indo-Pacific and demonstrated support for Sri Lanka, which sits in a strategic position along sea lanes. China has been making advances into the Indian Ocean in recent years.

The Future

Figure 5 LDP Diet member Nikai Toshiro shakes hands with Zhao Leji, chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, in Beijing on Aug. 28. Credit: Kyodo, accessed at Nikkei, Aug. 28, 2024.

Whether these hopeful signs will result in warmer Sino-Japanese relations remains to be seen. Even if Xi Jinping pays the state visit that Tokyo has long desired, Ishiba, due to his party and its coalition partner losing their majority in the Diet, will be in a weak negotiating position. He is known as a defense hawk which will give Xi little incentive to remove the offensive buoy, resume seafood imports, or reduce even temporarily the tempo of Chinese encroachments in the East China Sea. Conversely, Ishiba has little leeway to concede to China on territorial issues and Taiwan. The most likely outcome is a continuation of efforts to manage tensions rather than resolve underlying issues.   

The year 2025 marks the 60th anniversary of the normalization of diplomatic relations between Seoul and Tokyo. It was originally expected to be a milestone year for bilateral ties and a fitting culmination of nearly three years of hard work by two leaders: President Yoon Suk Yeol and former Prime Minister Kishida Fumio. But that outlook now seems hung in the balance, with new unknowns on the horizon—both expected and unexpected. In this final issue on Japan-Korea relations, we discuss the key factors that are likely to impact the future of bilateral ties and the Camp David trilateral in four major areas: 1) Trump 2.0, 2) political uncertainty in Seoul, 3) weak political support in Tokyo, and 4) resurfacing history issues. The final months of 2024 have brought new unknowns in the shape of leadership changes in the United States, Japan, and potentially South Korea. It is now possible that come January 2025, the leadership trio—President Biden, Prime Minister Kishida, and President Yoon that has made the Korea-Japan rapprochement and the unprecedented trilateral partnership possible will be gone from office. 

What happens next is impossible to predict, but one hopes that the hard-fought and laboriously planned institutionalization of bilateral and trilateral ties will withstand these changes in leadership. This will be the first true test for Seoul-Tokyo-Washington trilateral partnership since the Camp David summit in August 2023. 

Japan’s new prime minister, Ishiba Shigeru, and President Yoon agreed in mid-November to “further elevate the bilateral relationship to new heights” towards 2025 and to promote comprehensive cooperation in areas such as “politics, security, economy, culture and social security.” However, following President Yoon’s declaration of martial law on Dec. 3, the future of Seoul-Tokyo relations faces a great deal of uncertainty. Given that it was President Yoon’s political will that initially facilitated rapproachment, depending on what happens to his political future and who comes into office in South Korea, Seoul-Tokyo relations may experience challenges. While conflicts over long-standing history issues have been consciously minimized during this period of rapproachment, they have not gone away, as demonstrated by their inability to reach a consensus on a joint event on the controversial Sado mine.

Trump 2.0 and US alliances with Seoul and Tokyo

Figure 1 President Yoon Suk Yeol shakes hands with Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba during a bilateral meeting at a hotel in Vientiane, Laos, Thursday. Photo: Yonhap

When thinking about the future of Japan-Korea relations, the most important events in 2024 revolve around (potential) changes in leadership—one expected (the US), one mostly unexpected (Japan), and one possible yet totally unexpected (South Korea). The 2024 US presidential election and the re-election of Donald Trump has re-introduced uncertainty into the region, casting a shadow of anxiety not only over bilateral Japan-Korea relations but also the future of trilateral cooperation. Foreign policy did not play a big role in this election. But candidates presented starkly different visions regarding US priorities and values. These differences would ultimately influence the fate of the liberal international order, within which the Camp David trilateral cooperation drives its significance.

Despite the unexpected withdrawal of President Biden from re-election, Kamala Harris’ candidacy was largely seen as a continuation of his administration’s key policies—the institutionalization of trilateral US-Korea-Japan relations and the strengthening of Washington’s traditional alliances with Japan and South Korea. In contrast, no one truly knows what the former President Trump will do. If history is any guide, hiss approach is likely to make these relations more transactional, with less focus on common values.  

At the end of the Cold War, a major debate emerged within the US over whether to continue stationing American forces in Asia. Some questioned why the US should bear the cost of defending wealthy Asian countries. Ultimately, the US maintained its presence, guided by the famous rationale put forward by Joseph Nye, then assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, who argued that “security is like oxygen—you tend not to notice it until you begin to lose it, but once that occurs, there is nothing else you will think about.” Fundamentally, Trump does not share this perspective on security. Instead, he views it as just another business transaction.

For both Tokyo and Seoul, there is growing concern about being in Trump’s crosshairs, as they may fail to meet two of his sacrosanct priorities—defense spending and trade balance. In the words of one expert, both countries are in the “danger zone” because they have large trade surpluses with the US, and spend less than 3% of their GDP on defense. This belief has been consistent with Trump’s worldview since the 1990s, with a clear message that it does not matter whether you are an ally or an adversary, it’s America first. There are concerns he will ask for the allies to pay more. Furthermore, according to another expert privy to conversations with Japanese officials in Tokyo, the new Trump team might even add two more conditions: how many US Treasury securities they have purchased and whether they manipulate their currency.

If Trump’s first term is any clues about his second, US alliances with Seoul and Tokyo are likely to experience the “fear of abandonment”—the anxiety that Washington might not be a reliable ally for their national security. Strong deterrence against North Korea is a key area that has repeatedly united Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington. But this may not be taken for granted under a Trump 2.0 administration. In the near term, trilateral multidomain military exercises like the newly-introduced Freedom Edge may be curtailed or stopped because it is expensive. 

A remote but plausible development under a Trump 2.0 administration is an intensified discussion of US troop withdrawals from South Korea. In an interview with a South Korean news outlet Yonhap, Elbridge Colby, former deputy assistant secretary of defense for strategy and force development during Trump’s first term—who is being discussed as a potential defense secretary—said, “South Korea is going to have to take primary, essentially overwhelming responsibility for its own self-defense against North Korea because we don’t have a military that can fight North Korea and then be ready to fight China.” He further noted, “The fundamental fact is that North Korea is not a primary threat to the US. It would not be rational to lose multiple American cities to just deal with North Korea.” 

If Washington under Trump 2.0 sends a signal reflecting this stance, this could possibly push South Korea to search for alternative security arrangements. Such alternatives may ultimately result in less optimal outcomes from the perspective of the US-South Korea alliance. Another issue is more political. Trump said little about North Korea during his campaign. But if he chooses to directly engage with Kim Jong Un, while sidelining South Korea, this is not a good signal from the perspective of alliance management. 

Therefore, Trump’s victory on Nov. 5 immediately created some consternation in both Seoul and Tokyo, with both sides scrambling to find ways to reach the re-elected president’s orbit and to brush up on their personal charm. Planning for the return of Trump to the White House has been at the top of every world leader’s mind since the election. Without the effective Trump whisperer Abe Shinzo, Japan might find it harder the second time around. But Prime Minister Ishiba may find a way to connect with Trump enough to make sure Japanese equities for the next four years are protected. And over in South Korea, President Yoon Suk Yeol reportedly restarted practicing golf in an attempt to connect personally with Trump, an avid golfer. 

Martial Law and Political Uncertainty in South Korea

Figure 2 South Korean soldiers outside the National Assembly in Seoul in the early hours of Wednesday. Images Photo: Chung Sung-Jun/Getty

The most unexpected development is the inexplicable and short-lived martial law on Dec. 3 in South Korea. In and outside the country, people are genuinely baffled as to why President Yoon suddenly declared martial law, as there was no apparent reason that the public can understand as a basis for such a drastic move. Martial law, introduced in 1948, was last imposed in 1979 before South Korea’s democratization. For many South Koreans, martial law is a reminder of the country’s authoritarian past, thus prompting many to ask “Are we back to the 1970s before democratization?” Having achieved democratization through years of grassroots struggle, the move caused strong negative reactions against the backdrop of immense pride that South Koreans have for their democracy. Prior to Yoon’s declaration of maritial law, criticism of his leadership has been mounting within South Korea, largely driven by scandals. Now, impeachment discussions have intensified. Calls for his resignation have grown louder. His political future is highly uncertain. 

Yoon’s action, which was purely aimed at a domestic issue—the opposition—has created consequences that reverberates far beyond the peninsula, at a time when the regional threat from China, North Korea, and Russia continues to grow. The reverberating effects of that event have left Seoul incapacitated at a critical time not just in domestic politics but in regional relations, with new governments in both Washington and Tokyo. While the quick overturning of the martial law is a resounding victory for democracy and the democratic process, the policy and leadership paralysis as Korea figures out a way forward can lead to “Korea passing” as other regional actors move ahead on critical issues in the new year. 

With the political uncertainty in Seoul, all this leads to the pressing question of who will shepherd this very important but prickly bilateral relationship moving forward. The recent improvement in Seoul-Tokyo relations was largely the work of President Yoon, which also laid the groundwork for the Camp David trilateral cooperation. Without him in the picture, the future of Japan-Korea relations becomes highly uncertain. In a hypothetical scenario where South Korea’s main opposition leader, Lee Jae-myung, assumes office, the rapprochement between Seoul and Tokyo would likely come to an end. Lee and his supporters would be expected to prioritize demands for Japan to address unresolved historical issues, potentially undoing recent progress in bilateral relations.

In particular, beneath the public debate over the constitutionality, rationale, and implications of the short-lived martial law declaration, there was one paragraph that caught our and others’ attention in the conclusion of the first impeachment motion submitted by the six South Korean opposition parties on Dec. 4. The paragraph read as follows: 

“In addition, under the guise of so-called “value diplomacy,” Yoon has neglected geopolitical balance, antagonizing North Korea, China, and Russia, adhering to a bizarre Japan-centered foreign policy, and appointing pro-Japan individuals to key government positions, thereby causing isolation in Northeast Asia and triggering a crisis of war, abandoning his duty to protect national security and the people.”

The line “bizarre Japan-centered” foreign policy and references to “pro-Japan individuals” clearly illustrates what the opposition party thinks about Yoon’s policy to improve relations with Tokyo. This has been a long-standing criticism of Yoon’s foreign policy, for being too pro-Japan, overly dependent on the US, and too anti-China and anti-North Korea. We have pointed out before that Yoon’s “low-reward unpopular decision” to reconcile with Japan required a lot of political capital, but it is still very stark to see a disagreement over foreign policy be included in a lengthy impeachment bill focused primarily on domestic issues. 

While this paragraph is no longer present in the second impeachment motion, it gave us a preview into what an opposition-run South Korean presidency might do in terms of foreign policy. If the current front-runner and Democratic Party leader Lee Jae-myung wins, we might see a reversal in key positions on China, Japan, North Korea, and the US. 

Based on his previous public statements, we cannot discount the possibility of an abrogation of the budding US-Korea-Japan trilateral (which might have happened anyway under Trump 2.0), a bypassing of Japan, and a more balanced and even conciliatory approach to China and North Korea. Lee has in the past called a trilateral military alliance “unnecessary” because its exacerbates instability on the peninsula and forces North Korea-China-Russia to align more closely, and have argued forcefully for a more “pragmatic” approach in US-China competition. Lee could possibly come into office in 2025 with a very different geopolitical environment than Yoon’s in 2022, with a revived North Korea-China-Russia axis, a de facto military alliance between its two neighbors in North Korea and Russia, and a retrenched United States. 

All of this does not bode well for Japan and South Korea, especially with the speed at which the returning US president might shake things up at the start of his second term. People who are worried about the first 100 days of the Trump presidency might now need to buckle up for the first 100 hours as there are now expectations that the changes coming out of the White House will be breakneck and immediate. For South Korea, unfortunately, there might not be a leader definitively in charge on Jan. 21 to be able to respond to Trump’s actions, or to make that all-important personal connection with him. 

As of this writing, President Yoon have vowed to “fight to the end” for a chance to make his case in court during an impeachment hearing. Under this timeline, the impeachment process can take up to six months to resolve in court (to remove or reinstate him), and then a two-month period before a presidential election can be held. We are potentially looking at a dire situation where Korea might be politically unstable and leaderless until August 2025. That’s a long time in any political calendar, and for Seoul, even if it successfully defends its democracy, it might re-emerge much weaker regionally and internationally as the rest of the world moves on. 

Ishiba and Weak Political Support in Japan

Figure 3 Shigeru Ishiba, the newly elected leader of Japan’s ruling party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) poses in the party leader’s office after the LDP leadership election Photo: REUTERS/Kim Kyung-Hoon/Pool

 Another change is the decision by Kishida Fumio to resign in mid-August ahead of the LDP party election in September. The result was not a total surprise, given a series of domestic setbacks for him this year: political fundraising scandal, electoral defeats and consistently poor approval ratings (below 30%). After nearly three years as Prime Minister, Kishida is leaving behind a clear foreign and security policy legacy—increasing defense spending to nearly 2%, reorienting efforts to improve Japan’s security environment, delivering strong support for Ukraine, and most importantly, pushing for rapprochement with Korea. This legacy was apropos of someone who served as Japan’s longest serving foreign minister in the postwar period. As we have discussed often, leaders dictate policy, and it takes two leaders to tango. Kishida’s support for improving prickly Japan-Korea relations—coupled with like-mindedness from Yoon—made Camp David and rapprochement possible. While regional relations lost a stalwart champion in Kishida this fall, his replacement—the longtime LDP politician and former defense minister Ishiba—is likely to follow a similar well-trodden path in foreign policy. 

Ishiba Shigeru, a man who famously ran for LDP leadership four times before succeeding on the fifth try, came into office in October 2024 after winning a closely-contested leadership contest with a well-documented track record as a defense hawk and some interesting ideas for North Korea and regional relations. While early talks of an “Asian version of NATO” and nuclear sharing has subsided after initial pushback—his idea of working with Pyongyang directly might gain some traction if President Trump resumes his bromance with Kim Jong Un. His plan to establish liaison offices in both capitals, while not novel, has seen some opposition from families of abductees. For the time being however, the liaison office idea has also been placed on the backburner, as he reaffirmed during a November 2024 national rally on the abduction issue the standard Japanese policy of normalizing relations with North Korea by first resolving the outstanding abduction, nuclear and missile issues. During that speech, he also reiterated his openness to a summit with the North Korean leader and even implored Kim Jong Un “not to miss this opportunity.” 

Before the political debacle in South Korea, Ishiba had already signaled his intention to continue the shuttle diplomacy of his predecessor and to press ahead with efforts to further improve bilateral relations. Ishiba and Yoon have already met twice, once on the sidelines of the ASEAN summit in Laos, and again on the sidelines of the APEC Summit in Peru—plus holding the first and last trilateral in the current leader configuration. During their October and November meetings, the two leaders had agreed to “further elevate” the bilateral relations in preparation for the important 2025 anniversary. In late November, there were rumblings of a potential January 2025 visit to Seoul by Ishiba. This early visit would have kickstarted an important year for the bilateral relations, the 60th anniversary of normalization. There were already speculations earlier this year that the two leaders—then Kishida and Yoon—might make a “future-oriented” joint statement to commemorate the occasion. Furthermore, there were additional plans for senior Japanese officials to visit Korea in December, including a bipartisan group of lawmakers from the Korea-Japan Parliamentary Federation in mid-December to be led by former Prime Minister Suga Yoshihide, and an end of the year visit by Japanese Defense Minister Nakatani Gen, which would have been the first visit in nine years. 

But all those plans were unceremoniously shelved after the shocking situation in Seoul, with Prime Minister Ishiba saying he is watching the developments with “particular and grave” concern. US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin similarly cancelled a planned stop in Korea—part of his last Asia trip with stops in both Tokyo and Seoul to reassure and commit to trilateralism before a Trump transition. Other trilateral efforts planned for December were also casualties of this “unforeseen circumstance,” including a session of the Nuclear Consultative Group (plus a related exercise) and a trilateral forum on women’s economic empowerment. With Ishiba’s January visit called off at the time of this writing, there are increasingly growing concerns that shuttle diplomacy between the two neighbors will become difficult for the time being until the domestic situation in Seoul is resolved. While it is too early to rule out any breakthroughs for 2025, what is certain now is that the political turmoil in Seoul has thrown off course a carefully calibrated transition and shifted tailwinds into headwinds for the foreseeable future. 

Resurfacing History Issues

A kerfuffle over the commemoration of the controversial Sado mine in November revealed the limits of foreign policy objectives over deep rooted historical grievances. The two sides were unable to reach a consensus on a joint event, and instead held two separate events. Moreover, ritual offerings by Japanese leaders to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine remains a perennial problem, though the decision by Ishiba to send an offering, instead of visiting in person in October revealed that he will likely be more cautious in this aspect, unlike what some more conversative members of his party such as Takaichi Sanae—who visited in person—might want from him. Experts have pointed out that other historical problems, including the potential depletion of third-party reimbursement for forced labor victims might resurface in the coming year. As we pointed out last year, a binational survey showed that there remain three major problems for a true “future-oriented” relations, all of which revolved around the question of history: resolving historical disputes; addressing Dokdo/Takeshima; and improving historical perceptions and education. 

Figure 4 President Yoon Suk Yeol hold hands with Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba, fourth from right, and Chinese Premier Li Qiang, second from right, during the 27th ASEAN Plus Three Summit held at the National Convention Center in Vientiane, Laos, Thursday. From left are Thai Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin, Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh, President Yoon, Ishiba, Laotian Prime Minister Sonexay Siphandone, Li and Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim. Photo: Yonhap

And finally, Prime Minister Ishiba will meander into the new year with weak political support, losing a majority in the October parliamentary election, and surviving a rare November run-off. The results meant that for the time being, Ishiba will need to focus inwardly on fixing the Japanese economy and addressing voters’ concerns over political scandals. He will not have the wherewithal to focus outwardly anyway because without a parliamentary majority, it would have been difficult to pass some of his bolder foreign policies. The situation in Korea also makes it much harder for any positive developments on either side, setting up an unfortunate lost opportunity in an anniversary year in 2025.

The election of Donald Trump as the 47^th US president changed the chemistry between Washington, Moscow, and Beijing so much and yet so little. It was so much because the war-ending rhetoric of the president-elect was in sharp contrast to his predecessor’s steadfast support of Ukraine. It was so little because the war in Ukraine not only continued but even escalated after Trump’s decisive electoral win in early November as the Biden administration rushed arms to Ukraine with much relaxed restrictions (on ATACMS, etc.). Meanwhile, Beijing-Moscow relations continued to broaden and deepen throughout 2024 despite Trump’s repeated vows to split the Russia-China entente. Xi and Putin met three times in six months (May, July, and October). Their joint enterprises (SCO, BRICS, etc.) also expanded steadily while experiencing growing pains. Meanwhile, the two large powers considerably stepped up their mil-mil interactions with more exercises, exchanges, and joint patrols. It remains to be seen how Trump would operationalize his campaign rhetorics not just to capture a pivotal position within the Moscow-Beijing-Washington triangle, but more importantly, to avert the Kissingerian dark prophecy of a grave new world of WMD and AI racing toward World War III.

Putin 5.0 and Russia’s China-Pivot

In his first 2024 campaign rally in March 2023, Trump blamed Biden for the devastating war in Ukraine, “casual talk” about nuclear war with Russia, and a China-Russia unity to “carve up the world.” A year later, Putin won his fifth term and then found himself in China, the first foreign visit of his fifth term in the presidency. It was also his first official visit since the outbreak of the Ukraine War in February 2022 (his October 2023 trip was defined as a “working visit” for the annual BRICS summit). 2024 was also a time of the 75th anniversary of China-Russian/Soviet diplomatic ties.

Despite the war, Moscow and Beijing managed to maintain and even deepen their bilateral ties. This time, Putin brought with him almost the entire Russian government (except the prime minister) to China, including six deputy prime ministers and heads of various governmental departments (foreign affairs, defense, national security, finance, economics, nuclear power, aerial space, railroad, nuclear power, etc.). These senior officials and their staff, along with hundreds of Russian businesspeople, filled up more than 20 large aircraft.

In Beijing, Xi and Putin held several hours of “sincere and cordial meetings covering many topics.” A joint statement was issued after the meeting. The 10,000-word document stressed the principles of nonalignment and equality in bilateral relations for a world order of “multipolarity and democracy” (Part I). As two large powers who suffered the most in WWII, the two sides said they would strongly defend the post-WWII world order by opposing distortion of war history and any effort to revive Nazism/militarism.

Figure 1 Following the talks, Putin and Xi signed a Joint Statement. Photo: Sergei Savostyanov

The statement covers nine functional areas for cooperation: security (parts II, VII, and X), economics (III), societal exchange (IV), multilateralism including the UN, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, BRICS (V, VI), the environment (VIII), and Ukraine (IV). Part III on economics listed 20 sub-areas for cooperation including the “Bilateral Investment Cooperation Planning Outline” (pending), the key to China’s large investment in Russia. The document has two noticeable additions: setting up an Arctic route cooperation subcommittee and a trilateral dialogue with North Korea regarding Chinese vessels’ access to the sea via the lower reaches of the Tumen River. While the former would open much of the Russia-controlled northern sea route and port facilities to China, the latter would play a key role in revitalizing China’s northeastern provinces.

The bulk of the joint statement (three parts) was about security. Part II, for example, called for “steady development for defense cooperation for both regional and global security.” The two sides needed to “deepen mutual trust and coordination,” and expand joint exercises and joint naval/aerial patrol. Communication and dialogue at various levels should be enhanced, the statement read, as well as coordination in multilateral forums (UN, SCO, BRICS) for anti-terror, law enforcement, and emergency management coordination. Part VII highlighted the danger of nuclear war, proliferation, militarization of outer space, weak international regulations on chemical/biological weapons, AI, and US deployment of intermediate-range missiles in the Asia-Pacific.

The emphasis on security was further underscored in Parts V (UN), VI (regional forums), VIII (environment), and IV (Ukraine) in which security issues were considered paramount for a just and enduring security for all. Lengthy joint statements between the two sides are not uncommon. The tone of the document, however, indicated a much stronger and more direct criticism of Washington’s “unilateralism” and rule-breaking behavior across all issue areas.

Is it Still the Economy…

Despite the war, Russia remained the world’s 4th largest economy in 2023 in PPP terms, and 11^th in nominal GDP. Meanwhile, massive Western sanctions on Russia led to a marked increase in Russia-China economic transactions. In 2023, bilateral trade reached $240 billion, up from $108 billion in 2020. While China’s import of Russia’s oil increased by 24% to 107 million tons, China’s 553,000 vehicles exported to Russia accounted for 49% of Russia’s auto market, up from 19% in 2022. Bilateral trade was “not only developing but also flourishing,” remarked Putin in his meeting with visiting Chinese Premier Li Qiang on Aug. 21.

At the 29^th prime ministerial meeting in Moscow, Li and Russian PM Mikhail Mishustin conducted “a detailed discussion on the entire range of trade, economic and humanitarian cooperation issues.” Eighteen documents were signed, including one to upgrade the outline of an investment cooperation plan to be finalized by the yearend. For many Chinese business leaders, Russia’s domestic law and regulations for foreign investment were quite “complicated,” and the sweeping Western sanctions made it worse.  A new version of the investment plan would facilitate China’s 86 large investment projects in Russia totaling $200 billion. While most of these projects would be in the “traditional areas” such as energy, transportation, agriculture, auto industry, and home electronics, Premier Li stressed the need to “explore new areas of technological and industrial cooperation,” including digital economy, biomedicine, green development, etc.

For decades, economic and trade relations were the weakest links between China and Russia, as both tried to integrate into the West-dominated global trading system. The Ukraine War and the tightening of their strategic space led to a marked broadening and deepening of their economic intercourse.

Moscow and Beijing had so far refrained from moving to a formal alliance. Yet for Washington, Zbigniew Brzezinski’s 1997 warning regarding the emergence of a dominant and antagonistic Eurasian power is now descending across the vast Eurasian continent. The potential for a “marriage,” convenient or not, between the world’s energy/raw material and manufacturing giants seemed “unlimited” in both geoeconomic and geopolitical terms.

Multilateralism to Go

One key area of China-Russian cooperation in 2024 was to manage the “growing pains” of the SCO and BRICS against the ever-changing and more complex world. Xi and Putin met twice on the sidelines of the annual summits of the SCO in Astana (July) and BRICS in Kasan (October).

In Astana, they agreed to enhance cooperation for regional security. While Xi called for more “strategic coordination,” Putin echoed that Russian-Chinese cooperation in global affairs served as “a main stabilizing factor.” Both vowed to strengthen the SCO for regional stability. Twenty-four agreements were inked, including a development strategy until 2035, several cooperation programs to combat terrorism, separatism, and extremism for 2025-2027, an anti-drug strategy for the next five years, and its corresponding action program. As for global issues, participants endorsed the “Initiative On World Unity for a Just Peace, Harmony and Development” proposed by Kazakhstan for a new, democratic, and equitable international order.

This global vision of the regional security group got an instant boost in Astana as Belarus officially ascended became the SCO’s 10^th member. A few days after the Astana summit, more than 100 PLA special forces were airlifted to Belarus for an 11-day “anti-terrorist” exercise (code-named “Attacking Falcon 2024,” July 8-19) in areas close to Poland and Ukraine. Despite its label as anti-terrorist, it was carried out by the regular PLA unit from the 80^th Group Army of the Northern Theater Command at the time of heightened tension between Belarus and Ukraine.

Despite these institutional gains, there was a growing gap between the SCO’s numerous adopted agreements/declarations and its ability to implement them, according to Professor Pan Guang, a prominent scholar on Central Asia in China. Part of the problem was SCO’s unanimity-based decision-making mechanism, which frequently led to inaction. SCO’s small and weak institutional setup (Secretariat in Beijing and the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure in Tashkent, Uzbekistan), too, badly needs an update.

Perhaps more than anything else, Russia’s influence in Central Asia steadily declined largely because of its preoccupation with the Ukraine war. A case in point was the final agreement in June 2024 regarding the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan (CKU) railroad that had been put on hold for 30 years by disagreement over its finance and Moscow’s hesitation. With a projected annual capacity of 15 million tons of cargo, CKU represents the shortest route between Shanghai and Paris. In the foreseeable future, Russia may have to live with a more proactive China in its traditional backyard. Alternatively, Washington and its allies will make further inroads into the post-Soviet space where de-Russianization was already irreversible.

More “Breaks” onto BRICS

As the SCO moved beyond its regional confine, BRICS also added more strategic and global dimensions. Putin and Xi met again in Kazan (Russia) prior to the BRICS group summit. Their “in-depth exchange of views on major international and regional issues of common concern” was described as “a key moment” of the annual summit, said Chinese FM Wang Yi. Both leaders spoke highly of the bilateral ties. While Putin described it as “a paradigm of how inter-state relations should be constructed,” Xi emphasized the principles of non-alignment, non-confrontation, and non-direction against third parties.

With the theme “Strengthening Multilateralism for Just Global Development and Security,” the Kazan summit was the first enlarged BRICS gathering with five new members (Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia). As BRICS’ rotating host, Russia organized more than 200 events. Thirty-six countries, including 22 heads of government/state and UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, joined the annual gathering. BRICS Business Forum also attracted more than a thousand participants.

In his speech to the BRICS business forum, Putin noted that the 10-member group now had 46% of the global population, 36% of the world’s landmass, and 45% of oil output. But even before its expansion, BRICS had overtaken the G7 in PPP terms (37.4% vs 29.3%).

Figure 2 Illustration and Observation by Christian Taiushi MA UZH Source: Raw Data from IMF

The BRICS summit ended with the signing of the Kazan Declaration, a 134-clause document covering every conceivable area of global issues. The long document “is a declaration for a new global order,” according to Andrey Kortunov of the Russian International Affairs Council and Professor Zhao Huashen of Fudan University in Shanghai. BRICS did not merely add new members but was becoming a platform for the entire Global South, noted Kortunov and Zhao in a jointly penned article. Four areas of cooperation were emphasized: multilateralism (Articles 6-23), global/regional stability and security (Articles 24-56), economic/financial development (Articles 57-118), and societal exchange (Articles119-132). Of these areas, security and development were highly interdependent, noted Kortunov and Zhao.

Ukraine was briefly mentioned in Article 26, stressing the need to comply with the UN principles and make all efforts to end the conflict. The bulk of the security section dealt with conflicts and challenges around the world, particularly in the Middle East including the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which reflected the views of the BRICS four new Islamic members (Iran, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia).

While multilateralism was a platform, the three functional areas of security, development, and cultural/humanitarian exchanges largely reflected the three “proposals” outlined by Chinese President Xi Jinping in the past few years for global development (2021), global security (2022), and civilizational dialogue and coexistence. This was also the theme of Xi’s speech in Kazan. China’s vision for the BRICS future, therefore, was largely accepted by its diverse members.

BRICS’ trajectory, however, was not to rival, but to parallel the existing global system dominated by the West. It does, however, serve the interests of the Global South, argued Kortunov and Zhao. At a minimum, BRICS’ highly diverse constituents are fundamentally different from the largely exclusive Western institutions such as G7, the European Union, and NATO, whose members are similar in political, economic, and cultural/religious construct. Hence the need for an interface for the diverse interests of its vastly different members.

Enhanced Mil-Mil Ties

In his meeting with Putin in Kazan, President Xi described the world undergoing “unprecedented tectonic transformation” and “serious changes and upheaval…unseen for centuries.” 2024 witnessed a significant increase in Russia-China mil-mil interactions. In July-September, for example, several large-scale joint exercises/operations even overlap with one another:

• July 2-16: Three Chinese naval ships and one Russian corvette conducted a 15-day joint patrol of the Western Pacific and the South China Sea, the fourth joint patrol since 2021.
• July 12-17: the annual (since 2012) “Exercise Joint Sea-2024” was held off the Zhanjiang naval port in southern China. Seven Chinese and Russian naval vessels joined the drill for “maritime security threats.”
• In late July, Chinese naval ships were present in both St Petersburg and Vladivostok for the 328^th anniversary of the Russian Navy.
• July 24: Russian and Chinese strategic bombers carried out a joint patrol of Far East Russia and the Bering Sea near Alaska, the 8^th strategic aerial patrol by the two militaries since 2019. For the first time, the joint patrol reached international airspace near Alaska.

August was quiet with only one military exchange: commander of the PLA Ground Forces Gen. Li Qiaoming led a delegation to the annual “Army-2024 Forum” outside Moscow. He held talks with Russian Ground Forces’ Commander-in-Chief Oleg Salyukov. By September, the high-frequency exercise mode returned:

• On Sept. 10-15, China launched the first phase of the annual “Northern/Interaction-2024” naval exercises with Russia. Unlike the 2023 series primarily in the Sea of Japan, the 2024 version extended to the Sea of Okhotsk which had been carefully guarded as an “internal sea,” or “Russia’s Great Lake,” by Soviet/Russian authorities since the end of WWII. The Chinese press referred to Russia’s “fortified waters” (堡垒海域) presumably for deploying Soviet/Russia’s strategic nuclear submarines for second/retaliatory strikes.
• On the same day (Sept.10), Russia began its “Ocean 2024” strategic command-and-staff exercises. Some 90,000 troops and more than 500 ships and aircraft drilled across the Pacific and Arctic Oceans, and the Mediterranean, Caspian and Baltic seas. China was the only country that participated in the exercise.
• The “recess” between the two phases of China’s “Northern/Interaction-2024” was not wasted. Between Sept. 16 and 20, Chinese and Russian coast guard ships held a joint drill near Peter the Great Bay off Vladivostok. This was followed by a first-ever joint patrol of the northern Pacific beginning Sept. 21. By Oct. 1, the patrol ships reached the Arctic Ocean, which was a first for the Chinese Coast Guard ships.
• No sooner had the Coast Guard ships departed from the northern Pacific than the second phase of the Northern/Interaction-2024 joint exercise began on Sept. 21. This was immediately followed by the 5^th joint patrol of the northern Pacific by the same naval vessels of the two navies, which was the first time for the two sides to conduct two joint maritime patrols within one year.

The high frequency and intensity of the Sino-Russian interactions occurred against a backdrop of heightened tension in the West Pacific. From late June to early August, the US-led Rim of the Pacific 2024 exercises (RIMPAC 2024), the largest in the world, drilled around the Hawaiian Islands with 40 surface ships, three submarines, 14 national land forces, over 150 aircraft, and more than 25,000 personnel from 29 countries.

It was during the multi-nation “Sama Sama” exercises that the PLA launched a 13-hour massive Joint Sword-2024B drill around Taiwan on Oct. 14. The exercise was a simulated blockade of the island shortly after Lai Ching-te’s speech on Oct. 10 (ROC’s national day), which was deemed as “provocative and dangerous” and aimed toward nominal independence. On the same day, Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov traveled to Beijing and held talks with Chinese counterpart Dong Jun. Military cooperation between Russia and China was important in safeguarding global and regional peace and stability, said Belousov.

While exercises came and went, the US deployment of an intermediate-range missile system in Japan and the Philippines was considered a long-term grave threat to China and Russia. “[L]and-based intermediate-range missiles in the Asia-Pacific region will pose the biggest security threat to the region,” TASS cited PLA’s Lt. Gen. He Lei on Sept. 12. The 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty prohibited the deployment of intermediate-range missiles but Washington withdrew from it in 2019.

Amidst these heightened military activities in 2024 was China’s effort to elevate/demonstrate its nuclear capabilities, with or without Russian cooperation. On Sept. 25, China tested, for the first time in 44 years, an ICBM (DF-31AG with a range of 12,000 km) from Hainan Island to the South Pacific. To this, Russian Presidential Spokesman Dmitry Peskov remarked “[T]his is China’s sovereign right… We respect [this].” In the Nov. 29-30 ninth joint strategic aerial patrol with Russia, China dispatched, for the first time, two long-range H-9N strategic bombers with refueling capabilities for a combat radius of 6,500 km. The nuclear-capable bomber could carry YJ-12 supersonic antiship missiles, CJ-100 cruise missiles, and even an air-launched variant of the hypersonic (Mach 10) DF-21 anti-ship ballistic missiles (see photo below). Many in China viewed this as a crucial step toward China’s first credible and operational airborne strategic deterrence.

Figure 3 H-6N Bomber with Ballistic Missile Photo: Military Watch Magazine

Intensified China-Russian mil-mil interactions occurred when Russia continued to be bogged down on its western front. Its vast east and Pacific regions were increasingly exposed despite Putin’s 2023 declaration that “the Far East is Russia’s strategic priority for the 21^st century.” Enhanced military interactions with China were therefore highly desirable given China’s growing military capabilities.

For the PLA, Russia remained the sole source of real combat experience regardless of Russia’s battle performance in Ukraine. At the operational level, interoperability between the two militaries in 2024 meant more access to each other’s facilities for refueling and resupply. In the case of the joint bomber patrols of the northern Pacific, the flying range was much shorter for China’s H-6 bombers to reach their intended area off Alaska as they took off from an airfield in northeast Russia. Some Chinese military experts were speculating that a shorter route via Russia’s Arctic air space would make China’s strategic bombers a more viable and flexible deterrent than PLA’s land and sea options.

Embracing Trump “Shock-n-Awe” 2.0

Although Putin remarked jokingly in early September that he wanted the Democratic candidate Harris to win, he was clearly avoiding comments on Trump’s win at the annual Valdai Forum on November 7. The Russian president nonetheless said Trump “impressed” him as a “courageous man” in “extraordinary conditions” (the assassination). Meanwhile, Trump’s words about ending the Ukraine conflict and improving relations with Russia “deserve attention.”

As to Trump’s repeated rhetoric of splitting the Beijing-Moscow partnership, Putin said that Russia would not team up with the US in dealing with China. Relations with China “have reached a historical high and are based on mutual trust, which is something we lack in our relations with other countries, above all with Western countries,” Putin replied to a question from Prof. Feng Shaolei, a top Russologist in China. He further suggested that “everyone would win and there would be no losers if the United States … treats both Russia and China by moving away from its double containment policy towards a trilateral cooperation framework.”

There were good reasons for Russia to be more careful with Trump’s huge win, given the highly charged US domestic chemistry and two assassination attempts against candidate Trump. “I believe he is still not entirely safe,” remarked Putin in late November. Meanwhile, Trump’s Cabinet picks reportedly received multiple threats against them. Even under the best circumstances, converting Trump’s campaign rhetoric into policies would be difficult.

While Russia could afford to adopt a wait-and-see posture regarding Trump, Beijing perceived Trump’s return with visible unease for at least four reasons. One was Trump’s solid record of “China-heavy-and-Russia-lite” in both words and deeds in the previous eight years. And there has been no indication of any deviation from that.

Second, Biden’s China policy, which was seen as bad enough—“endless trouble, endless frictions, and endless struggles” (麻烦不断 摩擦不断 斗争不断) according to Wu Xinbo, director of American Studies Center of the prestigious Fudan University in Shanghai—would have to be interrupted if not disrupted given the gathering of China hawks under Trump. In this “you-go-low-I-go-lower” “China race,” Taiwan and the South China Sea could be the next flash points between Washington and Beijing.

Third, the US trade war with China, which was started by Trump in 2018, will likely escalate rapidly, further disrupting the already fragile supply chains of the world trading system. In contrast to Russia’s raw-material-based economic structure (oil, gas, grain, etc.), China’s globalized production chains, extensive energy supplies, and trading/shipping networks are far more vulnerable to sanctions and disturbances than Russia even under normal circumstances.

Last, a growing number of China’s foreign policy analysts came to see an eerily yet persistent “civilizational” factor permeating the Trump camp, in that white communism of the Soviet type and its post-Soviet variant were seen in a far more favorable light than “a great power competitor (China) that is not Caucasian” (words by Kiron Skinner, director of policy planning at the State Department during Trump’s first term). To China’s surprise and perplexity, Skinner herself is African-American. No matter how much Russia is demonized, Putin, and particularly his “healthy conservatism,” always has a strong appeal among conservative segments in the US/West. Such a sense of racial hierarchy may help explain why recent polls continuously show that more Americans view China as a greater enemy than Russia despite Russia’s war-prone propensity and China’s zero record of use of force in the past 45 years.

Figure 4 Americans’ Perceptions of of the United States’ Greatest Enemy. Photo: GALLUP

Moscow and Beijing, despite their long-term strategic partnership and being targets of Washington’s “dual containment” strategies, assume very different cultural/racial identities in the US domestic scene. It remains to be seen how far this genre of US identity politics will find its way to policies toward Moscow and Beijing under Trump 2.0.

End the War or the World?

Trump made his historic comeback a year after the passing of Henry Kissinger in November 2023. In their 2017 meeting in the White House, Trump described his “long-time” friend (Kissinger) as “a man of immense talent, experience, and knowledge.”

Despite the huge difference between the world’s most powerful salesman and the realpolitik thinker/practitioner, both men showed strong aversions to the Ukraine conflict. That said, the biggest difference between them is how the conflict may end. For more than six months, Trump repeatedly promised to end it in 24 hours.” Kissinger, however, warned that ending a conflict was far more difficult than starting one. “The test of policy is how it ends, not how it begins,” argued Kissinger shortly after the 2014 Crimea crisis.

For Beijing, the Trump-Kissinger discourse, regardless of the outcome, would put China between a rock and a hard place. As a profoundly conservative country, the ending of the Ukraine war, or any war, is good for China’s sprouting business around the world, particularly its Belt and Road Initiative now in its second decade with more than 150 countries. Such a prospect, however, would divert more attention and resources to America’s “China issue.”

Regardless, the Ukraine war was moving steadily toward a breaking point in the waning days of the Biden administration. On Nov. 17, Biden authorized Ukraine to use long-range ATACMS missiles (300-mile range) for deeper strikes into Russia, which Ukraine did two days later. On the same day, Putin approved changes to Russia’s nuclear doctrine. Now an attack from a non-nuclear state, if backed by a nuclear power, would be treated as a joint assault on Russia. On Nov. 21, the Ukrainian city Dnipro was struck by Russia’s newest nuclear-capable intermediate-range hypersonic (Mach 10) ballistic missile code-named Oreshnik (or “Hazel Bush”) with six independently-guided warheads.

Moscow and Beijing reacted very differently to this escalation. For Russia, it was “a qualitatively new round of escalation of tensions and a qualitatively new situation…in this conflict,” remarked the Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov. Meanwhile, Beijing urged all sides to de-escalate and find a political solution. The strongest reaction came from Trump’s supporters who almost unanimously depicted the ATACMS reversal as an “escalation move” toward WWIII. “It’s another step up the escalation ladder and nobody knows where this is going,” said Trump’s incoming national security adviser, Florida Rep. Mike Waltz.

Just a few days after Biden’s ATACMS decision, the New York Times reported that some officials of the Biden administration floated the idea of returning nuclear weapons to Ukraine as a deterrent against Russia. Although this was dismissed a few days later by National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan, the 21^st-century version of the 1983 made-for-TV film The Day After was rapidly unfolding as Newsweek published a series of simulated impacts of nuclear blasts on major metropolitan centers in Europe, North America, Russia, China, and North Korea.

Russia’s reaction, or lack of reaction, to the Newsweek extravaganza may be uncharacteristic. Or it was exactly what Russia wanted. In contrast, China’s netizens erupted with disbelief and anger at Newsweek’s “coldblooded calculation” “reducing the untold human cost to lifeless statistics.”

For incoming US President Donald Trump ending the war in Ukraine is now a far more complex and difficult, if not impossible, issue. Meanwhile, time is limited for Trump, and perhaps for all other world leaders, to avert what Henry Kissinger warned, 11 months before his passing, was a global catastrophe (WWIII) in a grave new world of WMD and AI.

Australia’s politicians prepare for the national election that must be held by May. In judging the first term of Anthony Albanese’s Labor government, the key concern for Australia voters is the cost of living, while international issues are bracketed by the United States and China—the return of President Donald Trump and the cooling of China’s trade coercion of Australia. The Albanese government tells Australians they face “fraught and fragile global conditions” in a “a time of great global uncertainty,” in “the most complex and challenging strategic environment since the Second World War.” Canberra’s approach to the Trump administration will emphasize traditional alliance ties while reinforcing new elements: AUKUS nuclear submarines, the Quad, the increase of US forces on Australian soil, and steps toward free trade in defense equipment and technology to achieve more integration between US and Australian industries.

Australia’s Election, Trump’s US Election

One of the many unusual impacts of Trump’s return to the presidency is the influence he will have on the federal election Australia will hold by May 2025. Prime Minister Albanese choses the day, but the three-year federal election cycle means the latest date for the vote on the House of Representatives and half the Senate is May 17, 2025. The parliamentary sitting calendar for 2025 is shaped by the election deadline. Australia’s annual budget is usually presented to Parliament in May. But the date for the 2025 budget is brought forward to March 25, 2025. An early budget and then a May federal poll is the same timetable used by Scott Morrison’s Liberal-National Coalition government in the previous elections in 2019 and 2022.

Issues that resonated in the US election will echo in Australia—the cost of living, housing, and migration levels. The opposition leader Peter Dutton will mobilize an Australian version of the question Trump asked US voters: “Are you better off than you were three years ago?” Labor’s response will be to ask voters: “Who is going to make you better off in the next three years?”

Figure 1 U.S. President Donald Trump speaks during a joint news conference with Australia’s Prime Minister Scott Morrison in the White House in Washington on September 20, 2019. Photo: Jonathan Ernst/Reuters

In the lower house of Parliament, where governments are formed, Labor goes to the voters holding the thinnest of majorities—78 seats in the 151-seat House of Representatives (redistributions will reduce the House to 150 seats at the election). The possibility of Labor being pushed into minority government looms as an equal or even stronger possibility than Labor hanging on to its majority. The Liberal-National Coalition holds 55 seats, while independents and minor parties hold 18. The Coalition will need a net gain of 20 seats from Labor and the cross-benches to return to office. The global electoral trend to punish incumbent government means the Albanese government has lost its lead in the opinion polls. Polls now deliver a near 50-50 split in the two-party vote for Labor and the Coalition; the polling margin of error decides which side is leading in individual polls.

The doyen of the Canberra press gallery, Michelle Grattan, observes that Trump’s victory in the United States will affect the climate of Australia’s campaign: “One obvious point of debate would be how either leader would potentially handle an unpredictable Trump. A Trump presidency might [favor] Opposition Leader Peter Dutton’s national security focus. But an opposite view, held in Labor circles, is it could make people stick to the status quo. Trump’s triumph would also be fodder for the Greens in their attack on Labor’s closeness to the US. For its part, Labor would argue the Australia-US alliance is enduring regardless of individual US and Australian leaders and governments.”

Finishing her term in Canberra, US Ambassador Caroline Kennedy emphasized what will be a key Australian talking point to Trump as she pointed to “the continuity that has characterized this alliance for more than a century.” Kennedy expressed the great alliance story Australia will seek to tell Trump: “Australia may be a middle power, but to the United States, you are number one. We have no more trusted or capable ally. In every dimension of our relationship, I’ve seen the United States rely on Australian leadership and experience. Australia is no longer America’s ‘deputy sheriff’ or whatever the critics like to say. Australia is our partner and often our teacher as the United States navigates a multipolar world. That’s true in our bilateral relationship. It’s true in multilateral fora, and it is vital in this region.”

After phoning Trump to congratulate him the day after the US election, Prime Minister Albanese said they “talked about the importance of the alliance, and the strength of the Australia-US relationship in security, AUKUS, trade and investment. I look forward to working together in the interests of both our countries.”

Albanese told a press conference: “President Trump has run a campaign based on change and he’s made it clear he’s going to do things differently–so we shouldn’t be surprised as things change. But equally, we should be really confident in ourselves and our place in the world as well, and our ability to deliver on our interests together as Australians.”

Albanese denied any need to apologize for previous negative comments on Trump’s first presidency. The most notable example was in 2017, when Albanese was an opposition frontbencher. Asked then how he would deal with Trump, Albanese answered “with trepidation,” going on to say “he scares the s–t out of me and I think it’s of concern the leader of the Free World thinks that you can conduct politics through 140 characters on Twitter overnight.”

Now as prime minister, Albanese says he will work with Trump, adding that he has demonstrated “my ability to work with world leaders and to develop relationships with them which are positive.” Australia’s ambassador in Washington, the former Labor prime minister, Kevin Rudd, acted swiftly after the US election to delete his previous criticisms of Trump. Media turned up plenty of examples of Rudd attacks, calling Trump, “the village idiot” and “the most destructive president in history.” A statement from the Australian embassy announced Rudd’s clean-up:

“In his previous role as the head of an independent US-based think tank [the Asia Society], Mr. Rudd was a regular commentator on American politics. Out of respect for the office of President of the United States, and following the election of President Trump, Ambassador Rudd has now removed these past commentaries from his personal website and social media channels. This has been done to eliminate the possibility of such comments being misconstrued as reflecting his positions as Ambassador and, by extension, the views of the Australian Government. Ambassador Rudd looks forward to working with President Trump and his team to continue strengthening the US-Australia alliance.”

Rudd’s previous criticisms were quoted in an interview with Trump in March by the British politician, Nigel Farage. In response, Trump responded by calling Australia’s ambassador “a little bit nasty,” and “not the brightest bulb.” While saying that the ambassador “won’t be there long,” Trump ended his response to the question about Rudd by noting, “I don’t know much about him.” After Trump’s election, the Albanese government expressed full confidence in Rudd and said he would stay as ambassador. Foreign Minister Penny Wong noted that Trump is “a pretty robust individual” while the alliance “is bigger than any individual or past comments. And in terms of Kevin, Kevin Rudd’s been an excellent Ambassador. He’s delivered an enormous amount for Australia, and I have great confidence that he’ll continue to do so.”

Australia will use the same lines that worked with Trump in his first term. The US has a trade surplus with Australia; or, in Trump-speak, America gets a good deal out of Australia. The balance of trade in America’s favor helped Australia avoid Trump tariffs on Australian steel and aluminum last time round.  Australia’s talking points to Trump will highlight the transactional wins the US gets from the relationship. The bilateral free trade treaty with the US, the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement reaches its 20^th birthday in January 2025. The US is Australia’s top foreign investment destination, while the US is Australia’s top foreign investor, as Australia’s Foreign Affairs Department outlines:

“The United States is our largest two-way investment partner, with two-way investment stock reaching A$2.3 trillion in 2023. The United States is by far the largest investor in Australia, with investment stock worth A$1.17 trillion at the end of 2023. The United States is our largest foreign investment destination, with outbound investments reaching A$1.196 trillion in 2023. The United States is our third largest trading partner and two-way trade stood at $98.7 billion in 2023.”

Australia’s tactics for Trump 1.0 will run again for Trump 2.0. When Canberra finds it hard to embrace Trump’s language or agenda, the focus will switch to the greatness of the US, the depth of the bilateral relationship, and the history of military alliance. The alliance narrative during Trump 1.0 was the idea of “100 years of mateship,” dating from 1918 when troops from the two nations fought side by side at the Battle of Hamel on France’s Western Front. Elements of tradition and transaction will be used with Trump 2.0. The alliance tradition will be the long history of mateship, while the transaction will be the promised growth in defense spending to show Australia is no military free rider. The economic pitch will always start from a business bottom line—Australia’s trade deficit means America is in profit.

Canberra’s script will follow the line Foreign Minister Penny Wong used after Trump’s victory: “We have an alliance that’s based on our values, on our history and on our shared strategic objectives. It is a timeless alliance, and we look forward to working with him.”

The US Alliance

“The Biden administration advanced the most consequential and ambitious bilateral security agenda with Australia since World War II.”

US Ambassador to Australia Caroline Kennedy, Nov. 19, 2024

Allowing for normal diplomatic gloss, the ambassador reflects new dimensions in an alliance that is shifting, not merely evolving. Responding to big geopolitical trends, Joe Biden deepened and broadened the alliance and gave it a sharper Australian focus. In its eighth decade, the alliance is coming to Australian soil. The ANZUS history has been Australia joining America’s wars (Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq and “the war on terror”). Now the commitment is what America is doing in, with, and for Australia in:

• the AUKUS nuclear submarine agreement;
• the evolution of the Quad grouping of Australia, India, Japan, and the US;
• America’s step-up in the South Pacific, as Washington declared a “renewed partnership with the Pacific Islands,” responding to Australia’s view that China’s challenge creates “a state of permanent contest in the Pacific”;
• the build-up of US military muscle in Australian soil in a new era of alliance integration, with more US troops, planes, and ships in Australia:
• the creation of a US-Australia combined intelligence center in Canberra;
• prepositioning in Australia of US stores, munitions and fuel:
• the lifting of US restriction to reach toward free trade in defense equipment and technology, to achieve more integration of US and Australian industries.

Canberra’s National Defense Strategy, issued in April 2024, said that Australia “must work even more closely with the US, our closest ally and principal strategic partner.” The US is increasing investment in “infrastructure, capability and equipment” on Australian soil, while Australian policy is to strengthen military engagement with the US to:

• focus joint exercises and capability rotations with the US on collective deterrence and force posture cooperation;
• collaborate on defense innovation, science and technology;
• drive interoperability and interchangeability with US systems and capabilities;
• “leverage Australia’s strong partnership with Japan” in the trilateral relationship with the US;
• speed reforms to US “export controls, procurement policy and information sharing to deliver a more integrated industrial base.”

In the words of a Washington Post headline in August, “Australia offers US a vast new military launchpad in China conflict.” On a visit to Darwin, the chairman of the US House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee, Michael McCaul, said: “This provides a central base of operations from which to project power.” Building that base means the “biggest expansion of the US military presence in Australia since World War II,” according to James Curran, international editor of the Australian Financial Review and professor of modern history at Sydney University.

Figure 2 Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, U.S. President Joe Biden, and British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak hold a press conference during the AUKUS summit on March 13 in San Diego, California. Photo: Leon Neal/Getty Images

Curran writes that the change in America’s approach since “the mid-1990s has been nothing short of staggering.” After the election of John Howard’s Liberal-National government in 1996, he notes, Canberra offered the Washington training facilities for US marines in northern Australia. The US declined. As the times have changed, so the US has altered its view of the military worth of Australia’s geography. See the official start point for that shift as November 2011, when President Barack Obama announced agreement for an annual marine rotation through Darwin.

The US presence or “posture” in Australia has had bipartisan political support. Noting that political consensus, James Curran questions how the US role in Australia is shifting the alliance foundation from deterrence to offense. “For Australia, the US alliance has always been the critical deterrent – any power considering hostile action towards Australia at least has to keep the existence of the ANZUS treaty in mind,” Curran writes. The central issue for Curran is whether Australia is being transformed “into a base for offensive US operations into Asia. Government language stresses deterrence rather than projection, but the debate is on as to where that line now blurs.”

The elements of the increased US use of Australia’s geography are known as the US Force Posture Initiatives, driven by a bilateral working group formed in 2021. Australia’s Defense Department calls the force posture work “a key component of the alliance” and a “tangible demonstration of the strength of the alliance.” The initiatives involve:

• Enhanced air cooperation “to deepen air-to-air integration that allows for seamless operation” and delivers security and stability across the Indo-Pacific region. Major air bases at Darwin and Tindal (near Katherine) in the Northern Territory are being upgraded. Tindal will be able to house up to six US B-52 bombers. Surveys are being done for upgrades to two air bases in Western Australia and one in northern Queensland. The US pledges to “continue frequent rotations of bombers, fighter aircraft, and maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft.”
• Prepositioning: the US is working on the requirements for long-term positioning of Army equipment material in Australia, plus the creation of a logistics support area in Queensland.
• Enhanced land cooperation involves “complex, integrated and combined” exercises and training with allies and partners in the region. The US Army provides capabilities and personnel, fuel infrastructure and explosive ordnance storage.
• During Exercise Talisman Sabre 2025, the US and Australia will test “new operating assumptions” in exercises “across the breadth of Australia.”
• The US supports Australia’s planned infrastructure upgrades at the Cocos (Keeling) Islands, an Australian territory in the Indian Ocean midway between Australia and Sri Lanka.
• Enhanced maritime cooperation to lift the logistics and sustainment capabilities of US surface and subsurface vessels in Australia.
• In Perth, in August, the USS Hawaii, a Virginia-class submarine undertook a maintenance package, the first time that a US nuclear-powered submarine has had maintenance performed outside the US or a US base, or had such work performed by non-US citizens. The Hawaii starts the process of creating a submarine rotational force operating from Western Australia, from the Stirling naval base in Perth. The aim as early as 2027 is to have five conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines rotating through Stirling—one sub from the UK and four from the US.

Prime Minister Albanese says work on critical minerals and clean energy has become “a third pillar” to the alliance, to stand alongside security and economic cooperation. The “compact” signed by Albanese and President Biden established climate and clean energy as “a central pillar of the Australia-United States alliance.” The work will deepen collaboration on the “critical minerals and materials that are vital to clean energy as well as defense supply chains.” Australian public opinion about the US is still warm, but trust declines. In the lead-up to the 2024 US presidential election, the annual Lowy Institute poll on how Australians view the world found levels of trust in the United States dropped five points from 2023 to 56%. This continues the fall since 2022, the second year of the Biden presidency, when Australian trust in the US stood at 65%. Using a “feelings thermometer,” Lowy asked Australians about “feelings toward” the US. While still warm, the 2024 measure fell four degrees to 59°, its lowest reading in the 20-year history of the Lowy poll, and down from an all-time high of 73° in 2015.

AUKUS

Australia’s quest for AUKUS nuclear-powered submarines is a thought bubble that turned into a huge project, driven by ambition and beset by anxiety. Canberra’s instant political consensus is a striking element of how quickly the bubble became policy. The Labor-Liberal unity ticket was set at the moment the AUKUS vision was announced by Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States in September 2021.

Figure 3 Navy Sailors assigned to the Los Angeles-class fast-attack submarine USS Annapolis (SSN-760) and HMAS Stirling Port Services crewmembers prepare the submarine to moor alongside Diamantina Pier at Fleet Base West in Rockingham, Western Australia, March 10, 2024. US Navy Photo

The distance covered in three years was emphasized by and Defense Minister Richard Marles when he told Parliament on Aug. 12: “When we came to power, AUKUS was really not much more than a thought bubble, but since then we have been turning it into a reality.” Marles says the thought is sailing along an “actual pathway,” steered by the Australian Submarine Agency, established last year. Some thought! Some bubble! Yet even the believers see an extraordinary journey—the Optimal Pathway, an outline plan for project execution, stretches out to 2053, with the first Australian-built AUKUS submarine due in “the early 2040s.” In August, a naval nuclear propulsion treaty was unveiled, providing the legal basis for AUKUS and the creation of an AUKUS trade zone for exchange of defense goods and technology. The treaty went to the Australian Parliament and US Congress in August and the UK Parliament in September. Marles signed the treaty in Washington on Aug. 5, describing it as “a foundational part of the legal underpinning” of building the nuclear-powered submarine.

The trilateral agreement will operate until 2075. The pact allows the transfer of nuclear propulsion plants to Australia, makes Australia responsible for “management, disposition, storage, and disposal of any spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste” and gives an Australian indemnity to the US and Britain for any “liability, loss, costs, damage or injury” from nuclear risks. The treaty gives Britain and the US the right to terminate AUKUS and demand the return of nuclear material and equipment. The termination clause can be used if Australia seeks to reprocess nuclear material, builds a nuclear weapon, or breaches its obligations to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the International Atomic Energy Agency. As part of its nonproliferation pledge, Australia is negotiating a treaty with the IAEA to meet its Article 14 comprehensive safeguards obligations.

In September, the three nations adopted an AUKUS zone for free trade of defense equipment and expertise. The exemptions remove licensing requirements for most controlled goods, technologies, and services. The AUKUS zone will have license-free trade for 70% of defense exports from the US to Australia that are subject to arms traffic regulations, and 80% of defense trade under US export regulations. The deal eliminates the need for 900 export permits covering Australian exports to the US and Britain, valued at $5 billion annually. Taking lessons from the AUKUS effort to cut red tape, the US has also set out principles to build an Indo-Pacific defense industry base.

Richard Marles says a license-free seamless defense industrial base for AUKUS will have “a profound impact,” describing it as one of the biggest reforms to defense trade in decades. In dealing with the new US administration from January, Canberra will push AUKUS as the top policy commitment it wants to reinforce with Trump. After Trump’s victory, Foreign Minister Penny Wong said “obviously we look to particularly prioritising AUKUS in our engagement, which is the thing that we have been most focussed on in the lead up to this election.”

Australia’s Strategy

Summing up foreign policy in a speech on Australia in the world, Albanese said Australia is investing in “deterrence and diplomacy,” transforming defense capability with the AUKUS pact, restoring relations in the South Pacific, revitalizing the Quad, taking a “patient, calibrated and deliberate approach” to China, and supporting the “fundamental guardrail” of US-China dialogue. In a stark view of strategic settings, Albanese and the deputy PM, Richard Marles, declared: “Australia faces the most complex and challenging strategic environment since the Second World War.” The Labor leaders offered that judgement on April 17, 2024, when releasing the National Defense Strategy. The strategy said: “While a major conflict is not inevitable, this new reality is making the pursuit of Australia’s interests more challenging.”

The strategy aims to double defense spending in the next 10 years to lift it from 2% to 2.4% of GDP by 2033-34. The increase in annual funding would see the defense budget grow to more than A$100 billion by 2033-34. The policy document described a strategic environment that continues to deteriorate:

“The optimism at the end of the Cold War has been replaced by the uncertainty and tensions of entrenched and increasing strategic competition between the US and China. This competition is being framed by an intense contest of narratives and values. The competition is playing out in military and non-military ways, including economic and diplomatic. It is accompanied by an unprecedented conventional and non-conventional military build-up in our region, taking place without strategic reassurance or transparency. The effects of this build-up are occurring closer to Australia than previously. This build-up is also increasing the risk of military escalation or miscalculation that could lead to a major conflict in the region.”

The Albanese government has scrapped the old “balanced force” model for the Australian Defense Force (ADF). The balanced force demanded lots of capabilities to keep options open. The balanced force could be adjusted to respond to whatever needs, contingencies, or dangers appeared on the horizon. An unbalanced future has arrived, and the balanced force is judged unfit for purpose. The ADF must become “an integrated, focused force” to face what Defense identifies as strategic risks that “have continued to deteriorate.” The new guidance to Defense from government is capitalized as “a Strategy of Denial,” calling for an ADF that can:

• defend Australia and our immediate region;
• deter through denial any adversary’s attempt to project power against Australia through our northern approaches;
• protect Australia’s economic connection to our region and the world;
• contribute with our partners to the collective security of the Indo-Pacific region;
• contribute to the maintenance of the global rules-based order.

A Strategy of Denial is appropriate for a nation that’s been through the stages of grieving for the disintegration of the liberal international order (denial, anger, bargaining, depression and acceptance).

Canberra proclaims it will take a “more focused approach to its international engagement.” The “focused” thinking can mean Australia is less willing to look beyond its region. Thus, in December, 2023, Canberra rejected Washington’s request to send an Australian Navy ship to the Red Sea as part of international efforts to safeguard cargo from attacks by Iranian-backed Houthi rebels. Richard Marles said Australia would not contribute a ship or plane to the Combined Maritime Forces that patrol the shipping route: “We need to be really clear around our strategic focus, and our strategic focus is our region—the northeast Indian Ocean, the South China Sea, the East China Sea, the Pacific.” The disappointed response from a US official was that Australia could not “pretend global problems don’t require global solutions.”

Australian responds to US-China competition as “a primary feature of our security environment,” a struggle over the global balance which will be “sharpest and most consequential in the Indo-Pacific.” The National Defense Strategy describes China’s expanding gray-zone activities and “coercive tactics” in its forceful handling of territorial disputes and unsafe intercepts of vessels and aircraft operating in international waters and airspace. China is improving its capabilities in all areas of warfare at a “pace and scale not seen in the world for nearly a century,” with no transparency about its strategic purpose, prompting this Canberra judgement: “The risk of a crisis or conflict in the Taiwan Strait is increasing, as well as at other flashpoints, including disputes in the South and East China Seas and on the border with India. There is increasing competition for access and influence across the Indian Ocean, including efforts to secure dominance over sea lanes and strategic ports. That said, US-China dialogue, both at the leader-level and military-level, is useful in preventing miscalculation and ensuring differences can be worked through in a way that supports stability.”

China: Seeking Balance as Economic Coercion Cools

“China does not see itself as a status quo power. It seeks a region and a world that is much more accommodating of its ambitions and its interests.”

Prime Minister Albanese, Dec. 20, 2023

“Over the past decade, we have made some progress in China-Australia relations and also witnessed some twists and turns. That trajectory has many inspirations to offer. Now, our relations have realised a turnaround and continues to grow, bringing tangible benefits to our two peoples.”

President Xi Jinping, Nov. 18, 2024.

Australia’s understanding of China’s future strategic pressure is shaped by Beijing’s recent unsuccessful, but costly, economic coercion. China’s trade sanctions on Australia have been wound back. Beijing’s refusal to talk to Australian leaders has ended. A relatively conventional diplomatic rhythm has resumed. Labor came to office in 2022 saying it would “stabilize” dealings with China, and stability has been achieved. China has scrapped its tariffs and unofficial customs bans on coal, barley, beef, wine, timber, lobsters, and cotton. Australia’s Trade Minister, Don Farrell, says nearly A$20 billion worth of “trade impediments on Australian exports to China have been removed.”

While defrosting with Beijing, the Albanese government kept getting warmer with Washington. The symbolic expression of this was in the prime minister’s back-to-back visits to the US and China. First, Albanese went to Washington at the end of October 2023. Then, a week later, he was in Beijing, the first visit by an Australian leader in seven years.

In Washington, Biden and Albanese proclaimed a new era of strategic cooperation to build what Albanese calls “an alliance for the future.”

As Australian journalists and TV crews gathered in the Oval office to record the grip-and-grin between Biden and Albanese, the president offered the Australians some unprompted remarks about the dragon in the room. “I was asked by Xi Jinping a couple of years ago why I was working so hard with your country,” Biden noted. “I said. ‘we’re a Pacific nation.’ He looked at me and I said, ‘Yeah, we’re a Pacific nation, the United States, and we’re going to stay that way’.”

Figure 4 Anthony Albanese meets Xi Jinping in Beijing. Photo: Australian Strategic Policy Institute

China welcomed Albanese in November 2023, seeking to cement the reset in relations, blaming past troubles on Australia’s previous Liberal-National government. The official China Daily described the trip as “ice-breaking” after dialogue halted in 2016 “because of the previous Australian government’s adversarial stance toward China.” Part of the thaw has been an end to China’s ban on Australian journalists. In August, 2024, Will Glasgow, a correspondent for Rupert Murdoch’s paper, The Australian, returned to China, almost exactly four years since Australian correspondents fled the country. Glasgow wrote: “The beginning of the return of Australian media is another manifestation of the improvement in diplomatic relations with China under the Albanese government, which continues despite a host of ongoing disagreements…It is by no means an exclusively Australian problem. The size of the English-language foreign-media presence here is a fraction of what it was when I was based in Beijing for The Australian in the first half of 2020.”

One of the continuing disagreements is China’s suspended death sentence on the Australian citizen, Dr Yang Jun. The sentence was denounced by Foreign Minister Wong in February, saying Australia was “appalled” at the “harrowing news” The “many years of uncertainty” since Yang’s detention on national security charges in 2019 were “extraordinarily difficult,” Wong said, and Australia would protest “in the strongest terms.” In November, Wong attacked the sentencing of Australian citizen Gordon Ng in Hong Kong “for organising and participating in an election primary.” Wong said Australia is gravely concerned at China’s broad application of the national security law and its use against Australian citizens

In Australia, public sentiment toward China remains low. The Lowy Institute survey of Australian attitudes to the world found only 17% of Australians say they trust China “somewhat” or “a great deal” to act responsibly in the world (only Russia ranks lower in Australian opinion). This is steady from 2023 and a minor increase on 2022, when trust in China reached a record low (12%). The low numbers are a contrast with the figure just six years ago, when half (52%) of Australians trusted China. The suspicion of China reflects the icy years of trade coercion, and publicity about Chinese cyber-attacks on Australia.

Australia’s chief spy-catcher, Mike Burgess, acknowledges that all nations spy, but charges that China’s “behavior goes well beyond traditional espionage.” The director-general of security says: “The Chinese government is engaged in the most sustained, scaled and sophisticated theft of intellectual property and expertise in history. It is unprecedented and it is unacceptable. China has developed a ruthless business model to seize commercial advantage. Stealing intellectual property is the first step. Then they use talent programs, joint ventures and acquisitions to harvest the expertise required to exploit the intellectual property. Sometimes the technology is put to military use, often it’s given to favoured companies to mass produce it, under-cutting and undermining the innovator.”

Australia in Comparative Connections: 2009-2024

The first annual account of Australia’s connections with the US and East Asia appeared in this series in 2009. Thus, this year’s report is the 16^th in the series I have written. My initial chat with the doyen of Pacific Forum, Ralph Cossa, set the scene for the warmest partnership any journalist could ask for. How long should my annual piece be? “Whatever it needs,” replied Ralph. Subject range, I asked? “Over to you,” responded Ralph. And so it has gone, ever since. Apart from Americanizing my spelling, the words have all be mine. Would that all editors were so generous of spirit, liberal about length, and open on content.

Looking back, that first 2009 effort offered two big themes that have endured. One pole was the continuity and comfort of the alliance fundamentals between Australia and the US. The other pole was the “tectonic effects being exerted by China’s rise. As with the rest of the Asia-Pacific, Australia is adjusting significant aspects of its foreign and security policy to the magnetic pull of China.” Official Australian usage is now “Indo-Pacific” not “Asia-Pacific.” But much else has endured, as one other line from that first effort observed: “For the first time in Australia’s history, its most important market is not also an alliance partner. Instead, it will be its major ally’s strategic competitor, perhaps even challenger.”

The 2011 report observed that Australia had decoupled from the US economy in ways unimaginable in the 20^th century. In the first decade of the 21^st century Australia did not follow the US into recession in 2001 and 2008. Asia’s business cycle now drives Australia’s economy: “Australia’s alliance commitment with the US no longer mirrors, as it once did, the economic ties to the US.” This annual series traced the 12-nation negotiations for the Trans-Pacific Partnership, launched in 2008, as the talks (and arm wrestling and haggling) crawled toward an ever-shifting finish line. In the arcane world of trade negotiators, the battle between the US and Japan was trench warfare lit by pyrotechnics. As Barack Obama observed, the TPP was an ambitious US effort to write the future trade rules of the Asia-Pacific, reflecting American interests in areas such as intellectual property rights, and labor and environmental standards.

The TPP was signed but then Australia watched in horror as the 2016 US presidential campaign trashed the agreement.” In the Australian interpretation,” I wrote in 2016, “a US that turns away from the TPP would also be turning away from Asia.” In his first week in office in 2017, Trump signed an executive order formally withdrawing the US from the TPP. Yet Washington commentary noted this was mere formality, because the treaty was already dead in Congress. My 2017 comment: “Can you create an enhanced trade structure to buttress the US strategic role in the Asia-Pacific if the US opts out of that trade pact?” A US turning protectionist is going to stress test the link between security and trade.

To end this round up of commentary/judgements, turn to the professionals in the game—the ambassadors (one Australian and two Americans) and an academic.

When an Australian jumps out of a New York taxi and prepares to make a dash across 5th Avenue, the habit of a lifetime is to look the wrong way for the traffic. Australia drives on the left; America drives on the right. It’s a simple metaphor for the many ways of looking and moving of the two nations. Rushing for a late-night drink in the city that never sleeps, Australia’s ambassador to the US, Joe Hockey (2016-2020), stopped his taxi by Central Park and dashed across the avenue, checking in the Australian direction. That “near-fatal error,” Hockey observed in his memoir, was “like so many who think they understand America.”

In 2010, the US and Australia marked the 70th anniversary of their formal diplomatic relationship. US Ambassador to Canberra, Jeffrey Bleich (2009-2013) said the relationship existed long before the 1940 treaty and extended far beyond words on paper: “Before there were diplomats in each other’s capitals, there were world-travelling whalers and miners, sailors of the Great White Fleet and their gracious Australian hosts, yanks and diggers hunkered down in trenches in World War I. We’ve trusted each other… We’ve valued each other’s freedom, self-reliance, open markets and sense of fair play. We’ve taken our work seriously, without taking ourselves too seriously. And when we’ve disagreed, we’ve done it without being disagreeable.”

During the 2013 Australian election, the American intellectual Francis Fukuyama visited and judged that the bitterness of Australian politics has not reached the intensity of the US: “Australia has got the fewest big long-term problems of any developed democracy I know. In policy terms, the fight within Labor, or even between Labor and the Liberals seem minor when compared to the things that [polarize] Americans, such as the legitimacy of taxation, dealing with the deficit, abortion and guns.”

Wrapping up her time in Canberra, the 27^th US ambassador to Australia, Caroline Kennedy, used a farewell at the National Press Club in November to sketch what Australia means to her: “I will miss the Australian sense of humor and the fact that everyone has a nickname. I will miss the way Australians are up for anything and pitch in to help each other out. I will miss the amazing creatures here, from the magpies and whale sharks to my two new embassy sheep, Louie and Eli. I can’t wait to come back and visit. There is so much left to see and do. Most of all, I know the best days for our alliance are yet to come.”