US Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel and Secretary of State John Kerry continued their “pivots” to Asia, respectively attending the Shangri-La Dialogue and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), before joining up for a 2+2 with their Aussie counterparts. President Obama’s failure to mention the Asia rebalance during his “major foreign policy address” at West Point raised questions about the US commitment to the region. No wonder no one seemed to have much time to pay attention to Pyongyang as it continued its (idle) threats and insults.  Meanwhile, there was little progress reported on the economic centerpiece of the US pivot, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), even as China continued its pursuit of an alternative “Asia for Asians” approach. Two of the world’s largest democracies, India and Indonesia, held landmark elections, in stark contrast to Thailand where the military leadership tried to legitimize its rule.

US Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel and Secretary of State John Kerry continued their “pivots” to Asia over the summer months, respectively attending the Shangri-La Dialogue and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), before joining up for a 2+2 with their Aussie counterparts. President Obama’s failure to mention his Asia rebalance during his “major foreign policy address” at West Point (incorrectly) raised questions about his administration’s commitment to the region as the Middle East and Eastern Europe continued to boil over. No wonder no one seemed to have much time to pay attention to Pyongyang as it continued its (idle) threats and insults.  Meanwhile, there was little progress reported on the economic centerpiece of the US pivot, the “gold standard” Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), even as China continued its pursuit of an alternative “Asia for Asians” approach, best manifested by the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and President Xi’s speech at the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA). Finally, two of the world’s largest democracies, India and Indonesia, held landmark elections, in stark contrast to Thailand where the military leadership tried to legitimize its rule amid lingering questions as to when true democracy will be restored.

The “Obama Doctrine”

President Obama’s commencement address at West Point on May 28 appears to have been intended to send Americans and the international community a number of important messages. One of them was NOT that the US commitment to the Asia “pivot” or “rebalance” was waning. For some, especially in Asia, the failure to mention this much-touted Asia policy rekindled fears that it was being reconsidered, if not abandoned. Those who read it that way missed a few major points, although the administration must share the blame for the misinterpretation.

Yes, the pivot was not mentioned, but Obama did state that “regional aggression that goes unchecked – in southern Ukraine, the South China Sea, or anywhere else in the world – will ultimately impact our allies, and could draw in our military.” Putting Ukraine and the South China Sea in the same sentence does not signal neglect or a downplaying of the challenges the US faces in Asia. His very pointed references to China, to the South China Sea, and even to the necessity of the US finally ratifying the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) all demonstrate that the Obama administration’s commitment to Asia remains alive and well, as did his inclusion of defense of allies as a US “core interest”: “the United States will use military force, unilaterally if necessary, when our core interests demand it – when our people are threatened; when our livelihood is at stake; or when the security of our allies is in danger.” The only place where the security of our allies is directly threatened today is in Asia, on the Korean Peninsula, and in the East and South China Seas.

The real source of confusion regarding the president’s West Point speech was that, administration hype notwithstanding, this was not really a “major foreign policy address” to “outline a broad vision for America’s role in the world” or “to outline top national security goals.” As was appropriate to the immediate audience to which it was delivered, the address was primarily about military strategy, and more specifically about the use of military force. There was no reference to APEC or the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), but also no references to the Trans-Atlantic Free Trade Agreement or any other trade matters; other than a brief reference to support for democracy, human rights, and free and open economies, the speech was primarily about how best to combat challenges to US security.

In the most simplified terms, it was Obama’s version of the “Powell Doctrine,” in which then-General and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell famously laid out a list of questions that should be answered affirmatively before the US uses military force. These questions helped guide the George H.W. Bush administration as it prepared for the use of force to push the Iraqis out of Kuwait. Failure to follow this doctrine a decade later created a situation that overextended the US military, the US economy, and US credibility or “soft power”: these are the “costly mistakes,” from Obama’s perspective, that “came not from our restraint, but from our willingness to rush into military adventures – without thinking through the consequences; without building international support and legitimacy for our action, or leveling with the American people about the sacrifice required.”

The new “Obama Doctrine,” not unlike Powell’s, cautions against the use of force as the first or best alternative: “US military action cannot be the only – or even primary – component of our leadership in every instance. Just because we have the best hammer does not mean that every problem is a nail.” Recall one of Powell’s questions: “Have all other non-violent policy means been fully exhausted?” Not to overplay the similarity, Powell also asked: “Do we have genuine broad international support?” Obama takes this one step further, arguing that in instances when the use of force is necessary, “we should not go it alone. Instead, we must mobilize allies and partners to take collective action…. We must do so because collective action in these circumstances is more likely to succeed, more likely to be sustained, and less likely to lead to costly mistakes.”

During his West Point address, Obama also addressed head on the issue of “America’s relative decline.” Relative to what? As Obama correctly noted, “by most measures, America has rarely been stronger relative to the rest of the world. Those who argue otherwise – who suggest that the US is in decline, or has seen its global leadership slip away – are either misreading history or engaged in partisan politics.” Compared to the height of the Cold War, there remains no peer competitor to the US, militarily, politically, or economically.

Hagel’s reinforcing message

Secretary Hagel made direct reference to the West Point speech in his remarks at the annual Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore: “President Obama laid out the next phase of America’s foreign policy…. He made clear we will balance our diplomacy, development assistance, and military capabilities, and that we will strengthen our global partnerships and alliances. That is how America is implementing its strategy of rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific.”

Hagel asserted that “(T)he rebalance is not a goal, promise, or a vision – it is a reality. Over the last year, President Obama launched comprehensive partnerships with Vietnam and Malaysia, held a summit with Chinese President Xi, and last month visited three of our five regional treaty allies – Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines – as well as Malaysia. In the Philippines, he and President Aquino announced a new Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement on the rotational presence of U.S. forces – the most significant milestone for our alliance in over a decade.”

Hagel also said “prosperity is inseparable from security, and the Department of Defense will continue to play a critical role in the rebalance – even as we navigate a challenging fiscal landscape.” He outlined four broad security priorities: encouraging the peaceful resolution of disputes while upholding principles including the freedom of navigation and standing firm against coercion, intimidation, and aggression; building a cooperative regional architecture based on international rules and norms; enhancing the capabilities of our allies and partners to provide security for themselves and the region; and strengthening our regional defense capabilities.

In the past, Hagel and his predecessors stressed the need to cooperate with China (among others) to ensure regional peace and prosperity and he repeated this message. But he was also much tougher and more specific in noting the challenge that Beijing’s policies and actions were posing: “One of the most critical tests facing the region is whether nations will choose to resolve disputes through diplomacy and well-established international rules and norms…or through intimidation and coercion. Nowhere is this more evident than in the South China Sea. . . . China has called the South China Sea ‘a sea of peace, friendship and cooperation.’ And that’s what it should be. But in recent months, China has undertaken destabilizing, unilateral actions asserting its claims in the South China Sea.”

He made Washington’s position abundantly clear: “we firmly oppose any nation’s use of intimidation, coercion, or the threat of force to assert these claims. We also oppose any effort – by any nation – to restrict overflight or freedom of navigation – whether from military or civilian vessels, from countries big or small. The United States will not look the other way when fundamental principles of the international order are being challenged.”

As documented in our chapter on US-China relations, the senior Chinese delegate at Shangri-La, Lt. Gen. Wang Guanzhong, deputy chief of the PLA General Staff Department, took great exception to Hagel’s “unwanted accusations” (and those of Japan Prime Minister Abe Shinzo), accusing him of “flaring rhetoric that usher destabilizing factors into the Asia-Pacific to stir up trouble, and a speech with unconstructive attitude.” Many were in fact surprised by Hagel’s bluntness, which must be seen as an expression of US frustration with Beijing’s “aggressive actions” toward US allies in both the South China Sea and East China Sea, while pretending to be the innocent victim of the aggression of others (or the target of the US pivot, which Beijing sees as the real source of the problem). Many were also again disappointed that China chose to send a lower ranking-officer to this gathering of the senior-most defense officials; while the defense minister does attend the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM+) meetings, in all but one instance, the PLA has been represented at Shangri-La by a deputy chief of the General Staff.

Hagel also strongly endorsed a “rules-based order [that] requires a strong, cooperative regional security architecture,” praising ASEAN and the ADMM+ and calling on the nations to “work together to provide rapid humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.” He further announced that he was asking USPACOM commander Adm. Sam Locklear to host his regional counterparts to discuss concrete ways to establish greater maritime security awareness and coordination.

Kerry’s reaffirmations

Secretary Kerry reinforced Washington’s commitment to regional security cooperation and the peaceful settlement of disputes during his sixth trip to the region. Kerry visited Myanmar on Aug. 9–10 to attend the annual ARF Ministerial Meeting and a Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI) Ministerial Meeting in Nay Pyi Taw. He also met Myanmar officials in the capital before traveling to Yangon to meet Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.

Not surprisingly, ARF discussions focused on the South China Sea. Kerry supported a Philippine proposal for a freeze on destabilizing actions in keeping with the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC), noting that a freeze would be “a way of actually locking into place the very promises that people have already made.” China rejected the proposal and it did not find its way into the final Chairman’s Statement. As they have for the past 12 years (to little avail), the ministers did support the “early conclusion to the code of conduct” which all parties keep promising to enact. Kerry pushed for its early implementation: “While we all share the hope that ASEAN and China will accelerate negotiations on a meaningful code of conduct, we think the urgency of developments means that it is not enough simply to wait for that solution to arrive. Obvious dangers arise during waiting time. The claimants need to take steps now to lower the temperature.”

He also noted that the failure of all claimants to clarify their claims adds to the uncertainty, which in turn “limits the prospect for a mutually agreeable resolution or equitable joint development arrangements. But let me be clear: We believe the obligation to clarify claims in keeping with international law applies to all claimants, not just China.” Despite this attempt to appear even-handed, Beijing accused Kerry of once again instigating problems, insisting that outside interference was not wanted or helpful; most other ARF participants disagreed, recognizing that tensions in this vital waterway could affect all.

The problem with the freeze proposal is that each of the parties claims (with some justification) that the others have been cheating and feels that they have a right to catch up or even the score. That’s why the more sensible proposal is not a freeze per se but a rollback to the status quo ante, to what each state possessed as of the signing of the DOC in 2002. Instead of challenging the claimants to accept a Washington or Philippine proposal, they should just be asked to honor their own commitments made under article five of the DOC: “The Parties undertake to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability including, among others, refraining from action of inhabiting on the presently uninhabited islands, reefs, shoals, cays, and other features and to handle their differences in a constructive manner.”

While in Nay Pyi Taw, Kerry also attended the Seventh Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI) Ministerial Meeting. According to a State Department Media Note, the LMI is the region’s only forum for addressing cross-border development and policy challenges facing the five Lower Mekong partner countries: Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam. Initiated by then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in 2009, the LMI holds four official events and many project and program events annually across six pillar areas: Agriculture and Food Security, Connectivity, Education, Energy Security, Environment and Water, and Health, as well as cross-cutting areas such as Women’s Empowerment and Gender Equality and the Water, Energy, and Food Security Nexus. At this year’s meeting, the ministers announced a renewed Lower Mekong Initiative program for the next five years that will focus the organization on its most successful, in-demand signature programs.

Kerry also met bilaterally with Myanmar officials, praising Nay Pyi Taw for its efforts in chairing ASEAN this year, duties that will culminate in November’s East Asia Summit (EAS), which will bring President Obama back to Myanmar for his second visit. He kept the pressure on for continued political and constitutional reform and progress in dealing with serious ethnic problems: “I made it very clear that these are important changes that need to take place in the course of the evolution of Myanmar into a democracy,” Kerry stressed. “This is not about Burma meeting US demands, it’s about Burma meeting the potential of the country. It will not be able to reach its full potential … unless they address the issues that exist right here at home.” The US focus continues to be on the 2015 elections and whether Daw Suu will be allowed to run for the presidency: “next year’s election will absolutely be a benchmark moment for the whole world to assess the direction Burma is moving in.”

2+2 down under

The US and Australia marked the 29^th anniversary of the AusMin process when Secretary of State Kerry and Defense Secretary Hagel met counterparts Minister for Foreign Affairs Julie Bishop and Minister for Defence Sen. David Johnston in Sydney on Aug. 12. Their talks covered regional and global security concerns, ranging from Afghanistan to the Ukraine, and highlighted the allies’ determination to collaborate on strategic planning, to develop common approaches to regional security challenges, and to harness opportunities for greater defense cooperation across the Asia Pacific and Indian Ocean regions. The two governments see their alliance as a cornerstone of larger efforts to build capacity, work with other allies and partners on shared security concerns, and increase interoperability among defense forces.

The biggest takeaway of the meeting was the conclusion of a 25-year pact that would more than double the number of US troops rotating through Darwin from the current 1,200 to around 2,500 by 2017. It also calls for an expansion of cooperation on ballistic missile defense systems. All participants denied that the agreement was aimed at any particular country, Hagel spoke for the group when he said that it will “expand our regional cooperation here in the Asia-Pacific from engagement with [the Association of Southeast Asian Nations] to the trilateral cooperation that we have been working on with Japan.”

Kerry’s island hopping

Secretary Kerry did some island hopping on his way home from Australia, stopping first in the Solomon Islands to commemorate the “stunning bravery” of the US Marines who, 62 years earlier, began the Guadalcanal campaign that served as the “turning point” of the war in the Pacific. He then traveled to Honolulu, where he spoke about the continued US commitment to Asia and the “new model” relationship with Beijing.

Kerry stressed that “America’s security and prosperity are closely and increasingly linked to the Asia Pacific. And that’s why President Obama began what is known as the rebalance to Asia in 2009. That’s why he’s asked me to redouble my own efforts in the region over the next two and half years.” He talked about four specific opportunities: creating sustainable economic growth, powering a clean energy revolution, promoting regional cooperation, and empowering people.

Responding to allegations that the US was retrenching or disengaging from Asia, Kerry argued that “nothing could be further from the truth.” While noting that the US is “more engaged and more active in more countries and more parts of the world than any time in American history,” he argued that the Obama administration “will never forget the long-term strategic imperatives for American interests . . . [and] nowhere are those strategic opportunities clearer or more compelling than in the Asia Pacific.”

Turning to Sino-US relations, he stressed that “we are committed to avoiding the trap of strategic rivalry and intent on forging a relationship in which we can broaden our cooperation on common interests and constructively manage our differences and disagreements. But make no mistake: This constructive relationship, this ‘new model’ relationship of great powers, is not going to happen simply by talking about it. It’s not going to happen by engaging in a slogan or pursuing a sphere of influence. It will be defined by more and better cooperation on shared challenges. And it will be defined by a mutual embrace of the rules, the norms, and institutions that have served both of our nations and the region so well.”

US-DPRK mutual condemnation society

During his Honolulu speech, as elsewhere during his trip, Kerry pulled no punches in dealing with the challenges posed by North Korea, condemning Pyongyang’s quest for nuclear weapons, its proliferation activities (which “pose a very serious threat to the United States, the region, and the world”), its pursuit of a nuclear-armed ballistic missile capability, and its “horrific human rights situation.” He praised the Report of the United Nations Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea “that revealed the utter, grotesque cruelty of North Korea’s system of labor camps and executions,” noting that “such deprivation of human dignity just has no place in the 21st century.”

Pyongyang begged to differ. The newspaper of the Workers Party of Korea called Kerry’s comments “clumsy and poor wordplay and mockery and insult to the Korean people.” Meanwhile, the North’s Rodong Sinmun went so far as to accuse the US of terrorist behavior: “Such harsh hostile moves pursued by the US against the DPRK for the last several decades are unethical and state-sponsored terrorism unprecedented in history.” Dismissing Washington’s offer for improved ties in return for denuclearization, Rodong Sinmun asserted that “the US has never wanted improved relations with the DPRK but worked hard to overthrow it by force of arms, waiting for a chance through procrastination.” So much for “strategic patience.”

Pyongyang also expressed its disgust for its sole ally and benefactor China following President Xi Jinping’s first visit to Seoul (without first visiting Pyongyang): “Some spineless countries are blindly following the stinking bottom of the US, also struggling to embrace Park Geun-hye, who came to a pathetic state of being.” On the surface at least, it would appear that the prospects for a resumption of Six-Party Talks appears pretty slim.

One never seems to know what goes on beneath the surface, however. According to unconfirmed ROK press reporting (citing unnamed multiple diplomatic sources), a group of US officials clandestinely traveled to Pyongyang in mid-August, reportedly to seek the release of three detained US citizens: Kenneth Bae, Miller Matthew Todd, and Jeffrey Edward Fowle. Administration officials have long hinted that their release could serve as one of the signs of “sincerity” necessary for Washington to consider re-instituting the Six-Party Talks. If true, the trip was apparently to no avail, with one source being quoted as saying “the US appears to have not gained any tangible results from the trip.”

The game may not be over, however. As we were preparing to go to press, the North allowed the three captives to hold unprecedented interviews with CNN. All three said that they wanted Washington to send an envoy to North Korea to help bring them home. That they remain chips in an apparent high-stakes poker game seems pretty clear; less clear is what game the North is trying to play and what it really seeks in return for their release.

The only potential “good news” to report is the lack of anticipated bad news. Speculation was running high earlier in the year that the North was preparing for its fourth nuclear test. While preparations for the test have apparently been completed, none was conducted over the past four months (and Don Zagoria is taking bets there will not be one this year). The North did conduct a number of short and medium range missile launches, especially to “commemorate” Xi’s visit to Seoul, but has also refrained from renewed testing of its long-range missiles. This could change, however. A major construction program under way at the North’s Sohae Satellite Launching Station since mid-2013, focused on upgrading facilities to handle larger, longer-range rockets with heavier payloads, appears to be nearing completion, suggesting that Pyongyang may be able to test longer-range rockets at its new launch site before the end of this year.

Japan’s collective self-defense

On July 1, the Japanese Cabinet reinterpreted the constitution to permit the exercise of the right of collective self-defense (CSD). While this is a domestic political development, it has implications for the US-Japan alliance and regional security, although the impact has been exaggerated: there is, as most observers point out, less than meets the eye. The limits are significant. Japan can act only when three conditions have been met: Tokyo can aid an ally with which it has a “very close relationship” if there is a threat to constitutional rights to life, liberty, and happiness of Japanese citizens. Second, there is no other diplomatic or negotiated means to protect both that nation and its citizens but through the use of military force. Third, the use of military force is kept to a “bare minimum.” Those three conditions would seem to severely constrict Japanese behavior. Moreover, the change must be followed by enabling legislation, which will likely take a couple of years to pass. Finally, Prime Minister Abe himself has said that the change will not lead to Japan fighting in foreign wars.

As the conditions make clear, the change in the interpretation will have the biggest impact on the US-Japan alliance. After all, the first qualifier is “aiding an ally with which it has a very close relationship,” and Japan’s only alliance is with the US. The two countries will now be able to train and plan together in new ways. In theory, the change should facilitate Japanese participation – from a distance; no troops will be deployed – in a contingency on the Korean Peninsula. Not surprisingly, Korean security planners are nervous about the change, mostly because they are not sure what it means. Japan has been slow to brief ROK counterparts – the blame for that goes both ways – but the lack of legislation is a good part of the problem. Tokyo needs to address ROK anxieties. China was particularly vocal in the run-up to the change, but the Foreign Ministry response was muted once the change was adopted by the Cabinet. Other nations are either unconcerned or welcome the decision. Australia, which has forged a strong security relationship with Japan and continues to strengthen that partnership, has been enthusiastic. Southeast Asian governments have been aggressively courted by the Abe government since it took office, and seem happy to accept security assistance, usually in the form of equipment and training. Proximity to China creates anxieties and those governments are eager to engage Tokyo – as long as that engagement does not require them to choose between Tokyo and Beijing.

Democratic pageants and pains

India. India held elections during April and May that yielded a landslide victory for the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and propelled Narendra Modi into the prime minister’s office. Modi, the chief minister of the state of Gujarat, is a Hindu nationalist who played up his can-do pro-business sentiment during the campaign. The BJP victory was expected with the Indian public fatigued by a decade of Congress Party rule. Sub-5 percent economic growth, high inflation, rampant corruption, and a sense that the party had lost its way all contributed to the BJP landslide: the party won 282 seats in the legislature, up from 116 in the previous assembly and 10 seats more than needed to claim a majority.

Modi has been a tireless traveler. He met Chinese President Xi Jinping at the BRICS Summit in July and visited Tokyo at the end of August. India figures prominently in Japan’s diplomatic agenda and there has been much speculation about the relationship between Modi and Japanese counterpart Abe Shinzo. They see each other as kindred spirits in intent and world view. Both are wary of Chinese intentions and eager to work together to check Beijing’s assertive behavior.

Indonesia. In a closely watched ballet, Jakarta Gov. Joko Widodo, known to most Indonesians as “Jokowi,” bested former Gen. Prabowo Subianto for the presidency, taking 53 percent of the vote to Prabowo’s 47 percent. The results are important for a number of reasons. First, there is the demonstration effect when Southeast Asia’s largest country holds a successful democratic election. That impact was magnified when Prabowo contested the results and was overruled by the courts; the readiness of him and his backers to accept that decision bodes well for Indonesian democracy. Similarly, Jokowi’s win is a victory for outsiders, a reminder that democracy should be for all Southeast Asians, not just political elites. Jokowi is a Muslim, but his support for tolerance of other religious faiths is an important signal amidst signs of growing intolerance for non-Muslims in Indonesia. Finally, his win allows the US to dodge a bullet as Prabowo had been banned from entering the US as a result of human rights violations by Special Forces under his command in 1998.

Thailand. By contrast, Thailand again made plain its difficulties with democracy. The downward spiral intensified with the Constitutional Court’s May decision that Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra abused her power in 2011 when she replaced the secretary general of the National Security Council, and ordered that she step down from office, along with all the members of her Cabinet that were in office at the time of the offense. A few days later, Gen. Prayuth Chan-ocha, head of the Royal Thai Army, launched a coup against the caretaker government, insisting that a military-led National Council for Peace and Order was the country’s only salvation.

The military assumed control of all offices in the national government and introduced internet censorship while rounding up its opponents and key officials in the former government. Less than a week after the coup, the Thai king appointed Gen. Prayuth to run the new government. An interim constitution was revealed in late July. It established a new legislature that formally named Prayuth prime minister a month later. The constitution also set up a provisional Cabinet along with a committee to draft a new constitution, as well as a reform council that would OK the new constitution. Significantly, the constitution also granted immunity to members of the military for any actions they made during or after the coup. The government has banned public criticism of the interim constitution, amid fears that the new document will be drafted to ensure that Thaksin’s power and influence are eradicated.

At CICA, Xi talks NASC, and the BRICS join the chorus

While US officials played up the US “rebalance” to Asia, China’s President Xi Jinping provided his own ideas about regional security order in early May. At the Summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA) held in Shanghai, Xi outlined his “New Asian Security Concept” (NASC). The CICA is a little-known organization, established in 1999, with a secretariat in Almaty, Kazakhstan, and a current membership of 26 member states, 7 observer states, and 4 observer organizations. A leader-level summit is held every four years: it was this meeting at which Xi unveiled his thinking.

The NASC draws on the “New Security Concept” (NSC) that Beijing advanced in the late 1990s, which had the core concepts of “mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, and coordination.” The NSC was an attempt to frame Chinese foreign and security policy as Beijing engaged more regional partners and sought to counter fears of its outreach and the modernization of US alliances in Asia.  Implicit in this framework is a criticism of alliances, which are for Chinese “a Cold War legacy,” but also inappropriate since they privilege allies and are therefore most assuredly not based on “mutual trust” or “equality.”

Noting that “regional security cooperation has reached a new phase,” Xi called on the assembled grandees – Vladimir Putin and Ban Ki-moon among them – to set up a new regional security architecture, with the New Asian Security Concept at its core. The NASC is “common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable” security for Asia and, once again, demands that countries move on from the “old era of Cold War and zero-sum mentality.” Curiously for an organization that only includes five East Asian nations among its membership – Cambodia, China, Mongolia, South Korea, and Vietnam (Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, and the Philippines are observers) – Xi said that “it is for the people of Asia to run the affairs of Asia, solve the problems of Asia and uphold the security of Asia.” (He did soften the statement a bit by noting that Asia must cooperate with other countries elsewhere in the world, but the overall tone did alarm many who don’t share Xi’s thinking.)

The NASC also emphasizes development, which Xi called “the greatest security and the master key to regional security issues.” To put some meat on the bones of that statement, Xi along with four other leaders at the BRICS Summit that was held in Brazil this summer, announced the decision to open the New Development Bank. Two years of discussion produced a compromise with something for everyone: headquartered in Shanghai, the first president will come from India, the first chair of the Board of Governors will come from Russia, the first chair of the Board of Directors will come from Brazil, and a regional center will be set up in South Africa. Initial authorized capital will be $100 billion with initial subscribed capital of $50 billion, apportioned evenly among all founding members. The bank will focus on infrastructure and development projects, with the first loans going out in 2016. Critics note that initial lending will be just under $3.5 billion, a proverbial drop in the bucket. Moreover, the founders say the bank will “complement existing international arrangements.” That should quell the breathless speculation about a challenge to existing global governance mechanisms, even if the BRICS leadership is happy to see their efforts as such.

TPP reaches the final stretch

In Honolulu, Secretary Kerry praised the “state-of-the-art” Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) as representing “a really an exciting new chapter in the long history of America’s mutually beneficial trade partnerships with the countries of the Asia Pacific.” Kerry’s enthusiasm notwithstanding, there have been few signs of progress in recent months. That is partly because the negotiations are being very closely held. While this may make it harder for critics to pick a deal apart, it will mean that there will be howls when the agreement is unveiled. Given the resistance from President Obama’s own Democratic Party – the biggest hurdle for any deal, although GOP support is increasingly subject to challenge – this is a dangerous strategy. Obama needs Trade Promotion Authority to get TPP approved and holding back details of what would be contentious in the best of circumstances is likely to only increase resistance.

The first hurdle, however, is forging a deal. The most positive sign thus far is silence; if talks weren’t progressing there would be denunciations and angry finger pointing over negotiations that failed. Instead, senior and working-level discussions proceeded apace, with the highlights of this reporting period (such as they were) being a two-day ministerial in Singapore in early May that “made progress in market access discussions and advanced outstanding rules issues,” and a 10-day negotiators’ meeting in Ottawa in July that “discussed labor, state-owned enterprises, services, investment, and all areas of market access, among others. These discussions were concurrent with a small number of working-level, technical group meetings held with the objective of advancing remaining rules.”

This is all in lead-up to a meeting of top negotiators in Hanoi that will convene in early September to work out technical problems. Japan’s Jiji press reported that negotiators will try to lay a foundation for political decisions that could (should?) be made when the 12 TPP nations hold a ministerial meeting in October. The dates of the ministerial are not set in stone, but it is necessary if a final deal is to be realized as anticipated in November. Chris Nelson cites Robert Wang, the senior US official for APEC, to note that Obama is expected to launch a “roadmap” to a Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific when he goes to Beijing in November for the annual Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Leaders Meeting. All in all, our next report should be a doozy.