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Japan - Korea

May — Dec 2024
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Trump 2.0, South Korea’s Martial Law, and Future of Seoul-Tokyo Relations

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Andy Lim
Associate Fellow, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Ji-Young Lee
American University

The year 2025 marks the 60th anniversary of the normalization of diplomatic relations between Seoul and Tokyo. It was originally expected to be a milestone year for bilateral ties and a fitting culmination of nearly three years of hard work by two leaders: President Yoon Suk Yeol and former Prime Minister Kishida Fumio. But that outlook now seems hung in the balance, with new unknowns on the horizon—both expected and unexpected. In this final issue on Japan-Korea relations, we discuss the key factors that are likely to impact the future of bilateral ties and the Camp David trilateral in four major areas: 1) Trump 2.0, 2) political uncertainty in Seoul, 3) weak political support in Tokyo, and 4) resurfacing history issues. The final months of 2024 have brought new unknowns in the shape of leadership changes in the United States, Japan, and potentially South Korea. It is now possible that come January 2025, the leadership trio—President Biden, Prime Minister Kishida, and President Yoon that has made the Korea-Japan rapprochement and the unprecedented trilateral partnership possible will be gone from office. 

What happens next is impossible to predict, but one hopes that the hard-fought and laboriously planned institutionalization of bilateral and trilateral ties will withstand these changes in leadership. This will be the first true test for Seoul-Tokyo-Washington trilateral partnership since the Camp David summit in August 2023. 

Japan’s new prime minister, Ishiba Shigeru, and President Yoon agreed in mid-November to “further elevate the bilateral relationship to new heights” towards 2025 and to promote comprehensive cooperation in areas such as “politics, security, economy, culture and social security.” However, following President Yoon’s declaration of martial law on Dec. 3, the future of Seoul-Tokyo relations faces a great deal of uncertainty. Given that it was President Yoon’s political will that initially facilitated rapproachment, depending on what happens to his political future and who comes into office in South Korea, Seoul-Tokyo relations may experience challenges. While conflicts over long-standing history issues have been consciously minimized during this period of rapproachment, they have not gone away, as demonstrated by their inability to reach a consensus on a joint event on the controversial Sado mine.

Trump 2.0 and US alliances with Seoul and Tokyo

Figure 1 President Yoon Suk Yeol shakes hands with Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba during a bilateral meeting at a hotel in Vientiane, Laos, Thursday. Photo: Yonhap

When thinking about the future of Japan-Korea relations, the most important events in 2024 revolve around (potential) changes in leadership—one expected (the US), one mostly unexpected (Japan), and one possible yet totally unexpected (South Korea). The 2024 US presidential election and the re-election of Donald Trump has re-introduced uncertainty into the region, casting a shadow of anxiety not only over bilateral Japan-Korea relations but also the future of trilateral cooperation. Foreign policy did not play a big role in this election. But candidates presented starkly different visions regarding US priorities and values. These differences would ultimately influence the fate of the liberal international order, within which the Camp David trilateral cooperation drives its significance.

Despite the unexpected withdrawal of President Biden from re-election, Kamala Harris’ candidacy was largely seen as a continuation of his administration’s key policies—the institutionalization of trilateral US-Korea-Japan relations and the strengthening of Washington’s traditional alliances with Japan and South Korea. In contrast, no one truly knows what the former President Trump will do. If history is any guide, hiss approach is likely to make these relations more transactional, with less focus on common values.  

At the end of the Cold War, a major debate emerged within the US over whether to continue stationing American forces in Asia. Some questioned why the US should bear the cost of defending wealthy Asian countries. Ultimately, the US maintained its presence, guided by the famous rationale put forward by Joseph Nye, then assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, who argued that “security is like oxygen—you tend not to notice it until you begin to lose it, but once that occurs, there is nothing else you will think about.” Fundamentally, Trump does not share this perspective on security. Instead, he views it as just another business transaction.

For both Tokyo and Seoul, there is growing concern about being in Trump’s crosshairs, as they may fail to meet two of his sacrosanct priorities—defense spending and trade balance. In the words of one expert, both countries are in the “danger zone” because they have large trade surpluses with the US, and spend less than 3% of their GDP on defense. This belief has been consistent with Trump’s worldview since the 1990s, with a clear message that it does not matter whether you are an ally or an adversary, it’s America first. There are concerns he will ask for the allies to pay more. Furthermore, according to another expert privy to conversations with Japanese officials in Tokyo, the new Trump team might even add two more conditions: how many US Treasury securities they have purchased and whether they manipulate their currency.

If Trump’s first term is any clues about his second, US alliances with Seoul and Tokyo are likely to experience the “fear of abandonment”—the anxiety that Washington might not be a reliable ally for their national security. Strong deterrence against North Korea is a key area that has repeatedly united Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington. But this may not be taken for granted under a Trump 2.0 administration. In the near term, trilateral multidomain military exercises like the newly-introduced Freedom Edge may be curtailed or stopped because it is expensive. 

A remote but plausible development under a Trump 2.0 administration is an intensified discussion of US troop withdrawals from South Korea. In an interview with a South Korean news outlet Yonhap, Elbridge Colby, former deputy assistant secretary of defense for strategy and force development during Trump’s first term—who is being discussed as a potential defense secretary—said, “South Korea is going to have to take primary, essentially overwhelming responsibility for its own self-defense against North Korea because we don’t have a military that can fight North Korea and then be ready to fight China.” He further noted, “The fundamental fact is that North Korea is not a primary threat to the US. It would not be rational to lose multiple American cities to just deal with North Korea.” 

If Washington under Trump 2.0 sends a signal reflecting this stance, this could possibly push South Korea to search for alternative security arrangements. Such alternatives may ultimately result in less optimal outcomes from the perspective of the US-South Korea alliance. Another issue is more political. Trump said little about North Korea during his campaign. But if he chooses to directly engage with Kim Jong Un, while sidelining South Korea, this is not a good signal from the perspective of alliance management. 

Therefore, Trump’s victory on Nov. 5 immediately created some consternation in both Seoul and Tokyo, with both sides scrambling to find ways to reach the re-elected president’s orbit and to brush up on their personal charm. Planning for the return of Trump to the White House has been at the top of every world leader’s mind since the election. Without the effective Trump whisperer Abe Shinzo, Japan might find it harder the second time around. But Prime Minister Ishiba may find a way to connect with Trump enough to make sure Japanese equities for the next four years are protected. And over in South Korea, President Yoon Suk Yeol reportedly restarted practicing golf in an attempt to connect personally with Trump, an avid golfer. 

Martial Law and Political Uncertainty in South Korea

Figure 2 South Korean soldiers outside the National Assembly in Seoul in the early hours of Wednesday. Images Photo: Chung Sung-Jun/Getty

The most unexpected development is the inexplicable and short-lived martial law on Dec. 3 in South Korea. In and outside the country, people are genuinely baffled as to why President Yoon suddenly declared martial law, as there was no apparent reason that the public can understand as a basis for such a drastic move. Martial law, introduced in 1948, was last imposed in 1979 before South Korea’s democratization. For many South Koreans, martial law is a reminder of the country’s authoritarian past, thus prompting many to ask “Are we back to the 1970s before democratization?” Having achieved democratization through years of grassroots struggle, the move caused strong negative reactions against the backdrop of immense pride that South Koreans have for their democracy. Prior to Yoon’s declaration of maritial law, criticism of his leadership has been mounting within South Korea, largely driven by scandals. Now, impeachment discussions have intensified. Calls for his resignation have grown louder. His political future is highly uncertain. 

Yoon’s action, which was purely aimed at a domestic issue—the opposition—has created consequences that reverberates far beyond the peninsula, at a time when the regional threat from China, North Korea, and Russia continues to grow. The reverberating effects of that event have left Seoul incapacitated at a critical time not just in domestic politics but in regional relations, with new governments in both Washington and Tokyo. While the quick overturning of the martial law is a resounding victory for democracy and the democratic process, the policy and leadership paralysis as Korea figures out a way forward can lead to “Korea passing” as other regional actors move ahead on critical issues in the new year. 

With the political uncertainty in Seoul, all this leads to the pressing question of who will shepherd this very important but prickly bilateral relationship moving forward. The recent improvement in Seoul-Tokyo relations was largely the work of President Yoon, which also laid the groundwork for the Camp David trilateral cooperation. Without him in the picture, the future of Japan-Korea relations becomes highly uncertain. In a hypothetical scenario where South Korea’s main opposition leader, Lee Jae-myung, assumes office, the rapprochement between Seoul and Tokyo would likely come to an end. Lee and his supporters would be expected to prioritize demands for Japan to address unresolved historical issues, potentially undoing recent progress in bilateral relations.

In particular, beneath the public debate over the constitutionality, rationale, and implications of the short-lived martial law declaration, there was one paragraph that caught our and others’ attention in the conclusion of the first impeachment motion submitted by the six South Korean opposition parties on Dec. 4. The paragraph read as follows: 

“In addition, under the guise of so-called “value diplomacy,” Yoon has neglected geopolitical balance, antagonizing North Korea, China, and Russia, adhering to a bizarre Japan-centered foreign policy, and appointing pro-Japan individuals to key government positions, thereby causing isolation in Northeast Asia and triggering a crisis of war, abandoning his duty to protect national security and the people.”

The line “bizarre Japan-centered” foreign policy and references to “pro-Japan individuals” clearly illustrates what the opposition party thinks about Yoon’s policy to improve relations with Tokyo. This has been a long-standing criticism of Yoon’s foreign policy, for being too pro-Japan, overly dependent on the US, and too anti-China and anti-North Korea. We have pointed out before that Yoon’s “low-reward unpopular decision” to reconcile with Japan required a lot of political capital, but it is still very stark to see a disagreement over foreign policy be included in a lengthy impeachment bill focused primarily on domestic issues. 

While this paragraph is no longer present in the second impeachment motion, it gave us a preview into what an opposition-run South Korean presidency might do in terms of foreign policy. If the current front-runner and Democratic Party leader Lee Jae-myung wins, we might see a reversal in key positions on China, Japan, North Korea, and the US. 

Based on his previous public statements, we cannot discount the possibility of an abrogation of the budding US-Korea-Japan trilateral (which might have happened anyway under Trump 2.0), a bypassing of Japan, and a more balanced and even conciliatory approach to China and North Korea. Lee has in the past called a trilateral military alliance “unnecessary” because its exacerbates instability on the peninsula and forces North Korea-China-Russia to align more closely, and have argued forcefully for a more “pragmatic” approach in US-China competition. Lee could possibly come into office in 2025 with a very different geopolitical environment than Yoon’s in 2022, with a revived North Korea-China-Russia axis, a de facto military alliance between its two neighbors in North Korea and Russia, and a retrenched United States. 

All of this does not bode well for Japan and South Korea, especially with the speed at which the returning US president might shake things up at the start of his second term. People who are worried about the first 100 days of the Trump presidency might now need to buckle up for the first 100 hours as there are now expectations that the changes coming out of the White House will be breakneck and immediate. For South Korea, unfortunately, there might not be a leader definitively in charge on Jan. 21 to be able to respond to Trump’s actions, or to make that all-important personal connection with him. 

As of this writing, President Yoon have vowed to “fight to the end” for a chance to make his case in court during an impeachment hearing. Under this timeline, the impeachment process can take up to six months to resolve in court (to remove or reinstate him), and then a two-month period before a presidential election can be held. We are potentially looking at a dire situation where Korea might be politically unstable and leaderless until August 2025. That’s a long time in any political calendar, and for Seoul, even if it successfully defends its democracy, it might re-emerge much weaker regionally and internationally as the rest of the world moves on. 

Ishiba and Weak Political Support in Japan

Figure 3 Shigeru Ishiba, the newly elected leader of Japan’s ruling party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) poses in the party leader’s office after the LDP leadership election Photo: REUTERS/Kim Kyung-Hoon/Pool

 Another change is the decision by Kishida Fumio to resign in mid-August ahead of the LDP party election in September. The result was not a total surprise, given a series of domestic setbacks for him this year: political fundraising scandal, electoral defeats and consistently poor approval ratings (below 30%). After nearly three years as Prime Minister, Kishida is leaving behind a clear foreign and security policy legacy—increasing defense spending to nearly 2%, reorienting efforts to improve Japan’s security environment, delivering strong support for Ukraine, and most importantly, pushing for rapprochement with Korea. This legacy was apropos of someone who served as Japan’s longest serving foreign minister in the postwar period. As we have discussed often, leaders dictate policy, and it takes two leaders to tango. Kishida’s support for improving prickly Japan-Korea relations—coupled with like-mindedness from Yoon—made Camp David and rapprochement possible. While regional relations lost a stalwart champion in Kishida this fall, his replacement—the longtime LDP politician and former defense minister Ishiba—is likely to follow a similar well-trodden path in foreign policy. 

Ishiba Shigeru, a man who famously ran for LDP leadership four times before succeeding on the fifth try, came into office in October 2024 after winning a closely-contested leadership contest with a well-documented track record as a defense hawk and some interesting ideas for North Korea and regional relations. While early talks of an “Asian version of NATO” and nuclear sharing has subsided after initial pushback—his idea of working with Pyongyang directly might gain some traction if President Trump resumes his bromance with Kim Jong Un. His plan to establish liaison offices in both capitals, while not novel, has seen some opposition from families of abductees. For the time being however, the liaison office idea has also been placed on the backburner, as he reaffirmed during a November 2024 national rally on the abduction issue the standard Japanese policy of normalizing relations with North Korea by first resolving the outstanding abduction, nuclear and missile issues. During that speech, he also reiterated his openness to a summit with the North Korean leader and even implored Kim Jong Un “not to miss this opportunity.” 

Before the political debacle in South Korea, Ishiba had already signaled his intention to continue the shuttle diplomacy of his predecessor and to press ahead with efforts to further improve bilateral relations. Ishiba and Yoon have already met twice, once on the sidelines of the ASEAN summit in Laos, and again on the sidelines of the APEC Summit in Peru—plus holding the first and last trilateral in the current leader configuration. During their October and November meetings, the two leaders had agreed to “further elevate” the bilateral relations in preparation for the important 2025 anniversary. In late November, there were rumblings of a potential January 2025 visit to Seoul by Ishiba. This early visit would have kickstarted an important year for the bilateral relations, the 60th anniversary of normalization. There were already speculations earlier this year that the two leaders—then Kishida and Yoon—might make a “future-oriented” joint statement to commemorate the occasion. Furthermore, there were additional plans for senior Japanese officials to visit Korea in December, including a bipartisan group of lawmakers from the Korea-Japan Parliamentary Federation in mid-December to be led by former Prime Minister Suga Yoshihide, and an end of the year visit by Japanese Defense Minister Nakatani Gen, which would have been the first visit in nine years. 

But all those plans were unceremoniously shelved after the shocking situation in Seoul, with Prime Minister Ishiba saying he is watching the developments with “particular and grave” concern. US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin similarly cancelled a planned stop in Korea—part of his last Asia trip with stops in both Tokyo and Seoul to reassure and commit to trilateralism before a Trump transition. Other trilateral efforts planned for December were also casualties of this “unforeseen circumstance,” including a session of the Nuclear Consultative Group (plus a related exercise) and a trilateral forum on women’s economic empowerment. With Ishiba’s January visit called off at the time of this writing, there are increasingly growing concerns that shuttle diplomacy between the two neighbors will become difficult for the time being until the domestic situation in Seoul is resolved. While it is too early to rule out any breakthroughs for 2025, what is certain now is that the political turmoil in Seoul has thrown off course a carefully calibrated transition and shifted tailwinds into headwinds for the foreseeable future. 

Resurfacing History Issues

A kerfuffle over the commemoration of the controversial Sado mine in November revealed the limits of foreign policy objectives over deep rooted historical grievances. The two sides were unable to reach a consensus on a joint event, and instead held two separate events. Moreover, ritual offerings by Japanese leaders to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine remains a perennial problem, though the decision by Ishiba to send an offering, instead of visiting in person in October revealed that he will likely be more cautious in this aspect, unlike what some more conversative members of his party such as Takaichi Sanae—who visited in person—might want from him. Experts have pointed out that other historical problems, including the potential depletion of third-party reimbursement for forced labor victims might resurface in the coming year. As we pointed out last year, a binational survey showed that there remain three major problems for a true “future-oriented” relations, all of which revolved around the question of history: resolving historical disputes; addressing Dokdo/Takeshima; and improving historical perceptions and education. 

Figure 4 President Yoon Suk Yeol hold hands with Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba, fourth from right, and Chinese Premier Li Qiang, second from right, during the 27th ASEAN Plus Three Summit held at the National Convention Center in Vientiane, Laos, Thursday. From left are Thai Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin, Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh, President Yoon, Ishiba, Laotian Prime Minister Sonexay Siphandone, Li and Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim. Photo: Yonhap

And finally, Prime Minister Ishiba will meander into the new year with weak political support, losing a majority in the October parliamentary election, and surviving a rare November run-off. The results meant that for the time being, Ishiba will need to focus inwardly on fixing the Japanese economy and addressing voters’ concerns over political scandals. He will not have the wherewithal to focus outwardly anyway because without a parliamentary majority, it would have been difficult to pass some of his bolder foreign policies. The situation in Korea also makes it much harder for any positive developments on either side, setting up an unfortunate lost opportunity in an anniversary year in 2025.

May 8, 2024: South Korean Minister of Science and ICT Lee Jong-ho vows to protect Korean companies from “unfair treatment” in the midst of Japan’s pressure on LY Corp. and Naver Corp. 

May 10, 2024: Top nuclear envoys of Japan, South Korea, and the United States meet in Tokyo to discuss the North Korean threat and its growing military cooperation with Russia. 

May 17, 2024: New Japanese ambassador to South Korea Mizushima Koichi arrives in Seoul for his new posting. 

May 21, 2024: South Korean and Japanese police chiefs agree to improve joint responses to security and cyberthreats during their meeting in Tokyo, the first talks in fourteen years. 

May 22, 2024: South Korean and Japanese foreign ministers speak on the phone to discuss the upcoming trilateral leader summit with China taking place in Seoul. 

May 26, 2024: South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol and Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio meet in Seoul on the sidelines of their trilateral with China and agree to make a “historic leap” in bilateral relations ahead of the 60th anniversary of normalization in 2025.  

May 28, 2024: Top nuclear envoys of Japan, South Korea and the United States speak on the phone and condemn North Korea’s latest satellite test. 

May 30, 2024: Top nuclear envoys of Japan, South Korea and the United States discuss efforts to coordinate responses to the latest North Korean ballistic missile test. 

May 31, 2024: South Korean First Vice Foreign Minister Kim Hong-kyun, Japanese Vice Foreign Minister Okano Masataka and US Deputy Secretary of State hold a trilateral meeting in Virgina to discuss the North Korean threat and efforts to create a trilateral secretariat.  

June 1, 2024: South Korean Minister of National Defense Shin Won-shik and his Japanese counterpart Kihara Minoru agree to prevent a repeat of a 2018 maritime incident over a Japanese patrol aircraft and South Korean warship on the sidelines of the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore. 

June 6,  2024: Japan, South Korea, and the United States hold the fourth economic security dialogue in San Diego to discuss cooperation on supply chains and emerging technologies. 

June 20, 2024: Appellate division of the Seoul Central District Court reverses a district court ruling and rules that Japan’s Kumagai Gumi have to pay 100 million Korean won ($72,200) to the bereaved family of a South Korean forced laborer. 

June 24, 2024: Japan, South Korea, and the United States release a joint statement condemning the deepening North Korea-Russia military cooperation after Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a “comprehensive strategic partnership” treaty during his visit to North Korea. 

June 25, 2024: South Korean and Japanese finance ministers meet for the 9th Korea-Japan finance dialogue in Seoul and agree to take “appropriate actions” against excessive currency volatility. 

June 25, 2024: South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol visits the USS Theodore Roosevelt, an aircraft carrier participating in the first ever, trilateral multi-domain Freedom Edge exercise.

June 26, 2024: Top nuclear envoys of Japan, South Korea and the United States discuss on the phone coordination on North Korea’s latest ballistic missile launch. 

June 27, 2024: Japan, South Korea, and the United States hold the first ever, trilateral multi-domain Freedom Edge exercise. 

June 27, 2024: Japan, South Korea and the United States launch a trilateral ministerial industry-commerce meeting in Washington, DC to elevate economic cooperation on key technologies, supply chains and economic security issues. 

June 28, 2024: South Korean First Vice Foreign Minister Kim Hong-kyun and Japanese Vice Foreign Minister Okano Masataka meet in Tokyo to reaffirm coordination on dealing with North Korea-Russia cooperation and improving trilateral cooperation. 

July 5, 2024: South Korean Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul meets new Japanese ambassador to South Korea Mizushima Koichi to discuss bilateral cooperation. 

July 9, 2024: Gwangju District Court rules that Japan’s Nippon Coke & Engineering have to pay compensation ranging from 13 million Korean won ($9,400) to 100 million Korean won to 11 family members of seven South Korean forced laborers. 

July 10, 2024: South Korea and Japan hold the first director general-level defense meeting in Tokyo for the first time in nine years, since the last one in August 2015. 

July 10, 2024: South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol and Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio meet on the sidelines of the NATO summit in Washington, DC and agree to increase security cooperation with NATO to tackle the deepening military cooperation between North Korea and Russia. 

July 12, 2024: South Korean foreign ministry asks Japan to drop its territorial claims to the disputed Dokdo/Takeshima islets after it was included in the 2024 defense white paper. 

July 18, 2024: The chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of Japan, South Korea and the United States agree to expand the trilateral multi-domain Freedom Edge exercise during a meeting in Seoul, South Korea. 

July 27, 2024: Japan’s Sado gold mine is officially listed as a UNESCO World Heritage Site after Japan and South Korea agree on conditions to reflect the “entire history.” 

July 28, 2024: Defense ministers of Japan, South Korea and the United States sign a Memorandum of Cooperation on the Trilateral Security Cooperation Framework, formalizing trilateral security cooperation.

July 31. 2024: South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol names Park Cheol-hee, the head of the Korea National Diplomatic Academy and a Japan expert as his new ambassador to Japan. 

Aug. 6, 2024: South Korean foreign ministry says Japan refused to use the term “forced” in the museum exhibits for the Sado mine, which was listed as a UNESCO World Heritage Site.

Aug. 9, 2024: Top diplomats from Japan, South Korea and the United States discuss on the phone the need for China to “use its influence” with North Korea to stop its threat. 

Aug. 15, 2024: South Korean foreign ministry voices “deep regret” over Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio’s ritual offering to the Yasukuni Shrine.

Aug. 18, 2024: Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio, South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol and United States President Joe Biden issue a joint statement celebrating progress made in trilateral cooperation since the Camp David summit a year ago. 

Aug. 21, 2024: South Korean Finance Minister Choi Sang-mok meets new Japanese ambassador to South Korea Mizushima Koichi to discuss strengthening bilateral economic cooperation. 

Aug. 22, 2024: The appellate division of the Seoul Central District Court reverses a district court ruling and rules that Japan’s Nippon Steel Corp. have to pay compensation of 100 million Korean won ($74,750) to four children of a deceased South Korean forced laborer. 

Aug. 29, 2024: South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol reaffirms that the trilateral security cooperation with Japan and US will continue despite leadership changes. 

Aug. 30, 2024: Seoul Central District Court rules that Japan’s Mitsubishi Materials Corp. have to compensate five South Korean forced laborers. 

Sept. 5, 2024: Seoul High Court reverses a district court ruling and rules that Japan’s Nishimatsu Construction Co. need to pay 20 million Korean won ($15,000) to one of the five forced laborers, and 13 million won each to the four others.

Sept. 6, 2024: South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol and Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio meet in Seoul for the last time to discuss maintaining positive momentum in bilateral relations. This was the 12th and last summit meeting between the two leaders. 

Sept. 6, 2024: During the third meeting of the Trilateral Diplomatic Working Group, diplomats from Japan, South Korea and the United States discuss sanctions and private industry efforts to deal with the North Korean cyber threat. 

Sept. 7, 2024: A former South Korean comfort woman passes away, leaving only eight officially registered surviving victims. 

Sept. 10, 2024: During the 15th Defense Trilateral Talks in Seoul, top defense officials from Japan, South Korea and the US agree to hold the second round of the trilateral, multidomain Freedom Edge military exercise in the near future.

Sept. 12, 2024: Nuclear envoys of Japan, South Korea and US discuss on the phone North Korea’s latest short-range missile launch. 

Sept. 12, 2024: Seoul Central District Court orders the North Korean government to pay 100 million Korean won ($74,700) each to five former Korean Japanese people who repatriated to North Korea as part of the “paradise on Earth” propaganda program. 

Sept. 24, 2024: Foreign ministers of Japan, South Korea and the United States meet on the sidelines of the UNGA in New York to discuss trilateral cooperation, with US Secretary of State Antony Blinken calling it “vital” despite political transitions in Japan and the US. 

Sept. 25, 2024: South Korean Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul asks UNESCO Director-General Audrey Azoulay on the sidelines of the UNGA in New York to monitor Japan’s compliance on the Sado mine, which was listed as a UNESCO World Heritage Site. 

Sept. 27, 2024: South Korea and Japan hold discussions on jointly developing an underwater continental shelf. 

Oct. 4, 2024: South Korean Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul holds his first phone call with his new Japanese counterpart Iwaya Takeshi to discuss bilateral ties. 

Oct. 10, 2024: South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol and Japanese Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru meet for the first time on the sidelines of the ASEAN Summit Meeting in Laos and discuss ways to further elevate the bilateral relationship.

Oct. 10, 2024: Senior diplomats from Japan, South Korea and the United States discuss trilateral cooperation to counter the North Korean threat. 

Oct. 10, 2024: South Korean Minister of National Defense Kim Yong-hyun hold his first teleconference with his new Japanese counterpart Nakatani Gen. 

Oct. 16, 2024: Japan, South Korea, and the United States launch a new joint multilateral mechanism to monitor North Korean sanctions called the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team (MSMT), comprising of 11 countries. 

Oct. 17, 2024: South Korean foreign ministry voices “deep regret” over Japanese Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru’s ritual offering to the Yasukuni Shrine. 

Oct. 17, 2024: South Korean first vice foreign minister Kim Hong-kyun and Japanese vice foreign minister Okano Masataka meet in Seoul to discuss bilateral cooperation and North Korea. 

Oct. 18, 2024: Federation of Korean Industries (FKI) and the Japan Business Federation (Keidanren) co-host the 31st Korea-Japan Business Council in Seoul. 

Oct. 18, 2024: Japan, South Korea, and the United States issue a joint statement after their first trilateral meeting on North Korean human rights in Washington, DC. 

Oct. 23, 2024: Yang Geum-deok, a South Korean forced laborer and one of the 15 original plaintiffs that won the 2018 Supreme Court case, accepts the government-led compensation plan, making her the 12th person to accept the package. 

Oct. 25, 2024: South Korean Finance Minister Choi Sang-mok meets his new Japanese counterpart, Kato Katsunobu in Washington, DC on the sidelines of the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors Meeting. 

Oct. 26, 2024: National security advisors from Japan, South Korea, and the United States hold a trilateral meeting in Washington to discuss the North Korean troop deployment to Russia and express “grave concern.” 

Oct. 30, 2024: Third and last surviving South Korean forced laborer accepts a government-led compensation package. 

Nov. 3, 2024: Japan, South Korea and the United States hold a combined air drill with a B-1B bomber in response to a recent North Korean ICBM launch. 

Nov. 7, 2024: Foreign ministers from 10 countries including Japan, South Korea, the United States plus the European Union release a joint statement expressing “grave concerns” over the North Korean troop deployment to Russia.  

Nov. 8, 2024: Vice defense ministers from Japan and South Korea hold talks in Seoul to discuss cooperation on responding to North Korea-Russia military cooperation. 

Nov. 15, 2024: Japan, South Korea, and the United States wrap up the second round of the trilateral, multidomain Freedom Edge military exercise. The exercise included various warships and aircraft, including the USS George Washington aircraft carrier, and F-35 stealth fighters from Korea and the US. 

Nov. 15, 2024: South Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs Cho Tae-yul and Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Iwaya Takeshi meet on the sidelines of the APEC Summit in Lima, Peru to discuss bilateral cooperation. This was their first meeting since Ishiba Shigeru became the new Japanese prime minister in October. 

Nov 16, 2024: South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol and Japanese Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru meet on the sidelines of the APEC Leaders’ Meetings in Lima, Peru and discuss ways to further elevate the bilateral relationship. They also hold a trilateral meeting with US President Joe Biden to discuss cooperation. 

Nov 17, 2024: The total number of air passengers between South Korea and Japan for the months of January to October 2024 exceeds 20 million, up 33 percent from a year earlier. 

Nov. 20, 2024: Japan, South Korea, and the United States officially launches the secretariat for trilateral cooperation in Seoul, with a rotating secretary general every two years, starting with South Korea. 

Nov. 22, 2024: The top air force commanders of Japan, South Korea and the United States hold the first trilateral meeting (via teleconference) to discuss cooperation, including on joint air exercises. 

Nov. 22, 2024: Japanese government announces that it will send Ikuina Akiko, the parliamentary vice minister at the foreign ministry to attend the memorial ceremony for Sado mine. 

Nov. 23, 2024: South Korea announces it will not attend the Japan-led memorial ceremony for forced laborers at Sado mine. 

Nov. 24, 2024: Japan holds memorial ceremony for forced laborers at Sado mine without participation from the Korean side, who protested the participation by Japanese parliamentary vice minister Ikuina Akiko, who did not mention forced labor in her speech. 

Nov. 25, 2024: Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry (KCCI) and Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry (JCCI) hold the 13th leadership meeting in Osaka, Japan and agree to strengthen cooperation in energy, supply chains and advanced technologies. 

Nov. 25, 2024: South Korean government holds a separate ceremony for family members of Korean forced laborers at Sado mine. 

Nov. 25, 2024: Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Hayashi Yoshimasa voices regret that South Korea did not attend the Japan-led ceremony honoring forced laborers at Sado mine. 

Nov. 26, 2024: South Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs Cho Tae-yul and Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Iwaya Takeshi agree to continue bilateral cooperation despite the Sado mine conflict at a meeting on the sidelines of the G7 foreign ministers’ meeting in Italy. 

Nov. 28, 2024: South Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs Cho Tae-yul calls on Japan to hold a “sincere” memorial ceremony for Sado mine next year, after failing to agree on a joint event this year. 

Nov. 29, 2024: The Seoul Central District Court rules that Nippon Steel needs to pay 100 million Korean won ($71,740) each to two South Korean forced laborers. The same court also orders Mitsubishi Heavy Industries to pay 100 million Korean won ($71,740) to a South Korean forced laborer. 

Nov. 29, 2024: South Korea and Japan hold a joint meeting of foreign affairs and defense officials to reaffirm the bilateral security cooperation.