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2024 closes with new governments primed to lead in the US and Japan. A surprise decision by Prime Minister Kishida Fumio to step away from leadership of his party in August led to an unprecedented race to succeed him. Nine members of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) fought for the chance to become president of the LDP on Sept. 27, and in a surprisingly tight race, Shigeru Ishiba won the honor and thus became the 102nd prime minister of Japan on Oct. 1. Within days, Ishiba called a Lower House election for Oct. 27. The LDP lost dramatically, and in the Nov. 11 vote in the Diet, Ishiba’s LDP and its partner Komeito formed a minority coalition government. The US similarly was in the throes of political contest. On Nov. 5, Donald Trump won a decisive victory in the presidential election, and in the days that followed, the Republicans were declared winners in both the House and the Senate as well.
While Trump’s inauguration will not be until January 2025, his transition team began immediately to announce candidates for his Cabinet and for the many political appointments needed to fill out his new administration. There was little doubt that this would be a far more robust challenge to the status quo than Trump marshaled during his first term.
The US-Japan alliance continues to be a fundamental feature of US strategy in the Indo-Pacific. The bilateral agenda for strategic coordination has grown considerably, and significant changes in Japanese defense preparedness are underway. US forces, too, are adapting to the needs of the growing military imbalance in the region. Trilateral US-Japan-South Korea security ties have deepened, and a new trilateral with the Philippines seems promising. Across the region and globally, the US and Japan have joined in broader coalitions of strategic cooperation. And yet, there is concern that this burgeoning agenda of strategic cooperation could flounder as domestic priorities take center stage in both Washington and Tokyo.
A Fall Full of Elections
The fall brought national elections in both Japan and the US, though under notably different circumstances. In Japan, a snap election came as a surprise, following Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s resignation, the subsequent LDP leadership race that elevated Shigeru Ishiba to power, and Ishiba’s abrupt decision to dissolve the Lower House. In contrast, the date of the US election may have been fixed and known, but the political landscape otherwise offered little predictability. President Joe Biden’s late decision not to seek reelection paved the way for Vice President Kamala Harris to step in as the Democratic nominee, only for former president Donald Trump and the Republicans to reclaim not only the presidency but also control of both the House and Senate.

Figure 1 Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and U.S. President Joe Biden shake hands at the White House on Friday. Photo: Masanori Genko / The Yomiuri Shimbun.
On Aug. 14, Prime Minister Kishida announced that he would not run for reelection in September’s LDP leadership race, setting the stage for a fiercely contested and unusually open competition. The race initially featured nine candidates but quickly narrowed to three frontrunners: Koizumi Shinjiro, who would have been Japan’s youngest prime minister; Takaichi Sanae, vying to become the first female prime minister; and Ishiba Shigeru, a seasoned politician marking his fifth bid for party leadership. Ishiba consistently led public opinion polls, reflecting strong grassroots support, but he had long struggled to win backing from fellow Diet members. In the Sept. 27 election, Takaichi emerged as the top candidate in the first round of voting, but in the second round, Ishiba narrowly secured victory. His unexpected win highlighted divisions within the LDP but also marked an effort among some members to turn the page on recent scandals and rebuild public trust.
On Oct. 1, Japan’s parliament formally elected Ishiba as prime minister. Just over a week later, on Oct. 9, Ishiba surprised many by calling a snap election for Oct. 27, a move that appeared aimed at capitalizing on his initial popularity, taking advantage of a fragmented opposition, and securing a stronger mandate for his leadership. However, the gamble backfired. On Oct. 27, voters handed the ruling coalition of the LDP and its junior partner Komeito a decisive defeat. The LDP lost power for the first time in 15 years. While the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDPJ), led by former Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda, gained significantly, much of the attention was drawn to the unexpected rise of the Democratic Party for the People (DPP) and its leader Tamaki Yuichiro, whose strong performance underscored the shifting political landscape.
The failure of any party or coalition to secure a majority of seats in the Lower House left uncertainty about the shape of Japan’s next government. On Nov. 11, Prime Minister Ishiba won a parliamentary vote to remain in office, making him the leader of Japan’s first minority government in three decades. Governing without a legislative majority presents significant challenges. The opposition now controls key committees, including the influential Budget Committee, which could complicate efforts to secure funding for next year’s priorities. Public approval of Ishiba’s Cabinet remains low, though it has improved slightly from 32% in late October to 40% in mid-November, according to Kyodo polling. Questions abound about how Ishiba will navigate this precarious political environment, including the extent to which smaller parties like the DPP will influence his policy agenda. With Upper House elections looming in July 2025, Ishiba’s ability to maintain leadership and deliver results will be closely watched, both at home and abroad.
In the US, the 2024 election campaign began with an air of familiarity, as it initially appeared to be shaping up as a rematch of 2020 between Biden and Trump. On July 15, the Republican Party officially selected Trump as their presidential nominee, alongside Senator JD Vance (Ohio) as his running mate. Trump had been the presumptive nominee since March 12, when he secured enough delegates in the Republican primary race. Despite unprecedented challenges—including his conviction on May 30 for 34 felony counts of falsifying business records to cover up a sex scandal tied to his 2016 campaign—Trump solidified his hold on the party. His path to the nomination was further punctuated by two assassination attempts, the most prominent of which occurred just days before the Republican National Convention. On July 13, Trump was shot and wounded in his right ear during a public appearance but was released from the hospital shortly thereafter and attended the convention as scheduled. A second attempt on Sept. 15 in Florida, while Trump was golfing, was thwarted before the would-be assassin could get close to him.
As the incumbent, President Biden initially appeared to have a clear path to securing the Democratic Party nomination, facing no primary challengers. However, his performance in the first debate on June 27 raised serious concerns among voters and within his party. Biden appeared visibly unwell, with a strained voice and moments of hesitation that cast doubts about his age and ability to serve another term—despite being less than four years older than Trump. These concerns quickly translated into declining public support and growing unease among Democratic leaders. On July 21, Biden announced he would not seek reelection, citing the need for new leadership and endorsing Vice President Kamala Harris as the party’s nominee.
On Aug. 2, Vice President Kamala Harris officially secured the Democratic nomination at the party’s national convention, becoming the first woman of color to lead a major party’s presidential ticket. Four days later, she announced Minnesota Gov. Tim Walz as her running mate, a choice seen as an effort to balance the ticket with a Midwestern governor who had garnered bipartisan support in his state. Initial polling suggested strong public enthusiasm for Harris, with many Democratic voters rallying behind her historic candidacy and optimism about her chances in the general election.
However, the Nov. 5 election saw Donald Trump ultimately emerge victorious, defeating Harris by a vote margin of 312 to 226 in the Electoral College. Trump carried all the key swing states, including Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin, flipping several districts that had narrowly supported Biden in 2020. Nationwide, most areas showed a pronounced shift toward the right. The Republican Party not only reclaimed the presidency but also gained control of both the House and Senate, signaling a significant shift in American politics.
Looking ahead to US-Japan relations in 2025, new teams in both countries will take the lead in managing the alliance. In Japan, Prime Minister Ishiba, a former defense minister, has signaled his focus on defense by appointing four former defense ministers to key posts, including Takeshi Iwaya as foreign minister and Gen Nakatani as defense minister. On the US side, Trump’s cabinet nominees reflect a mix of experience and controversy. Senator Marco Rubio of Florida has been nominated for secretary of state, while former Army National Guard officer and Fox News host Pete Hegseth is Trump’s choice for secretary of defense. Rubio’s nomination is expected to sail through Senate confirmation, but Hegseth’s has drawn significant scrutiny over past allegations of sexual misconduct, excessive drinking, and financial mismanagement.
These new teams will inherit a complex and demanding alliance agenda, spanning bilateral priorities, regional security challenges, and pressing global issues.
The US-Japan Security Agenda
Bilateral security cooperation is burgeoning. Japan’s security review in 2022 produced a massive increase in security-related investments, including new conventional strike capability, improved operational integration and readiness for the Self Defense Force, and a new program of overseas security assistance. In January, the Japanese government agreed to purchase 400 land-based Tomahawk missiles, and in April, the Maritime Self Defense Force began training for their use. Deployment is expected in Japanese fiscal year 2025, which begins in April 1, a year earlier than originally planned.

Figure 2 South Korea, the US and Japan began their first trilateral multi-domain exercise on June 27, 2024, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said, amid efforts to deepen security cooperation against threats from North Korea, recently emboldened by its deepening ties with Russia. Photo: Yonhap
A new Joint Permanent Operational Command will also be stood up in the coming fiscal year, a first for Japan’s three branches of armed forces. This will integrate Japanese military operations to respond jointly to aggression and will place a single combatant commander in charge of Japan’s military readiness. To match this Japanese move to enhance operational integration, the US Forces Japan will gradually match operational requirements to provide smooth integration of operations between Japanese and US forces.
Finally, the Japanese government has begun to provide overseas security assistance to its neighbors in an effort to enhance their capacity to meet the growing instability in the region. By the end of the Japanese fiscal year 2023, this assistance included support for surveillance, radar, and patrol boats provided to the armed forces of the Philippines, Malaysia, Bangladesh, and Fiji.
All told, the Japanese government committed to enhancing its spending to 2% of GDP by 2027 when the current five year build up plan will be complete. In its third year, the plan will require consistent revenue if it is to be successful. A new defense tax is under consideration in the Diet, and preliminary cooperation between the LDP, DPP, and Ishin no Kai has been reached.
The US has also led efforts to institutionalize trilateral military cooperation between the Japanese, South Korean, and US forces in multidomain exercises named Freedom Edge. These were initiated after a bilateral Japan-South Korean defense agreement was reached in June at the Singapore gathering of the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue. Two of these trilateral exercises have been held since then, one in June and another in November, bringing the air, maritime, and space forces of all three allies together for a combined exercise dedicated to cooperation in case of a contingency on the Korean peninsula.
Keeping the US and Japan in Regional and Global Alignment
Much of the bilateral effort over the past several years has been focused on building coalitions of like-minded countries to cope with the growing challenge to the rules-based order. Two sets of relationships were emphasized by the Biden Administration. The first was the recovery of the Japan-South Korea bilateral relationship and the strengthening of institutionalized trilateral cooperation between the US and its two northeast Asian allies. Consultations between National Security Advisors, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Intelligence heads bolstered a shared vision of strategic cooperation. Presidents Yoon and Biden and Prime Minister Kishida also committed to a set of shared strategic principles, outlined in the Spirit of Camp David joint statement in 2023, that were then amplified in November 2024 in a second leader’s meeting with Prime Minister Ishiba attending on the sidelines of the APEC meeting in Peru. In addition to the regular trilateral military exercises, noted above, the three leaders agreed to create a secretariat designed to facilitate trilateral cooperation.

Figure 3 US President Joe Biden hosted Australia’s Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Japan’s Prime Minister Fumio Kishida for the latest summit of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) in Wilmington, Delaware on September 23, 2024. Photo: South China Morning Post
Second, Japan and the US worked closely on building stronger ties among the Quad nations: US, Japan, Australia, and India. Leaders’ summits began in 2020 virtually but then became annual in-person meetings in 2021. In 2024, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese joined Japanese Prime Minister Kishida in Wilmington, Delaware to honor President Biden’s support of the Quad. A full agenda of Quad projects has developed over time, largely focused on aiding the Indo-Pacific nations in the provision of healthcare, infrastructure development, maritime domain awareness, and other collective goods required for regional stability. India is expected to host the 2025 Quad Leaders meeting.
Of course, concerns loom large over the fate of Taiwan. The US and Japan will continue to consult on the increased Chinese military exercises around Taiwan. Much of this is interpreted as pressure on President William Lai Ching-te. For example, a recent surge of Chinese military activity around Taiwan occurred shortly after Lai’s first overseas trip, which included visits to Pacific Island nations and transit stops in Hawaii and Guam—moves that were widely expected to elicit a strong response from Beijing.
But the growing assertiveness of China’s military beyond the Taiwan Straits continues to prompt enhanced security cooperation among US, Japanese, and other national forces. Chinese maritime pressure on the Philippines has also grown, challenging their maritime defenses and drawing a US restatement of its commitment to the US-Philippine alliance. During his fourth visit to the Philippines in November 2024, Secretary of Defense Austin announced the establishment of an information sharing agreement with the Philippines, designed to enhance the ability of the US and the Philippines to have real-time information on the activities of Chinese forces. Over the course of 2024, the PLA Navy has also increased its activity in and around Japanese waters, and Chinese-Russia strategic exercises have also increased. In August, Chinese government survey vessels intruded repeatedly into Japanese waters.
Conclusion
As the Ishiba Cabinet seeks to navigate its difficult position in the Japanese Diet, a second Trump Administration prepares to take the reins in the US. Trump’s Cabinet picks have created controversy already, and there is a sense that a major shakeup is coming to Washington. How this will affect US foreign policy remains to be seen, and personnel responsible for the day-to-day management of US Asia policy have yet to be identified. On the surface, however, there is little to suggest that the US-Japan alliance will suffer from a second Trump Administration.
Two issues will likely be of deepest interest to alliance watchers. The first is President-elect Trump’s position on tariffs and on trade more broadly. His announcement after his electoral victory that he is looking to place 25% tariffs on Canada and Mexico and “an additional 10% tariff, above any additional tariffs” on China will, of course, have spillover effects for many countries. Japan’s automakers have a stake in however the Trump Administration seeks to revamp the USMCA trade agreement, up for review in 2026. More short term, the political hot potato of the purchase of US Steel by Nippon Steel will be determined by the CFIUS decision expected on Dec. 18. President-elect Trump has stated he will reject the deal.

Figure 4 Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida meets with U.S. President Joe Biden and other Group of Seven leaders at NATO Headquarters in Brussels in March. Photo: REUTERS
Burden-sharing will also likely be on the agenda for the US-Japan alliance, as it will for the NATO allies. Already, there are rumors that the NATO commitment to spending 2% of GDP on defense might be raised to 3% in a new Trump administration, again with possible spillover effects for US Indo-Pacific allies. The five-year Host Nation Support agreement between the US and Japan is set to expire in 2027 and thus will need to be renegotiated during the next administration.
But it is likely the larger questions of US strategy under the Trump administration that will be of most concern. Three foreign policy areas are particularly important for Japan. First, US strategy toward China will be of deepest import to Tokyo. Given that Japan has identified China as its gravest strategic threat, Washington’s choices and how much Japan’s interests will be considered in those choices are paramount. Second, how the US decides its role in Ukraine and in the larger context of European security remains to be seen. Japan has committed extensive resources to Ukraine and to the effort to rebuild the nation. Similarly, Japan, like other G7 nations, has imposed sanctions on Russia, drawing retaliation from Moscow. Finally, Japan has a deep stake in the global economy and relies on a free and open global order. A retreat to mercantilist practices would have devastating effects on Japan’s future economic prosperity. Of course, the LDP will face yet another election next year, and Prime Minister Ishiba will have to juggle pressures from within to keep on top of the domestic dynamics at play in Tokyo even as he seeks to ensure a strong US-Japan partnership under a second Trump Administration.
May 21, 2024: US, Japan, and the Philippines launch the Luzon Economic Corridor Steering Committee to Drive Infrastructure Investment on the sidelines of the Indo-Pacific Business Forum in Manila.
May 30, 2024: Former president Donald Trump is convicted of 34 felony counts.
May 31, 2024: US-Japan-South Korea Vice Foreign Minister-Level Dialogue is held in Washington, Virginia.
May 31, 2024: US-Japan-South Korea Trilateral Foreign Minister-Level Dialogue is held in Washington, DC.
May 31, 2024: First US-Japan Strategic Diplomacy and Development Dialogue is held in Washington, DC.
June 13-14, 2024: US-Japan Extended Deterrence Dialogue is held at F.E. Warren Air Force Base in Cheyenne, Wyoming.
June 14, 2024: Prime Minister Kishida and President Biden meet on the sidelines of the G7 Apulia Summit in Italy.
June 24, 2024: Senior Official for the DPRK Jung Pak, Assistant-Minister for Asian and Oceanian Affairs Namazu Hiroyuki, and Korean Vice Foreign Minister for Strategy and Intelligence Cho Koo-rae speak by telephone.
June 26, 2024: Ninth US-Japan Cyber Dialogue is held in Washington, DC.
June 27, 2024: President Biden and former president Trump hold their first presidential debate.
June 27-29, 2024: US, Japan, and South Korea hold the inaugural Freedom Edge trilateral multi-domain exercises.
July 3, 2024: US-Japan-Australia-Indiana Senior Officials’ Meeting is held via videoconference.
July 5, 2024: Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs Masataka Okano meets with Ambassador Rahm Emanuel in Tokyo.
July 10-11, 2024: Prime Minister Kishida visits Washington, DC to attend the NATO Summit.
July 10, 2024: Prime Minister Kishida attends a dinner hosted by President Biden during the NATO Summit.
July 11, 2024: President Biden and Prime Minister Kishida meet on the sidelines of the NATO Summit.
July 11, 2024: Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshimasa Hayashi and Governor of Texas Greg Abbott meet in Tokyo.
July 11, 2024: Foreign Minister Yoko Kamikawa and Governor of Texas Greg Abbott meet in Tokyo.
July 15, 2024: Republican Party officially selects Donald Trump as their presidential nominee and JD Vance as the vice-presidential nominee.
July 21, 2024: President Biden announces he will withdraw from the 2024 presidential election and instead endorses his vice president, Kamala Harris, for the Democratic Party nomination.
July 28, 2024: Secretary of State Blinken, Secretary of Defense Austin, Foreign Minister Kamikawa, and Defense Minister Kihara convene a US-Japan ministerial meeting on extended deterrence in Tokyo.
July 28, 2024: Japan-US Security Consultative Committee (Japan-US “2+2”) is held in Tokyo.
July 28, 2024: Foreign Minister Kamikawa and Secretary of State Blinken meet in Tokyo on the sidelines of the 2+2 meeting.
July 29, 2024: Foreign Minister Kamikawa, Secretary of State Blinken, Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong, and Indian External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar hold a Japan-US-Australia-India (Quad) Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Tokyo.
July 29, 2024: Prime Minister Kishida meets with Secretary of State Blinken, Australian Foreign Minister Wong, and Indian External Affairs Minister Jaishankar in Tokyo.
July 29, 2024: Prime Minister Kishida meets with Secretary of State Blinken and Secretary of Defense Austin in Tokyo.
Aug. 2, 2024: Democratic Party officially selects Kamala Harris as their presidential nominee.
Aug. 6, 2024: Vice President and Democratic Presidential Nominee Harris selects Minnesota Governor Tim Walz as her running mate.
Aug. 9, 2024: Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel Kritenbrink, Director General for Asian and Oceanian Affairs Namazu Hiroyuki, and Korean Vice Foreign Minister for Strategy and Intelligence Cho Koo-rae speak by telephone.
Aug. 14, 2024: Prime Minister Kishida announces he will resign in September and not run for a second term as LDP president.
Aug. 27, 2024: Foreign Minister Kamikawa meets with the delegation led by US Congressman John Moolenaar, Chairman of the House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party.
Aug. 28, 2024: Prime Minister Kishida meets with the with the delegation led by US Congressman John Moolenaar.
Aug. 28, 2024: Seventeenth US-Japan Joint Working-Level Committee Meeting on Science and Technology Cooperation is held in Washington, DC.
Aug. 30, 2024: Foreign Minister Kamikawa meets with the delegation led by Senator and former US Ambassador to Japan William Hagerty.
Aug. 30, 2024: Prime Minister Kishida meets with the delegation led by Senator and former US Ambassador to Japan William Hagerty.
Sept. 6, 2024: Third US-Japan-South Korea Trilateral Diplomacy Working Group for Foreign Minister Cooperation on North Korea’s Cyber Threats is held in Seoul.
Sept. 21, 2024: President Biden and Prime Minister Kishida meet in Delaware at President Biden’s private residence.
Sept. 21, 2024: President Biden, Prime Minister Kishida, Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi hold a Quad Leaders’ Meeting in Delaware.
Sept. 23, 2024: Former Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda is elected to lead the main opposition Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan.
Sept. 26, 2024: Japan-US Economic Policy Consultative Committee (Economic “2+2”) is held in a hybrid format.
Sept. 27, 2024: Shigeru Ishiba wins the LDP leadership race.
Sept. 30, 2024: Prime Minister Kishida meets with Ambassador to Japan Rahm Emanuel in Tokyo.
Oct. 1, 2024: Japan’s parliament elects Shigeru Ishiba as prime minister.
Oct. 2, 2024: Prime Minister Ishiba and President Biden speak by telephone.
Oct. 2, 2024: Foreign Minister Takeshi Iwaya and Secretary of State Blinken speak by telephone.
Oct. 3, 2024: Prime Minister Ishiba meets with Ambassador to Japan Rahm Emanuel in Tokyo.
Oct. 7, 2024: Foreign Minister Iwaya meets with Commander of US Indo-Pacific Command Admiral Samuel Paparo.
Oct. 9, 2024: Prime Minister Ishiba dissolves parliament and calls for an election on Oct. 27.
Oct. 9, 2024: Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific Daniel Kritenbrink, Assistant-Minister and Director-General of the Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau Namazu Hiroyuki, and South Korean Vice Minister for Strategy and Intelligence Cho Koo-ra speak by telephone about North Korea.
Oct. 13, 2024: Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Masataka Okano, and South Korean First Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Kim Hong-kyun meet in Seoul.
Oct. 15, 2024: Foreign Minister Iwaya meets with Deputy Secretary of State Campbell in Tokyo.
Oct. 15, 2024: Vice Minister Okano meets with Deputy Secretary of State Campbell in Tokyo.
Oct. 16, 2024: Foreign Minister Iwaya meets with Commander of US Forces Japan and Fifth Air Force Lieutenant General Stephen Jost in Tokyo.
Oct. 16, 2024: Vice Minister Okano, Deputy Secretary of State Campbell, and First Vice Minister Kim meet in Seoul.
Oct. 18, 2024: First US-Japan-Philippines Cyber-Digital Dialogue is held in Singapore.
Oct. 24, 2024: Foreign Minister Iwaya meets with Senator Jerry Moran and Senator John Hoeven in Tokyo.
Oct. 25, 2024: US-Japan-Philippines Trilateral Discussion on Economic Resilience is held in Manila.
Oct. 27, 2024: Japan’s ruling LDP and Komeito coalition loses their majority in the House of Representatives election.
Oct. 31, 2024: Deputy Director-General of the Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau Akihiro Okochi, Director for Korea and Mongolia Affairs and Deputy Special Representative for the DPRK Seth Bailey, and Director-General for the Korean Peninsula Policy Lee Jun-il speak by telephone.
Oct. 31, 2024: Foreign Minister Iwaya, Secretary of State Blinken, and Korean Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yul speak by telephone.
Oct. 31, 2024: US, Japan, and South Korea release a Joint Statement on the DPRK Launch of an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile.
Nov. 7, 2024: Prime Minister Ishiba and President-elect Donald Trump speak by telephone.
Nov. 7, 2024: State Minister for Foreign Affairs Kiyoto Tsuji meets with Idaho Governor Brad Little in Tokyo.
Nov. 11, 2024: Prime Minister Ishiba wins parliamentary vote to remain as prime minister.
Nov. 13-15, 2024: US, Japan, and South Korea hold the second Freedom Edge exercise.