Articles
There were no high-level visits this reporting period with each side continuing to reiterate its stance on key issues—China’s dissatisfaction with Japan’s discharge of allegedly radioactive water into the Pacific, disagreements over the sovereignty of the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, Tokyo’s concern with nationals detained in China on vague spying charges, resentment over China’s ban of marine exports from Japan, and concerns with Chinese cyber hacking. Japanese leaders increased their willingness to acknowledge that China is the principal threat not only to Japan but to the world. Beijing continued to denounce Japan, sometimes as a pawn in US plans to thwart China’s rise, sometimes as motivated by a desire to re-create the militant expansionist empire that led to World War II. Japan became increasingly active in international diplomacy and, while declaring fealty to the one-China policy, moved closer to Taiwan. Public opinion in both countries remained hostile toward the other.
Political
Though regarded as a weak ruler and despite low approval rates and his party’s problems with a funding scandal and ties with the Unification Church, Kishida surpassed Tanaka Kakuei to become Japan’s 10th longest-serving prime minister in the postwar era. Still, his Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) lost all three seats in a special election at the end of April that has been interpreted as punishment for the corruption scandal. As the report period closed, a poll showed the disapproval rate for his Cabinet at a record high of 69%. While there were no noticeable concerns in Washington about the China policy of who, if anyone, will succeed Kishida, there were concerns in Tokyo regarding the 2024 US election. In February, Japanese officials reportedly met with sources close to Trump to ask them to urge him not to upend years of collective efforts to reign in Beijing. They view a China-US- trade or security deal, which Trump has mentioned, as potentially emboldening Beijing and undermining efforts by G7 nations to counter China and weaken support for Taiwan.
Meanwhile, China’s National People’s Congress affirmed the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and Xi Jinping thought. While they did not personally interact, both leaders were active diplomatically, with their relations with the other country an important factor in the visits.
Figure 1 Prime Minister Kishida’s Official Visit to Washington. Photo: Andrew Harnik/Getty Images
Kishida’s April trip to Washington was primarily about defense (as discussed below). In a rare address to a joint session of Congress, Kishida bluntly stated that “China’s current external stance and military actions present an unprecedented and the greatest strategic challenge, not only to the peace and security of Japan but to the peace and stability of the international community at large,” for which he received a standing ovation. His meeting was followed immediately by a trilateral summit with Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos and Biden, also hosted by the White House. Like Japan, Marcos’ government has been struggling with progressive encroachment by China, in this case on islands within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Supply chain strengthening to reduce reliance on China was also on the agenda, with the three agreeing to a framework for a stable supply of nickel under which resource-rich countries and high-consumption countries in Europe, Africa, and other regions would work together to share information and invest in developing critical minerals. Plans were discussed to expand the refining process to extract the metal from nickel other than that from China. The Philippines is the world’s second-largest producer of nickel ore after Indonesia, though Indonesia and China have a larger market share of smelted and refined nickel. While Indonesia has banned the export of minerals, China is acquiring mining rights and interests in Indonesia and other Southeast Asian countries, increasing its influence in the international market and acquiring concessions in Africa and other regions as well as holding a high share of the refined products of critical minerals such as lithium and cobalt. In a clear rebuff to Beijing, the three leaders affirmed their alignment as maritime democracies by insisting that the South China Sea should be governed by international law.
Xi Jinping was also active diplomatically, receiving a steady stream of visitors from developing states such as Indonesia whose newly elected president, Prabowo Subianto pledged to continue friendly ties and received promises of Chinese investment, Nonetheless, Subianto signaled his desire to pursue a middle of the road policy by immediately proceeding to visit Japan and the Philippines. High-level contacts included a visit from Germany’s Olav Scholz, although trade tensions, dissatisfaction for China’s tacit support of Russia in the war in Ukraine and Berlin’s arrests of individuals suspected of spying for the PRC, meant it was not an especially cordial visit. Xi is scheduled to visit Paris, Belgrade, and Budapest in May, and is expecting a visit from Russian President Putin shortly thereafter.
The two sides’ foreign ministers were active in soliciting support for their countries’ positions. Among other visits, Wang Yi met French President Emanuel Macron in February in Paris to discuss setting up a strategic dialogue and went to Indonesia and Papua New Guinea in late April. China’s deepening ties with South Pacific nations have aroused concerns in Japan as well as in the United States, Australia, and France, the last-named having possessions (French Polynesia, New Caledonia, Wallis, and Futuna) in the area. Kamikawa Yoko met with Indian External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, with the two pledging cooperation in defense and security for the realization of a free and open Indo-Pacific. In the last week in April, Kamikawa visited five countries in Africa and Asia (Cote d’Ivoire, Nigeria, Madagascar, Sri Lanka, and Nepal) to strengthen bilateral ties as China increases its presence in these regions. In August 2025, Japan will host leaders of African countries and hold the eighth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD). A preparatory ministerial meeting for the event will take place in August 2024 and Kamikawa plans to ensure good communications with key persons in major African countries ahead of the ministerial meeting. The Foreign Ministry is to assign “wide-area economic officers,” who will be in charge of helping Japanese businesses expand into Africa, to six diplomatic missions in Africa and other regions where Japanese companies have offices to supervise operations in Africa, such as Europe and the Middle East. The officers will be stationed at Japanese embassies in South Africa, Britain, India, and Turkey, as well as Japanese consulates general in Istanbul and Dubai.
The war-related Yasukuni Shrine remains a perennial sore point , though not as salient as it was since Japanese prime ministers ceased visited there in person in 2013. After reports surfaced that groups of Self-Defense Forces (SDF) members had visited, the center-left Asahi, essentially taking China’s view, editorialized that such visits not only breached the constitutional principle of separation of religion and politics but also raised suspicions that the SDF has not broken with the imperial Japanese military as it is supposed to have done, rejecting the explanation that they attended of their own free will. Oddly, there was no discernible reaction to the shrine’s choice of a former Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) commander, Adm. Otsuka Umio, as chief priest. The last retired military officer appointed as chief priest was in 1978 when Nagayoshi Matsudaira enshrined 14 prominent convicted war criminals including World War II-era Prime Minister Hideki Tojo alongside the 2.5 million war dead. Chinese reaction was muted when Kishida donated ritual masakaki sprigs to the shrine on the first day of its spring festival — in his capacity as prime minister — but did not attend himself. Lower House Speaker Nukaga Fukushiro and Upper House President Otsuji Hidehisa also offered masakaki. Shindo Yoshitaka, minister in charge of economic revitalization, explained that he visited “out of reverence and respect for the souls of those who worked for the country with all their might in the past.”
As measured by not necessarily reliable social media, public opinion in China was negative on Japan. In March, online nationalists accused Zhong Shanshan, said to be China’s richest man, of covertly promoting Japan. They interpreted a pagoda on the design of his Nongfu Springs green tea label as resembling that of Tokyo’s Sensoji Temple; the design of the label on bottled water as looking like Mount Fuji and its red cap to resemble the Japanese flag; a third design was said to show Japanese koinobori carp streamers. Hu Xijin, the nationalist former editor of Global Times, wrote in a March 7 post that the extremity of the backlash against Zhong was “vulgar and ridiculous” and an “insult to patriotism” but later deleted his post. On the other hand, the Chinese government said it was willing to help Japan in the wake of its January earthquake and state television suspended an anchor after he suggested that Japan’s earthquake disaster was punishment for Japan’s discharge of nuclear waste water. The comments had gone viral. In Japan, a Cabinet office survey in late January found that respondents who “feel no affinity” or “would rather not feel affinity” toward China reached 86.7%, up 4.9 percentage points from the previous year. A separate poll conducted by center-right Yomiuri found that 91% of respondents considered China a threat, up five points from last year; 71% were in favor of strengthening Japan’s defense capabilities.
Japan continued what appeared to be carefully crafted efforts to move incrementally closer to Taiwan, eliciting complaints from Beijing after each. Immediately after Japan’s New Year’s Day earthquake, Taiwan’s foreign minister announced a $420,000 donation for relief and rebuilding. After Foreign Minister Kamikawa congratulated Lai Ching-te, Beijing least favorite candidate, on his victory in the island’s January election, the Chinese embassy in Japan, without mentioning Lai’s name, said it “resolutely opposes” her statement and that Japan should refrain from sending any “wrong signals” to “Taiwan independence” forces. Several Japanese newspapers covered the election and its aftermath on their front pages, and Diet members Furuya Keiji, Kaneko Yasushi, and former member Ohashi Mitsuo visited Taiwan to offer their personal congratulations. Furuyu also chairs the Japan-ROC Diet Members’ Consultative Council while Ohashi heads the Japan-Taiwan Exchange Association. The three met with President Tsai Ing-wen at the presidential office building and with President-elect Lai Ching-te at his party’s headquarters in Taipei with Ohashi commenting that Japan is looking forward to continuing to deepen cooperation and exchanges with Taiwan’s future government. In February, Tokyo Gov. Koike Yuriko, on her first visit to Taiwan since taking office in 2016, spent two days there “to strengthen ties with the island’s leadership.” She met separately with Tsai, Lai, Digital Affairs Minister Audrey Tang, and Taipei Mayor Chiang Wan-an, the great-grandson of Chiang Kai-shek. To the Chinese foreign ministry’s statement of opposition to any official interactions between Japan and Taiwan, Koike replied that “Cooperation between cities is crucial for urban diplomacy.”
Economic
China’s economy continued to struggle while Japan’s boomed, albeit with significant doubts that the boom could continue. China’s consumer prices rose in February, ending four straight months of declines though economists warned that the return of some inflation does not mean that deflation has ended. In March, China’s manufacturing purchasing index rose for the first time in a year, buoyed by rising export orders, but the PRC’s National Bureau of Statistics cautioned that companies suffered from “insufficient market demand,” requiring further state support. Leading Chinese economic magazine Caixin reported that as global investors continue to seek alternatives to the PRC, Japan stocks were rapidly recovering the ground they lost to their Chinese peers in the early years of the pandemic. The gap between the market capitalization of the Chinese mainland and Japan has shrunk to $2.7 trillion, the smallest since July 2020. The last time Japan commanded a higher market capitalization value than China was in early 2019.
China’s trading partners worry that the country’s industrial overcapacity will spill over into export markets. Meanwhile, Japan’s largest employers announced record pay increases, signaling a break from the deflationary mindset that led to the country’s prolonged period of low economic growth known as the “lost decades.” However, the yen remained weak, trading at one point at 160 to the US dollar down 11% on the year. Such a drop had not occurred since Japan’s economic bubble burst in 1990 and it was not helped by the Bank of Japan’s decision to raise interest rates for the first time in 17 years. A decision is still pending, but in the end the Ministry of Finance may be compelled to intervene.
The slowdown in Chinese economic growth caused difficulties for some Japanese enterprises. The country’s trade deficit with China expanded for the second straight year to reach ¥6.7 trillion as exports fell 6.5%. Japan’s seafood exports to China in fiscal 2023 fell 57% due to the ban triggered by the wastewater discharge from the Fukushima nuclear power plant, their lowest level since comparable data became available in fiscal 1988. Cosmetics maker Kao blamed the water release for a 1.2% sales decline in its sales to China in 1923.
Japanese investment in China continued to fall for several reasons. The prolonged economic slump in China was one, and the need to break away from excessive trade dependence on China for security reasons was another. It is understood that this would not be easy: as the world aims to decarbonize, the spread of solar power, offshore wind power, and electric vehicles is essential, yet supplies of many of the necessary raw materials and components, including key minerals, are dependent on China. According to the Japanese Chamber of Commerce and Industry’s survey of the economy and business environment in China, 23% of respondents said they did not invest in China in 2023, while 25% said they reduced their investment from 2022, together accounting for about half of total responses. On the business outlook in China, 44% answered it was worsening or slightly worsening, 45% said it stayed flat, and 11% saw it slightly improving or improving. 21% of respondents said they were not treated equally to Chinese companies, 73% said they were treated, and 5% said they were treated preferentially. Thirty-eight percent said they invested the same amount as in the previous year, while 15% said they increased or significantly increased investment.
Another factor dampening China-Japan economic relations was the security of Japanese nationals in China—there is still no disposition of the case of the Astellas employee who was arrested in March 2023 and accused of engaging in espionage activities—and two Chinese academics employed at Japanese universities have separately disappeared as well. The ambiguities of a newly passed espionage law heightened concerns, with a Japanese national working in China at a specialized trading company telling Nikkei that that fewer people were willing to work in China, which is affecting staffing, and another said that he wants to go back to Japan as soon as possible.
Figure 2 Japan Business Delegation, Chinese Premier Li Meet; Both Sides Tout Importance of Bilateral Economic Ties, Kosei Shindo, who leads a delegation of the Japan-China Economic Association, left, and Masakazu Tokura, chairman of the Japan Business Federation (Keidanren), center, meet with Chinese Premier Li Qiang at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on Thursday. Photo: The Yomiuri Shimbun/pool photo
Chinese government officials were at pains to show that Japanese investment was welcome. Chinese Ambassador to Japan Wu Jianghao sought to allay growth and security concerns in the Japanese business community, saying the two sides should explore opportunities in emerging industries while warning that although Tokyo has an alliance with Washington, it had a responsibility to maintain stable ties with Beijing under their treaty of peace and friendship. Japanese businesses were receptive to such overtures. An usually large delegation from the Japan-China Economic Association visited Beijing in January but returned home having received little beyond Premier Li Qiang’s vague pledge to improve the business environment for foreign firms. In their roughly hourlong meeting with Li, the Japanese representatives raised several thorny issues, including concern about the safety of their citizens in China and bans on the import of seafood and other food products. In a separate meeting with Minister of Commerce Wang Wentao, the delegation raised concerns such as China’s anti-espionage law, difficulties on bidding for government contracts, and rules on cross-border data transfers, according to a briefing for journalists by representatives of the Japanese association. Later in the same day, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs rejected concerns about the anti-espionage law, with spokesman Wang Wenbin saying “as long as companies are operating in accordance with the law, they should be worry free.”
Some Japanese companies continued to do well. Fast fashion retailing chain Uniqlo reported a large, though unspecified, increase in revenue and profits in revenue and profits in China in 2023 and announced plans to open more outlets in China in 2024 to add to its 931 store presence.
Problems in the Chinese economy notwithstanding, its resilience should not be underestimated. Vehicle sales are robust, with EV sales by BYD surpassing former industry leader Tesla. In January, BYD launched three new passenger models in Indonesia as a Japanese government official lamented the declining market share of Japanese car brands there due to their lagging EV sales. There are widespread fears in Europe and the US, however, that China is seeking to export its overcapacity in production, with discussions taking place on how to limit imports of cars and other commodities.
Despite China’s disapproval of Japan’s closer ties with Taiwan, the effect on the Japanese economy has been beneficial. Taiwanese company TSMC, the world’s leading producer of high-end computer chips, has built one foundry in Kumamoto and broken ground on a second. At the ceremony to open the plant, which will provide 1,700 new jobs, TSMC founder Morris Chang predicted a chip renaissance in Japan as it attempts to regain the chipmaking glory it enjoyed in the 1980s. Kumamoto’s economic boom has led to interest from other Taiwanese companies and plans for a “Taiwan town” and a shopping mall.
However, as the report period closed, the International Monetary Fund predicted that India will overtake Japan in nominal gross domestic product in dollar terms in 2025 due to a combination of the weak yen and India’s own rapid economic growth. As Japan was overtaken by Germany in 2023, this would mean Japan will become the world’s fifth largest economy.
Defense
China announced an increase of 7.2% in its defense budget, to $236.1 billion, about the same rate of increase as last year and in line with annual increases for the past several years. China now has the world’s second-largest defense budget, after the United States, one that is four times higher than Japan’s, but actual expenditures are apt to be substantially higher than reported. The Stockholm International Peace Institute estimates that the actual defense budget is 27% higher than officially reported. Among other items, China’s space program, which is managed by the military; defense mobilization funds; provincial military base operating costs; military pensions and benefits; dual-use research and development efforts; and paramilitary organizations like the People’s Armed Police and the Coast Guard are not incorporated into the defense budget.
The Japanese Cabinet approved a record 16.5% increase to $55.9 billion (7.95 trillion yen) in its defense budget for fiscal year 2024, which began April 1. This is expected to increase until it reaches $62.5 billion (8.9 trillion yen) in FY 2027.Though polls show that most Japanese recognize the threat from China and favor the need for a more robust defense, center-left publications like Asahi continue to oppose them, generally on the grounds that there has been insufficient public consultation, and LDP coalition partner Komeito, with its long history as a pacifist party, has had to be cajoled into approval. A particular point of contention has been whether Japan should be allowed to approve the sale of the sixth-generation fighter plane it is developing in conjunction with the UK and Italy. After protracted negotiations, Komeito leaders agreed to allow the exports but for this specific model of fighter jet only rather than all internationally co-developed defense equipment. Potential importers of the aircraft are restricted to nations with relevant agreements with Japan and countries currently engaged in military conflict are also excluded. The Cabinet must approve each case before a jointly developed fighter jet is exported to a third country in the future. The next-generation aircraft will replace the Air Self-Defense Force’s F-2 fighter jets whose decommissioning is expected to start around 2035.
Figure 3 Japan-Italy-UK Joint Fighter Program Takes a Step Forward With New Treaty Japan, Britain, and Italy agreed to establish a joint organization to develop a new sixth-generation fighter jet. From left to right: Italy’s Defense Minister Guido Crosetto, Japan’s Defense Minister Kihara Minoru, and British Defense Secretary Grant Shapps shake hands after the signing of the treaty at the Japanese defense ministry in Tokyo on December 14. Credit: Takahashi Kosuke
With Chinese coast guard and fishing vessels frequently in and around waters that Japan considers part of its territorial waters, Japan has heightened its deterrence capabilities in coordination with other countries in the Indo-Pacific region. The SDF took part in multinational joint exercises 56 times last year, 18 times the figure in 2006 when the Joint Staff Office was founded to manage the three forces. One of these included the annual Iron Fist exercise to practice recapturing remote Japanese Islands, indicating that the strategy is to retake rather than defend the islands from initial attack. Maj. Gen. Hajime Kitajima, commander of the GSDF Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade, told a joint news conference at Kin Blue Beach in Okinawa that the exercises were designed to “show to the world that any attempt to invade Japan will end in failure in the face of the Japan-US alliance.” Held since 2005, they were until 2022 held in the US, and have been broadened to include Britain, Germany, France, and Australia as observer participants as they had in the last fiscal year. This year for the first time the Philippines and the Netherlands also observed with the obvious intent being to strengthen cooperation with like-minded nations. Making explicit what had always been known, the joint US-Japan command post exercises in February named China as the enemy for the first time, even though the Japanese Defense ministry had classified the scenario as a “specially designated secret” under Japan’s secrecy law. China’s Global Times responded that what had been described as a leak was in fact intentional since multiple government officials had revealed the name to the media at the same time.
Figure 4 US, Japan Accelerate War Drills to Deter China. U.S. Marines execute command and control from a combat operations center during Keen Edge 22 at Camp Hansen, Japan, Jan. 31, 2022. The U.S. and Japan finished Keen Edge 24, a biannual bilateral command post exercise, Feb. 8, 2024. Photo: U.S. Marine Corps
In February, the Defense ministry announced that it had been deploying an airborne early warning and control system (AWACS) planes and other aircraft into the air defense identification zone (ADIZ) which China has unilaterally declared over an area of the East China Sea, for surveillance of Beijing’s constant deployment of warships near the boundaries of the ADIZ. Also showing the Kishida government’s concern, Japanese officials moved up the purchase of US Tomahawk missiles by a year, which China Daily called “a dangerous move deserving the full alert of the region and beyond,” since it means that Japan will have acquired long-range precision strike capacity.
Multiple efforts were made to shore up the defense of the remote islands, including stationing weaponry and troops thereon, hardening defenses and population shelters against attack, and evacuating civilians. Underground shelters capable of accommodating residents for about two weeks in times of emergency in islands including Yonaguni and Ishigaki near Taiwan, are being built. To make the shelters strong enough to withstand blasts from missiles, the doors of the shelters must open outward and their outer walls made of reinforced concrete no less than 30 centimeters thick. There are to be three liters of drinking water per day for each person. An exercise in January indicated that all 1,700 residents of Yonaguni could be transported to Kyushu in one day, though the matter of how to support the evacuees after they had arrived had yet to be resolved. Should the evacuation be prolonged, schools and new jobs would be needed.
After a leak revealed that a Chinese cyber-attack had penetrated Japan’s Foreign ministry telecommunications network, Foreign Minister Kamikawa Yoko told the Budget Committee of the House of Representatives that the government must deepen relations with allies and friendly nations to expedite measures against cyber-attacks. The United States has been concerned about this for some time, making it reluctant to share intelligence with Tokyo. Improving cyber defenses will, however, entail revision of a wide range of laws, prolonging the period of vulnerability.
The report period closed with an incident with major consequences for peace in the region: Chinese Coast Guard vessels stopped a Japanese survey off the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and the Japan Coast Guard intervened. Chinese sources then stated that Japanese lawmakers including former Defense Minister Inada Tomomi had landed on one of the islands, which the Japanese government, anxious to avoid provocation, has forbidden. China lodged a formal diplomatic protest and a day later, on April 29, the Shanghai Maritime Safety Administration declared an area of the East China Sea off-limits to traffic from May 1 through 9 for military activities. On May 1 the PRC’s newest aircraft carrier, the Fujian, began its first sea trials. A blog post by political commentator Su Hao suggested the timing was not a coincidence since designating the operations as military activity rather than training could allow more targeted countermeasures against Japan.
Figure 5 Two Japan Coast Guard vessels on guard to block a Chinese Coast Guard vessel, center, from approaching the research vessel off the coast of the Senkaku Islands on Saturday. Uotsuri Island is seen in the background. Photo: Yomiuri Shimbun
The Future
As concerns about the future of China and its now all but completely assimilated Special Economic Zone of Hong Kong rise, Japan is gaining from uncertainties of the PRC. While Chinese stock markets decline, the Nikkei reached its highest level since the financial bubble burst in 1990, and investors, including a number from China, and tourists are flocking in. The country’s technological expertise, extensive industrial base, impressive infrastructure, and large accumulation of savings remain formidable assets. Yet major unresolved issues between China and Japan remain, and the PRC has not only the largest and best equipped military in Asia but arguably in the world. Both countries face declining populations, and declining economic growth in China has negative consequences for Japan. Neither government can be optimistic about what the future holds for them or for their relations with each other.
Jan. 1, 2024: China Military Online characterizes Japan’s lifting its ban on the export of lethal weapons as entering an era where it is part of the international arms supply network and likely to become more involved in regional conflicts.
Jan. 2, 2024: China Daily says it is highly improper for Japanese Consul General in Hong Kong Okada Kenichi to urge the government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to lift the ban on seafood imports to show “a stark contrast between the mainland and Hong Kong.”
Jan. 3, 2024: Chinese foreign ministry says the country is willing to provide necessary help to Japan in the wake of the massive earthquake that struck the country on New Year’s Day.
Jan. 3, 2024: Chinese TV suspends an anchor after he suggested that Japan’s earthquake disaster was punishment for Japan’s discharge of nuclear waste water. The comments had gone viral.
Jan. 4, 2024: Japan Forward advocates deepening ties with Taiwan and India to counter common threats from China.
Jan. 5, 2024: Global Times editorializes that US Ambassador Rahm Emanuel is trying to drive a wedge between China and Japan.
Jan. 5, 2024: An opinion piece in South China Morning Post notes that, contrary to Beijing’s rhetoric about Asian states opposing Japan’s increase in military spending and easing of rules on the export of rules on the export of lethal weapons, many Asian countries in fact welcome Japan’s growing deterrence posture in curbing what they perceive as China’s increased attempts at economic and military coercion
Jan. 5, 2024: China Daily cites Japanese experts’ views that the majority of Japanese people do not want missiles deployed toward China in their areas and that doubts and dissatisfaction with the government are growing in various municipalities.
Jan. 8, 2024: An annual parachuting drill including forces from eight countries including Britain, France, Germany, the US, and Japan’s 1st Airborne Brigade features the recapturing of an island that had been occupied by an unnamed enemy force.
Jan. 8, 2024: Showing Chinese uneasiness with closer relations among Japan, South Korea, and the US, foreign ministry spokesperson Mao Ning expresses “serious concern” over a joint statement issued by the US, Japan, and the Republic of Korea about Taiwan and the South China Sea.
Jan. 10, 2024: Nikkei ends at its highest in 34 years as technology shares tracked overnight gains in US peers while a weaker yen boosted exporters. Meanwhile, a downbeat assessment of the Chinese economy prevails, as does an uptick in outlook on India and Japan.
Jan. 11, 2024: Aso Taro, LDP vice-president and former prime minister, speaks to the US Congress and, separately, to reporters saying that the Japanese government may regard a contingency in Taiwan as a situation threatening the existence of Japan, thus implying that Japan may exercise the right of collective self-defense based on 2015 national security legislation.
Jan. 11, 2024: Fast fashion retailing chain Uniqlo reports a large, though unspecified, increase in revenue and profits in revenue and profits in China in 2023, Uniqlo has 931 outlets in China, more than in Japan, and plans to open more in 2024.
Jan. 11, 2024: Yomiuri editorializes on the need to pay close attention to a prolonged economic slump in China as well as the need to break away from excessive trade dependence on it. As the world aims to decarbonize, the spread of solar power, offshore wind power, and electric vehicles is essential, but supplies of many of the necessary raw materials and components, including key minerals, are dependent on China.
Jan. 12, 2024: Mazda plans to launch a plug-in hybrid vehicle to be jointly developed with Chinese state-owned partner Changan Automobile. Production could start as early as 2025. Plug-in hybrids are growing popular given their advantage over electric vehicles in terms of range and convenience in charging. The two automakers will also work together to develop electric vehicles.
Jan. 12, 2024: Japanese Foreign Minister Kamikawa Yoko and US counterpart Antony Blinken agree to cooperate closely in dealing with issues relating to China and on the importance of peace and stability around Taiwan and discuss a state visit by Kishida to Washington.
Jan. 14, 2024: The Chinese embassy in Japan, without mentioning Lai Ching-te’s victory in the Taiwan presidential race, says it “resolutely opposes” Japanese Foreign Minister Kamikawa’s statement congratulating Lai on his victory and that Japan should refrain from sending any “wrong signals” to “Taiwan independence” forces.
Jan. 15, 2024: Diet members Furuya Keiji, Kaneko Yasushi, and former member Ohashi Mitsuo visit Taiwan to offer congratulations on Saturday’s election.
Jan. 15, 2024: According to the Financial Times, “Chinese chipmakers are taking group tours to network with their Japanese counterparts, as the semiconductor industry adapts to increasingly stringent export controls introduced by the US and its allies.”
Jan. 16, 2024: Global Times charges that Japan and Australia’s discussions of cooperation in military contingencies are stirring up troubles and adding new factors of instability into the region.
Jan. 18, 2024: BYD, China’s largest electric vehicle maker, launches three passenger models in Indonesia as a Japanese government official laments the declining market share of Japanese car brands in Indonesia due to their lagging behind in EV sales.
Jan. 18, 2024: Leading Chinese economic magazine Caixin reports that as global investors continue to seek alternatives to the PRC, Japan stocks are rapidly recovering ground they lost to Chinese peers in the early years of the pandemic.
Jan. 19, 2024: Aiming to respond quickly to possible cyberattacks and disinformation plots by countries such as China and Russia, Japan and NATO hope to establish a secure dedicated communication line for quickly sharing sensitive security information.
Jan. 19, 2024: Responding to its perception of threats from China and North Korea, the Japanese government agrees to purchase up to 400 Tomahawk cruise missiles a year earlier than planned.
Jan. 21, 2024: A Japanese Cabinet office survey finds that respondents who “feel no affinity” or “would rather not feel affinity” toward China reached 86.7%, up 4.9 percentage points from the previous year. By contrast 52.8% of respondents “feel an affinity with South Korea,” including “would rather feel affinity,” up 6.9 percentage points from the previous year, presumably due to improved bilateral relations under South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol.
Jan. 21, 2024: China Daily terms Japan’s decision to move up its purchase of Tomahawk missiles by a year “a dangerous move deserving of the full alert of the region and beyond.”
Jan. 21, 2024: Trade statistics released by Chinese customs authorities show that exports of graphite and related products to Japan decreased by over 40% on a quantitative basis or 59% in monetary terms in December compared to the previous month.
Jan. 22, 2024: Japanese Chamber of Commerce and Industry’s survey on the economy and business environment in China reveals that 23% of respondents said they did not invest in China in 2023, while 25% said they reduced their investment from 2022, together accounting for about half of the total responses.
Jan. 22, 2024: Likely prompted by concerns over China’s hegemonic activities, Vietnam accelerates its efforts to strengthen its relationship with Japan and the United States.
Jan. 24, 2024: Aiming to strengthen cooperation between Japan and Australia with China’s aggressive maritime expansion in mind, the Australian and Japanese defense departments have begun a four-year joint research project on unmanned underwater vehicles for underwater mine detection and unspecified other activities.
Jan. 24, 2024: A newly released report says ASDF scrambled fighter jets 555 times from April to December 2023, of which 392 or about 70% of which were against Chinese aircraft, down by 70 scrambles year on year.
Jan. 24, 2024: Japan’s trade deficit with mainland China expanded for the second straight year to reach ¥6.7 trillion ($44 billion) as exports fell 6.5% reflecting a slowdown of China’s economy.
Jan. 24, 2024: Japan’s December exports to China logged their first rise in more than a year as its exports surged to record highs, with shipments to the US reaching their strongest-ever level
Jan. 24, 2024: In its first visit to Beijing in about four years, a delegation from the Japan-China Economic Association seeks to improve relations.
Jan. 25, 2024: An usually large delegation from the Japan-China Economic Association that sought to improve Sino-Japanese relations returns home with no results save Premier Li Qiang’s pledge to improve the environment for foreign firms.
Jan. 26, 2024: New York Times financial analysts state that a change in perception among investors about China and Japan is one of the biggest themes in the markets right now. Japan’s stock market, overlooked by investors for decades, is making a furious comeback.
Jan. 27, 2024: CCTV reports that a Japanese fishing vessel and several patrol boats illegally entered the territorial waters of the Diaoyu (Senkaku) islands on the 27 and that the Chinese coast guard took the necessary control measures against them and warned them away.
Jan. 28, 2024: China is deploying multiple warships around the clock in waters near the borders of the air defense identification zone that it has unilaterally established.
Jan. 29, 2024: Referencing China’s stationing of warships and recent efforts to defend its claimed ADIZ, Yomiuri states that the Japanese government needs to maintain a sense of urgency and continue to demonstrate that it will not tolerate China’s attempts to change the status quo.
Jan. 30, 2024: Japanese government sources reveal that four Chinese warships have been constantly deployed around Taiwan, likely aiming to block US and other forces by using the ships in conjunction with other warships nearby.
Jan. 30, 2024: Foreign Minister Kamikawa pledges to promote a “mutually beneficial” relationship with China and make it “constructive and stable” through dialogue.
Jan. 31, 2024:According to Japanese customs data, Japan exported 5.97 million vehicles last year while PRC customs data reported that China sold 5.22 million vehicles. Other media report that Chinese exports exceeded those of Japan by almost 500,000. Toyota remains the world’s largest automobile company by unit sales.
Feb. 1, 2024: Japanese Defense Industry announces that it has been deploying an airborne early warning and control system (AWACS) planes and other aircraft into the ADIZ which China has unilaterally declared over an area of the East China Sea, for surveillance of Beijing’s constant deployment of warships near the boundaries of the ADIZ.
Feb. 2, 2024: Reuters, citing interviews with six Japanese officials who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the issue’s sensitivity, reports that the Japanese government has quietly attempted to engage with people close to Trump to warn against striking any deal with China that could upend years of collective efforts to rein in Beijing and risk the region’s fragile peace.
Feb. 4, 2024: Self-Defense Forces and the US military name China as a hypothetical enemy for the first time in their joint command post exercise amid rising concerns over a potential invasion of Taiwan by Beijing in the future.
Feb. 6, 2024: Global Times accuses Japan of hypocrisy with regard to the confidentiality of Japan-US exercises.
Feb. 6, 2024: Yomiuri reports that China’s cyber-attack on the foreign ministry’s telecommunications network has exposed vulnerabilities in Japan’s security measures, leaving the United States hesitant to share defense-related information with Japan.
Feb. 6, 2024: Kishida stresses the urgent need to improve Japan’s ability to mount an active cyberdefense saying he will “speed up discussions to pass related bills as soon as possible.”
Feb. 6, 2024: Referencing Kishida’s meeting with Italian Prime Minister Georgia Meloni, Professor Cui Hongjian of Beijing Foreign Studies University says that “In recent years, the major trend of Japan’s diplomacy is to strengthen contact and cooperation with European countries due to the impact of the [US’] Indo-Pacific strategy, while at the same time, the G7 has gradually become an important platform and tool for the US’ strategy against China.”
Feb. 6, 2024: Kyodo reports that Chinese Coast Guard vessels have been warning Japanese military aircraft to leave airspace over and around the Japanese-administered Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. Tokyo has lodged a protest with Beijing through diplomatic channels
Feb. 8, 2024: Cosmetics maker Kao blames Beijing’s opposition to Japan’s releasing treated radioactive water for its 1.2% sales decline in China in 1923.
Feb. 9, 2024: Kishida, meeting Kenyan President William Ruto in Tokyo, announces fiscal reconstruction aid for Kenya, which faced a worsening debt situation due to loans from China.
Feb. 9, 2024: On her first visit to Taiwan since taking office in 2016, Tokyo Gov. Koike Yuriko spends two days in Taiwan “to strengthen ties with the island’s leadership.”
Feb. 9, 2024: A former Japanese Defense Ministry intelligence officer believes that the Chinese military wants to eventually deploy Tang-class [Type 096] nuclear ballistic missile submarines equipped with the next-generation JL-3 submarine-launched ballistic missile to the Sea of Japan, posing a new security risk for Japan.
Feb. 9, 2024: Japan’s current account surplus was up 92.5% in 2023 from 2022. Exports grew 1.5% while imports declined 6.6%.
Feb. 10, 2024: After a Chinese cyber-attack leaked Japan’s diplomatic cables, Foreign Minister Kamikawa tells the Budget Committee of the House of Representatives that the government must deepen relations with allies and friendly nations to expedite measures against cyber-attacks.
Feb. 10, 2024: In light of overseas developments such as China’s military expansion in recent years, the Japanese government intends to strengthen integrated operations of the SDF, including in new domains such as space and cyber.
Feb. 11, 2024: Komeito is refusing to agree to the LDP’s desire to supply allies with the next-generation fighter jet being developed with Britain and Italy.
Feb. 11, 2024: Slowing Chinese economy has started affecting Japanese companies, mainly manufacturers. Motor maker Nidec Corp. lowered its full-year net profit outlook due to falling electric vehicle prices in China, while chemical maker Asahi Kasei Corp. partly blamed weaker demand there for a decline in its operating profit.
Feb. 12, 2024: Defense Ministry tries to reassure residents of Uruma, to be the site of a GSDF training site as part of the “southwest shift” of Japan’s defense capabilities, with China in mind.
Feb. 20, 2024: Asahi editorializes against “rushing” to increase SDF forces in Okinawa. The Defense ministry plans to increase personnel of the GSDF’s 15th Brigade based in Naha, and upgrade it to a division.
Feb. 24, 2024: Nikkei Asia discloses that officials from the Japanese foreign ministry and METI were among those taking part in an unannounced meeting with Chinese officials earlier this year. Japan and China have held working-level meetings on Fukushima wastewater before.
Feb. 24, 2024: Using such foreign organizations as the US Defense Department’s Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) or the DoD affiliated Defense Innovation Unit (DIU), as models, Japan announces it will launch a research institute for innovative technology development this autumn. Fifty of its 100 staffers are to be recruited from outside the defense ministry such as from companies and universities.
Feb. 24, 2024: At the ceremony to open TSMC’s first chip production plant in Japan, TSMC founder Chang predicts a chip renaissance in Japan as it attempts to regain the chipmaking glory it enjoyed in the 1980s.
Feb. 26, 2024: Asahi editorializes that recent visits of groups of SDF members to Yasukuni Shrine not only breach the constitutional principle of separation of religion and politics but also raised suspicion the SDF have not broken with the imperial Japanese military as they are supposed to have done.
Feb. 26, 2024: Supreme Allied Europe (SACEUR) Commander Gen. Christopher Cavoli visits Tokyo.
Feb. 27, 2024: Kyoto-based control system manufacturer Omron is to cut 2,000 jobs in Japan and overseas in response to China’s economic slump.
March 1, 2024: China, Japan, and South Korea which account for 20% of world trade by value agree to reuse shipping pallets and make efforts to implement license plates usable in both the country of departure and the country of arrival to smooth the flow of goods among the three countries.
March 1, 2024: Government data reveal that Japan’s industrial production fell 7.5% in January from the previous month due mainly to lower automobile output, the fastest decline since May 2020 in the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic.
March 2, 2024: SDF will create a new sea transport joint force in 2025.
March 2, 2024: Global Times warns that South Korea’s closer relations with Japan are its “Achilles heel” since they may trigger another wave of anti-Japanese sentiment across the country.
March 3, 2024: Chinese Ambassador to Japan Wu Jianghao seeks to allay growth and security concerns about China in the Japanese business community, saying the two sides should explore opportunities in emerging industries while warning that although Tokyo has an alliance with Washington, it has a responsibility to maintain stable ties with Beijing under the treaty of peace and friendship between the two sides.
March 3, 2024: Heightening deterrence capabilities in coordination with other countries in the Indo-Pacific region as China builds up its military strength and North Korea continues launching missiles, the SDF took part in multinational joint exercises 56 times last year, 18 times the figure in 2006 when the Joint Staff Office was founded to manage the three forces.
March 5, 2024: Speaking at a press conference Chief Cabinet Secretary Hayashi Yoshimasa says that China’s rapidly expanding military power is a “serious concern’ for Japan and the international society.
March 6, 2024: Kishida warns that Japan’s defense will be negatively impacted if the country is not allowed to export finished defense equipment developed jointly with Britain and Italy to third nations.
March 6, 2024: Yomiuri editorializes against China’s planned 7.2% increase in its military budget—4.4 times the size of Japan’s proposed defense budget for the next fiscal year—even as the PRC economy faces problems. The editorial describes the Xi administration’s attempts to change the status quo by force through unbridled military expansion as absolutely unacceptable.
March 6, 2024: An Asahi editorial urges Beijing to reconsider scrapping the premier’s news conference that has always been held on the final day of the legislative sessions, describing the decision as tantamount to abandoning its responsibility as a superpower by shutting down communication with the international community.
March 6, 2024: In an exclusive interview with China Daily Chinese Ambassador to Japan Wu reiterates familiar points: the two nations should “focus on the fundamental interests of the two peoples and the region’s need for peace and stability, and earnestly implement the important consensus of their leaders.”
March 7, 2024: Indian External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar meets counterpart Kamikawa, with the two pledging cooperation in defense and security for the realization of a free and open Indo-Pacific.
March 8, 2024: Japan’s trade deficit halves after a halt in the price of materials. Exports grow 7.6% year on year while imports fall 12.1%.
March 9, 2024: In another indication of warm relations between Japan and Taiwan, Kyushu Railway’s Nichinan station has become the sister station of Taiwan’s Rinan station, with the two sharing the same kanji, as do 31 other stations.The Nichinan municipal government plans to hold events such as Taiwan-style night markets to make its citizens feel closer to Taiwan.
March 11, 2024: On the 13th anniversary of the Great East Japan Earthquake, Japanese students in Taiwan hold their annual event to thank the Taiwanese people for their generous donations, this year adding thanks for donations to areas hit by the New Year’s day quake on the Noto Peninsula.
March 11, 2024: An Asahi editorial takes China to task for its “extremely incoherent” attitude of describing itself as a “staunch force for peace, stability and progress of the world” while failing to take a resolute stance against a war of aggression and threatening neighboring countries with its own military buildup.
March 13, 2024: SDF and US Marine Corps conduct the annual Iron Fist exercise to practice recapturing remote Japanese Islands.
March 13, 2024: Japan’s largest employers including Nippon Steel, Toyota, Hitachi, and Toshiba announce record pay increases on Wednesday, signaling a break from the deflationary mindset that led to the prolonged period of low economic growth known as the “lost decades.”
March 13, 2024: A self-described patriotic blogger sues Mo Yan, the first Chinese to have won the Nobel Prize in Literature (2012), for “beautifying soldiers of the Imperial Japanese Army and insulting Mao Zedong.”
March 15, 2024: LDP and Komeito agree to allow exports of next-generation fighter jets to be jointly developed with Britain and Italy but for this specific model of fighter jet rather than all internationally co-developed defense equipment.
March 15, 2024: Yasukuni Shrine picks retired MSDF commander and former Ambassador to Djibouti Otsuka Umio as its chief priest.
March 15, 2024: Zhong Shanshan, said to be China’s richest man, is accused by online nationalists for covertly promoting Japan.
March 18, 2024: Kobe Gakuin University discloses that professor of Chinese literature and linguists Hu Shuyin has been missing since last summer when he temporarily returned to China.
March 20, 2024: Foreign Minister Kamikawa, aiming to create an encircling net around China as part of efforts to increase momentum for nuclear disarmament, takes the initiative in creating a group of nations that support negotiations for the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty at a UN meeting.
March 20, 2024: Foreign Ministry Press Secretary Kobayashi Maki reiterates the Japanese government’s grave concern that the tough national security bill passed by Hong Kong lawmakers “will further undermine the confidence in the ‘one country, two systems’ framework.”
March 20, 2024: Japanese Coast Guard states that a fleet of Chinese ships sailed in the territorial waters of the Diaoyu Islands on March 20.
March 21, 2024: According to government data, Japan’s exports rose 7.8% in February, as shipments continued to expand in cars and electrical machinery while its trade deficit sank to 379 billion yen ($2.5 billion).
March 23, 2024: Japanese government announces plans to build underground evacuation shelters capable of accommodating residents for about two weeks in times of emergency in remote islands near Taiwan, including Yonaguni and Ishigaki.
March 23, 2024: Kyodo states that Japan has conducted its first-ever cybersecurity exercise with five Pacific island counties Feb. 18-26.
March 26, 2024: After months of disputes, the Japanese government approves revised guidelines to its strict defense equipment transfer rules, enabling the export of next-generation fighter jets jointly developed with the UK and Italy under the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP).
March 27, 2024: Air Self-Defense Force scrambles fighters after a Chinese WZ-7 reconnaissance drone flies over the Sea of Japan for the first time though does not intrude into Japanese territorial airspace.
March 27, 2024: Chinese foreign ministry expresses grave concern over Japan’s latest step away from the pacifist constitution by approving a plan to sell next-generation fighter jets to other countries.
March 27, 2024: Asahi editorializes against the government’s decision to lift the nation’s export ban on fighter jets which it sees as executed in the absence of public discourse and coming on the heels of the revision of the three strategic documents— the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy and the Defense Buildup Program.
March 29, 2024: Xinhua takes note of the record-high 2024 Japanese defense budget of about $52.53 billion and its focus on enhancing the country’s counterstrike capabilities and strengthening missile defense systems.
March 30, 2024: Nikkei commentator Akita Hiroyuki, referencing the confrontation between Chinese and Philippine vessels in the South China Sea as well as increased maritime pressures against Malaysia and Vietnam and in the East China Sea against Japan, argues that he strategy of making concessions to China on territorial and other sovereignty issues will never work.
March 31, 2024: According to Japan’s Coast Guard, two Chinese Coast guard ships stay in Japanese waters near the contested Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands for more than two days before leaving on the 30th.
March 31, 2024: in response to China’s growing naval presence in the South China Sea, Japan plans to take part in a joint training exercise with the United States and the Philippines.
March 31, 2024: Nikkei comments on the new GDF unit that became operational in March with the mission of electronic combat intercepting enemy communications and jamming radar.
April 2, 2024: Japanese government designates 16 airports and ports in seven prefectures where the SDFs and the coast guard will be granted peacetime use, as part of efforts to boost the country’s defenses.
April 2, 2024: With an eye on China, the US and Japanese governments are working out subsidy rules for strategic goods such as semiconductors, storage batteries and permanent magnets.
April 3, 2024: Japan’s industry ministry approves subsidies up to 590 billion yen ($3.9 billion) for chip foundry venture Rapidus as Tokyo pushes forward with plans to rebuild the country’s chip manufacturing base amid concerns over supply chain security.
April 10, 2024 “Defense industry cooperation between Japan and the United States, as well as with like-minded countries, are extremely important,” Kishida says in an interview with selected foreign media at the Prime Minister’s Office.
April 11, 2024: Addressing a joint session of the US congress, Kishida states that “China’s current external stance and military actions present an unprecedented and the greatest strategic challenge, not only to the peace and security of Japan but to the peace and stability of the international community at large.”
April 14, 2024: Aiming to reduce their reliance on China for critical minerals, Japan, the US and the Philippines agree to a framework for a stable supply of nickel under which resource-rich countries and high-consumption countries in Europe, Africa and other regions work together to share information and invest in developing critical minerals.
April 15, 2024: Yomiuri editorializes in favor of close security cooperation among Japan, the US, and the Philippines to deter China’s dangerous actions. It argues that provocative behavior of China Coast Guard vessels is especially reckless and could lead to a military clash.
April 16, 2024: Writing in Foreign Affairs, former special adviser to then-prime minister Abe Shinzo speaks of Japan’s “China Reckoning,” noting that policies aimed at bolstering Japan’s defense capabilities and expanding its alliance networks have become broadly popular.
April 16, 2024: Foreign Minister Kamikawa announces the publication of Japan’s 67th Diplomatic Bluebook which, she says, focuses on the rule of law and human dignity, taking into account the situations in Ukraine and the Middle East.
April 18, 2024: Global Times describes Japan’s latest Diplomatic Blue Book as following the cliché of smears against China by playing up the so-called China threat and interfering in China’s internal affairs.
April 21, 2024: In his capacity as prime minister, Kishida donates ritual masakaki sprigs to the Yasukuni Shrine on the first day of its spring festival, but does not attend himself.
April 23, 2024: Asia University discloses that Professor Fan Yuntao, a Chinese national who specializes in international law and political science, has been unreachable since returning to China in February 2023 on leave.
April 24, 2024: Descendants of 18 Chinese “comfort women” who were sexually exploited by Japanese soldiers during World War II file lawsuits in the Shanxi High People’s Court against the Japanese government.
April 24, 2024: Bloomberg reports that Japanese brands are poised to take advantage of electric-vehicle demand in North America as US protectionism and security fears stymie the overseas expansion of Chinese names like BYD and SAIC.
April 25, 2024: China Military Online accuses Japan of “false narratives.”
April 25, 2024: According to a survey conducted by Yomiuri in February and March, 84% of respondents feel that Japan is in a threatening security environment. Respondents who considered China a threat rose to 91%, up five percentage points from last year’s survey.
April 26, 2024: Chinese media describe Japanese companies and industry groups as optimistic about the potential of the Chinese market for new opportunities, particularly its new-energy vehicle industry, robotics, health care, and eldercare.
April 27, 2024: An environmental survey of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands and the surrounding waters is conducted by the municipal government in Ishigaki, Okinawa Prefecture, was forced to halt due to a Chinese Coast Guard vessel approaching within 1 kilometer.
April 27, 2024: Asahi editorializes that Japan-China ties are being hurt by the disappearances of Chinese scholars Fan Yuntao and Hu Shiyun deeming the Chinese foreign ministry’s response that it “did not have a grasp of the situation” unacceptable.
April 28, 2024: China lodges solemn representations to Japan after five Japanese lawmakers reportedly trespassed into waters near the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands for a maritime inspection.
April 29, 2024: Foreign Minister Kamikawa begins a visit to five countries in Africa and Asia (Cote d’Ivoire, Nigeria, Madagascar, Sri Lanka, and Nepal) to strengthen bilateral ties as China increases its presence in these regions.
April 29, 2024: Japan’s seafood exports to China in fiscal 2023 fall 57% due to China’s ban, reaching their lowest level since comparable data became available in fiscal 1988.
May 1, 2024: On April 29, a day after the Chinese government lodges a protest against Japanese lawmakers including former Defense Minister Inada Tomomi allegedly landing on one of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, the Shanghai Maritime Safety Administration declared an area of the East China Sea off limits to traffic from May 1-9 for military activities, and on May 1 the PRC’s newest aircraft carrier, the Fujian, began its first sea trials.