Kan Naoto resigned as prime minister on Aug. 26 after promising to step aside almost three months earlier amid dissension within his ruling Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) and dwindling public support after a clumsy response to the tragedies of March 11.  He was succeeded by Finance Minister Noda Yoshihiko, who prevailed in the DPJ presidential race despite little evidence of support in the polls, but strong backing within the party.  The US and Japan convened the first Security Consultative Committee or “2+2” in four years to outline common strategic objectives and strengthen alliance cooperation in a regional and global setting.  The two governments also consulted on the margins of international events to discuss cooperation on various issues.  Vice President Joseph Biden visited Japan in late August to reiterate US support for the recovery effort and met victims of the disaster in Tohoku.   Public opinion polls in Japan and the United States revealed a solid foundation of support for the US-Japan alliance.

Kan quits, eventually

The Diet passed a $50 billion supplementary budget on May 2 including resources to support recovery from the March 11 disasters but that did little to quell public frustration with the Kan government’s response, which was widely criticized for a lack of coordination and transparency.  In a seemingly calculated effort to boost his popularity by capitalizing on public concerns about safety since the nuclear accident at the Fukushima Daiichi plant, Kan made a series of announcements signaling a shift away from nuclear power.  First he declared on May 6 that operations at the Hamaoka nuclear power plant southwest of Tokyo would be suspended due to the potential for a catastrophic natural disaster akin to that which struck the northeast coast of Japan on March 11.  Several days later Kan confirmed that the government would revise an energy strategy unveiled in 2010 that called for 14 additional nuclear reactors to be built by 2030 to boost the share of nuclear power in electricity supply to 50 percent.  On May 25, Kan addressed the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in Paris and unveiled a plan for Japan to obtain 20 percent of its energy needs from renewable sources by the 2020s.  And on July 13 Kan revealed his desire for Japan to end its reliance on nuclear power altogether.  These initiatives seemed to resonate with the public in opinion surveys published over the summer, but failed to improve his standing overall as attempts to unseat Kan exacerbated the political gridlock during his tenure.

On May 26, in an interview with the Wall Street Journal, former DPJ president Ozawa Ichiro – who together with Kan and his predecessor Hatoyama Yukio founded the party in 1998 – called on Kan to resign for responding slowly to the March 11 disasters and failing to implement policies in response.  Opposition parties led by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) then submitted a no-confidence motion in the Diet on June 1 and both Hatoyama and Ozawa threatened to encourage their supporters in the DPJ to support it.  (Kan was less attached to the social welfare spending initiatives outlined in the 2009 DPJ election manifesto and earned the ire of his party’s co-founders with periodic references to tax increases as a means of restoring fiscal health).  Kan survived a no-confidence vote on June 2 only after a vague promise to resign once progress had been made in containing the nuclear crisis at the Fukushima Daiichi plant and implementing reconstruction plans.  (Hatoyama ended up voting against the motion but Ozawa abstained.)  Yet that did not prove satisfactory to many politicians and a week later Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Sengoku Yoshito stated that Kan had no choice but to resign, fueling speculation regarding the timing of Kan’s departure and potential candidates to succeed him.  As the nation marked the three-month anniversary of the March 11 disasters, politicians appeared more focused on the drama in Nagatacho than on strategies to engineer a recovery, an unfortunate yet accurate depiction of the dynamics under Kan’s rule.  On June 20, the Diet did manage to pass a basic law outlining guidelines for reconstruction policy including the creation of a new reconstruction agency, and shortly thereafter legislators approved a DPJ proposal to extend the Diet session until the end of August to pass other recovery-related legislation.

Undeterred by forces within and outside his party determined to remove him from office, Kan announced on June 27 that his resignation was conditional upon three pieces of legislation passing the Diet: a second supplementary budget; legislation authorizing the issuance of bonds to finance the recovery; and a renewable energy bill.  But his approval rating averaged just upward of 20 percent at the time and two subsequent developments further weakened his standing with the public.  The first involved Matsumoto Ryu, whom Kan appointed minister for reconstruction soon after the basic law passed but resigned after one week on the job for several gaffes uttered during meetings with local officials in the Tohoku region.  (Matsumoto reportedly confessed to being ignorant of local geography; suggested that only locales that presented plans would receive government assistance; and berated the governor of Miyagi prefecture for keeping him waiting for a meeting.)  The second and more serious fiasco stemmed from a lack of policy coordination within the government regarding the resumption of operations at nuclear power plants.  In early July, officials in Genkai in Saga prefecture announced a decision to allow the local nuclear power plant to restart after Trade Minister Kaieda Banri assured them the plant was safe.  But days later, the Kan government announced that it was considering stress tests for all nuclear power plants as a safety measure, embarrassing Kaieda and prompting some analysts to question whether the government had a coherent energy strategy.  Both episodes damaged Kan’s reputation and helped cement his lame duck status in the eyes of the public.  By mid-July, his approval rating was 15 percent and 70 percent of the public wanted him to resign by the end of August, according to a survey by Asahi Shimbun.

The first of Kan’s three conditions for his resignation, a second supplementary budget totaling $25 billion, passed the Diet on July 25 and DPJ Secretary General Okada Katsuya led several rounds of negotiations with the opposition LDP and Komeito (Clean Government Party) that eventually resulted in an agreement to review the 2009 DPJ election manifesto to pave the way for the recovery bond legislation and several compromises that sealed the renewable energy bill.  Both passed on Aug. 26 and Kan resigned, setting the stage for a DPJ presidential race featuring former Foreign Minister Maehara Seiji, Finance Minister Noda Yoshihiko, Trade Minister Kaieda Banri, former Transportation Minister Mabuchi Sumio, and Agriculture Minister Kano Michihiko.  The election, scheduled for Aug, 29 and limited to DPJ Diet members, was a battle between power bases in the DPJ with Maehara, the most popular figure in the polls, expected to face off against Kaieda, who was endorsed by Ozawa Ichiro.  None of the candidates cleared the 50 percent threshold to win in the first round but Kaieda was the top vote getter, followed surprisingly by Noda, who did not really register in polls due allegedly to his low profile and support for tax increases and was expected to lose after Maehara entered the race (they court similar bases within the party).  But Noda prevailed in a runoff by a comfortable margin, perhaps an indication that Ozawa’s influence in the party had waned since he was indicted earlier in the year because of an alleged funding scandal.

Noda vowed to unify the DPJ and at this writing moved to form a Cabinet reflective of the various power centers within the ruling party.  He also expressed a willingness to work with the opposition but faces an uphill battle as the LDP will likely continue a pattern of obstruction to force a general election.  Priorities would likely include containing the nuclear crisis at Fukushima, implementing reconstruction efforts and charting a path for economic growth.  The Aug. 24 downgrade of Japan’s sovereign debt rating by Moody’s Investors Service brought into stark relief concerns about Japan’s public debt, which Noda had addressed repeatedly as finance minister under Kan and would likely bring to the fore again as prime minister.  The appreciation of the yen prompted Noda to oversee an intervention in currency markets on Aug. 4 to protect Japanese exports.  Much like his US counterpart, Noda might find the balance between growth and fiscal discipline one of his greatest policy challenges.

Bilateral engagement

Japan and the United States sustained a pattern of consistent dialogue beginning with a meeting between President Barack Obama and Prime Minister Kan during the G8 summit in Deauville, France, on May 26.  Obama pledged continued US support for Japan’s recovery from the March 11 disasters and they discussed bilateral security issues and cooperation on Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Middle East.  Kan also briefed Obama on the postponement of Japan’s decision, in light of 3-11, regarding entry into negotiations over the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade liberalization initiative, which was originally due in June.  Defense Secretary Robert Gates and Defense Minister Kitazawa Toshimi reaffirmed a commitment to the existing relocation plan for Marine Corps Air Station Futenma on Okinawa during a meeting on the margins of the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore on June 3.  This set the stage for comprehensive consultations in Washington on the strategic trajectory of the alliance.

Gates and Kitazawa, together with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Foreign Minister Matsumoto Takeaki, convened a bilateral Security Consultative Committee (“2+2”) meeting on June 21, the first in four years and the first since the DPJ assumed power in 2009.  The committee released a joint statement updating common strategic objectives from 2005 and 2007 and outlining ways to enhance bilateral defense cooperation.  Three additional documents were also released focused on bilateral cooperation in response to 3-11, an agreement reached at the end of last year on host nation support, and progress on the realignment of US forces in Japan.  This meeting was significant in that the two governments were not able to pen a joint vision statement for the alliance last year to commemorate the 50^th anniversary of the bilateral security treaty but could now build on successful cooperation in the aftermath of 3-11 to develop a framework for alliance cooperation into the future.

The joint statement on common strategic objectives detailed the need for the alliance to address various regional and global challenges and meet them by modernizing forces, enhancing alliance interoperability, and promoting cooperation in developing new technologies.  China was encouraged to play a constructive role in regional stability and prosperity, adhere to international norms of behavior, and improve transparency with respect to its military modernization.  Among the numerous objectives documented, trilateral security and defense cooperation with South Korea and Australia, as well as trilateral dialogue with India, and outreach to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) featured prominently, as did cooperation on nonproliferation, the safety and security of the maritime domain, and the protection of and access to space and cyberspace.  (The document referenced bilateral strategic dialogues on space security, cyber-security issues, and extended deterrence.)  The joint statement also noted progress in ballistic missile defense cooperation and that Japan would allow the transfer of the SM-3 Block IIA to third parties requested by the US in cases where the transfer supports the national security of Japan and/or contributes to international peace and stability, and when the third party has sufficient policies to prevent the further transfer of the SM-3 Block IIA (an exception to Japan’s three principles banning the export of arms).

The statement on realignment reiterated the commitment of the two governments to implement the relocation plan for Futenma as described in a joint statement of May 28, 2010. It was acknowledged that the target date of 2014 for completion of the project would not be met, but that both sides would strive to conclude the effort at the earliest possible date.  This contrasted sharply with the views of some members of Congress who had begun to question both the feasibility and cost of the plan.  On May 11, Senators James Webb (D-VA), Carl Levin (D-MI), and John McCain (R-AZ) issued a joint statement calling for the reexamination of the overall US military basing plans in East Asia, including the relocation of MCAS Futenma.  They encouraged the exploration of alternatives including the integration of functions at Futenma with Kadena Air Base.  At the end of June, the US Senate Appropriations Committee then excluded funding covering the transfer of US Marines from Okinawa to Guam from a spending bill for fiscal year 2012, citing concerns about Japan’s ability to implement the Futenma relocation plan to which the Guam transfer is linked.  Prime Minister Kan and Defense Minister Kitazawa both met with Okinawa Gov. Nakaima Hirokazu to stress the merits to the relocation plan and repeat the desire of the central government to implement it. But the politics of Futenma remain complicated in Okinawa and now appear increasingly so in Washington, which suggests that Futenma relocation could remain on the bilateral agenda for some time.

Secretary of State Clinton and Foreign Minister Matsumoto subsequently met on the margins of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in Bali, Indonesia, on July 25 to discuss Japan’s recovery from the March 11 disasters, bilateral security cooperation, and plans for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum to be hosted by the United States in Hawaii this November.  Clinton and Matsumoto then joined South Korean Foreign Minister Kim Sung-hwan for a trilateral ministerial in which the three, building on a previous meeting in Washington last December, agreed to consult closely on policy toward North Korea, including efforts to prevent proliferation and respond to Pyongyang’s uranium enrichment program.  They also aimed to coordinate efforts to support the ARF and the East Asia Summit, scheduled for October, and to cooperate on global issues such as nonproliferation, human rights, and development cooperation.  They also agreed to explore the establishment of a trilateral secretariat to facilitate this strategically vital forum in support of regional security and prosperity.

Concluding another season of high-level bilateral diplomacy, Vice President Joseph Biden visited Japan in August at the conclusion of a trip that also took him to China and Mongolia.  Biden met Prime Minister Kan in Tokyo on Aug. 23 to discuss rebuilding efforts after 3-11 and then traveled to Sendai in Miyagi Prefecture to survey damage from the tsunami, deliver an address at Sendai Airport (cleared for relief operations just days after the tsunami with the assistance of the US military) to reiterate US support for the recovery and the importance of the bilateral alliance, and meet with survivors living in temporary housing facilities.  Biden also addressed US troops at Yokota Air Base on Aug. 24 to thank them for their support of disaster relief efforts under the rubric of Operation Tomodachi (Japanese for friend).  His trip was well received and played positively in the US and Japanese press.

Public opinion

The success of Operation Tomodachi and the convening of the 2+2 enhanced the potential to further strengthen alliance cooperation.  And, recent public opinion surveys indicate both countries continue to recognize the importance of the relationship.  A survey by the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project released on June 1 showed 85 percent of the Japanese public has a favorable opinion of the US.  The Ministry of Foreign Affairs released the results of a poll on the image of Japan in the US on June 9 showing that 84 percent of the US public and 90 percent of opinion leaders consider Japan a dependable ally.

The stretch run

Economic policy and divided government will consume both leaders at home over the coming months.  Prime Minister Noda will likely face a heated debate over fiscal policy while trying to pass the third and largest supplementary budget in support of reconstruction in a divided Diet.  President Obama will attempt to advance legislation aimed at job creation in the face of Republican resistance in the House of Representatives.  The two will have multiple opportunities to discuss their similar circumstances and develop a rapport, first in September during the United Nations General Assembly in New York City.  Both will also likely participate in the East Asia Summit in Indonesia in October, followed by the APEC forum in Hawaii in November.