The last four months of 2022 saw a flurry of bilateral diplomatic activities between Japan and South Korea in both nations’ capitals and around the world. They focused on 1) North Korea, 2) the issue of wartime forced labor, and 3) the future of Seoul-Tokyo cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region. Despite mutual mistrust and the low approval ratings of Prime Minister Kishida Fumio and President Yoon Suk Yeol, both leaders had the political will to see a breakthrough in bilateral relations. Another signal came in the form of new strategy documents in which Seoul and Tokyo explained their foreign and security policy directions and goals. On Dec. 16, the Kishida government published three national security-related documents—the National Security Strategy (NSS), the National Defense Strategy (NDS), and the Defense Buildup program. On Dec. 28, the Yoon government unveiled South Korea’s Strategy for a Free, Peaceful, Prosperous Indo-Pacific Region, its first-ever Indo-Pacific strategy. Although each document serves a somewhat different purpose, it is now possible to gauge how similarly or differently Japan and South Korea assess challenges in the international security environment, and how they plan to respond to them.

Importantly, they signal the other, the United States, and the world that they acknowledge the strategic and economic importance of their partner in their vision of the future. When one considers the future of Japan-South Korea relations, what are some of the most important takeaways?

South Korea’s Indo-Pacific Strategy and Japan’s Security Documents

To understand the significance of the mutual recognition in these documents, it is necessary to situate the plans in the broader context, particularly in comparison to prior policies.

First, when it comes to North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities, overall, there is considerable convergence between Seoul and Tokyo in terms of threat perceptions and the emphasis on deterrence. This is an area where one may expect to see an even further tightening of Seoul-Tokyo cooperation, especially together with Washington. Japan’s National Security Strategy notes that North Korea has conducted missile launches “with an unprecedented frequency and in new ways,” estimating that Pyongyang’s intention is “to bolster its nuclear capabilities both in quality and in quantity at the maximum speed.” It assesses that “North Korea’s military activities pose an even more grave and imminent threat to Japan’s national security than ever before.” South Korea’s Indo-Pacific Strategy similarly views North Korea’s growing nuclear and missile capabilities as “a serious threat to peace and stability not only on the Korean Peninsula and in the Indo-Pacific region, but also across the globe.”

In addressing these threats, both Japan and South Korea consider the other an important partner. South Korea’s Indo-Pacific Strategy says, “Based on the ROK-US Alliance, we will maintain and strengthen our robust combined defense posture against North Korea’s nuclear threats, while expanding ROK-US-Japan trilateral security cooperation to reinforce our capability to safeguard peace.” Japan’s National Security Strategy similarly writes, “with the response to North Korea and other issues in mind, Japan will enhance Japan-ROK and Japan-US-ROK strategic coordination, including in the area of security.”

Figure 1 President Yoon Suk Yeol attends a trilateral summit with President Joe Biden and Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. Photo: Office of the President (South Korea)

Second, there is an acknowledgement on both sides that they can be like-minded partners in the Indo-Pacific region, in terms of navigating shifts in the regional balance of power, growing geopolitical competition, and the resulting economic risks, such as supply chain disruptions. Sharing an emphasis on such values as “freedom,” “democracy,” “human rights,” and the “rule of law,” both Seoul and Tokyo have repeatedly signaled their interest in improving bilateral relations, while positioning themselves as global actors. South Korea, branding itself a “Global Pivotal State,” acknowledges Japan as “our closest neighbor.” It reads, “we will seek a forward-looking partnership that supports our common interests and values. Improved relations with Japan is essential for fostering cooperation and solidarity among like-minded Indo-Pacific nations; we are thus continuing our diplomatic efforts to restore mutual trust and advance relations.” Japan, viewing itself as a “major global actor,” calls South Korea “a highly important neighboring country to Japan in a geopolitical context and in regard to Japan’s security.” It goes on to state, “Japan will communicate closely with the ROK in order to develop Japan-ROK relations based on the foundation of friendly and cooperative relations that have developed since the normalization of diplomatic relations in 1965.”

While some assert that South Korea’s Indo-Pacific Strategy did not elaborate enough on China, there are important differences in South Korea’s tone and signaling. On the one hand, compared to the previous Moon administration’s reluctance to even talk about China, President Yoon is willing to articulate his vision for the regional order as being a “free, peaceful, and prosperous Indo-Pacific,” referencing the issues of the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait. His Indo-Pacific Strategy states, “in this regard, peace, stability and freedom of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea, which constitutes strategically important sea lines of communication, must be respected. We also affirm the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait for the peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula and for the security and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific.” On the other hand, South Korea’s use of the word “inclusive” in describing its Indo-Pacific Strategy as one that “neither targets nor excludes any specific nation” is perhaps in consideration of its relations with Beijing.

Compared to South Korea, Japan viewed China as a threat in unequivocal terms and described it as an “unprecedented and the greatest strategic challenge” to the peace and security of Japan. Seoul and Tokyo included the expression that they oppose unilateral changes to the status quo by force. However, there is a difference. Japan pointedly described its first defense objective as shaping a “security environment not accepting unilateral changes to the status quo by force.” Japan’sNational Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy list in detail intensifying Chinese activities in the region around Japan, and around Taiwan, calling it a “matter of serious concern.”

Japan’s national security documents drew much attention because of two things: 1) a concrete plan to double defense spending to 2% of GDP by 2027—breaking with decades-long tradition of a 1% cap—and 2) inclusion of the use of counterstrike capabilities—the capability for Japan to strike into an opponent’s territory. This represents what Japan calls a “major turning point” for its postwar defense policy. Japan’s intent to acquire counterstrike capabilities has raised questions among its neighbors, including South Korea. Japan’s National Security Strategy elaborates the circumstances of such use as when “deterring invasion against Japan,” “missile attacks by an opponent,” and “preventing further attacks while defending against incoming missiles by means of the missile defense network.” South Korea’s government and military are said to have paid a great deal of attention to this inclusion as they regard it as relevant for possible contingencies on the Korean Peninsula.

For example, in the NDS Tokyo lays out seven key “functions and capabilities” to fundamentally reinforce its defense capabilities, including 1) stand-off defense, 2) integrated air and missile defense, 3) unmanned defense, 4) cross-domain, 5) command and control and intelligence-related functions, 6) mobile deployment and 7) sustainability and resiliency. In terms of acquiring new capabilities, the more than $2.4 billion ($1.6 billion for buying and $832 million for training) earmarked in its new record defense budget ($51.4 billion) approved in December 2022 to buy hundreds of US Tomahawk missiles for its Aegis destroyers made headlines. Acquisitions like this will complement homegrown capabilities described within the NDS to bring about real material changes to Japan’s defense capability for the decade to come. Some of these new capabilities include standoff missiles such as hypervelocity gliding projectiles (HVGP), Aegis-equipped vessels (sea-based ballistic missile defense), unmanned underwater vehicles (UUV), a Space Domain Awareness system, and many more. Furthermore, in a nod to a lesson learned from the conflict in Ukraine, the NDS promises to resolve its current shortage of ammunition and missiles by 2027.

Expressing concern about the inclusion of counterstrike capabilities and their implications for the Korean Peninsula, a South Korean foreign ministry official said, “it is necessary to have close consultation with us and seek out approval in advance on issues that have a significant impact on the security of the Korean peninsula and out national interest.” “It is desirable that related discussions will be carried out transparently in a way that contributes to regional peace and stability, while upholding the spirit of the Peace Constitution.” In response, a Japanese government official said that Japan would not need permission from other countries when exercising counterstrike capabilities and “decide on its own.”

Bilateral Diplomacy on: North Korea, Forced Labor Issue, and Security Cooperation

The last four months of 2022 saw a flurry of bilateral visits, meetings, and phone calls between Korea and Japan. This includes two leader meetings and a phone call between Yoon and Kishida, visits to Seoul by an 18-member delegation of Japanese Diet lawmakers, two former Japanese prime ministers, and the leader of Komeito, and visits to Tokyo by the South Korean prime minister and health minister. There were also numerous working-level consultations on critical bilateral issues held in both capitals. On the table for bilateral diplomacy are 1) North Korea, 2) the issue of wartime forced labor, and 3) the future of Seoul-Tokyo cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region.

In early September, Japanese Foreign Minister Hayashi Yoshimasa and South Korean Foreign Minister Park Jin discussed the need for improving bilateral relations at a forum. Park said “a starting point for improving South Korea-Japan relations is being created,” while Hayashi believed “there has never been a time when progress in Japan-South Korea, Japan-US-South Korea cooperation is more important than now.” South Korean Prime Minister Han Duck-soo visited Japan to attend the state funeral of former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo. During his meeting with Kishida the day after the funeral, the two sides agreed to discuss the issues of wartime forced labor and the so-called comfort women. In response to Han’s offer of condolences extended on behalf of President Yoon and South Korea, Kishida said that Japan “received numerous polite condolences from many Koreans, including President Yoon and the Prime Minister.” South Korea’s Deputy National Assembly Speaker Chung Jin-suk on the South Korean delegation to the state funeral similarly called for two-track efforts to resolve difficult historical issues and expand exchanges between the two countries, “as the younger generation wishes for.”

Figure 2 South Korean President Yoon and Japanese Prime Minister Kishida pose for a photo prior to their talks in New York. Photo: Yonhap

Prime Minister Kishida and President Yoon met twice in late 2022—in September on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York, and in November on the sidelines of ASEAN-related summit meetings in Phnom Penh. The brouhaha behind their September meeting mirrors the current state of bilateral relations where both sides feel the need to improve relations but are unable to make a clear breakthrough due in large part to mutual mistrust combined with domestic politics. With the issue of wartime forced labor still pending, both Kishida and Yoon had to navigate domestic opposition amid their low approval ratings.

Leading up to the Sept. 21 meeting, South Korea’s Presidential Office announced that Seoul and Tokyo planned to hold a summit in New York. The remark by Kim Tae-hyo, deputy national security adviser, was widely reported in South Korean media outlets. The Japanese Prime Minister’s Office denied this, with Chief Cabinet Secretary Matsuno Hirokazu responding that Kishida’s schedule has not been determined. Amid South Korean media reports that Kishida was unhappy with South Korea’s announcement, Kishida and Yoon did meet for 30 minutes on Sept. 21. South Korean Foreign Minister Park and Japanese Foreign Minister Hayashi also met for 50 minutes in New York to discuss bilateral relations. South Korean politicians in the opposition criticized Yoon’s meeting with Kishida as a “disgrace,” and “humiliating,” questioning why Yoon had to go to the building where Kishida was holding his official function to meet.

Regardless of how one characterizes the September meeting—an official summit or not—Kishida and Yoon met longer for 45 minutes on Nov. 13, which was acknowledged as an official summit. During these two meetings, the two leaders confirmed three things. First, they would work closely to deal with North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats bilaterally and trilaterally with the United States. Indeed, the North Korean threat was the unifier for which the need for Korea-Japan bilateral cooperation was repeatedly reconfirmed. North Korea in the last four months continued to up the ante on provocations, shooting missiles on 19 different days and launching almost 60 missiles in the process, including a record-breaking 23 (or 25) missiles in a single day in early November. Overall in 2022, North Korea has shattered all provocation metrics, conducting missile tests on 37 different occasions, and launching over 90 missiles of all types, including two North Korean missiles that flew over Japan for the first time since 2017. North Korea is no longer just shooting missiles: it is increasingly conducting hybrid provocations, including airplane exercises and drones (UAVs), and doing them on land, water, and air. As the year ends, the 7th nuclear test has not been conducted, but all indications point to preparations being ready and timing now solely up to the discretion of Kim Jong Un.

Second, Kishida and Yoon promised that they would endeavor to resolve the issue of wartime forced laborers. After the November summit, an official from South Korea’s Presidential Office said, “the overall tone was that we should move more quickly, and that the two leaders should pay closer attention and lend further support to induce not only a resolution of the forced labor issue but also an improvement in South Korea-Japan relations.” Despite the two sides’ desire to make headway and put this issue of forced labor to rest by the end of 2022, the year ended without a breakthrough. A proposal that emerged in South Korea in the final months of 2022 entails a plan that does not involve compensations by Japanese companies, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Inc. or Nippon Steel Corp., and will instead use South Korean corporate donations. Many in South Korea including the forced labor victims oppose this proposed plan. There remain concerns that the Yoon government will push for a compromise with Japan. In Japan, there is no guarantee that a South Korean proposal will be accepted by members of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) who are skeptical of a deal with South Korea. Perhaps it is in this context that Aso Taro, vice president of the ruling LDP and a former prime minister, visited Seoul prior to the Kishida-Yoon summit on Nov. 2, and met President Yoon for 85 minutes on bilateral issues, including forced labor. According to Nikkei, Kishida wanted Aso’s visit to enable a bilateral summit between Japan and South Korea.

Figure 3 Members of a civic group seeking compensation from Japanese firms over forced labor during World War II and opposition lawmakers stage a rally to oppose the government’s reported resolution to the issue outside the National Assembly in Seoul. Photo: AP Photo/Ahn Young-joon

Third, Kishida and Yoon support each other’s vision for the Indo-Pacific region. Kishida shared Japan’s plan to announce a new “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” Plan in early 2023, to which Yoon responded by explaining to Kishida his own “Indo-Pacific Strategy of Free, Peace, and Prosperity.” Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs reported that “the two leaders welcomed each other’s vision for the Indo-Pacific and concurred on aligning their collective efforts in pursuit of a free and open Indo-Pacific, that is inclusive, resilient, and secure.”

It remains to be seen what “like-minded partners” will mean and how they will materialize in policy settings. However, it seems clear that both the Kishida and Yoon governments are willing to view each other as partners more than ever before, even in national security-related matters. For the first time since September 2016, South Korea and Japan began to normalize defense cooperation, with Japanese Vice Defense Minister for International Oka Masami participating in a vice defense minister-level talk with Korean counterpart Shin Beom-chul in Seoul. South Korea’s decision in late October to join Japan’s international fleet review—its first in 20 years to celebrate the 70th anniversary of its MSDF—wasn’t a guarantee, despite the increased tempo of trilateral cooperation and military exercises this year. Seoul initially missed the Oct. 12 deadline to indicate their participation; Tokyo confirmed on Oct. 25 that Seoul had not responded. Less than 10 days before the fleet review, South Korea decided to participate, citing the “grave security situation surrounding the Korean peninsula.”

In the end, South Korea sent a logistics support ship, the Soyang to participate, the first time the South Korean navy has participated in seven years (2015), and the second time since 2002. It’s important to note that South Korea was not invited to participate in a smaller fleet review in 2019, after conflict over the alleged December 2018 locked fire-control incident—the review was later canceled due to a typhoon. Kishida during the fleet review on Nov. 6 said, “We absolutely cannot allow nuclear and missile development by North Korea.”

As the year 2022 came to a close Yamaguchi Natsuo of Komeito, the junior party of Japan’s ruling coalition, visited South Korea and met with President Yoon. Yoon acknowledged the party’s efforts for improving bilateral relations including the issue of voting rights for ethnic Koreans residing in Japan and requested continued support. Yamaguchi emphasized the importance of trilateral cooperation among Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington to address North Korea’s missile and nuclear capabilities, adding that the party would make efforts to ensure that subsequent discussions of Japan’s national security strategies contribute to peace in the region.

Trilateral Cooperation

The year 2022 ended on a strong note for Seoul-Tokyo-Washington trilateral cooperation. The US, South Korea, and Japan issued a comprehensive trilateral cooperation document on the sidelines of the East Asia Summit on Nov. 13. The Phnom Penh statement outlined ways to “forge still-closer trilateral links, in the security realm and beyond” at “all levels of government.” It was unequivocal in reaffirming that a North Korean nuclear test would be “met with a strong and resolute response,” and that the three will work to strengthen deterrence, including sharing real-time North Korean missile warning data. The statement also reiterated the importance of trilateral cooperation on economic security, including launching a new trilateral dialogue on this critical issue. Lastly, in a veiled reference to China, the three countries also announced they will “stand as one against economic coercion.”

The three partners are coordinating trilaterally in other areas, including on sanctions on North Korea. On Dec. 2, the US lauded  “synchronized action” by the three to designate officials and entities associated with the North Korean nuclear and missile program as a demonstration of the “increased strength” of the trilateral relationship. The US, South Korea, and Japan sequentially announced unilateral sanctions against North Korea on the same day, targeting different entities and actors.

Poor Popular Support

The Kishida administration’s approval ratings in the final stretch of the year were not strong, falling to 25% in mid-December from 31% in mid-November, according to the Mainichi Shimbun. Mainichi Shimbun polls on Nov. 19 and 20 show that 43% of respondents wanted Kishida to “step down soon,” while only 14% said that they hoped he “stayed in office as long as possible.” Against the backdrop of revelations of LDP lawmakers’ connections with the Unification Church, by the end of December, Kishida witnessed four of his Cabinet members—Internal Affairs Minister Terada Minoru, Justice Minister Hanashi Yasuhiro, Economic Minister Yamagiwa Daishiro, and Reconstruction Minister Akiba Kenya—forced to resign their ministerial positions over scandals. The Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan—the largest opposition party—criticized the Kishida administration as “having almost collapsed.”

For the Yoon administration, his popularity has remained in the 30s for much of his presidency, but it slowly but gradually rebounded from 24% in early August to 41.1% in mid-December. Domestic politics remains too volatile for his administration to pursue a decisive Japan policy. Opposition party leader Lee Jae-myung of the Democratic Party called trilateral naval drills among South Korea, Japan, and the United States on Oct. 7, “an extreme pro-Japanese act.” Urging the Yoon administration to apologize for conducting the exercises, he claimed that “holding joint military exercises between South Korea, the US, and Japan can be interpreted as acknowledging Japan’s Self-Defense Forces as an official military.”

Japan finally lifted border restrictions after 2 years and 7 months in October 2022, and as many as 5,000 South Koreans traveled to Japan on the first day of lifted restrictions. South Korean airlines were quick to announce expansion of flights to Japan, including to Tokyo, Nagoya, Osaka, Fukuoka, and other cities. Regular ferry service between Fukuoka and Busan resumed in early November, creating more travel options and opportunities for people-to-people exchange.

Looking Ahead to 2023

In early 2023, as the Yoon government’s proposal for the wartime forced labor issue takes shape, South Korea-Japan relations will have an important window of opportunity to improve bilateral ties. Both Yoon and Kishida have key dates in early 2023—such as the G7 in Hiroshima in May 2023 (and maybe the World Baseball Classic in Japan in March) to showcase a breakthrough in this difficult, emotional, and politically unpopular issue. Judging from the gestures and signals in late 2022, there seems to be enough political will on both sides—Kishida and Yoon—to come to an arrangement that is acceptable for both. But domestic politics remains a big factor as both leaders struggle with low approval ratings. We are hopeful that the two countries will celebrate the 25th anniversary of the Korea-Japan Joint Declaration of 1998 in October 2023 in some meaningful way, especially as they strive to be global actors as well as closest neighbors.